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ABSTRACT
In in te rn a tio n al law, co-operation is a general concept applied in a variety of 
contexts. In the  context of the law of in tern a tio n al w atercourses, the general 
obligation to co-operate an d  the p rocedural ru les  it com prises have a  crucial 
role to play in the  im plem entation  of the  su b stan tiv e  princip les of equitable and  
reasonab le  u tilisa tio n  an d  of diligent prevention of tra n sb o u n d a ry  harm . The 
problem s lie in th e  identification of the scope of the  obligation, its specific 
con ten t, legal s ta tu s  an d  application.
The princ ipa l objective p u rsu ed  in th is  th esis  is to p resen t a  detailed 
exam ination  of th e  n a tu re , scope, specific con ten t, application, and 
consequences of non-com pliance with the obligation to co-operate in the 
p a rtic u la r  context of the  law of in te rna tional w atercourses, in order to 
co n trib u te  to the  clarification of th is  vague b u t fu n d am en ta l principle. To 
illu stra te  how  the  theories relating to the obligation to co-operate on 
in te rn a tio n a l w atercourses can  be tran sla ted  into concrete acts, several 
exam ples are  provided, including p lanned  w orks in a  b asin  S tate such  as 
dam s.
Due to the  variety  an d  the  n a tu re  of the  issu es  involved in the  context of 
in te rn a tio n a l w atercou rses, an  in terdiscip linary  ap p ro ach  w as adopted between 
law a n d  geography. This approach  perm its the  sh arin g  of insigh ts and  
inform ation, an d  a  bette r u n d erstan d in g  of several technical questions 
p resen ted  to th e  in terna tional lawyer w hen dealing w ith in ternational 
w atercourses.
The th esis  finally p resen ts  conclusions regard ing  th e  evolution and  
consolidation of th e  principle of co-operation, an d  a sse sse s  the feasibility of 
co nstruc ting  an d  securing  wider acceptance for a  m odel of co-operation and  the 
potential u tility  of su ch  a  model.
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G lossary  o f T ech n ica l T erm s
This glossary in c ludes term s adopted and  modified from different so u rces .1
A quiculture. The raising  or fattening of fish in enclosed ponds.
Aquatic eco sy stem . System  in which different o rgan ism s p resen t in w ater 
in te rac t w ith th e ir  environm ent th rough  a  cyclic in terchange of m ateria ls and  
energy. These include rivers, w etlands, estu a ries , an d  near-coast m arine 
ecosystem s.
Aquifer. A geological form ation, usually  perm eable, capable of storing 
groundw ater.
A tm ospheric w ater. W ater located in the atm osphere  as  cloud, rain , snow, fog, 
etc.
Barrage. B arrier co n stru c ted  across a  stream  provided w ith a  series of gates or 
o ther control m echan ism s to control the w ater surface level upstream , to 
regulate the  flow, or to divert w ater supplies into a  canal. This kind of s tru c tu re  
is u sually  bu ilt in a  flat land  across wide rivers; it does no t create a  storage 
reservoir an d  th e  w ater level is only raised  by a  few m eters.
Dam. A m an  m ade b arrier constructed  across a  river valley. The w ater is 
re ta in ed  an d  the w ater level is raised  significantly th u s  form ing a lake or 
reservoir beh ind  it. It m ay serve for, inter alia , flood control, hydro-electric 
power generation , w ater supply  and  san itation , an d  irrigation. The reservoir 
m ay be u se d  for recreation.
D ischarge. The volum e of river flow per u n it of tim e expressed  in cubic m etres 
per second or litres per second.
Drainage basin . C atchm ent area. A p articu la r geographical area  delim ited by 
the w atershed  an d  d ra ined  by a  drainage netw ork, u su a lly  considered the basic 
hydrological u n it.
E nvironm ental flow. W ater flow regime provided w ithin a  river, w etland or 
coastal zone to m ain ta in  the  ecosystem s and  the ir benefits w here there are
1 Mainly these are Thomas and Goudie (eds.)(2000); Briggs, et al. (1997); UNESCO/WMO (1992); ICOLD 
(1998) and (2003); the British Dam Society website at http: / / www.britishdams.org/about dam s/types.htm  
(last visited on 28.7.2007).
29
com peting w ater u se s  an d  w here flows are regulated. It is considered essential 
to river hea lth , econom ic developm ent, and  poverty alleviation.
Effluent. Liquid in d u stria l w aste, sewage, or fertilizers in solution discharged 
from in d u stria l p lan ts  into a river, stream  or lake.
Erosion. The w earing away of p art of the land  surface by the  action of wind, 
w ater, ice, or gravity.
E vapotranspiration. Release of w ater from the  soil to the  atm osphere by the 
p rocesses of evaporation and  p lan t transp ira tion .
Hydraulic head. The w ater p ressu re  due to the height of a  w ater colum n, i.e., 
the h igher the  reservoir w ater level is in relation to the  discharge point, the 
higher is its ou tle t velocity and  the  energy it contains.
Hydrography. Science th a t deals with the descrip tion  and  m easurem ent of 
open bodies of w ater, su ch  as oceans, seas, s tream s, rivers, lakes, reservoirs, 
etc.
H ydrology. Science th a t deals with the p rocesses governing the  depletion and 
rep lacem ent of the  w aters above and  below the land  surfaces of the E arth , their 
occurrence, c ircu lation  and  distribution , both  in tim e an d  space, their 
biological, chem ical an d  physical properties, their reaction with their 
environm ent, includ ing  the ir relation to living beings.
H ydrom eteorology. Study of the atm ospheric and  land  p h ases  of the 
hydrological cycle, w ith em phasis on the in terre la tionsh ips involved between 
precip ita tion , evapotransp iration  and  the drainage basin .
International W ater R esources. W ater in the n a tu ra l hydrological cycle 
shared  by two or m ore States.
Large dam . D am  w ith a  height of 15 m etres or m ore from the  foundation, or 
w ith a  height betw een 5 and  15 m etres, and  w ith a  reservoir volume of more 
th a n  th ree  million cubic m etres.
M inimum  annual flow. Least value of d ischarge in a  stream  during  a 
hydrological year.
M ulti-annual storage. Volume of w ater th a t can  be stored  in a reservoir to 
deal, partly  or fully, w ith variations in flow and  dem and  over m ore th an  one 
year.
R ehabilitation . Partial s tru c tu ra l and  functional re tu rn  to a  p re-d istu rbance 
state.
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R estoration . Process of recovery obtained by m an ipu la ting  hydrology, w ater 
quality, h a b ita t s tru c tu re  to a  p re-d istu rbance state.
River fragm entation  is the  in terrup tion  of the n a tu ra l flow of a  river by dam s, 
in ter-basin  tran sfe rs  or w ater w ithdrawal, and  ind icates the degree to which a 
river system  h a s  been  affected by m an.
Run-off. P art of precipita tion th a t appears as  s tream  flow. This occurs when 
the rainfall is very heavy and  the rocks and  soil canno t absorb  any m ore water.
‘Run-of-river* dam s. Dam s, su ch  as  weirs and  barrages, and  run-of-river 
diversion dam s, w hich raise  the  level of the w ater u p s tream  and  generate a 
hydraulic head  in the  river to divert some of the  w ater flow to a canal or power 
station.
Sed im ent. M aterial tran sp o rted  by w ater from the place of origin to the place of 
deposition. In w atercourses, sedim ent is the  alluvial m aterial carried in 
su spension  or a s  bed  load.
W atershed. The boundary  delim iting a  drainage b asin  usually  a t the land 
surface. However, th is  m ay not correspond with th e  subsu rface  boundary  of 
the basin , w hich is delim ited according to the w ater table as  the  phreatic  divide 
(UK). Also u sed  as  a  synonym  of drainage basin  or ca tch m en t a rea  (US).
Weir. Run-of-river dam , usually  a  low wall of stone, concrete or wicker, which 
m ay be u sed  for controlling the  upstream  w ater level or for m easuring  
discharge or for both.
W etlands. An a rea  of sa tu ra ted  soils which occurred  natu ra lly , such  as fen or 
m arsh es .
I n t r o d u c t i o n
You can never step into the same river, 
for new waters are alw ays flowing on to you.
Heraclitus (535 BC - 475 BC), On the Universe
1. I d e n t i f i c a t io n  o f  t h e  Prob lem
Over the cen tu ries, in te r-s ta te  relations have developed in order to share the 
fresh w ater from the  261 in terna tional w atercourses of the  w orld .1 The sharing 
am ong S ta tes of fresh w ater from in terna tional w atercou rses has, from time 
im m em orial, ra ised  complex legal questions, together w ith political and  
diplom atic issues. S ta tes, to m eet their needs, rely to a  greater or lesser extent 
on the fresh w ater available w ithin their territory. B u t fresh  w ater, a crucial 
n a tu ra l resource, flows natu ra lly  across political boundaries, th u s  requiring 
some form of in te rn a tio n a l regulation of the h u m an  u se s  of the w aters. Thus, 
the problem  of sh arin g  fresh  w ater h a s  often been a t the  centre of negotiations 
and  d isp u tes  due to geographical facts: S tates u se  rivers as  boundaries or are 
positioned differently in  relation to the w ater, e ither as  u p stream  or as 
dow nstream  S tates. This conditions the uses of the  w ater, and  consequently 
the legal positions adopted by individual S tates a t the  in terna tional level.
In ternational law, largely th rough  the law relating to in terna tional w atercourses 
and  in te rn a tio n a l environm ental law, h as  con tribu ted  to the developm ent of 
in te r-s ta te  rela tions by providing the m eans to deal w ith these  issues. Some of 
these  differences have been partially  solved by m eans of b ilateral or m ultilateral
1 Although there is no precise figure as to the num ber of in terna tional shared  rivers, mainly 
due to methodological problem s, some figures have been p u t forward. See, for example, Gleick 
(2000), 33. The term  ‘in ternational river b asin ’ was defined as  any  tribu tary  th a t crosses the 
political boundaries of two or more nations. Only perennial rivers, th a t is, those th a t flow all the 
time, were considered.
Due to geopolitical changes, the num ber of in ternational b asin s  h a s  increased since 1978, 
w hen a UN body listed 214 in ternational basins. See UN (1978).
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in terna tional agreem ents, w hilst m any problem s rem ain  the  centre of d ispu tes 
yet to be resolved.
Although n u m ero u s  in terna tional w ater trea ties have been concluded dealing 
specifically w ith tran sb o u n d a ry  w atercourses, m any in terna tional river basins 
worldwide are still wholly unregulated  or insufficiently regulated, and  
consequently  p rone to give rise to tension or to aggravate existing conflicts.
This s ta te  of affairs ra ises the question of w hether there  is an  obligation falling 
upon  S ta tes to co-operate w ith each o ther on certain  te rm s and  conditions.
Especially in the context of in terna tional w atercourses, several questions are 
raised  relating  to the  obligation of S tates to co-operate:
• Is a  sovereign S tate  lim ited in its u se  of fresh w ater w ithin its national 
territory?
• To w h at ex ten t does a  S tate have control of a  river the  spring of which 
does no t lie w ithin its boundaries?
• Does the  physical reality of rivers im pose on S ta tes  an  obligation to 
co-operate?
• W hat are th e  concrete obligations falling u pon  S ta tes as a  resu lt of the 
general obligation of co-operation?
• And w hat are the  consequences of non-com pliance w ith the obligation to 
co-operate?
Problem s of definition of the scope, content, and  application of the  obligation to 
co-operate th u s  occupy an  im portan t place in in te rna tional law and  practice. 
N onetheless, th e  detailed exam ination of th is  obligation in the  context of 
in terna tional w atercou rses h a s  been ra th e r neglected by w riters. The need for 
research  in th is  field w as acknowledged as  early as  1980:
The opposite to conflict is co-operation. In the flora of UN reports over recent years, 
cooperation and concerted action between men, between administrative units and 
ministries are called for in one way or the other. It is often not realised that it is not 
enough to call for cooperation -  the way such cooperation is to be brought about must 
be spelled in detail.2
2 W idstrand (ed.)(1980), 172.
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Vast lite ra tu re  ex ists in the form of studies, of a legal or o ther n a tu re , dedicated 
to specific river b as in s  or rivers, or addressing  p articu la r legal problem s related 
to in terna tional w atercourses. Most general trea tises  on the law of in ternational 
w atercourses or in te rn a tio n a l environm ental law refer to a  principle or general 
obligation to co-operate, bu t, ap art from the few stu d ies  on specific procedural 
obligations of S ta tes, these  stud ies often om it the legal im plications of the 
obligation to co-operate, notably the precise m ethod of com plying with it and 
the  legal consequences of non-com pliance. There is, to the a u th o r’s knowledge, 
no specific s tudy  dealing with the  precise identification and  application of the 
principle of co-operation in the context of the law of in terna tional w atercourses.
Hence, th is  s tu d y  a ttem p ts  to provide some insigh ts into our u n d erstan d in g  of 
the in terna tional law of co-operation and  to con tribu te  to the  clarification of the 
principle of co-operation in the context of in terna tional w atercourses, in the 
light of recen t treaty  provisions and  s ta te  practice, an d  th rough  the analysis of 
represen tative m odern  doctrine and  case law.
The general obligation of S tates to co-operate plays a  critical role in the 
im plem entation  of the  substan tive  principle of equitable and  reasonable 
u tilisation  an d  the  obligation no t to cause significant tran sb o u n d ary  harm , as 
well as  in th e  protection, preservation and  m anagem ent of w atercourses. 
Im plem entation of these  principles requires the  application of several 
p rocedural ru les, corollaries of the principle of co-operation, which may be 
com m on to all cases an d  m ore precise in content.
To illu stra te  how  the  theories relating to the  obligation to co-operate on 
in terna tional w atercourses can  be tran sla ted  into concrete acts, several 
exam ples are provided, nam ely those involving p lanned  w orks in a  basin  State. 
Com m on cases of p lanned  w orks which potentially cau se  tran sb o u n d ary  harm  
are those  of projects for the construction  an d  operation of dam s on 
in terna tional w atercourses.
This th esis  is an  a ttem p t to shed some light into a  still vague b u t fundam ental 
principle th ro u g h  an  in terdisciplinary  perspective betw een law and  geography.
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2. T he I n te r d is c ip l in a r y  A pp roach
The topicality of the  sub ject of co-operation in the context of in ternational w ater 
resources is obvious. Aware of global w ater problem s, the United Nations 
G eneral A ssem bly (UNGA) in its  M illennium D eclaration set as  developm ent 
goals on w ater ‘to halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the w orld’s people 
who are u n ab le  to reach, or to afford, safe drinking  w a te r’, as well as ‘to stop 
the u n su s ta in ab le  exploitation of w ater re so u rces’.3 The World Sum m it on 
S usta inab le  Developm ent, w hich took place in Jo h a n n e sb u rg  in 2002, 
re iterated  these goals in its  Plan of Im plem entation and  added the target of 
reducing by half, also by 2015, the  proportion of people w ithout access to basic 
san ita tion .4 The UNGA proclaim ed the year 2003 the In ternational Year of 
F reshw ater5 an d  the  period from 2005 to 2015 th e  In ternational Decade for 
Action,6 W ater for Life’,7 com m encing on World W ater Day, 22 M arch 2005.
To achieve these  goals there  is a need for co-ordinated action. The in ternational 
com m unity th ro u g h  governm ents, in terna tional o rgan isations and  agencies, in 
collaboration w ith NGOs and  the private sector, jo ined  efforts in order to 
prepare several pro jects of different n a tu re  and  to organise several in ternational 
events to ad d ress  global w ater issu es .8
In addition, several im portan t conferences have been tak ing  place in order to 
d iscu ss  all the  com plex issu es abou t and  su rround ing  w ater. This resu lts  from 
the  recognition over the p as t decade of existing an d  potential fresh 
w ater-related  problem s around  the globe and the conflicts th a t could arise if no
3 UNGA Resolution 5 5 /2 , of 8 Septem ber 2000.
4 The role of the UN, in its m any facets, should not be underestim ated . In 1993, the UNGA 
declared the 22 M arch of each year to be World Day for Water, following the recom m endations 
the UN Conference on Environm ent and Development (UNCED) se t forth in C hapter 18, on Fresh 
W ater R esources, of Agenda 21. See Resolution A /R E S /4 7 /193, of 22 Decem ber 1992.
5 UNGA Resolution 5 5 / 196, of 20 December 2000.
6 UNGA Resolution 5 8 /2 1 7 , of 23 December 2003.
7 Based on the title of the first UN World W ater Development Report W ater for People, W ater 
for Life’ (WWDR), a  periodic, com prehensive review of the sta te  of the world’s freshwater 
resources. The m ain goal of the decade is to have a greater focus on w ater-related  issues a t all 
levels and  on the im plem entation of w ater-related program s and  projects and ‘the furtherance of 
co-operation a t all levels’, in order to achieve the goals contained in Agenda 21, the UN 
Millennium Developm ent Goals and  the Jo h an n esb u rg  Plan of Im plem entation.
8 For the key events, see infra s .5.3.3. For an  exhaustive list of w ater-related events, see 
http: /  / w w w .unesco.org/w a te r/w ate r events, and  specifically for those events which took place 
in the am bit of the In ternational Year of Freshw ater, see http: /  / www.w ateryear2003.org .
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action w as tak en  on time. The program  ‘From Potential Conflict to Co-operation 
P oten tial’, p a rt of UNESCO’s World W ater A ssessm ent Program m e (WWAP), 
evidences th is .9
The a tten tion  paid  to the subject over the p as t few years is not of tran sien t 
im portance. The need  for S tates to avoid conflict an d  invest in co-operation is 
now a  com m on call.
D ue to the variety and  the n a tu re  of the issu es  involved in the context of 
in terna tional w atercourses, an  in terdisciplinary app roach  w as adopted between 
law and  geography in order to u n d e rs tan d  th e  k ind  of issues faced in 
negotiations. Different m ethodologies and  concep tual tools have proved 
valuable in a  field th a t could undoubted ly  benefit from a  com m on vocabulary 
and  fram ew ork of analysis. W hen dealing with river b as in  m anagem ent, it is 
widely accepted  th a t  it is necessary  to assu m e an  in teg ra ted  approach. This 
im plies a  scientific and  technical knowledge th a t goes beyond the u su a l legal 
field. This in terd iscip linary  approach  th u s  perm its the  sh arin g  of insigh ts and  
inform ation an d  a  be tte r u n d erstan d in g  of technical questions p resen ted  to the 
in terna tional lawyer w hen dealing with in terna tional w atercourses, especially in 
complex trea ty  negotiations. This approach facilitates m ore equitable, efficient, 
and  effective long-term  solutions. In fact, for an  in teg ra ted  approach, stud ies of 
an  in terd iscip linary  n a tu re  are required, notably of law and  both  physical and 
h u m an  geography, civil and  environm ental engineering, econom ics, political 
science, an d  in terna tional relations. For exam ple, quan tita tive research  is 
essentially  a  m ethodological approach using  geographical d a ta  and  sta tistics 
and  converting facts and  inform ation into a  form th a t is su itab le for scientific 
investigation, w hich in tu rn  produces, in the context of tran sb o u n d ary  rivers, 
an  im p o rtan t effect on in terna tional law by enabling  a greater depth  of 
knowledge an d  appreciation  of the various issu es  involved. This is particularly  
relevant to the  in terna tional lawyer, since the in tegra ted  m anagem ent of an 
in terna tional river or p a rt of a  river is based  on co-operation th rough  
consu lta tions an d  negotiations between the  riparian  S ta tes on the  basis  of 
scientific inform ation. Similarly, com m unication betw een lawyers and 
hydrologists, geom orphologists, engineers and  ecologists, to nam e ju s t  a few, is 
fundam ental in th e  context of jo in t river com m issions, or other jo in t
9 See infra s .5.3.4.
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in stitu tional m ech an ism s.10 The ru les and  principles of in ternational law 
applicable to in te rn a tio n a l river b asin s derive, for the m ost part, from sta te  
practice and  from the agreem ents reached th rough  negotiations between the 
basin  S tates.
The need for in terd iscip linary  work in th is field h a s  been recognised and  there 
are now several recen t exam ples. Of particu lar reference are the  first UN World 
W ater D evelopm ent Report: W ater fo r  People -  W ater fo r  Life  (WWDR), and  the 
second UN World W ater D evelopm ent Report: W ater a S h ared  R esponsibility  
(WWDR 2), the  m ost im portan t outcom e of the WWAP, a  jo in t project involving 
23 UN specialized agencies and  o ther entities, w hich provide a  com prehensive 
perspective of global w ater problem s an d  p resen ts  num erous 
recom m endations.11
A nother recen t exam ple of interdisciplinary  w ork is found in the report 
p repared  by the  World Com m ission on Dam s, an  a d  hoc  independent body 
estab lished  in 1998 by different in terest groups, su ch  as  the  World 
C onservation Union and  the  World Bank. This report recognises the need for 
co-operation am ong S ta tes in sharing  the w aters an d  the benefits derived from 
those in te rn a tio n a l riv e rs .12
A lthough the  repo rt is no t a  legally binding docum ent, it addresses the 
principles of in te rn a tio n al w ater resources law concurren tly  with issues of a 
technical, financial, environm ental and  social n a tu re , th u s  bringing them  for 
the  first tim e to the in terna tional fora debating dam s on in terna tional rivers.13 
Thus, in tern a tio n al w ater lawyers partic ipate in the  decision-m aking process 
on dam s together w ith engineers, geographers, econom ists, financial analysts, 
and  affected people.14
10 For a criticism  of the norm al limited scientific knowledge am ongst legislators, policy-makers, 
and  the jud iciary  an d  its consequences, see Eckstein (1998), 1.
11 See UN/WWAP (2003) and  (2006). The WWDR is targeted to those involved with 
w ater-related policies an d  investm ent strategies as well as different professionals. The target 
audience includes scientists, hydrologists, w ater experts and  adm inistrators and 
decision-m akers a t local, national, regional, and in ternational levels, w ater educators, 
hydrological tra iners, s tu d en ts  in hydrology and other w ater-related subjects.
12 See infra s. 1.5.2.4 and  4.3.1.7.
13 Salm an (2001b), 288.
14 Salm an (2001a), 1504.
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The advantages of interdisciplinary  work should  no t be u n d erestim a ted ,15 since 
the in te rn a tio n al society’s approach to w ater resou rces development, 
protection, an d  m anagem ent based  on fundam ental principles of national and  
in terna tional law m ay strongly determ ine the effects on m an and the 
environm ent.
3. The M eth o d  A d o p ted
The thesis  is s tru c tu red  in six chapters.
C hapter 1 begins by explaining the  relevant term inology an d  approaches in the 
context of in tern a tio n al w atercourses. It provides an  overview of the in teraction 
of the different u se s  of w ater, and  considers their im pact upon  the w ater 
environm ent an d  how they cause tension betw een riparian  S tates. It also 
ad d resses the  m ost serious causes for conflict an d  how these  th re a ts  may be 
transform ed in to  ac tua l co-operation, for exam ple, th ro u g h  the  construction  
and  operation of dam s.
C hapter 2 ad d resses  the  principle of co-operation from a  theoretical 
perspective. It begins w ith an  in troduction to the evolution of in ternational 
w ater law. In order to u n d e rs tan d  the extent to w hich sovereign S tates have the 
right to u se  th e  fresh w ater available w ithin their boundaries, the different 
theories are explained and  discussed.
The relationsh ip  betw een the principle of co-operation and  o ther im portan t 
general princip les of in terna tional law are th en  exam ined with the purpose of 
determ ining the scope of the obligation to co-operate in the context of 
in terna tional w atercourses.
C hapter 3 focuses on the  concept of co-operation in general and  in the context 
of the  law of in terna tional w atercourses in particu lar. This concept is exam ined 
through  in te rn a tio n a l legal in stru m en ts, th rough  the  relevant case law, and 
through  the  definitions presen ted  by au tho rs. In addition, there is a
15 On the need for interdisciplinary work on in ternational w ater-related m atters, see, e.g. Wolf 
(1998), 263.
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com parative analysis  of the role and  application of the  du ty  to co-operate in 
relation to o ther fields related  to the protection of the  environm ent, nam ely the 
law of the sea, an d  biodiversity.
C hapter 4 exam ines the individual procedural ru les, w hich reflect the principle 
of co-operation, and  are relevant to the law applicable to in ternational 
w atercourses, as  well as their evolution, prim arily in conventional State 
practice.
The p rocedural ru les u n d er scru tiny  include the  obligation to exchange da ta  
and  inform ation regularly, the obligation of notification com prising the duty  to 
notify p lanned  m easu res, environm ental im pact assessm en ts , and  the 
provision of em ergency inform ation, the obligation to en te r into consultations, 
and  the  obligation to negotiate in good faith. The exam ination  of these rules 
com prises a  critical analysis of the relevant in terna tional conventions, treaties 
and  o ther legal in stru m en ts , and  of the relevant in terna tional judicial 
decisions, in order to identify their m ain s tren g th s  and  critical w eaknesses, as 
well a s  their im portance outside specific treaty  regimes.
C hapter 5 p re sen ts  a  categorisation of the forms an d  levels of co-operation, and  
analyses the  variety  an d  im portance of in stitu tional m echanism s and  jo in t 
com m issions. In addition, it exam ines the role of in terna tional organisations in 
increasing  co-operation regarding in terna tional w atercourses and  the problem 
of its  im plem entation. Finally, it d iscusses the feasibility of constructing  and 
securing w ider acceptance for a  model of co-operation concerning in ternational 
w atercourses an d  its potential utility.
In C hapter 6, th e  m ost pertinen t issu es of non-com pliance and  state 
responsibility  rela ted  to the obligation to co-operate are exam ined. The study 
also refers to the  recen t work of the ILC on prevention of transboundary  
dam age from h azard o u s activities.
Finally, the  th esis  provides a  syn thesis and  conclusions regarding the  evolution 
and  consolidation of the  principle of co-operation.
1
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  W a t e r c o u r s e s :  
G e n e r a l  I s s u e s
Water is likely to become a growing source o f tension and 
fierce competition between nations, i f  present trends continue, 
but it can also be a catalyst for co-operation.
Kofi A n n a n , fo rm e r UN S e c re ta ry -G e n e ra l, 2 0 0 2
The relationsh ip  betw een geography and  law concerning in ternational 
w atercourses is evident. On the one hand , the  physical reality  of transboundary  
rivers requ ires in terna tional law: since ‘w ater know s no fron tiers’1 and 
frequently  flows across different S tates, it requires law to im pose lim itations on 
S ta tes’ control over the  w ater w ithin their territory, and  ‘as  a  com m on resource 
it dem ands in te rn a tio n a l co-operation’2 betw een them . On the o ther hand, 
n a tu ra l fea tu res  su ch  as  in ternational rivers are often u sed  to m ark  territorial 
frontiers betw een S tates, while the peoples in either side share  use  of the river 
w aters. Indeed, the  in ternational law of w atercourses reflects the relevance of 
geographic charac teris tics  of river system s in its  evolution. W hat is no t so 
evident, however, is the extent to which in terna tional law obliges S tates to 
co-operate on these  tran sb o u n d ary  w atercourses.
The p resen t ch ap te r add resses some of the in terd iscip linary  issu es  related to 
the principle of co-operation. In order to u n d e rs tan d  th e  role of legal ru les in 
regulating  righ ts an d  obligations over w ater, the ch ap te r begins by referring to 
the som etim es difficult transition  from geophysical facts into legal terminology 
or vice-versa. Following an  overview of the in teraction  of the  different u ses  of 
the w ater an d  the ir im pact upon  the environm ent, the ch ap ter addresses the
1 Principle 12 of the 1968 E uropean W ater Charter.
2 Id.
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m ost com m on cau ses  for tension  between riparian  S ta tes  th a t m ay lead to 
conflict. It th en  focuses on the possibility of transform ing  existing and  future 
th re a ts  into opportun ities  to co-operate, in p articu la r the  case of dam s.
1.1 B asic  C o n c e p ts
One of the  reaso n s  underlying the som etim es problem atic relation between 
law yers and  policy m akers on the one hand , and  sc ien tists  and  engineers on 
the  other, is the fact th a t, generally speaking, they  do not share  the sam e 
terminology. This probably m eans th a t they have difficulty in understand ing  
one a n o th e r’s disciplines, and, as a  consequence, the  com m unication between 
them  m ay a t tim es becom e strained. The need for a  com m on terminology is 
m anifest, in p articu la r w hen w ater reso u rces’ p lann ing  is the subject of 
dom estic regulation  or negotiations between S tates.
Over the  cen tu ries, and  especially since the 1960s, new  approaches have been 
adopted and  legal terminology h as  evolved in ‘an  a ttem p t to em brace a 
geophysical reality  ab o u t w hich there is increasing  knowledge and, therefore, 
abou t w hich the  legal system  m u st be more realistic to be effective’.3 As with 
the law of th e  sea, the  conversion of geographical facts into legal concepts, and 
occasionally the  o ther way around, reflects the som etim es difficult relationship 
betw een legal an d  scientific concepts.4
The problem  of u sin g  concepts both in geography an d  law m ay be illustrated  by 
the expression shared natural resources. F u rth e r to the  norm al m eaning 
arising from the  underly ing  physical reality th a t a  n a tu ra l resource, such  as 
fresh w ater or m igratory species, is shared  by two or m ore S tates, the 
expression h a s  been argued to have legal im plications.5 The In ternational Court 
of Ju s tice  (ICJ) h a s  asse rted  in two cases th a t ‘sh ared  re so u rces’ and  ‘common 
property ’ bo th  reflect the concept of falling outside the  exclusive control of one
3 Cohen (1975), 236.
4 A good exam ple is provided on the determ ination of the ou ter lim its of the continental shelf. 
For a study  on the interface between scientific and legal concepts in th is area, see Cook and 
Carleton (eds.)(2000).
5 See generally on the legal s ta tu s  of na tu ra l resources, Birnie and  Boyle (2002), 137-144, and 
particularly  on sh ared  n a tu ra l resources, a t 139-141.
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S tate .6 In addition , in the Territorial Jurisdiction o f  the  In ternational Com m ission  
o f the R iver O der  case, the Perm anent C ourt of In ternational Ju stice  (PCIJ) 
in troduced  the concept of ‘com m unity of in terest of riparian  S ta te s ’ in relation 
to w atercou rses,7 m eaning th a t S tates m ay exercise sh ared  rights over the 
w ater reso u rces  in  question.
The expression  ‘shared  n a tu ra l reso u rces’ w as u sed  in a  few United Nations 
G eneral Assem bly (UNGA) resolutions, such  as the  1973 UNGA Resolution on 
Co-operation in the Field of the Environm ent, and  Article 43 of the 1974 
C harter of Economic Rights and  D uties of S ta tes.8 Both resolu tions affirm the 
need for S tates to co-operate on the basis  of inform ation exchange and  prior 
consultation.
These reso lu tions led to the adoption in 1978 of the  ‘Principles of C onduct in 
the  Field of the  E nvironm ent for the G uidance of S ta tes  in the Conservation 
and  H arm onious Utilization of N atural Resources S hared  by Two or More 
S ta te s ’ by the  Governing Council of the U nited N ations Environm ent 
Program m e (UNEP).9 Principle 1 recognises th a t sh a red  n a tu ra l resources are 
subject to specific obligations of co-operation and  equitable utilization. In the 
UNGA, however, the  Principles were trea ted  only as guidelines and 
recom m endations for fu tu re  treaties Svithout prejudice to the binding n a tu re  of 
those ru les already recognized as such  in in terna tional law ’. It should  be noted 
th a t bo th  reso lu tions and  the Principles fail to specify w hich n a tu ra l resources 
should  be considered as  sh a red .10
More recently  the  expression ‘shared  n a tu ra l re so u rces’ w as initially adopted by 
the In ternational Law Commission (ILC) in  its  draft articles on the 
non-navigational u se s  of in terna tional w atercourses. B ut it h a s  not received the 
general agreem ent of S tates, some of whom opposed the u se  of the concept 
because its  legal im plications were no t clear. The reference to th is  concept was 
th en  elim inated from the  draft articles on the  g rounds th a t greater legal
6 In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case (1951), and over twenty years later in the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction  case (1974). B ut these two concepts also differ: com m on property ‘refers primarily to 
areas beyond national ju risd ic tio n ’. See Birnie and Boyle (2002), 139-143.
7 For an  analysis of the case, see infra s .3.2.6.2.
8 Several W estern S ta tes voted against this resolution or abstained .
9 For an  analysis of th is docum ent, see e.g. Lammers (1984), 335-8.
10 Birnie and  Boyle (2002), 140.
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certain ty  h ad  been achieved w ithout it while the loss of the concept would not 
interfere w ith the determ ination  of the rights and  obligations of the co-basin 
S ta te s .11
The controversy su rround ing  the adoption of these  UNGA resolutions, the 
unw illingness of S ta tes  to adopt the 1978 UNEP Principles on Shared N atural 
R esources a n d  th e  language then  used , as well as the  rem oval of the expression 
from th e  ILC D raft Articles points to the conclusion th a t S tates tend  to reject a 
vague notion w hich im poses on them  not only lim its to their sovereignty bu t 
also a  level of co-operation th a t they are no t p repared  to undertake.
Nevertheless, the  te rm s ‘sh a re d ’, ‘in te rn a tio n a l’ an d  ‘tran sb o u n d a ry ’ in relation 
to w ater resou rces will be u sed  in terchangeably  th ro u g h o u t th is  thesis. They 
m ay refer to surface, ground, or atm ospheric w aters. The te rm s Svatercourses’ 
and  ‘rivers’ will also be u sed  synonymously.
A lthough rivers flow n a tu ra lly  w ithout regard to frontier dem arcations, the laws 
th a t are applied to them  differ. The distinction betw een national and 
in ternation al rivers is therefore relevant. National rivers flow exclusively 
w ithin the territo ry  of one State, are un d er the ju risd ic tion  of th a t State, and 
are regu lated  prim arily  by dom estic law. Conversely, in terna tional rivers flow 
across or serve as  boundary  between two or m ore S ta tes  and  are also regulated 
by in terna tional law. Clear as th is  distinction seem s to be, two im portant 
considerations shou ld  be m ade. Firstly, as regional organisations, such  as the 
E uropean Union or the Southern  African Developm ent Com m unity (SADC), 
increase their activity in regard to dom estic m a tte rs ,12 and  the num ber of 
treaties regulating  w ater affairs grows rapidly, even na tional rivers tend  not to 
be regulated  exclusively by national laws. Second, as we will see in the next 
section, the  relevance of th is  distinction is limited. If a  drainage basin  approach 
is adopted, even in the case of national rivers the  in te re sts  of co-basin S tates 
m u st be tak en  into account.
11 1986 McCaffrey’s Second Report, 103, para  74. Nevertheless, in 2002 the ILC decided to 
include in the program m e of its work the topic entitled ‘Shared N atural R esources’. Although this 
only focuses on tran sb o u n d ary  groundw aters, and in the fu ture on oil and  na tu ra l gas, the 
suitability of the title h a s  already raised concern in the UNGA Sixth Com mittee a t its 57th session 
in 2002. See Special R apporteur Y am ada’s First Report on S hared Natural Resources, UN 
Doc.A/CN.4 /5 3 3 , p a ra .4.
12 Notably in the context of w atercourses through the 2000 EC W ater Fram ework Directive, 
and  the 2000 SADC Revised W ater Protocol.
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A nother d istinction  th a t arguably h as  legal significance is th a t between 
su ccess iv e  and con tigu ou s rivers.13 Successive rivers are those th a t flow 
across the  territo ry  of two or more States, w hereas contiguous or boundary 
rivers are those  th a t  separate  two or more S tates. The relevant ru les of 
in terna tional law  apply to both successive and  contiguous rivers.14 Lipper 
considers th is  d istinction  as having no significance in in terna tional law .15 While 
there  is a  geographical difference between them , i.e., in a  successive river each 
S tate h a s  to tal physical control over its course, and  in a  contiguous river th is is 
sh a red  betw een the  S tates, th is difference seem s to have limited legal 
significance. In both  cases the course of the river touches the land  territory of 
the riparian  S tates, and  in some cases the river m ay flow th rough  the territory 
of two S ta tes an d  a t some point serve also as a  border betw een them .
1 .2  T he R e le v a n c e  o f  D if fe r e n t  A p p r o a c h e s
Through tim e different approaches have been adopted in the context of w ater 
re so u rces .16 Traditionally, S tates approached in terna tional w ater resources 
issu es  by considering  their u ses  of the w aters, su ch  as navigation or 
hydro-electric power, th u s  focusing m ainly on the surface w ater of rivers and 
lakes sh ared  by two or m ore S tates, in order to accom m odate the conflicting 
in te rests . B ut the increasing knowledge of the  hydrological system  led to a 
change in approach , by including not only the m ain  w ater channel and  the 
w ater con tained  therein , b u t also all trib u ta ries  and  groundw ater, and  
eventually the  whole catchm ent a re a .17
This new  approach  is based  on the concept of the  drainage or river basin, or 
catch m en t. This consis ts  of a  particu lar geographical a rea  of land  delimited by
13 See generally McCaffrey (2001), 41-4.
14 This is the view of several com m entators from an early time, such  as Sm ith (1931), 155-6, 
and Lipper (1967), 17, who also points to the fact th a t the PCIJ in the River Oder case, while 
d iscussing  general fluvial law, drew no distinction between the two categories of rivers. There 
seem s to be no opposition to th is view.
15 Lipper (1967), 17.
16 See generally McCaffrey (2001), 33-45; Teclaff (1996); B ruhacs (1993), 24-40; and  Bourne 
(1969).
17 McCaffrey (2001), 34.
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the w atershed  w here the w ater is concen trated  an d  flows into the drainage 
netw ork, i.e., the  system  of river and  stream  ch an n e ls  in a  specific basin  or 
a re a .18 It includes, for instance , surface w aters, su ch  as  the m ain  channel and 
all trib u ta ries, lakes, etc.; groundw aters, except if the aquifer system  is 
confined or im perm eable; atm ospheric water; estuaries , etc. In geography, a 
drainage b as in  h a s  long been considered the  basic hydrological u n it for 
p lann ing  an d  m anagem ent p u rp o ses .19
This ‘u n ita ry  theo ry ’ considers the whole drainage basin  as a u n it for 
m anagem ent purposes, as opposed to the regulation of one or more w ater uses 
separately. In the 1930s, Sm ith defended the adoption of th is  un itary  theory 
into the legal field. This w riter considered th a t ‘the  law gradually moves 
tow ards the  tru e  conception of each river b asin  as  an  indivisible physical 
u n it’.20 This app roach  is supported  by m ost au th o rs  an d  h a s  been favoured by 
declarations of in terna tional conferences21 and  by learned  societies.22 Although 
s ta te  practice did no t previously support th is  theory ,23 m odern treaties are 
increasingly adopting  it, m ainly in specific trea tie s ,24 an d  is now widely used  in 
dom estic legal system s. Thus, the concept m ay be considered a  resu lt of the 
progressive developm ent of in ternational law. B ut w hat im plications does th is 
approach  have for in terna tional law? And how does it differ from other 
approaches?
The 1966 H elsinki Rules of the International Law A ssociation (ILA) used  the 
concept of ‘in terna tional drainage b as in ’ as  the underly ing  legal unit. Article II 
defines it a s  ‘a  geographical area  extending over two or m ore S tates determ ined 
by the w atershed  lim its of the system  of w aters, including surface and
18 Note th a t ‘ca tch m en t a re a ’ m eans drainage basin and w atershed in American English, and 
w atershed in British English m eans ‘divide’ in American English.
19 However, it should  be noted th a t the surface boundary  of the drainage basin might not 
correspond with the subsurface limit and  this may have legal im plications. McCaffrey (2001), 25.
20 Smith (1931), 20.
21 E.g. the 1972 Stockholm  Declaration and the 1992 UNCED Rio Declaration. It is the 
approach recom m ended by the Panel of Experts on the Legal and  Institu tional Aspects of 
In ternational W ater R esources Development. UN (1975), 48.
22 The IDI’s 1961 Salzburg Resolution and  the 1979 A thens Resolution on Pollution; and the 
ILA’s 1966 Helsinki Rules, 1982 Montreal Rules on W ater Pollution, and  2004 Berlin Rules.
23 See C aubet (1991), 35, and  Birnie and  Boyle (2002), 299-301.
24 E.g. in South  America, the 1978 Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation; in Asia, the 1995 
Mekong River Agreement; and  in Europe, the 1994 D anube Convention. See infra s .3.2.5.
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underg round  w aters, flowing into a  common te rm in u s ’. Its scope, however, 
generated som e controversy.
The advantages of adopting a  drainage basin  app roach  are num erous. It is 
based  on a  hydrological u n it th a t allows an optim al utilization and  development 
of the whole b as in  while accom m odating different in te rests  on the uses of the 
w aters;25 its  physical geography provides a  certain  u n it th a t allows a simpler 
app roach  th a n  o thers, easier to study and  to p lan th a n  larger areas; it provides 
a  convenient fram ew ork for p lanning  and  m anagem ent, th a t is, its 
com prehensive scope allows a  m ore efficient environm ental m anagem ent of 
tran sb o u n d ary  w aters, bo th  in w ater utilization and  pollution control. More 
recently, the  approach  h a s  been used  on a  project-by-project basis to promote 
ecosystem  resto ra tio n .26
N evertheless, opposition to the adoption of the drainage b asin  as a u n it has 
been voiced.27 As in terna tional river basins do no t correspond to political un its, 
the m ain  reaso n s for th is  opposition relate to the fact th a t  the  hydrological un it 
m ay n o t alw ays be advantageously considered as a  legal or econom ic u n it.2*.
In order to avoid the  controversy raised  by the wide concept of ‘in ternational 
drainage b a s in ’ u se d  in the  1966 ILA Helsinki Rules, the  ILC, in its work on the 
law of non-navigational u ses  of in ternational w atercourses, reform ulated the 
concept an d  opted for the  expression in ternational w atercourse system . This 
expression w as adopted since it had  long been u sed  in agreem ents on 
in terna tional w atercourses to refer to a river, its  trib u ta ries  and  connecting 
canals .29
In the  1997 UN W atercourses Convention, th e  expression ‘in ternational 
w atercou rse’ is defined in Article 2(b) as ‘a w atercourse, p a rts  of which are
25 See, e.g. com m ent to Article II of the 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules, 485.
26 Teclaff (1996), 376 and  the exam ples given therein.
27 See, e.g. B ourne (1969).
28 Bourne argues th a t neither state practice nor in ternational or federal cases support the 
proposition th a t a principle of legal unity  of the drainage basin  may be deduced from its physical 
geography. He also argues th a t an  in ternational drainage basin  canno t be treated as an economic 
un it separated  from the national economies of the co-basin S tates. He proposes th a t a broader 
approach should  be adopted, such  as  of an  ‘a rea’, ‘regional’ or national approach, and that 
in ternational law favours a ‘flexible form ula’. However, he recognises the advantages of adopting 
a drainage basin  approach. Bourne (1969), 15, 19, 21-2.
29 See, e.g. the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.
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situ a ted  in different S ta te s ’.30 This is based  on the concept of ‘w atercourse’ 
which is defined in Article 2(a) as  ‘a system  of surface w aters and  groundw aters 
constitu ting  by v irtue of their physical re lationsh ip  a  u n ita ry  whole and 
norm ally flowing in to  a  com m on te rm in u s’.31
Special R apporteu r McCaffrey considers the concept of drainage basin  
‘functionally  equ ivalen t’ to th a t of w atercourse system , and  justifies the choice 
m ade by the  ILC as follows:
... a term that is scientifically accurate will be of little use in the field of international 
law if it is not recognised in the practice of States. And it m ust be remembered as a 
practical matter that lawyers and governments, like Humpty Dumpty, are used to 
defining words to mean whatever they want them to m ean.32
A lthough only 32 S ta tes replied to the ILC’s questionnaire , m ore th an  half were 
generally in favour of adopting the concept of drainage b asin  as the basis for 
the ILC’s work. M ost of these  S tates were dow nstream . Conversely, m ost of the 
S tates opposing the  u se  of the concept were u p s tream  or h ad  a predom inantly  
u p stream  position. This seem s to reflect the concern by these  S tates th a t the 
u se  of th is  concept m ight involve regulation of land  territory  besides th a t of the 
w aters.33
B ut o ther geographical approaches have been adopted for purposes of 
m anaging in terna tional rivers in in ternational legal in stru m en ts .
The eco sy stem  approach to w ater m anagem ent w as developed from the 
outcom e of the  1972 Stockholm  Conference on the  H um an Environm ent by 
North A m erican s ta te  practice34 and  by some in terna tional conferences.35 But 
th is  led to different in terp reta tions as to w hat an  ecosystem  approach  consists
30 The term  ‘p a r ts ’ here include the m ain stream , tribu taries, headw aters, or any aquifer 
receiving w ater from or supplying w ater to portions of the w atercourse system  situated  in other 
States. McCaffrey (2001), 40-1.
31 This last p h rase  also raised controversy. See McCaffrey (2001), 39-40.
32 McCaffrey (2001), 36.
33 Ibid., 36-37
34 Namely on the G reat Lakes-St. Lawrence drainage basin. See Teclaff (1996), 378, and 
references therein.
35 Id. For the em ergence of th is approach in the context of in terna tional w atercourses, see 
McIntyre (2004).
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of. The concept ‘ecosystem ’ som etim es referred to the  channel and  banks of the 
river, a t o thers  tim es to the w atercourse netw ork, and  som etim es even to the 
whole river b as in .36 The 1993 UNECE G uidelines on the Ecosystem  Approach 
in W ater M anagem ent a ttem pted  to clarify the  issue  by using  the concept of 
river basin . It recom m ended th a t the whole catchm en t a rea  be considered as a 
n a tu ra l u n it  for ecosystem s-based w ater m anagem ent (para. 1). It further 
proposed th a t  a  river basin  be considered an  ecosystem s continuum  when 
covering a  large territory  com prising different types of ecosystem s (para. 5).
This approach  w as also considered in the 1992 D ublin UN Conference on 
W ater and  the Environm ent, and  in the 1992 Rio de Jan e iro  UN Conference on 
Environm ent and  Developm ent (UNCED). Principle 1 of the 1992 Dublin 
S tatem ent associa tes  it w ith an  in tegrated  or h o listic  water resources  
m anagem ent approach. It declares th a t ‘[f]resh w ater is a  finite and  vulnerable 
resource, essen tia l to su sta in  life, developm ent and  the environm ent’, and  
explains th a t  ‘[s]ince w ater su s ta in s  life, effective m anagem ent of w ater 
resources dem ands a  holistic approach, linking social and  economic 
developm ent w ith protection of n a tu ra l ecosystem s. Effective m anagem ent links 
land and  w ater u se s  across the whole of a ca tch m en t a rea  or groundw ater 
aquifer.’ Again, th e  river b asin  is ‘the m ost appropriate geographical en tity ’37 for 
planning, m anagem ent, protection of the ecosystem s, an d  the resolving of 
w ater d ispu tes. The 1992 Dublin S tatem ent fu rth er associates these 
approaches w ith su sta inab le  developm ent.38 However, it falls short of indicating 
w hat exactly an  in tegrated  or holistic approach m eans.
The 1992 A genda 21 followed the sam e line an d  specified th a t an  integrated 
w ater resou rces m anagem ent ‘should be carried  o u t a t the level of the 
catchm ent b asin  or su b -b as in ’, while tak ing  into account existing 
in ter-linkages betw een surface and  groundw ater.39 B u t it con tribu ted  to the 
clarification of the  m eaning of an  in tegrated  approach  by adding th a t one of its 
principal objectives is ‘to prom ote a dynam ic, interactive, iterative and 
m ulti-sectoral approach  to w ater resources m anagem ent . . . th a t in tegrates
36 Teclaff (1996), 379.
37 1992 Dublin S tatem ent, Action Plan, paragraph on Resolving W ater Conflicts.
38 Para, on Protecting Aquatic Ecosystems.
39 Ch. 18.9.
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technological, socio-economic, environm ental an d  h u m an  health  
considera tions’.40
These two in terna tional docum ents have no binding force.41 Nevertheless, their 
influence in na tio n al and  in ternational policies,42 in dom estic legislation43 and 
in terna tional tre a tie s44 is ind isputable.45 Teclaff su m m arises  the issue in the 
following term s:
Within the past quarter of a century, however, environmental concerns have reinforced 
the basin concept and transformed it from a plan for water resources exploitation into a 
blueprint for holistic management and use of a unique natural unit.46
There is no one exact definition of the concept of in tegra ted  w ater resources 
m anagem ent. Several definitions have been p u t forw ard,47 and  based  on these 
it is possible to conclude th a t integrated m anagem ent includes different forms 
of in tegration, notably  Tor all u ses  of w ater, w ith a  view to m axim ising the 
global benefits an d  reducing conflicts am ong those who depend on and 
com pete for th is  finite and  vulnerable resource; of economic, social and
40 Id. 18.9 (a).
41 See also, e.g. Article 6 and  com m ent of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules, which considers it 
essential for realizing the susta inab le  use of waters and other resources; and  Principle 7 of the 
2002 ILA New Delhi D eclaration of Principles of In ternational Law Relating to Sustainable 
Development, w here the principle of ‘integration’ is recognized as  fundam ental to sustainable 
developm ent generally.
42 The UN Com m ission on Sustainable Development (CSD), created in December 1992 to 
ensu re  effective follow-up of UNCED, as well as to m onitor and  report on im plem entation of 
agreem ents a t the local, national, regional and in ternational levels, also recom m ended an 
integrated or holistic approach to water resources m anagem ent and  conservation of the basins at 
the different levels. See UN D oc .E /C N /1 7 /1994/L.5 (1994). In ternational financial institu tions 
are also institu ting  increasingly stringent requirem ents for integrated water resources 
m anagem ent. The Inter-Am erican Development Bank, for example, s ta tes  in its Strategy fo r  
Integrated W ater R esources M anagem ent th a t ‘Eventually, conformity with an  integrated national 
water resources m anagem ent strategy based on the river basin  as  the m anagem ent un it will be a 
condition of all loans for w ater-related projects on a case-by-case b as is ’. Inter-American 
Development B ank (1998), 14.
43 E.g. in Portugal, Decree-Law No.4 5 /9 4 , Diario d a  Republica  4 4 /9 4 , Series I-A, of 22 
February 1994, which regulates the w ater resources planning process and  the elaboration and 
approval of w ater resources plans.
44 See, e.g. the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention, or Article 5(j) of the 1999 Protocol on W ater 
and  Health.
45 Agenda 21 and  the Rio Declaration were adopted by more th an  178 Governm ents a t UNCED.
46 Teclaff (1996), 359.
47 E.g., it h as  been defined as the m anagem ent of surface an d  groundw ater in the qualitative, 
quantitative and  ecological sense from a m ultidisciplinary perspective, and  focused on the needs 
and requirem ents of the society a t large regarding water. For a detailed exam ination of the 
concept, see van Hofwegen (2000), and van Hofwegen and  Ja sp e rs  (2006). See also the technical 
study of the Inter-A m erican Development Bank (1998), 14-19, which adopts a sim ilar definition.
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environm ental in te rests , bo th  of the direct u se rs  of w ater and  of society at 
large; of all aspects  of w ater (quantity, quality and  tim e of occurrence) which 
have influence on its u ses  and  users; of the different p h ases  of the  hydrological 
cycle; a t the level of river basins, aquifers, or in terconnected  w ater system s; of 
w ater dem and  an d  w ater supply; of water, land and  o ther related resources and  
ecosystem s’.48
It is clear from the above th a t the adoption of the drainage or river basin  as a 
geographical and  legal u n it reflects the recognition of the  in terdependence of 
basin  S ta tes and  the need for some form of co-operation. This concept has been 
used , for instance, a t the  regional level in the EC W ater Fram ew ork Directive.49 
The evolution of the concept and  its adoption reflect the degree of difficulty in 
transposing  a  hydrological reality into a legal concept. On the  other hand , 
increasing geographical knowledge is reflected in the developm ent of legal 
concepts.
1 .3  C o m p e t in g  D em a n d s  o f  F resh  W ater U ses  and  
U se rs  and  T heir  Im p a ct  u p o n  th e  Water
E n v ir o n m e n t
1 .3 .1  N a v ig a tio n
For cen turies, and  un til the first decades of the tw entieth  century, navigation 
was the m ost im p o rtan t m eans of transpo rt, and  its u se  for trade was vital and  
u n d erstan d ab ly  h ad  an  enorm ous im pact in the  econom ies of S tates. It was in 
the context of navigation th a t the issues relating to righ ts an d  du ties of riparian  
S tates first appeared.
48 C ircular of the Network for Cooperation in Integrated W ater Resource M anagem ent for 
Sustainable Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, UN/ECLAC, No.24, August 2006, 
1, available a t h t t p : / /w w w .eclac.org /drn i/ (last visited on 15.1.2007).
49 See, e.g. Pream ble p a ra .(13) and  (35), Article 2(13), which defines river basin , and Article 2, 
pa ra .(15), which defines ‘river basin  d istrict’, the m ain u n it for m anagem ent of river basins.
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Historically, navigation w as the m ost significant u se  of in ternational 
waterw ays. This m ean t th a t its use  took precedence over all o ther u se s .50
This m ay be illu stra ted  by the 1921 B arcelona Convention and  S ta tu te  on the 
Regime of Navigable W aterways of In ternational Concern. Although adm itting 
an  exception in  p arag rap h  6 in the cases where navigation had  very small 
im portance an d  w hen the State in question could ‘justify  its  action on the 
g round of an  econom ic in terest clearly greater th a n  th a t of navigation’, Article 
10(1) provided the rule th a t
‘1. Each riparian State is bound, on the one hand, to refrain from all the measures 
likely to prejudice the navigability of the waterway, or to reduce the facilities for 
navigation, and, on the other hand, to take as rapidly as possible all necessary steps 
for removing any obstacles and dangers which may occur to navigation.’
B ut w ith a rap id  population growth and  as the needs from industry  
developm ent an d  technology progressed, non-navigational u ses  of waterways 
increased, th u s  dim inishing the pre-em inence once given to navigation.51 This 
shift in approach  is evidenced in several in terna tional in stru m en ts , notably 
Article VI of th e  1966 ILA Helsinki Rules. This Article s ta te s  th a t ‘A use  or 
category of u se s  is n o t entitled  to any inheren t preference over any other use  or 
category of u s e s ’.
Similarly, Article 10(1) of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention provides th a t 
‘[i]n the absence of agreem ent or custom  to the contrary, no use  of an 
in terna tional w atercourse enjoys inheren t priority over the  o ther u s e s .’ B ut in 
th is  case the ILC w ent fu rther and  added in p arag rap h  2 th a t in the event of a 
conflict betw een the  u ses, th is  should be resolved according to the principle of 
equitable and  reasonable  u tilisation  and  the obligation n o t to cause significant 
harm , an d  th a t  vital h u m an  needs should never be com prom ised.
In fact, th is  app roach  to the  question of conflicting u ses  follows s ta te  practice. 
A lthough there  is no rule of in ternational law prohibiting S ta tes from agreeing 
to accord priority to navigation over other u ses, or indeed to any  one use over
50 For an  overview of the historical evolution of the legal protection of the different water uses, 
see infra s .2.1.2.
51 Com m entary to Article VI of the 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules.
51
another, n u m ero u s exam ples exist th a t illu stra te  the  decline in relative 
im portance of navigation or even the prioritisation of any one use  over the 
o th ers.52
The m ain  practica l problem  with th is  approach is th a t of the application of the 
principle of equitab le  and  reasonable u tilisation .53 For in stance , when riparian  
S ta tes do no t share  a particu larly  friendly relationship , the complex 
determ ination  of w hat is equitable and  reasonable, th a t is, the need for 
consideration  of all u ses, c ircum stances and  relevant factors, its discussion, 
and  possibly the conclusion of a  new agreem ent seem s m ore difficult. Although 
the flexibility of the  principle allows for negotiations, these  would take place 
probably m ore effectively with th ird  party  in terven tion .54
One exam ple of a  problem atic situation  associated  w ith the  com patibility of 
w ater u ses  is th a t of the relationship  between A rgentina, Brazil and  Paraguay, 
the rip a rian s  of th e  P arana  River b asin ,55 w hich is the m ost im portan t river in 
the P ra ta  system . Navigation is still a  very im portan t u se  in the basin , 
especially for A rgentina, for geographical reasons, the  m ain  beneficiary of this 
use. Its priority  h a d  never been questioned before the 1960s. B ut the  need for 
developm ent an d  th e  production  of electricity led Brazil to construc t num erous 
dam s on in te rn a tio n a l rivers.56 The issue of com peting u se s  w orsened because 
A rgentina feared th a t  navigation would be affected by Brazilian projects and  it 
would place the  th ree  riparians on an  unequal footing in  term s of hydro-electric 
power generation. This is because the geographical s ituation  and  the boundary 
line favoured the Brazilian Itaipu project u p s tream  over A rgentinean projects 
dow nstream , notably  due to the volume of river flow needed for the dow nstream  
projects.
52 E.g. Article 9 of the 1995 Mekong River Agreement.
53 See infra s .2.3.4.
54 McCaffrey (2001), 50.
55 It covers ab o u t 890,000 km 2 in Brazil, 565,000 km 2 in Argentina, and 55,000 km 2 in 
Paraguay. Most of its a rea  is located in Brazil. For abou t 190 km it serves as boundary between 
Brazil an d  Paraguay, un til it reaches the Iguagu River. This confluence is the point of 
convergence of the territories of Argentina, Brazil, and  Paraguay.
56 Today Brazil h as  built 594 dam s, Argentina 101, and  Paraguay 4 dam s. World Commission 
on Dam s (2000), Annex V, 374. The m ain purposes for building large dam s have been 
hydropower generation and  flood control.
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In the  1960s an d  70s, the w ater policy of regional S ta tes changed and 
negotiations led to bilateral and  m ultilateral agreem ents focusing on 
hydro-electric power production, then  considered the essen tial use  of the 
resources for econom ic and  development purposes. In m ost cases, the treaties 
regulating th is  u se  also considered other u ses  linked to the projects, such  as 
irrigation, an d  navigation .57
Having negotiated  and  concluded the 1973 Treaty of Itaipu with Paraguay, 
Brazil w as accused  of deliberately choosing a  location to dam age Argentinean 
p rospects and  to enhance the economic and  political dependence of Paraguay 
by following a  geopolitical expansionist and  im perialist strategy .58 B ut in the 
p ast decades all ripa rian  S tates have decided as a  m a tte r  of policy to invest 
heavily on hydro-electricity. Thus, a t p resen t, Paraguay  totally depends on 
hydro-pow er as  the  source of electricity; Brazil relies heavily w ith 97,4% of its 
energy deriving from hydro-power; and  A rgentina generates from hydro-power 
44,7%  of its  to tal electricity production .59
1 .3 .2  N o n -n a v ig a tio n a l U ses
The n a tu re  of non-navigational u ses  of the w aters varies. There may be 
agricu ltural, econom ic or commercial, as well as  dom estic and  social uses. 
A gricultural u se s  include irrigation, such  as w ater supply  for livestock and to 
grow crops, drainage, aquiculture , and  effluents; econom ic and  commercial 
u ses  include electric power generation, w hether hydro-electric, nuclear or 
conventional, in d u stria l uses, such  as tim ber floating, effluents, or in 
industries, su ch  as  m ineral or oil; dom estic an d  social u se s  include the supply 
of w ater for m unicipal u se  and  for san itation  p u rposes, effluents, and for 
recreation, su ch  as  fishing, swimming, or w ater sports.
Most m ajor w ater-related  problem s encountered  today60 resu lt from rapid 
population growth, w hich in tu rn  leads to industria lization  as well as
57 E.g. the 1973 Treaty of Itaipu.
58 C aubet (1991), 30. The three S tates eventually reached an  agreem ent on the Parana River 
Projects in 1979.
59 Gleick (1999), 278.
60 See generally UN/WWAP (2003) and (2006).
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u rb an isa tio n , land  u se  change, food insecurity , h igher energy requirem ents 
and  th u s  to a  co n sta n t increase in w ater dem ands for agriculture, industry , 
recreation and  tourism , and  different u rb an  lifestyles.
F u rth er expanding  econom ic activity and  poor irrigation practices endanger 
w ater resou rces, w hich are often already overloaded w ith dangerous industrial 
chem ical effluents and  raw  sewage. A large percentage of w ater used  is 
depleted, th a t  is, no t re tu rn ed  to the servient catchm ent; the rem ainder is 
re tu rn ed  to rivers, lakes or coastal w aters as  w aste w ater of varying quality. 
The resu lt is w ater pollution and  environm ental degradation such  as loss of 
biodiversity. In addition, fresh w ater ecosystem s are also affected by reduced 
and  altered flows and  by in frastruc tu re  construction .
Hence, the u se s  of fresh w ater ra ises two d istinct, yet by their n a tu re  
necessarily  in terconnected , issues with which w ater m anagem ent m u st deal: 
w ater quality an d  w ater quantity. Thus, the protection of w ater resources m u st 
involve a  complex of activities covering both  aspects. These include activities for 
the prevention, control and  reduction of w ater pollution, such  as the 
m onitoring of w ater quality and  m easurem ents against eu trophication, and  
specific activities aga inst industria l, therm al, and  accidental pollution, the 
control and  reduction  of m unicipal w aste w ater d ischarges and  its treatm ent, 
the control of d ischarges containing radioactive m aterial, and  m easurem ents 
related  to w ater levels and  flow rates, erosion control, an d  against overuse and 
pollution of groundw aters.
Since the essen tia l problem s of w ater quality centre on the environm ental 
im pact caused  by h u m an  use  of the rivers, the  core issu e  is the linking of 
susta inab le  developm ent to the qualitative a ttrib u tes  of w ater supply, especially 
the control of pollution. These concerns have been the  object, for example, of 
E uropean  Union legislation, and  progressively of m ore bilateral and  m ultilateral 
trea ties.61
The problem  of S ta tes sharing  quan tum  h as  often been a t the centre of 
negotiations an d  d isp u tes  due to geographical features: S ta tes are positioned 
differently in relation  to the w ater, either as u p s tream  or as  dow nstream  States.
61 E.g. the 1993 CE Lugano Convention.
54
This conditions the  u ses  of the water, and  consequently  the legal positions 
adopted by individual S tates a t the in ternational level.62
1 .4  C a u se s  for C o n f l ic t  R e -e x a m in e d
The need  for co-operation is evident with 145 S ta tes having territory w ithin 
in te rna tional basins: 22 of them  in their entirety, and  33 with more th an  95% 
of their territory .63 From the 261 in ternational basin s  in the world, 19 are 
shared  betw een five or m ore riparian  S tates, the  D anube being the m ost 
challenging, w ith 17 co-riparians.
Conflicting in te rests  over w ater resources can becom e a serious cause of 
tension and  m any recen t stud ies on the global w ater crisis and on 
environm ental security  have focused on the po tential for conflict in 
in terna tional b a s in s .64
1 .4 .1  G r e a te s t  T h r e a ts
Among the  factors and  circum stances th a t alone or com bined can trigger 
tension  betw een S ta tes are w ater scarcity, w ater pollution, unequal w ater 
d istribu tion , w ater extrem es, such  as floods and  d roughts, and  the building of 
m ajor developm ent works such  as dam s.
The lack of clean fresh w ater or access to it -  associated  w ith poverty -  h as  led 
to political in stab ility  and  occasionally to violence. D isputes over w ater have 
occurred w ithin national borders, generally betw een religious, ethnic, or tribal 
groups, different w ater u se  sectors and  s ta te s  or provinces.65 B ut as w ater 
quan tity  d im inishes and  its quality deteriorates, in terna l p ressu res  and 
instability  m ay becom e regional and  escalate into in terna tional d isputes.
62 See infra s. 1.4.2, and  s .2.2.
63 Wolf, e t al. (1999).
64 E.g. Gleick (1993) and  (1999).
65 Wolf (2002), 3.
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D isparities betw een riparian  S tates in relation to the level of economic 
developm ent, in fras tru c tu ra l capacity or political orien ta tion  m ay complicate 
in terna tional w ater resources m anagem ent and  developm ent, and  for th is  
reason  negotiations m ay be difficult.66 Existing trea ties  an d  institu tions are at 
tim es considered  inefficient or ineffective, th u s  causing  tension  in diplom atic 
relations.
A recen t s tu d y  reached  the conclusion th a t the in stitu tio n al capacity w ithin a 
basin , w hether w ater m anagem ent institu tions or o ther trea ty  arrangem ents, or 
generally friendly relations with its  neighbours are as  im portan t, if not more 
im portant, th a n  the physical aspects of the system .67 Furtherm ore, tension 
between rip a rian s  occurs w hen the  rate of change w ithin a  basin  exceeds the 
institu tional capacity  to absorb the change. T hus, th e  m ost significant 
ind icators of potentia l conflict are related to extrem ely rap id  changes, w hether 
in stitu tional or in the  physical system.
The m ost rap id  institu tional changes relate to ‘in te rn a tio n a lised ’ basins, i.e., 
those w hich u sed  to be national b u t are abrup tly  divided betw een two or more 
S tates. This is the  case w ith the Amu Darya and  Syr D arya Rivers which 
becam e rivers sh a red  am ong five different S ta tes -  Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
U zbekistan, T urkm en istan , and  K azakhstan -  after th e  d issolution of the Soviet 
Union.
As to the  physical system , the m ost rap id  changes are frequently the 
developm ent of a  large dam  or diversion project, w hich m ay bring about a wide 
variety of consequences, including tran sb o u n d ary  harm . In th is  case, if a  jo in t 
in stitu tion  or m echanism  exists and  if the S ta tes are engaged in friendly 
relations, the  adverse or negative effects of the  project m ay be mitigated; 
w hereas if there  is no institu tional arrangem ent and  S tates in teract with some 
hostility, the  project m ay create or aggravate tension  or give rise to conflict.
66 See infra s. 1.4.3.
67 Wolf (2002), 9.
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1 .4 .2  U p strea m  v. D o w n strea m  S ta te s :  th e  C o n tin u in g  
P r essu re
In ternational rivers flow through the territory of two or m ore S tates and, more 
often th a n  not, are conveniently u sed  to m ark  the  borders between them . But 
the sam e ru le s  of the in ternational law of w atercourses apply to both 
con tiguous an d  successive rivers. This is because any action taken  by a State 
to modify the  n a tu ra l w ater regime m ay have repercussions in other p arts  of 
the  w atershed . The potential consequences m ay be felt no t only on the 
principal course of the river, b u t also on the entire system  of tribu taries in the 
catchm ent a rea .68
Two or m ore S ta tes m ay have jurisd iction  over portions of a  geographical area 
which co n stitu tes  the  catchm ent area  for a single river. In the absence of a 
co-operative approach  to the developm ent of the river basin , one or more of 
these S ta tes m ay be placed a t a  disadvantage. W ater control projects, such  as 
flood protection w orks, dam s, locks and  weirs, or soil conservation, in one 
country  m ay adversely affect the  territory or w ater u se s  of ano ther through 
w hich the sam e river flows. D isposal of sewage or in d u stria l w aste into a river 
by an  u p s trea m  State, or the  transfer of w ater from one basin  to another, may 
adversely affect o ther S ta te ’s dom estic w ater supply, irrigation requirem ents, 
power generation, an d  so forth. The w ithdraw al of groundw ater in one State 
m ay reduce the  available riverine w ater in ano ther S tate. Hydrological system  
interconnectivity  is such  th a t the use  by a riparian  S tate of the  w atercourses 
conditions o ther riparian  S ta te ’s use  and  developm ent of its  resources.
In a n u m b er of these cases the works and  conditions dow nstream  may 
adversely affect u p s tream  S ta tes.69 B ut in m ost cases it is the  upper S ta te ’s 
actions or om issions th a t have a  larger im pact dow nstream . Thus, it is usually  
the dow nstream  S tate  th a t h as  greater in terest in co-operating through jo in t 
p lann ing  for the  drainage basin , as it m ay suffer the  consequences in case of 
an  u p s tream  S ta te ’s p lanning  with poor or no regard  to the  in te rests  and  needs 
of the dow nstream  State. However, the dow nstream  State m ay also benefit from
68 For river basin  m anagem ent issues, see generally Newson (1997).
69 For instance, by preventing or limiting not only navigation, b u t also fish migration, tim ber 
floating, and  by causing  floods, siltation, and  spread of insects or o ther transm itte rs  of disease. 
For a description of these cases, see the 1982 Schwebel’s Third Report, 101-2, paras. 146-52.
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the increased  value resu lting  from the u p stream  S ta te ’s works, such  as dam s 
to m inim ise irregu lar flow dam age, and  th u s  the u p s tream  State m ay ask  in 
some cases for com pensation for the benefits provided from the works of 
regularising the  d ischarges which improve the  conditions dow nstream . 
Hydraulic developm ents also alter the n a tu ra l w ater flow regime of the 
w atercourse, reducing  the average an n u a l flow, dim inishing the seasonable 
variation of the  flow, altering the time of occurrence of extrem e flows, reducing 
the  im pact of floods, and  im posing n o n -n a tu ra l d ischarges.
The m odification of the flow regime leads to the  alteration  of the velocity and 
depth  of drainage, of the  tran sp o rt of sedim ent and  morphology of the bed, of 
the tem peratu re  and  quality of w ater, and  th u s  affects the  aquatic ecosystem. 
Therefore, in some in stances, it is critical th a t the  u p p er riparian  State ensures 
the discharge of a  m inim um  flow during  the  year, in m ost cases an 
environm ental flow. The principal difficulty w ith th is  is to reach  an agreem ent 
betw een the  rip a rian s  on the  figures for the m inim um  flow. This consists of 
defining the  levels of alteration  of the n a tu ra l w ater regime considered 
acceptable, while tak ing  into account the im pact on the fluvial ecosystem s th a t 
the alteration  will i n d u c e . 70 In addition, a large n u m b er of w atercourses suffer 
from highly variable seasonal and  an n u a l flow, th u s  m aking co-operative efforts 
a t the m anagem en t level crucial for achieving an  optim al u tilisation of the 
river’s w aters to the  benefit of all riparian  S tates, while using  the w ater in a 
susta inab le  m anner.
Due to having control over the flow, it is the u p p er riparian  th a t has, in m ost 
c ircum stances, a  m ore powerful position to negotiate w ith the lower riparians 
over the non-navigational u ses  on the w atercourse concerned. Interestingly 
enough, the  opposite occurs in relation to navigation. In o ther words, it is the 
lower riparian  th a t  controls navigation.71
In the dry season , the w ater m ay be retained  in the  reservoirs of the upstream  
dam s. In the  rainy  season, there m ay be d ischarges w hich are of high flow in a 
sho rt period of time. This is the reason  why negotiations frequently prescribe 
w hat to do in extrem e circum stances. In the case of significant d ischarges from 
u p stream  dam s, for instance  in the case of floods, a  previous agreem ent may be
70 Bearing in m ind the level of uncertain ty  still existing in th is area, especially as to quantum .
71 McCaffrey (2001), 46.
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required or a t leas t advance notice. In the case of d rough ts, the w ater should 
not be fully re ta ined , and  it m ay be argued th a t a t least the  environm ental flow 
should  be guaran teed .
O ther factors aggravating the ongoing tension  betw een upstream  and 
dow nstream  S ta tes  include the evaporation of w aters from rivers, long-term  
shortage of w ater, soil salination, m ism anagem ent or inefficient irrigation 
schem es, dependence on sophisticated technology for developm ent, w ater flow 
obstruc tions in w atercourses, shallow river restric tions, the reception of 
effluents, aquifer pollution, and  the lack of a  su sta in ab le  cyclical re-utilisation 
of p articu la r rivers.
In the case of the Incom ati b a s in , 72 as with some o ther basin s  in the African 
continent, d isas te rs  caused  by extrem e floods and  d rough ts  are very frequen t . 73  
These c ircum stances s tress  the need for basin-w ide co-operation in its  different 
forms, for in stan ce  th rough  effective exchange of real-tim e inform ation in order 
to m itigate the  effects from floods.
1 .4 .3  D ip lo m a c y  a n d  B arg a in in g  Pow er
In negotiations, the  in te rests  the S tate w ants to pro tect will determ ine the level 
of its  involvem ent. Control over the headw aters, or ac tu a l control over a large 
proportion  of the  river flow, its economic power and  development, or the 
dependence of a  S tate  on a  particu lar dam  or series of dam s to satisfy its needs 
(whether in th e  form of electricity generated by hydro-pow er, irrigation, w ater 
supply an d  san ita tio n  for populations or navigation) will lead the  S tate to adopt 
a  certain  position  a t the  negotiating table. The position of S tates as  upstream  
or dow nstream  is also critical to the strategy they adopt in negotiations. States 
m ay choose to develop closer co-operation if they  have already developed 
friendly relations. B ut the  opposite is also true. If S ta tes have essential national 
in terests  to p ro tect an d  a  history of d ispu tes  or even of conflict, the 
developm ent of a  sh a red  w ater regime and  closer form s of co-operation may
72 Shared between South  Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique, the lowest State.
73 Such as  the floods of February 2000 or last y ea r’s prolonged drought in southern  and 
central M ozambique with more th an  800,000 people estim ated to be particularly  at risk.
59
a ss is t the build ing of bridges, which in tu rn  m ay improve sta te  relations 
overall.
The G anges-B rahm apu tra  river basin, for exam ple, is hom e to an  estim ated 
400 million people. Little regional co-operation h a s  existed, in particu lar 
concerning crucial issues, such  as  the way to allocate w ater flows, to address 
the  often devasta ting  floods, or to utilize the hydro-pow er potential of the 
u p s tream  S tates. After decades of discussions, the rip a rian s  repeatedly failed to 
reach  ag reem en t . 74 For decades, India h as  refused to negotiate sim ultaneously 
with Nepal and  B angladesh on the u se  and  developm ent of shared  water 
resources. By relying only on bilateral negotiations, India can  adopt a  different 
position w hen negotiating with Nepal or B angladesh since its in terests  change 
with its position in relation to the w atercourse (upstream  or downstream ). A 
m ultilateral negotiation would expose th is  inconsistency.
The F arak k a  barrage w as built by India in the  late 1960s and  early 70s, 
w ithout consu lting  o ther riparians, across the river G anges up stream  from the 
border w ith B angladesh, w ith the purpose of diverting w ater into the Hooghly 
River for irrigation an d  to improve navigation. B ut the  dam  caused  serious 
effects on agricu ltu re  and  food production in B angladesh as it affected the 
flows in  the  dry season. Following the independence of B angladesh several 
tem porary  agreem ents were concluded. B ut it w as only in 1996 th a t India and  
B angladesh signed the  Treaty on Sharing the G anges W aters a t F arakka which 
specifies w ater allocations of the Ganges in norm al and  dry periods, stipu lates 
ru les regarding the  operation of the F arakka B arrage, and  creates a Jo in t 
Committee to observe and  record a t F arakka the  daily flow in different 
locations . 7 5  Any difference or d ispute no t resolved by the  Jo in t Committee is to 
be referred to the  Indo-B angladesh Jo in t Rivers Com m ission and  if necessary  
to the two G overnm ents. In addition, the Parties recognised ‘the need to 
co-operate w ith each  o ther in finding a  solution to the long-term  problem  of 
augm enting  the  flows of the G anga/G anges during  the  dry seaso n ’ (Article VIII), 
and  agreed to conclude w ater sharing  agreem ents concerning other common 
rivers (Article IX).
74 See also infra s .5.3.2.
75 See Salm an and  Uprety (1999) and (2002).
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The reso lu tion  of th is  im portan t difference, which h ad  persisted  for decades, 
created an  atm osphere  for d iscussing and  for reach ing  agreem ents on other 
w ater resources issues, and  in relation to o ther rivers . 7 6  However, the option for 
b ilateral negotiations w ith no m ultilateral ta lks will continue to prevent an 
in tegrated  an d  river basin-w ide w ater resources m anagem ent approach.
A nother exam ple is th a t of the Incomati river b a s in , 77 located in sou theast 
Africa. C om pared to o ther in ternational river b asin s, it is relatively small with 
an  a rea  of ab o u t 46,700 Km2. Its drainage area  is sh ared  between the Republic 
of South  Africa (28,600 Km2, 61%), the Republic of M ozambique (15,600 Km2, 
33%), and  the Kingdom of Swaziland (2,500 Km2, 5% ) . 78 As developm ents of 
w ater resources in the basin  continue and  w ater u se  intensifies, issues of both 
w ater quan tity  an d  quality need increasing atten tion  and  should  be discussed 
and  negotiated betw een the S tates concerned. In the p a s t decade, w ater 
scarcity h a s  becom e m ore severe with w ater ab strac tio n s  reaching  very high 
levels and  the  effects of d roughts more evident. B ut floods also occurred, with 
dram atic effects, such  as those in the year 2000. T hus, issues such  as 
in ter-basin  tran sfe rs  of w ater, which have taken  place w ithout agreem ent or 
com pensation to the  dow nstream  users , or the need to m ain ta in  a m inim um  
flow, su ch  as  th a t  from South  Africa a t the border w ith Mozambique, are 
fundam ental an d  require negotiation between all riparian  States.
The different bargain ing  power of the riparians stem s from a  range of factors, 
such  as  the  different stage of development and  consequent relative economic 
power, the  different position in relation to the w atercourse and  in frastructu ral 
capacity, an d  the  adverse w eather conditions of recen t years.
The political h isto ry  of each riparian  State as well as the  evolution of their 
in terna tional relations, in particu lar on w ater-related  m atters , have been over 
the last decades quite u nstab le  a t tim es. M ozam bique experienced the 
transition  from P ortugal’s overseas territory to an  independen t dem ocratic 
State. South  Africa h a s  lived th rough  the end of the aparthe id  regime. These
76 Ibid. (1999), 341-2.
77 For a detailed study, see Carmo Vaz and  van der Zaag (2003). For an  overview of the main 
issues relating to South  Africa’s transboundary  rivers, see e.g. T urton (2005).
78 These riparian  S ta tes also share other basins, nam ely the Umbeluzi an d  the Maputo basins.
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changes con tribu ted  to the form ation of S ta te s ’ w ater policies and  legislation as 
well as  re la tions w ith their riparian  neighbours.
The th ree Incom ati basin  S tates are a t p resen t m em bers of The 
Com m onwealth. After its  first dem ocratic elections in 1994, M ozambique was 
adm itted  in 1995.79 Although it h as  experienced a  rem arkable economic 
recovery in th e  p a s t decade, it still is one of the  least developed and  poorest 
coun tries  in th e  world. Among the key problem s in the  b asin  is the dependency 
of M ozam bique, the  dow nstream  riparian, on the  w ater from international 
rivers, particu larly  the Incom ati . 80 In addition, the lack of national institu tional 
capacity h inders  effective integrated m anagem ent. This is reflected, for 
instance, in the lim ited d a ta  available.
By con trast, S outh  Africa, which rejoined The Com m onw ealth in 1994, has 
plenty of resou rces and  is one of the 50 w ealth iest countries in the world. 
However, beyond four developed areas, there  is no t m uch  developm ent and 
poverty still exists. With th is  large income gap, S outh  Africa is considered a 
developing State. It is also Africa's largest energy producer and  consum er.
As a form er B ritish  pro tectorate which becam e independen t on 6  Septem ber 
1968, Sw aziland is today an  absolute m onarchy. This sm all landlocked State, 
where subsistence  agricu lture occupies more th a n  80% of the population, is 
heavily dependen t on South  Africa. About 90% of its  im ports come from South 
Africa, to w hich Swaziland sends more th an  60% of its exports. Some of the 
m ost difficult problem s a t present, and  likely to continue in the future, include 
soil depletion, d roughts, and  occasional floods. In 2002 alone, m ore th an  25% 
of the population  needed em ergency food aid due to drought.
In 1999, d iscussions began between M ozambique, S outh  Africa, and  Swaziland 
to reach  an  in terim  agreem ent for the Incom ati and  M aputo basins, th a t is, an 
agreem ent in tended  to be in force un til o ther m ore com prehensive w ater 
agreem ents are reached  for both  the M aputo and  Incom ati basins. After a long, 
and  occasionally difficult, process of negotiations, and  the  resu lts  from a jo in t
79 M ozambique is the only m em ber which h as  never had  any constitu tional relationship to 
either the British Em pire or a Commonwealth member, b u t it had  the support of its neighbouring 
States.
80 See generally on M ozambican water resources,
http: /  / w w w .fao .o rg /ag /ag l/ag lw /aq u asta t/co u n tries /m o zam b iq u e /.
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basin  study, the Tripartite Interim  Agreem ent on the Protection and 
S ustainab le  Utilization of the W ater Resources of the  Incom ati and  M aputo 
W atercourses w as s igned . 81 An existing jo in t body, the  Tripartite Perm anent 
Technical Com m ittee, is given the responsibility  of im plem enting the 
agreem ent. Since all S ta tes are m em bers of the SADC, they are bound by the 
2000 Revised W ater Protocol, a  fram ework convention . 82 Even so, m any 
concrete an d  problem atic issues are still to be resolved.
1 .5  T ra n sfo rm in g  T h rea ts  in to  O p p o rtu n it ie s :  
C o -o p era t io n  in P r a c t ic e
1 .5 .1  In tr o d u c to r y
While tension  is inevitable w hen dealing with in terna tional w ater resources 
m atters , w ater h a s  proved th roughou t history  to be m ore often a factor 
con tribu ting  to the  im provem ent of in ternational s ta te  relations th an  one giving 
rise to or aggravating ten sio n s . 83 Hence, w ater-related  tension  between S tates 
offer an  im p o rtan t window of opportunity  for streng then ing  s ta te  relations and 
regional co-operation.
This is particu larly  relevant since the idea th a t ‘the  w ars of the [21st] century 
will be fought over w ater ’84 seem s to have gained ground. The choice of words 
here w as certainly no t casual. The reference to w ars alone h as  undoubtedly  
served the purpose  of raising in ternational a tten tion  and  aw areness of potential 
conflicts an d  w ater-related  problem s which could be prevented were S tates 
p repared  to co-operate pre-emptively.
N evertheless, the p a tte rn s  of conflict resolution point no t to war b u t to the 
conclusion of trea ties  and  the creation of jo in t in s titu tio n s  which have proved 
to be resilient over tim e and  during periods of tense  relations. In fact, ‘[t]he
81 The 2002 Incom aputo Agreement.
82 See infra s .3 .2.4.5.
83 This is the conclusion of several studies. See, e.g. Wolf (1998), or H assan  (2003).
84 First a ttrib u ted  to Ism ail Serageldin, Former Vice-President of the World Bank, who in 1995 
stated  ‘If the w ars of th is cen tury  were fought over oil, the w ars of the next century  will be fought 
over w ater’. This quote h a s  been used  repeatedly in different d iscourses.
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choice exists for tran sb o u n d ary  riparians between un ila te ra l developm ent th a t 
will lead to a  crisis or institu tional capacity-building and  diplom acy ’. 85 W ater is 
a resource th a t, ‘by its  very n a tu re , tends to induce even hostile co-riparians to 
co-operate, even as  d ispu tes  rage over other is su e s ' . 8 6 This m ay be illustrated  
by the  P erm anen t Indus River Commission which w as created  by the 1960 
Indus W aters T reaty and  continued its work th ro u g h o u t several w ars between 
India and  P a k is ta n ;87 or the Committee for Co-ordination of Investigations of 
the Lower M ekong basin , established in 1957 by the  four lower rip a rian s , 88  
w hich functioned th roughou t the Viet Nam war, and  only in 1975, a t the end of 
the war, in te rru p ted  its work while its  S ecretariat con tinued  operating . 89
1 .5 .2  T h e P a r a d ig m a tic  C ase o f  D am s
Several u ses  of fresh  w ater, such  as hydro-pow er generation and  irrigation, 
require the  p lanning, design, construction  and  operation of dam s. Dam s raise 
m any im portan t issu es  -  particularly  in in terna tional settings -  th a t are less 
likely to arise  in o ther w ater m anagem ent contexts: environm ental problem s, 
such  as pollution; social problem s, such  as d isp lacem ent of populations; 
financial problem s, su ch  as those related to conservation and  paying for the 
dam  itself; cu ltu ra l problem s, such  as the conservation of cu ltu ra l heritage 
sites. These and  o ther potential im pacts of dam s m ay be felt on the  territory of 
m ore th a n  one State, and  m ay require co-operation in accordance with 
in terna tional legal obligations.
Although th e  benefits of dam s are num erous an d  widely acknowledged, there 
h as  been criticism  of dam  effects, especially those of large d a m s . 90 Even though 
dam s aid regional developm ent, by providing w ater an d  energy, by creating jobs
85 Wolf (2002).
86 Ibid., 3.
87 E.g. the second K ashm ir war of 1965, the Indo-Pakistani w ar of 1971, the continued Siachen 
conflict which began in 1984, and the Kargil war of 1999. For the Indus basin case, see infra 
s.5.3.2.
88 The S ta tu te  of the Committee was adopted a t Phnom -Penh, on 31 October 1957. UN (1963), 
267-70.
89 For the evolution of institu tional co-operation on the Mekong, see e.g. Le-Huu and 
Nguyen-Duc (2003).
90 For a strong  criticism  of large dam s and  a eulogy to the irrigation system s of traditional 
societies, see G oldsm ith and  Hildyard (1992).
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and  developing industry , the  debate on dam s questions w hether their benefits 
justify  the  costs. The World Wide Fund for N ature (WWF), in their characteristic  
assertive fashion, con tends th a t ‘the true  cost of a  dam  never shows up on a 
balance sh e e t ’. 91 By ‘tru e  cost’ they are prim arily referring to environm ental and 
social costs.
Thus, for the  pu rp o ses  of exam ining how the obligation to co-operate is 
tra n s la ted  in to  concrete acts  and  is im plem ented in different regions under 
different c ircum stances, the paradigm atic case of the construction and 
operation of dam  projects will be examined.
The project m anagem ent, planning, calculation, design, construction  and  
operation of a  dam  require a  m ultidisciplinary team . Ultimately, civil engineers 
are responsible for the  s tru c tu re  of the dam. B ut several o ther specialists are 
involved in the  project of a dam  and  th a t of a  power p lan t by providing 
inform ation an d  advice. These include geologists, geotechnical engineers, 
hydrologists, surveyors, econom ists, who calculate the costs of the project, 
environm entalists, biologists, and  conservationists, who consider the effects 
th a t a reservoir and  a  power station will have on the local environm ent 
including fa u n a  an d  flora. In addition, for hydro-electric power p lan ts, the work 
of m echanical an d  electrical engineers is essential. Finally, the contribution of 
lawyers, who prepare  all the contracts, is necessary , as  well as th a t of 
politicians, who eventually assess  and  decide the fate of the  project.
W hen a  dam  is constructed  on an  in terna tional river, due to its potential 
im pact on o ther S ta te s ’ territory, the p lanning and  execution of the project may 
require cross-border procedures. This process of in terna tional co-operation 
m ay include notification and  provision of inform ation, consultation, and 
negotiations . 92 Those involved include sta tesm en  and  diplom ats, representing 
their S ta te s ’ in terests; technical experts from national w ater resources 
adm in istra tions, river b asin  authorities or in terna tional jo in t com m issions; civil 
society, th ro u g h  non-governm ental organisations, affected peoples’ groups, 
private sector com panies; and  in ternational organisations. These may 
partic ipate  in specific projects for a  wide variety of pu rposes, such  as financing 
(World Bank); project consulting services (FAO or UNESCO); or m ay participate
91 Advertisem ent in The Economist, 19-25 Ju ly  2003, 85. See also w w w .panda.org /dam s.
92 See infra C h.4.
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in the process lato sensu, th rough  studies and  knowledge dissem ination (the 
WCD or ICOLD).
1 .5 .2 .1  Introduction
The n u m b er of large dam s constructed  in the p a s t 50 years h as  increased 
dram atically . The In ternational Commission on Large Dam s (ICOLD) 93  
estim ated  th a t by 1998 there were more th an  45 ,000 large dam s worldwide , 94  
and  800,000 sm all d am s . 95 A large dam  is defined by ICOLD as a  dam  with a 
height of 15 m etres or more from the foundation, or w ith a  height between 5 
and  15 m etres, and  with a  reservoir volume of m ore th a n  three million cubic 
m etres.
Over 60% of large dam s have reservoir surface a reas of u p  to 1 km 2, including 
run-of-river dam s with no reservoir, and  only 2 % of dam s have reservoir areas 
larger th a n  100 km 2. In the first half of la st century , the  average height, 
reservoir volum e, and  reservoir area  increased  in all regions. The average 
height of new  dam s w as estim ated  a t 30 to 34 m etres from 1940 to 1990, b u t 
increased  to ab o u t 45 m etres in the 1990s, m ostly due to new projects in Asia. 
The average a rea  and  volume of freshw ater reservoirs have also gradually 
increased: betw een 1945 and  1970 it raised to abou t 50 km 2; in the 1980s it 
declined to 17 km 2; b u t in the  1990s it increased again to abou t 23 km 2 . 96
Hydropower is the  source of about 19% of electricity in the  world as a  whole, 
b u t over 90% of electricity in 24 countries from different continents, such  as 
Brazil, Congo, H onduras, and  T ajik istan , 97 an d  over 50% in 63 countries.
93 E stablished in 1928, th is NGO is the world’s leading professional organization dedicated to 
‘the a rt and science’ of dam  engineering and  water resources m anagem ent. See ICOLD’s website 
a t h t tp : / / www.icold-cigb.org/.
94 In the la test edition of the World Register of Dams, there are  33,105 registered dam s. See 
ICOLD (2003).
95 See ICOLD (1998). S ta tes with large dam s include C hina with 22,100, the USA with 6,390, 
India with over 4,000, and  Spain and Jap a n  with 1,000-1,200 each. More than  half of the total 
num ber of dam s are located in developing countries, some of them  pursu ing  a significant 
dam -building program . S ta tes with the greatest num ber of large dam s under construction 
include Turkey, China, Jap a n , Iraq, Iran, Greece, Romania, Spain, and the Parana basin 
riparians. The river basins with the greatest num ber of large dam s u n d er construction are the 
Yangtze River with 38 dam s, the Tigris and E uphrates with 19 dam s, and  the D anube River with 
11. Revenga, et al. (2000), 17.
95 ICOLD (1998), an d  WCD (2000), 15.
97 WCD (2000), 14. Gleick (1999), 276-280, speaks of 18% and 18 countries.
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Brazil, C anada, China, Russia, and  the United S ta tes of America alone account 
for m ore th a n  half of the hydro-power generation in the w orld . 98
Although reliance on hydro-electricity varies, it is im portan t to take into 
consideration the different coun tries’ dem and for electricity, since the installed 
hydro-electric capacity  and  the hydro-electric production  also vary greatly. In 
addition, an n u a l hydro-electricity generation depends on the annual flow of 
w ater in  the river, which varies from year to year, an d  on the different forms of 
operating  the d am . 99
The in terrup tion  of the n a tu ra l flow of a river by dam s, in ter-basin  transfers or 
w ater w ithdraw al is called river fragm entation, and  ind icates the  degree to 
which a  river system  h as  been affected by m an. Strongly fragm ented river 
system s are ‘those w ith less th an  one quarter of the ir m ain  channel left w ithout 
dam s, w here the  largest tribu tary  h as  at least one dam , as well as rivers whose 
an n u a l flow p a tte rn s  have changed su bstan tia lly . ’100 This m ay be illustrated  by 
the Yangtze River on C hina after the com pletion of the  Three Gorges dam  
project . 101
B ut in addition to rivers, in land  w aters, such  as  the  Aral Sea, Lake Chad, or 
the M esopotam ian M arshlands, also have their ecosystem s affected by m an. 
The size of th ese  w aters as well as their functions have declined. The only rivers 
considered unaffected  are those which have no dam s on their m ain channel, or 
w here despite dam s on the tribu taries the total river discharge h as  declined by 
less th a n  2 % . 102 Exam ples include parts  of the Amazon, the Orinoco, and  the 
Congo.
A study  of river fragm entation in 2000 103 on 227 rivers show ed th a t 37% of the 
rivers were strongly affected by fragm entation and  altered flows, 23% were 
m oderately affected, and  40% were unaffected. Strongly or m oderately
98 WCD (2000), 14.
99 Gleick (1999), 276
100 Revenga, e t al. (2000), 17.
101 Id. On the issues raised by this dam , see infra 1.5.2.3
102 Revenga, e t al. (2000), 17.
103 Study com m issioned by the World Resources Institu te  and  carried out by the University of 
Umea, Sweden. Revenga et al. (2000), 17.
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fragm ented river system s corresponded to alm ost 90% of the total volume of 
w ater flowing th rough  the rivers analysed . 104
Although m ost dam s are built on national rivers, those situated  on 
in terna tional rivers m ay have significant effects u p s tream  and  dow nstream  and 
m ay affect o ther S tates.
1 .5 .2 .2  R easons for Dam C onstruction and Operation
1.5.2.2.1 Historical Context
D am s have long been considered essential for m anaging and  controlling 
freshw ater resources. Their construction  com m enced as  early as 3000 B.C . 105 
Ancient em bankm en t or gravity dam s were co nstruc ted  th roughou t all 
co n tin en ts 106 m ainly for the  purpose of w ater supply, flood control, soil and 
w ater conservation, and  la ter irrigation. Some of these  dam s have been over 
2000 years in  operation . 107 Over the centuries, o ther types of dam s appeared, 
such  as  the  arch  an d  b u ttre ss  dam s in troduced by the Rom ans.
B ut it w as in the tw entieth  century  th a t w ater policies prioritised dam  projects 
for developm ent purposes. Although in the 1950s the  nu m b er of dam  projects 
h ad  already doubled, it was during the 1960s an d  1970s, the golden era of 
dam s worldwide, th a t construction  reached its p ea k . 108 The num ber of dam s 
constructed  decreased  slightly in the 1980s and  1990s, b u t today the global 
an n u a l average is still of abou t 160 to 320 new large d a m s . 109
104 Id.
105 With the gravity Jaw a  Dam in Jo rdan . On the history of dam s, see e.g. Schnitter (1994).
106 Ancient dam s were constructed  in Egypt, Iran and Pakistan, Yemen, Greece, Turkey, Israel, 
Iraq, Mexico, China, Sri Lanka and Sudan. For a chronological list of dam s, see Schnitter (1994), 
235-8.
107 E.g. the Greek em bankm ent Kofini dam  built in 1260 BC for flood control is still operating 
today; as is the C hinese em bankm ent Anfengtang dam  construc ted  in 581 BC for irrigation. 
Schnitter (1994), 52-55.
108 See WCD (2000), Annex V, 369.
109 Ibid., 10.
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1.5 .2 .2 .2  Purposes o f  Dams
Dams are constructed  for several purposes, and  often as m ulti-purpose 
projects. They serve as reservoirs and th u s  for w ater storage for supply and 
sanitation to populations, for irrigation, for the production of electricity, and for 
industrial u ses, in particu lar in times of drought. They also serve to regulate 
the flow, and  th u s  prevent or control flooding, b u t also to control other 
hydrological extrem e events, such as droughts or ice drifts. One of the methods 
u sed  to minimize damage caused by floods is to construct reservoirs to 
withhold flood w aters temporarily and release them  later on in am ounts th a t fill 
the channel. The lake created by the dam  may be used  as an amenity lake, and 
th u s  may benefit tourism  by allowing the practice of some water sports and 
fishing. Lakes m ay also move the water back into channels in tim es of drought.
In a nutshell, dam s store, use and divert w ater for consum ption, irrigation, 
cooling, transportation , construction, mills, electricity, and  recreation.
Half of existing large dam s were constructed exclusively or primarily for 
irrigation purposes. It is estim ated th a t 30% to 40% of the 268 million hectares 
of irrigated lands all over the world depend on dam s . 110
Figure 1: D istribution of existing large dam s by region and purpose.
Source: WCD (2000), 12, adapted from ICOLD (1998).
110 See WCD (2000), 12-3, and Annex V.
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1 .5 .2 .2 .3  T ypes o f  D am s
Most large dam s m ay be categorised as  reservoir projects for storage or 
‘run-of-river’ dam s w hich often have no storage reservoir and  m ay have limited 
daily capacity. W ithin these two types of dam s there is a  significant variety as 
to scale, design, operation, and  potential for adverse im pact.
Reservoirs hold w ater behind  the dam  for seasonal, an n u a l, and  in some cases 
m u lti-an n u a l storage and  regulation of the  river flow. Run-of-river dam s, such 
as weirs and  barrages, and  run-of-river diversion dam s, raise the level of the 
w ater up stream  and  generate a hydraulic head in the  river to divert some of the 
w ater flow to a  canal or power station.
The m ain types of dam  are arch dam s, m ade from concrete; b u ttre ss  dam s, 
m ade from concrete or m asonry; em bankm ent dam s, m ade m ainly from 
n a tu ra l m ateria ls  such  as earth  or rock; and  gravity dam s, m ade from concrete 
or m asonry, or som etim es b o th . 111
The m ost com m on types of dam s as  to their construction  m ateria ls are: earth , 
which includes clays, sands, gravels and  silts, and  soils m ade up  from a 
m ixture of these; concrete; m asonry, which are m ade from stone and m ortar or 
cem ent; an d  rocks.
The decision on the  type of dam  to be constructed  depends on the purpose and 
on technical criteria  concerning the location for construction . E ssential factors 
include the  adequacy of the abu tm ents in the m argins to fix the dam , and  
conditions u p s tream  for the estab lishm ent of a  reservoir for w ater storage.
For a  dam  built for w ater storage, or for both w ater storage and  the production 
of hydro-electricity, ano ther essential factor is the  availability of sufficient w ater 
for its  functioning. In the  case of a dam  constructed  for agricu ltural purposes, 
the dam  m u st be located in the  area  to be irrigated.
111 See the glossary and the British Dam Society website at 
h ttp ://w w w .b ritish d am s.o rg /ab o u t_ d am s/ty p es.h tm .
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In the  case of dam s built for hydro-electricity production  there are also other 
aspects  to consider. These are, inter alia, the flow of the river and  the hydraulic 
head  th ro u g h o u t the  year; the inclination of the river in the  location where the 
dam  is to be built; the characteristics of the  reservoir, notably its storage 
capacity; the  availability of construction m ateria ls for the  type of dam  to be 
built.
1 .5 .2 .3  Dam Im pacts
Dam s m ay have negative im pacts not only on a  river basin  bu t on entire 
regions, u p stream  and  dow nstream . 112 Power p lan ts  and  o ther works may add 
o ther adverse effects. The n a tu re  and  extent of the  im pacts differ considerably. 
Most u p s tream  effects are im m ediately noticeable, w hereas dow nstream  effects 
are generally m ore com plicated to assess. These effects include the flooding of 
inhab ited  areas, resu lting  in displacem ent of population; the flooding of 
industria lised  areas, often causing serious environm ental problem s due to 
w ater contam ination; siltation; salination; the change of w ater quality and 
tem perature; the division and  dam aging of riverine ecosystem s; the reduction 
or destruction  of fish stocks; the change of the p a tte rn  of floods, drainage and 
flows; on w etlands and  on river navigation.
Due to its  foreseeable adverse im pacts, the m ost controversial project of recent 
years is the  Three Gorges Dam and  power p lan t on the Yangtze River in China, 
the longest river in Asia. The dam  was com pleted in the  sum m er of 2006 and 
its power p lan t is expected to be completed by 2009. This power p lan t will be 
the m ajor source of electrical power for C hina reach ing  18,200 MW of installed 
capacity . 113 This is the  m ost am bitious engineering project since the Great Wall. 
Growing population  and  industrialization n ecessita te  an  increase in the 
p roduction of hydropower, which h as  become a  national priority. Besides the 
clear benefits of flood control and  electricity production, the dim ension of the 
project an d  its  im pact have been the target of strong criticism . The adverse 
effects are of great proportions, as the dam  will have, in particu lar, major 
environm ental an d  social impact: over 1 , 0 0 0  villages, several towns,
112 For a rgum ents aga inst dam s, see e.g. Pearce (1992), or McCully (2001).
113 Acording to the project, the power p lant will produce 84 billion kW h/year with its 26 
tu rb ines of 680 MW each - 20 MW less than  the m achines of Itaipu, still the largest power plant 
in operation in the world, which have 700 MW each.
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archaeological sites, and  farm land will be subm erged and  abou t 1.3 million 
people d isp laced . 114
This is a  na tional project with no apparen t tra n sb o u n d ary  effects. In the past, 
C hina h as  s tre ssed  its  absolute territorial sovereignty over its w ater resources, 
and  also in re lation  to its shared  resou rces , 115 such  as  the  Mekong River, and  it 
h as  acted  accordingly. Thus, and w ithout the  financial support from 
in tern a tio n al in stitu tions, which impose conditions for financing large dam s, 
C hina h a s  decided to proceed with a  project which would m ost likely not m eet 
the  criteria  recom m ended by the WCD to assess  w hether a  dam  project should 
be executed.
1 .5 .2 .4  The Debate on Dams: the Report o f  th e  World C om m ission  
on Dams
Dam s, and  large dam s in particu lar, have become in the p a s t decade the focus 
of an  in tense  worldwide debate, reflecting the growing concern of the 
in terna tional com m unity over the effects caused  by dam s. This h as  led to 
several global initiatives w ith the purpose of d iscussing  the  benefits as well as 
the costs of dam  projects, in particu lar their environm ental and  social impact. 
The m ost significant exam ple is the jo in t w orkshop organised by the World 
Conservation Union (IUCN) and the World B ank in April 1997 for debating 
several problem s related to dam s, which led to the estab lishm ent of an  ad hoc 
independent body in 1998, the World Com m ission on D am s (WCD). The 
different in te re st groups represented  ranged from private sector and 
governm ents to academ ic institu tions and  NGOs, as  well as  the World 
Conservation Union and  the World Bank.
The Com m ission h ad  specific objectives: to review the development
effectiveness of large dam s on national and  in terna tional w atercourses, and  
assess  alternatives; to develop a  fram ework for assessing  options and 
decision-m aking processes for w ater resources, energy services and
114 Roger C ohen’s article ‘Perils of am bition in C hina’s provinces’, in the International Herald 
Tribune, 16-17 Decem ber 2006, 2. He sum m arises the am bivalence tow ards the dam  project 
questioning w hether ‘C hina [is] the great despoiler of the environm ent or ... the world’s great 
developm ent engine?’.
115 For th is position on water rights, see infra s.2.2.1.
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developm ent; and  to develop internationally-acceptable criteria and  guidelines 
for p lanning , designing, construction, operation, m onitoring, and 
decom m issioning of d am s . 1 1 6  In other words, the role of the WCD was to 
research , review, debate, write and  endorse policy guidance a t a global level.
The WCD b ro u g h t all stakeholders involved in the dam s debate together in a 
un ique p rocess an d  h as  conducted the m ost com prehensive and  independent 
review of the  experience with large dam s to date. It produced the report Dams 
and Development: a New Framework for Decision-Making, approved by 
consensus. This report reviews the perform ance of dam  projects and  p resen ts a 
new fram ew ork of recom m endations for in tegrating  economic, social and 
environm ental considerations into options a ssessm en t and  the planning of 
projects in the  w ater and  energy sectors, th a t is, for decision-m aking based on 
recognising rights an d  assessing  risks of all in terested  parties.
The WCD h ad  no m andate  to develop in ternational law nor w as it a  law-m aking 
body. The report provides recom m endations to G overnm ents and  it is not a 
legally b inding docum ent. Yet the Com m ission relied on a  num ber of 
in terna tional law in stru m en ts. For example, w hen it recom m ended 
co-operation betw een S tates, it m ade several references to the 1997 UN 
W atercourses C onvention . 1 1 7
The report is com posed of two parts. Part I reports fact-findings on large dam s. 
P art II focuses on fu tu re  practice and recom m ends seven strategic priorities, all 
together contain ing 26 guidelines for fu ture  dam  developm ent projects. 
Strategic Priority 7, entitled ‘Sharing Rivers for Peace, Development, and 
Security’, expressly focuses on in ternational rivers. Its key m essage s ta tes that: 
‘Storage and  diversion of w aters on tran sb o u n d ary  rivers h a s  been a  source of 
considerable tension  betw een countries and  w ithin countries. As specific 
in terventions for diverting water, dam s require constructive co-operation. 
Consequently, the  u se  and  m anagem ent of resources becom es the subject of 
agreem ent betw een S tates to prom ote m u tu a l self-interest for regional 
co-operation an d  peaceful collaboration. This leads to a  shift in focus from the 
narrow  approach  of allocating a  finite resource to the sharing  of rivers and their 
associated  benefits in which S tates are innovative in defining the scope of
WCD (2000), 28.
H7 Ibid., 251.
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issues for d iscussion . External financing agencies su p p o rt the  principles of 
good faith negotiations between riparian  S ta tes ’. 1 1 8
The Com m ission considered th a t several policy principles were necessary in 
order to im plem ent th is  strategic priority. These included th a t agreem ents 
should  be negotiated  in good faith between riparian  S tates based on the 
principle of equitable utilisation, the obligation no t to cause significant harm  
and  the obligation of prior notification. The WCD recom m ended th a t S tates 
co-operate in  shared  river basins and  th a t they conclude basin-w ide treaties. In 
addition, it recom m ended th a t S tates ratify the 1997 UN W atercourses 
Convention, since it considered th is Convention as codifying ‘an emerging body 
of custom ary  law ’. 119
A lthough five of the  eight dam s which were s tud ied  by the Commission are 
built on in terna tional rivers, the recom m endations relating to th is Strategic 
Priority 7 are no t based  on any stud ies of s ta te  practice. This fact evidently 
lim its their significance.
The Report h a s  also been the target of criticism  of its  n a tu re . The final WCD 
Forum  revealed th a t a  gap existed in perceptions and  evaluations of the report 
am ong various in te re sts  g roups . 1 2 0  Most environm entally concerned NGOs 
appreciated  th e  guidelines and  dem anded th a t governm ents and  financial 
in stitu tio n s  should  adopt the guidelines as their own norm s. On the other 
h and , observations of some governm ents and  dam  construction  com panies to 
the  report have been negative or sceptical, particu larly  in term  of the 
guidelines' feasibility . 121
The m andate  of the  WCD ended with the launch ing  of its Report. B ut the 80 
p artic ipan ts  of the  final WCD Forum  m eeting agreed th a t the m om entum  and 
work of the WCD should  continue, although the em phasis should shift from 
policy analysis to practical application, notably to d issem ination  of the report 
and  facilitation of exchange of inform ation. So UNEP agreed to initiate in 
November 2001 a  follow-up process, the D am s and  Development Project
1 ^  Id.
119 Ibid., 252.
120 F ujikura an d  N akayam a (2003).
121 For an  exam ination of the 26 guidelines, see Fujikura and  Nakayam a (2002).
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(DDP) . 1 2 2 This consists  of an  independent netw ork 1 2 3 which prom otes a 
con tinuous dialogue on improving decision-m aking, p lann ing  and m anagem ent 
of dam s and  their alternatives based on the WCD core values and  strategic 
priorities a t local, na tional and  global levels.
122 See generally their website a t http: / / w w w .unep-dam s.org/.
123 The m andate of the DDP does not perm it it to take positions or to judge individual projects 
or associated practices.
2
C o - o p e r a t i o n  a n d  t h e  Law o f  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  W a t e r c o u r s e s 1
For good faith, in the language o f Cicero, is not only the 
principal hold by which all governments are bound 
together, but is the key-stone by which the larger society o f 
nations is united. Destroy this, says Aristotle, and you 
destroy the intercourse o f mankind.
Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pads (1625) 
Book III, Ch. 25: Conclusion
The purpose  of th is  C hapter is to show how the  principle of co-operation 
evolved in the context of the theories and  practice of in ternational w ater law, 
notably th ro u g h  its relationship with other general principles of public 
in terna tional law. It begins with an  in troduction  to the  evolution of 
in terna tional w ater law. In order to u n d ers tan d  the  ex tent to which sovereign 
S tates have the  right to u se  the fresh w ater available w ithin their boundaries, 
the relevant theories are described and  assessed.
The re lationsh ip  betw een the  principle of co-operation and  other im portant 
general principles of in ternational law is then  exam ined with the purpose of 
determ ining the  scope of the obligation to co-operate in the context of 
in terna tional w atercourses. These general principles include the principle of 
sovereignty and  equality of S tates, perm anen t sovereignty over na tu ra l 
resources, equitable and  reasonable u tilisation, prevention of transboundary  
significant harm , the  p recautionary  principle, su sta in ab le  development, good 
neighbourliness, good faith, and  peaceful settlem ent of d isputes.
1 This chap te r is partly based on a paper presented a t the C urren t Legal Issues Fifth Annual 
Interdisciplinary Colloquium -  Law and Geography a t University College London on 3 Ju ly  2001.
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2 .1  H is to r ic a l  O verview  o f  th e  Law o f  I n te r n a t io n a l  
W a terco u rses
2 .1 .1  W ater R e g u la t io n  an d  M a n a g em en t T h ro u g h o u t H isto ry
In antiquity , civilizations developed along rivers th ro u g h o u t the  world, such  as 
the G anges, th e  Indus, the Mekong, the Nile, the Tigris and  the  E uphrates and 
the  Yangtze River . 2 U rban centres continuously increased  in num ber, extension 
an d  population, and  so did w ater dem ands. The w ater available was used  
predom inantly  for dom estic and  agricultural purposes. Artificial waterworks, 
from canals to w ater mills, aqueducts to su b te rran ean  qanats , 3 gravity dam s to 
drainage system s, developed by different societies, sp read  to m any parts  of the 
world . 4
W ater regulation and  m anagem ent evolved in different societies and  cultures 
th roughou t tim e . 5 Co-operation in early S tate societies consisted  prim arily in 
providing for cases of floods or droughts. The agreem ents concluded referred to 
the repair of em bankm ents and  the digging of canals, or the sharing  of crops in 
order to prevent food sh o rtages . 6
Historically, m any of the concepts and  principles of w ater law were introduced 
th rough  Rom an law . 7 This is so, for instance, for the  general freedom of use  of 
public w atercourses asserted  in the period of the  P rincipate . 8 U nder the law of 
Ju s tin ia n , the general prohibition on diverting w ater from navigable 
w atercourses an d  their tribu taries  was codified in the  Corpus Iuris Civilis.9
2 Teclaff (1967), 15; C aponera (1992), 212. On the history of w ater m anagem ent and early 
civilizations, see also H assan  (2002).
3 These consist of a  ‘su b terran ean  system  of tunnels  connecting wells and  dug using vertical 
shifts designed to collect and  transport water, som etim es over d istances more than  50 kilometres 
long, to extend farm ing to m arginal desert areas by utilizing underground, long-distance 
tran sp o rt of groundw ater from m ountain  springs to low-lying farm ing lan d .’ H assan (2002), 8.
4 Ibid., 8-9.
5 See C aponera (1992), Ch.2.
6 H assan (2002), 5.
7 For the history of principles of w ater law, see generally C aponera (1992), Chs.2 and 3, and in 
particu lar for Rom an w ater law principles, 29-43.
8 27 BC-186 AD; Ulpian, Digest, 39, 2, 24.
9 Pom ponius, Digest, 44, 12, 2.
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2 .1 .2  F rom  th e  P r o m in en ce  o f  N a v ig a tio n  to  O th er  U ses
Navigation 10 becam e im portan t on national and  in terna tional w atercourses in 
conjunction w ith the developm ent of the principle of free trade. At the Congress 
of Vienna, in 1815, the in ternationalisation of E uropean  rivers and  lakes, 
which h ad  been  first proposed by Grotius in De iure belli ac p a d s , was 
form alised, an d  navigational rights for nationals of the  Parties on the Rhine 
and  D anube were expressly recognised . 11 This in ternationalisation  continued 
gradually  and  w as extended to African rivers by different trea tie s . 12 This 
process w as continued  with the 1919 Treaty of V ersailles13 and the 1921 
B arcelona Convention and  S ta tu te  on the Regime of Navigable W aterways of 
In ternational Concern, which was in tended to becom e a  worldwide regim e . 14 
However, due to historical c ircum stances and  the p articu la r in terests  of some 
of the S tates involved, it w as ratified by only a  few S ta te s . 15 Furtherm ore, the 
S ta tu te  did no t consider navigation as an  unconditional priority . 16
From the e ighteenth  cen tury  on, with a  rapid  population  growth and  technical 
progress, the  h u m an  u ses  of w ater have diversified and  intensified. 
In ternational trea ties  becam e crucial in regulating  in ter-sta te  relations 
concerning the different u ses  of in ternational w atercourses, and  their num ber 
increased  considerably. Most of the treaties were m ainly concerned with 
estab lish ing  w atercourse boundaries or with navigation, b u t later agreem ents 
were concluded for regulating specific w ater u tilisation  m ethods, such as 
irrigation, flood control, or hydro-electric power generation . 17
10 See su pra  s. 1.3.1.
11 1815 Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, Articles 108 to 116.
12 Notably in relation to the Congo and the Niger, the 1885 Act of Berlin, of 26 February 1885, 
CTS 165 (1885), 485; the 1890 B russels Declaration, of 2 Ju ly  1890, CTS 173 (1890), 319; and 
the 1919 Treaty of Saint-G erm ain, of 10 Septem ber 1919, 8 LNTS, 25. Or in relation to other 
rivers, such  a s  the Zambezi, Limpopo and Sabi. See 1890 Luso-British Treaty, CTS 175 (1891), 
197, where European powers divided their spheres of influence in the African continent.
13 See Articles 331 and  338.
14 Jen n in g s and  W atts (1992), 580-2.
15 These treaties were concluded in the end of the First World War, and  reflected the interests 
of the Allied and  Associated Powers in controlling the river network in Europe, as well as the 
possibility to restric t the territorial rights of the defeated S tates. See Caflisch (1989), 41.
16 B ruhacs (1993), 11.
17 See infra s .3.2.5.
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The increase in the  non-navigational u ses  led to m ore d ispu tes over water 
betw een u se rs , an d  different -  som etim es conflicting -  u s e s . 18 Nevertheless, 
only th irteen  decisions have so far been m ade by in terna tional courts and 
arb itra l tr ib u n a ls  in d ispu tes concerning or directly relevant to these 
non-navigational u se s  of in ternational w atercou rses . 19 In addition to these 
in terna tional decisions, there have been several in te r-s ta te  cases in the United 
S tates of Am erica th a t  h ad  repercussions on in terna tional w ater law . 2 0
The influence th a t in ternational decisions have h ad  in the developm ent of the 
law of in terna tional w atercourses h as  been paralleled by the contribution from 
w riters. The works and  opinions of w riters such  as  Sm ith 21 and  B erber , 2 2  who 
provided surveys of s ta te  practice, as well as  of o ther scholars, such  as 
W iniarski , 23 G arretson, Hayton, and  O lm stead , 2 4  who also attem pted  to identify 
the ru les applicable to in ternational w atercourses, dem onstra te  the complexity 
of the nu m ero u s issu es  th a t exist in th is  b ranch  of the law.
2 .1 .3  T h e  C o n tr ib u tio n  o f  S ch o la r ly  A s s o c ia t io n s  a n d  
In te r n a t io n a l O rg a n iza tio n s
Since the  n in e teen th  century , the in ternational legal com m unity has, through 
bo th  scholarly associations and  in ternational organisations, paid great 
a tten tion  to the  problem s emerging from the u ses  and  allocation of fresh water 
and  the  protection of the environm ent of in ternational w atercourses . 25
I8Teclaff (1967), 113, and  Caflisch (1989), 37. See supra  s. 1.3.2.
19 They are the H elm and R iver Delta  case (1872 and  1905), the San Juan River arbitration 
(1888) and  case (1916), the K ushk River case (1893), the Faber case (1903), the Diversion o f  
Water from  the M euse R iver case (1937), the Trail Sm elter case (1938 and  1941), the Lake Lanoux 
arb itration  (1957), Gut Dam  arb itration (1969), G abcikovo-N agym arosProjectco.se  (1997), and the 
K asik ili/S ed u d u  Island  case (1999). For an exam ination of som e of these cases, see infra s .3.2.6.
20 See, e.g. Teclaff (1967), 87-90 and 193-201, and Fuentes (1996), 357-363. An im portant 
contribution w as the introduction of the principle of equitable ‘apportionm ent’. See McCaffrey 
(2001), 325, and  infra s .2.2.3.
21 Smith (1931).
22 Berber (1959).
23 W iniarski (1933).
24 G arretson, Hayton, and Olm stead (eds.)(1967).
25 C ontribution to the development of doctrine h as  come from several associations and 
organisations. These include the 7th International Conference of American S tates and its 1933 
Declaration of Montevideo; the Inter-American Bar Association an d  the 1957 Declaration of 
Buenos Aires; the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee and  the 1964 New Delhi 
Declaration; and  the Council of Europe, and the 1967 European W ater Charter.
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Scholarly associations, in particu lar the Institu te  of In ternational Law (IDI) and 
the In ternational Law Association (ILA), have m ade a  critical contribution to the 
developm ent of the  law of in ternational w atercourses, particu larly  in the last 
decades. Their s tudy  in the field originated from in terna tional d isputes then  
em erging in different p a rts  of the world . 26
From the  1950s u n til 2004 the ILA worked consistently  on the law of w ater 
re so u rces . 27 Its m ost significant contributions to the field have been the 1966 
ILA Helsinki Rules, la ter supplem ented by sub seq u en t resolutions, such  as the 
1982 ILA M ontreal Rules on Pollution and  the  1986 ILA Seoul Rules on 
in ternational groundw aters. The 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules, notably through the 
elaboration of the  principle of equitable u tilisation , have played an  im portant 
role in the  codification and  progressive developm ent of the  law of in ternational 
w atercourses. They have had  a  considerable im pact on su b seq u en t work in th is 
b ranch  of in terna tional law, notably on the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention 
and  are still referred to by S tates. In 2004 the ILA W ater Resources Committee 
adopted the Berlin Rules on W ater Resources, its  final and  m ost com prehensive 
work on the  topic, which revises all previous ILA ru les on the subject. These 
Rules will rem ain  an  authoritative source of guidance and  reference for States, 
in terna tional organizations, local governm ents, and  w ater professionals.
In the late 1960s, the  UN assigned the topic of the  non-navigational u ses of 
in terna tional w atercourses to the In ternational Law Com m ission (ILC) for 
fu rther s tu d y . 2 8  After over twenty years of work on the subject, the ILC 
subm itted  to the  UN General Assembly (UNGA) a  docum ent consisting of 33 
Draft Articles and  recom m ended its adoption as a  fram ework convention . 2 9  The 
Sixth Com m ittee of the UNGA, after receiving responses from some eleven 
S tates, convened as  a Working Group of the  Whole in order to produce a
26 Such as  those involving the Columbia, the Indus, the Jo rd an , the Nile, and  the Plata.
27 For the contribution of the ILA to international w ater resources law, see Bourne (1996) and 
Bogdanovic (2001).
28 See UNGA Resolution 2669 (XXV), of 8 December 1970. This w as fu rther to Resolution 1401 
(XIV), of 21 November 1959 which called on the Secretary-G eneral to prepare and circulate a 
report on sta te  legislation, bilateral and  m ultilateral treaties, judicial decisions and arbitral 
aw ards, and stud ies in the subject-m atter. This report was presented as Legal Problems Relating  
to the Utilization o f  International Rivers, UN Doc.A/5409 (1963), reprin ted  in Yrbk ILC [1974], Vol. 
II, Pt. 2, 33. See also UN (1963). For a detailed account of the events since the ILC began working 
on the topic, see Tanzi an d  Arcari (2001), 35-45.
29 GAOR, 49 th  Session, Suppl. No. 10 (A/49/A0), p a ra .219.
8 0
fram ework convention.3o Several m eetings were needed to d iscuss controversial 
issues relating inter alia to the identification of the  substan tive  rules th a t 
determ ined the  righ ts and  obligations of riparian  s ta tes , the ru les governing 
d ispute settlem ent, as  well as the extent to which procedural ru les should be 
detailed.
In April 1997, the  Sixth Committee finally adopted the text of the framework 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
W atercourses , 31 w hich w as presented to the UNGA, and  adopted on 21 May 
1 9 9 7 . 3 2  The Convention is not yet in force . 33
The 1992 Rio D eclaration on Environm ent and  Developm ent and  Agenda 21, 
for exam ple, and  the creation of some in stitu tions, su ch  as the World Water 
Council, reflect the  a tten tion  th a t the in ternational com m unity is continuously 
paying to w ater issu es  a t the  global level, including the design of w ater policies 
and  their legal im plications.
2 .2  T he R e le v a n t  T h e o r ie s  on  Water R igh ts
One of the key problem s concerning in ternational w atercourses is defining the 
lim its to the  sovereignty of S tates over them . In applying the principle of 
perm an en t sovereignty over n a tu ra l resources , 34 the  issue  is w hether the right 
to the u se  of fresh w ater w ithin the frontiers of each  S tate can be restricted. 
Since river w ater is a  dynam ic n a tu ra l resource, flowing from one country to 
another, the literal application of internally  contained  or static territorial 
concepts of sovereignty seem s inappropriate. The lim its, if any, of S ta tes’ 
sovereignty have, however, been the subject of different theories which have 
developed over tim e, reflecting prim arily the evolution of sta te  practice. This 
raises the  question  of w hether these theories developed because of geographical 
considerations or because of potential conflicts betw een m en. As we will see,
30 For an  analysis of the d iscussions in the Sixth Committee, see Tanzi and  Arcari (2001).
31 UN D oc.L.3/L.3A D D .l/CRP.94, Voting Record, Text of Convention as  a Whole, Resolution 
A /R E S /5 1 /2 0 6  (4 April 1997).
32 Resolution 5 1 /2 2 9 , of 21 May 1997.
33 See infra s .3 .2.4.3.
34 See infra s .2.3.3.
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the different theories reflect the evolution of S ta te s ’ a ttitude  tow ards the 
principle of co-operation in the context of in terna tional w atercourses.
2 .2 .1  T h e  T h e o r y  o f  A b so lu te  T erritor ia l S o v e r e ig n ty
The theory of abso lu te  territorial sovereignty w as advanced by some publicists 
in the n in e teen th  century. It also becam e know n as the H arm on D octrine , 35 
w hen the  Attorney General of the United S tates, Mr. Ju d so n  Harmon, 
e laborated it in h is Opinion of 12 December 189536 on the cu rren t d ispute with 
Mexico over u tilisation  of the w aters of the Rio G rande. This theory asserts  th a t 
a  State h as  the right to use  the w aters of the  rivers th a t flow through its 
territory w ithout lim itation, regardless of the effects su ch  u se  causes to another 
State, w hether dow nstream  or contiguous . 37
A com m entator observed th a t th is doctrine w as in fact ‘an  assertion  tha t, there 
being no ru les of in terna tional law which governed, S tates were free to do as 
they w ished ’, 38 b u t questioned w hether th is  w as ever p a rt of in ternational law. 
It seem s to be based  on the principle expounded in 1927 by the PCIJ in the 
Lotus case, th a t ‘[res tric tio n s  upon  the independence of S tates cannot be 
p resu m ed ’ . 39 After analysing the facts relating to the  H arm on Opinion and a 
survey of s ta te  practice, McCaffrey also reached th is  conclusion, adding th a t 
H arm on, in h is  Opinion, ‘did not deny -  and  in fact recognized -  th a t there was 
a  du ty  to refrain from harm ing other s ta te s ’ . 40
The H arm on doctrine as commonly understood is an  expression of the principle 
of full sovereignty of S tates over their national territories, and  while it clearly 
favours u p s tream  S tates to the detrim ent of dow nstream  S ta te s’ in terests, it
35 See generally, e.g. McCaffrey (2001), 113-128, and Berber (1959), 11-44. For an  in-depth 
analysis of the Harm on opinion, see McCaffrey (1996), and  (2001) Ch.4, 76-111.
36 US O pinions of Attorney-General, 21 (1893-97) 274.
37 Although no assertion  of this doctrine h as  ever been m ade in relation to contiguous 
w atercourses, th is theory would apply to the cases where the boundary  between contiguous 
S tates lies on one of the ban k s of the river ra ther than  on the m edian line or thalweg. McCaffrey 
(2001), 116, n. 14.
38 U pper (1967), 22ff.
39 T hat is, the burden  of proof of the existence of an  in ternational rule limiting the action of a 
State lies with the claim ant State. This principle h as  been criticised by authorities and 
contradicted by the views of the ICJ in the Nottebohm  and  Fisheries cases. See Lotus case, 18-19. 
See also, e.g. Brownlie (2003) 300-1.
40 McCaffrey (1996), 766. For further criticisms, see, e.g. Berber (1959), 96.
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rejects any obligation of co-operation. It ignores the fundam ental na tu ra l 
conditions of w atercourses, and  h as  its foundation on individualistic concepts 
of u n co n stra in ed  territorial sovereignty.
Although asse rted  by some S tates on a  few occasions , 41 in m ost cases in the 
course of diplom atic negotiations, th is theory h as  never been followed; not even 
by the USA . 42 In fact, the S tates th a t have affirmed th is  doctrine have 
afterw ards en tered  into treaties based on different a ssu m p tio n s . 4 3
The w ritings of publicists over time also reflect a  decline in its su p p o rt . 44 In our 
day there are no advocates of th is  theory . 43
2 .2 .2  T h e T h eo ry  o f  A b so lu te  T errito r ia l In te g r ity
The theory of abso lu te  territorial integrity on the o ther h an d  asse rts  tha t, while 
the S tate h a s  righ ts over the  w ater in its territory, it m u st conduct itself within 
its territory so as  no t to alter the n a tu ra l features - th a t is, the course, volume 
or quality - of the  river which flows to the territory  of ano ther S ta te . 46 The 
exercise of the  S ta te ’s sovereignty over its n a tu ra l resources is th u s  limited, 
and  the right of the  lower riparian  State to the n a tu ra l flow is sustained . The 
consequence is th a t where the n a tu ra l flow is altered by the upper riparian 
State w ithout the  necessary  consent of the lower riparian  State, the former 
becom es liable for such  conduct.
41 As referred to above, by the USA in a dispute with Mexico, by the A ustrian Government in a 
dispute with Bavaria over the development of shared w atercourses, by Chile in a dispute with 
Bolivia, or by India in its dispute with Pakistan over the Indus River and  in the earlier phase of 
the negotiation with Bangladesh over the Ganges waters. See Lipper (1967), 21, and McCaffrey 
(2001) 116-123.
42 See Lipper (1967), 22 and n.21. For an  exam ination of US State practice, see McCaffrey 
(1996).
43 See Lipper (1967), 22 and  ns. 15 and 21, and McCaffrey (2001), 116-123.
44 Mainly in the n ineteenth  century and until m id-tw entieth century, from com m entators from 
upstream  countries.
45 For an  analysis of the evolution of the views of publicists, see McCaffrey (2001), 123-127.
46 See generally McCaffrey (2001), 128-137, and Berber (1959), 19-22.
83
Among o ther p u b lic is ts , 47 both  O ppenheim ’s 7 th and  8 th editions edited by Sir 
H ersch L au te rpach t seem  to support th is  theory. O ppenheim  sta tes  as follows:
But the flow of not-national, boundary, and international rivers is not within the 
arbitrary power of one of the riparian States, for it is a rule of International Law that no 
State is allowed to alter the natural conditions of its own territory to the disadvantage 
of the natural conditions of the territory of the neighbouring State. For this reason a 
State is not only forbidden to stop or divert the flow of a river which runs from its own 
to a neighbouring State, but likewise to make such use of the water of the river as 
either causes danger to the neighbouring State or prevents it from making proper use 
of the flow of the river on its part.48
This s ta tem en t is based  on the n a tu ra l flow theory , 49 w hich operates to the 
advantage of the lower riparian  States, and  could have serious consequences 
on the u p s tream  States. These are prohibited from developing their water 
resources should  these affect the n a tu ra l flow. One exam ple will suffice to 
illustrate  the point. Dam construction and  operation, w hich is u sed  am ong 
o ther purposes to regulate seasonal w ater levels, would depend on the consent 
of dow nstream  S ta tes even though they m ay no t reduce an n u a l average flows.
Occasionally, the  S tates invoke the theory of territorial integrity un d er concepts 
such  as those  of ‘priority of appropriation’, ‘acquired  rig h ts’ or ‘historical 
r ig h ts ’ . 50 It h a s  been invoked in four d isputes betw een m em ber sta tes of the 
United S ta te s ; 51 b u t the United States Suprem e C ourt rejected the argum ent in 
all in stan ces  as  being inapplicable as between co n stitu en t s ta tes  of the federal
47 Berber refers to five au thors. See Berber (1959). However, after close scrutiny, McCaffrey 
concludes th a t the doctrinal support of this theory is equivocal or w ritten before state practice 
had developed considerably. See McCaffrey (2001), 133-135.
48 Oppenheim  (1948) 430, §178, (1955), 474-5, §178. See also §127 and  the references therein. 
In the 1992 edition these statem ents rem ain the sam e. See Jen n in g s and  W atts (1992), 584-5. 
However, the editors introduced further developments based on case law pointing to a different 
in terpretation of the sta tem ent concerned. In particular, reference was m ade to the limitation 
introduced by the Lake Lanoux arbitration th a t ‘a neighbouring state  cannot object to works 
carried out by ano ther riparian, un less its own in terests in the river w aters are affected 
substan tia lly ’, and  to the ‘principle of com m unity of in terest’ se t ou t in the River Oder case. See 
McCaffrey (2001), 134. B ut as  the editors recognise th a t notions su ch  as  prior appropriation and 
vested private rights have not become general principles, the sta tem en t as  such  is misleading.
49 Under th is theory, based on the common law doctrine, ‘the prim ary or fundam ental right of 
each riparian  proprietor of a  w atercourse is to have the body of w ater flow as it was wont to flow 
in natu re , qualified only by the privilege of each to m ake limited u ses  of the w ater.’ American Law 
Institu te  R estatem ent of the Law, Second, Torts (1977), Ch.41, §849, 210.
50 See C hau h an  (1981), 137, and  McCaffrey (2001), 130.
51 Colorado v. K ansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943); New Jersey  v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931); 
C onnecticut v. M assachussets, 282 U.S. 660, 669-70 (1931); and  K ansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 
46, 100 (1907).
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United S ta te s . 52 At the  in ternational level, th is  theory h a s  been invoked in only 
a  few cases by dow nstream  S ta tes , 53 b u t there is no ‘evidence of a  State having 
accepted a  diplom atic settlem ent based upon  th is  theory ’. 54
Like the theory of absolu te sovereignty, th is  theory does no t imply any duty of 
co-operation; ra th e r  it dem ands from the u p stream  State an  a ttitude of 
non-interference with the  n a tu ra l flow of the river, th a t is, of co-existence with 
its  co-riparians.
2 .2 .3  T h e T h eo ry  o f  E q u itab le  an d  R ea so n a b le  U tilisa t io n
The theory of equitable and  reasonable u tilisation, also know n as the theory of 
limited territorial sovereignty or integrity , 55 a sse rts  th a t each riparian  State is 
entitled to a  reasonable and  equitable share in the beneficial u tilisation of the 
w atercourses, the  right of which is to be determ ined on a  case-by-case basis in 
accordance with different relevant factors to be tak en  into account. This theory 
considers in terna tional w atercourses as shared  resources and  requires the 
S tates to take into accoun t the in terests  of the neighbouring riparian  States, 
th u s  requiring  ‘some com promise of in terest by all ’ . 56 S tates may, however, 
develop the  river b asin  in their territory independently, th a t is, S tates do not 
need the consen t of co-basin S tates to plan and  build  w ater works on their 
territory as  long as these do not interfere with the  co-basin S ta tes’ rights to an 
equitable an d  reasonable share  of the beneficial u se s  of the  w atercourse.
52 See Lipper (1967), 19-20.
53 Namely, Egypt a t the Nile Commission in 1925 and in a note to the United Kingdom dated 7 
May 1929 regarding the Use of the W aters of the River Nile for Irrigation Purposes, although 
Egypt later renounced it. See UN (1963), No.7, 100-6; and Bolivia in relation to the Rivers Mauri 
and  Lauca. McCaffrey argues that, although referred to by different writers, both the cases of 
Pakistan  in relation to the Indus basin and Spain in relation to the Lake Lanoux were not 
exam ples of S ta tes invoking this theory. See Caflisch (1989), 51-2 and  the references therein, and 
McCaffrey (2001), 130-133.
54 Lipper (1967), 18.
55 See generally McCaffrey (2001), 137-149; Berber (1959), 25ff.; and Lipper (1967), 23-38; 
Caflisch (1989), 55-59.
56 Lipper (1967), 33.
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This is based  on the  principle of equitable apportionm ent57 and  on the principle 
of reasonable u s e . 58 This theory h as  acquired the largest support in state 
p ractice , 59 m u ltila teral conventions, bilateral treaties, and  decisions of both 
dom estic and  in terna tional courts and  tr ib u n a ls . 60 This is evidence th a t S tates 
have been recognising th a t there are lim its to their sovereignty stem m ing from 
the geographical characteristics of shared  w ater resources. Furtherm ore, it 
shows th a t  S tates are aware th a t some form of co-operation is required to 
determ ine w hat is equitable and reasonable in each case. The m inim um  level of 
co-operation implied in th is  theory m ay be considered embryonic, since in 
practice different forms of closer co-operation have been developing through 
time.
The precise rights to u se  the w atercourses, and  the  correlative obligations of 
riparian  S ta tes w ithin th is  am bit, need fu rther exam ination in order to assess 
their relation w ith the principle of co-operation. For th is  purpose the 
fundam ental principles th a t characterise th is theory will be analysed in s .2 .3.4. 
and  s .2 .3.5. below.
2 .2 .4  T h e T h eo ry  o f  C o m m o n  M a n a g em en t
The theory of com m on m anagem ent , 61 som etim es called the theory of 
com m unity of in te re s t , 62 seem s to be gaining support a t the  in ternational level. 
This theory aim s a t obtaining an optim um  u tilisation  of the w aters by an
57 This principle w as developed in the USA, where two different regimes govern the uses of 
water. The doctrine of prior appropriation prevails in the w estern states, while in the eastern 
sta tes it is the law of riparian  rights th a t applies. In settling in ter-sta te  d isputes over water 
resources, the Federal C ourts have determined th a t the governing rule is the rule of equitable 
apportionm ent. W outers (1997a).
58 This is well estab lished  in American common law. U nder th is principle ‘the prim ary or 
fundam ental right of each riparian proprietor on a w atercourse . . .  is to be free from 
unreasonable u ses  th a t cause  harm  to his own reasonable use. E m phasis is placed on a full and 
beneficial use  of the advantages of the stream  ..., and each riparian  proprietor h as  a privilege to 
m ake a reasonable u se  of w ater for any purpose, provided th a t his u se  does not cause harm  to 
the reasonable u ses  of others. Each riparian m ust m ake h is use  in a m anner that will 
accom m odate as m any o ther u ses  as possible.’ American Law Institu te  R estatem ent of the Law, 
Second, Torts (1977), C h.41, § 849, 211-3.
59 See the surveys of sta te  practice carried out by the ILC Special Rapporteurs: 1982 
Schwebel’s Third Report, 75-82, and 1986 McCaffrey’s Second Report, 103-5, 11 Off.
60 Such as  the R iver O der  case, Lake Lanoux arbitration, and  the Gabcikovo-Nagym aros Project 
case, p a ra .55. This is also the opinion of Lipper (1967), 62-3, Caflisch (1989), 55, and McCaffrey 
(2001), 137. See also infra s .2.3.4.
61 See Birnie an d  Boyle (2002), 304-5.
62 See also Berber (1959), 22-25; Caflisch (1989), 59-61; and  McCaffrey (2001), 149-171.
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in tegrated  and  jo in t m anagem ent of the river b asin  in its entirety, with little 
regard to political frontier dem arcations . 63 It th u s  facilitates the in ternational 
regulation of the w ater environm ent.
As with the  previous theory, the root of th is  theory is the  concept of ‘com m unity 
of in te rest of rip a rian  S ta tes’, defined by the PCIJ in the  Territorial Jurisdiction  
o f  the In ternational C om m ission o f  the River Oder6 4  in the  context of navigation, 
and  elaborated  in other in ternational decisions. This concept rests  on ‘the 
perfect equality of all riparian  S tates in the use  of the whole course of the river 
and  the exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian  State in 
relation to the o th e rs’. In addition, the whole w atercourse or the river basin  are 
considered one u n it for economic, legal and  m anagem ent purposes. This theory 
requires the estab lishm ent of a  jo in t policy-m aking and  m anagem ent 
institu tion.
This is a  very am bitious theory, given th a t it im plies a  high level of 
co-operation, m ainly by requiring an  institu tional fram ew ork further to the 
procedural obligations indispensable for the im plem entation of the substantive 
principle of equitable and  reasonable utilisation and  the  prohibition on causing 
significant tran sb o u n d ary  harm . In fact, the com m on m anagem ent approach 
diverges from the  previous theory only in degree of its  developm ent , 65 since it is 
based  on the  sam e prem ises . 66
B ut is the  m ere fact th a t States have a  certain  m easure  of com m unity of 
in terest, as  w ith o ther n a tu ra l resources, sufficient ipso facto to impose on 
them  an  obligation of common m anagem ent? This obligation seem s to arise 
from an  inductive process, th a t is, from s ta te  practice. The theory h as  been 
progressively developing through bilateral and  regional s ta te  practice, and  the 
exam ples con tinue to increase . 67 The need for com m on m anagem ent 
in stitu tions have been advocated by learned societies, in ternational 
organizations and  conferences over the p as t decades. B ut ‘... it still cannot be
63 U pper (1967), 38.
64 For an  analysis of th is case, see infra s .3.2.6.2.
65 Lipper (1967), 67, n.4.
66 See Benvenisti (1996); and  Brunee and Toope (1997).
67 E.g. the 1978 Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation and the Amazonian Cooperation Council, or 
the more recent 1995 Mekong River Agreement and the Mekong River Commission.
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asserted  w ith confidence th a t the duty  to cooperate th rough  jo in t institu tions is 
generally accepted as  reflecting custom ary law ’. 68
This com m unity of in terest approach h as  been criticised for having 
d isadvantages for S tates which are not a t the sam e stage of economic 
developm ent, since it requires investm ent , 69 as  well as for presenting an 
‘absolu te restric tio n ’ on the free use  of fresh w ater, since it would prevent a 
S tate from usin g  the  w aters ‘w ithout the positive co-operation of the o th ers ’. 70  
The need for positive co-operation, however, m ay also be argued to be required 
in the theory of lim ited sovereignty, since the application of the principle of 
equitable and  reasonable utilisation also needs some of the procedural 
obligations related  to co-operation, such  as the regular exchange of d a ta  and 
inform ation.
We have seen th a t the  legal theories on in terna tional w atercourses have 
developed th rough  tim e reflecting prim arily the evolution of sta te  practice. The 
sovereignty of S ta tes over rivers and  their b asin s  in their territory is 
undoubted ly  restric ted  and  subject to some form of co-operation. This general 
obligation to co-operate and  its concrete applications arise in response to 
geographical characteristics and  to hum an  u ses  of the w aters and  suggest 
responsiveness by law to geography. B ut how does th is obligation relate to 
o ther principles of in ternational law?
2 .3  T he  R e la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  th e  P r in c ip le  o f  
C o -O p era t io n  and Other G eneral P r in c ip le s  o f
In te r n a t io n a l  Law
2 .3 .1  In tr o d u c to r y
In in terna tional law, co-operation intertw ines w ith several other principles of 
in terna tional law, the  con ten t of which m ay contribu te  to determ ining its scope 
and  content. The du ty  of S tates to co-operate w ith one ano ther in accordance
68 Benvenisti (1996), 413. See also Perrez (2000), 317. For an  exam ination of this issue, see 
infra s .5.2.
69 B ut these m ay be overcome through long-term loans and  g ran ts  provided by international 
financial in stitu tions or lending States. Lipper (1967), 39-40.
70 C hauhan  (1981), 137.
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with the UN C harter w as incorporated and  expanded in UNGA Resolution 2625 
(XXV), adopted on 24 October 1970,71 containing the ‘D eclaration on Principles 
of In ternational Law concerning Friendly Relations and  Co-operation am ong 
S tates in accordance with the C harter of the United N ations’.72 This resolution, 
adopted by consensus, solemnly proclaim s a num ber of principles identified as 
governing all S ta te s ’ relations, namely:
1. The du ty  of S ta tes to co-operate with one ano ther in accordance with the 
C harter;
2. The principle of sovereign equality of S tates -  one of the UN C harter’s 
fundam ental principles
3. The principle th a t S tates shall settle their in terna tional d ispu tes by peaceful 
m eans;
4. The principle th a t S tates shall fulfil in good faith the  obligations assum ed by 
them  in accordance with the Charter;
5. The principle th a t S tates shall refrain in their in terna tional relations from 
the th re a t or u se  of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other m an n er inconsisten t with the 
pu rposes of the  UN;
6. The principle of non-intervention in the in terna l affairs of ano ther State; 
and
7. The principle of equal rights and  self-determ ination of peoples.
A lthough sub ject to criticism s both as to form and  su b stan ce ,73 the Declaration 
h a s  the  m erit of bringing different principles together u n d er the sam e heading. 
The re la tionsh ip  of some of these principles w ith the  principle of co-operation is 
clearly sta ted .
Some of these  principles are particularly helpful in the determ ination of the 
content of co-operation, especially in the context of in terna tional w atercourses. 
Thus, the  relationsh ip  between the principle of co-operation and  some of the 
o ther principles of th e  D eclaration will now be exam ined.74
71 Also printed as  Appendix in Lowe and W arbrick (eds.)(1994), 256-263.
72 For an  in-depth  analysis of the Declaration and its elaboration process, see Sinclair (1994).
73 See Salm on (1991), 419-420.
74 This no tw ithstanding  the fact th a t other general principles of law are relevant in the context 
of in ternational water resources, such as the polluter-pays principle.
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2 .3 .2  T h e P r in c ip le  o f  S o v e r e ig n ty  a n d  E q u a lity  o f  S ta te s
The concept of sovereignty may be considered in different senses, legal and 
non-legal. In the  context of the debate over Europe, the  Select Committee on 
the E uropean  C om m unities of the House of Lords referred to three distinct 
senses of sovereignty. First, sovereignty is u sed  to describe ‘the suprem e 
au thority  in the  in terna l order of a S ta te’, such  as  a King or Queen. Second, the 
concept is u sed  in in ternational law to describe the characteristics of a State. 
This includes a  settled population, a  defined territory, a  governm ent with power 
to m ain ta in  its in terna l order, and  independence in the conduct of its 
in ternational relations. Third, the term  is also u sed  in a political sense to 
describe ‘the ex tent to which a  S tate h as  a  power of effective or unfettered 
action’.75
The general principle of the sovereignty and  equality  of S tates is one of the 
foundations of in terna tional law.76 For th is  reason , th is  principle is 
in terconnected  w ith alm ost all o ther principles, including th a t of co-operation.77
The underlying concept of sovereignty does not imply unlim ited  power. O ther 
S tates have equal stand ing  u n d er in ternational law and  are also sovereign. The 
sta te  rem ains a  sovereign sta te  in in ternational law and  continues to be able to 
guide its fu tu re  destiny w ithin the limits th a t it h a s  itself accepted’.78 In other 
words, national sovereignty is limited in term s of power where international 
obligations begin,79 for instance, the acceptance of any treaty  obligation or the 
m em bersh ip  of an  in ternational organisation. The la tter, for example, implies 
the accep tance of the  organisation’s ru les and  procedures. Hence, sovereignty 
is ‘no longer abso lu te  b u t sh a red ’.80
In the  field of in te rna tional environm ental law, com prising the law of w ater 
resources, Perrez developed a  theory where co-operation is considered simply
75 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Com m unities, Political Union: Law-Making 
Powers and Procedures, 17th Report, Session 1990-91, a t 8.
76 Recognised in Article 2, paragraph  1 of the UN Charter.
77 For the relationship  between co-operation and  sovereignty, see W arbrick (1994), in 
particu lar a t 220.
78 L auterpacht (1997), 149.
79 Id.
80 Sir Eli Lauterpacht, in ILA, 5 International Law  Forum (2003), No.3, 219.
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an elem ent of the concept of sovereignty.81 The theory of co-operative 
sovereignty82 holds th a t co-operation between S ta tes is not a principle 
independent from th a t of sovereignty, bu t ra th e r an  elem ent of its notion. The 
principle of sovereignty is argued to include the elem ents of independence and  
freedom, b u t also the positive elem ent of m em bership  in the in ternational 
com m unity w ith its  inheren t authority, responsibility, and  duty  to participate 
actively in the  com m unity. This theory is p u t forward th rough  a  functional 
analysis of the  concepts of sovereignty and perm anen t sovereignty, where these 
principles are said  to inherently  include a duty  to co-operate.83
Perrez argues th a t the evolution of the concept of sovereignty resu lts  from 
existing problem s of environm ental, economic and  social n a tu re , which hardly 
ever conform to s ta te  boundaries b u t are ra th e r of regional or global scope, and 
consequently  canno t be solved by S tates acting independently .84 Sovereignty as 
responsibility to co-operate, however, is argued no t to elim inate the elem ent of 
independence. S ta te s ’ different goals and  priorities are considered of equal 
value, b u t in case of conflicting or overlapping in terests, such  as those related 
to developm ent and  environm ent, co-operation is necessary  to reach  equitable 
and  balanced  so lu tions.85
The reasoning  beh ind  th is  theory agrees with the  theory of limited territorial 
sovereignty. B u t how m uch does th is theory really contribute  in the field of 
in terna tional w ater resources? In its essence, and  since its  am bit is wider than  
in te rna tional w atercourses, th is theory offers little m ore th an  a  theoretical 
approach  to corroborate the w ell-established doctrine of equitable and 
reasonable u tilisation . In fact, the concept of co-operative sovereignty applies to 
both  the theory  of equitable and  reasonable u tilisation  and  th a t of common 
m anagem ent. The difference lies in the required level of co-operation. For 
example, jo in t in s titu tio n s  may exist in both, a lthough they are com pulsory in
81 In the debate in the ILC concerning the legal principle of in ternational co-operation, some of 
the m em bers expressed the view th a t this was a necessary elem ent of the principle of sovereign 
equality of S tates. See Yrbk ILC [1987], Vol. II, Pt. 2, 21.
82 See Perrez (2000), especially 255-317.
83 Within the m eaning of the phrase ‘obligation to co-operate’, the au th o r distinguishes a 
‘general duty to co-operate’, which refers to an  ‘indefinite obligation to co-operate’, and ‘concrete 
obligations to co-operate’, which consist of obligations ‘to act in a specific way’. Perrez (2000), 
261. See also infra s .3 .2 .7 .
84 Perrez (2000), 86. See also Hohm ann (1994), 185.
85 Perrez (2000), 340.
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the latter. None of the  existing concrete obligations to co-operate ‘require S tates 
to give u p  all their autonom y and  freedom ’.86
B ut the underly ing  issue rem ains alm ost un touched . T hat is, w hat exactly does 
co-operation entail? This is not analysed, ju s t  referred to. Nevertheless, this 
theory is innovative in its perspective, in approaching  the question of 
sovereignty from a  procedural point of view ra th e r th a n  from the traditional 
substan tive  one. And as we have seen, procedural ru les, as forms of 
co-operation, are implied and  are required for the im plem entation of the 
substan tive principles of equitable and  reasonable utilisation and  the 
prohibition of causing  significant harm .
2 .3 .3  T h e P r in c ip le  o f  P erm a n en t S o v e r e ig n ty  o v e r  N atural 
R e so u r c e s
The principle of perm anen t sovereignty over n a tu ra l resources is 
w ell-established. The evolution and  developm ent of the  concept h as  gone 
th rough  different stages.87 The right of S tates to p erm an en t sovereignty over all 
their n a tu ra l resources h a s  been declared and  reaffirm ed several tim es a t the 
in terna tional level. Since the early 1950s with the p rocess of decolonisation in 
newly independen t S tates, the problem of ow nership of n a tu ra l resources, such 
as  oil, by foreign entities led to the discussion of the  subject in the UNGA and 
to the assertion  of the  principle in several resolu tions.88
In Resolution 626 (VII) of 21 December 1952, one of its earliest resolutions on 
the subject, the  UNGA recognised th a t ‘the right of peoples to u se  and  exploit 
their n a tu ra l w ealth  and  resources is inheren t in their sovereignty’. B ut it was 
Resolution 1803 (XVII) adopted in 1962 that, although non-binding, h as  been 
viewed as declaratory  of existing law.89 This resolution recognised the
86 Ibid., 317.
87 For a detailed accoun t of the evolution of this principle, see Chow dhury (1984), or Schrijver 
(1997), Ch.2.
88 And later on to the right to nationalize or to control foreign-owned resources and industries, 
in order not to be bound by foreign investm ent protection legislation. See the ‘Declaration on the 
E stab lishm ent of a New International Economic O rder’ (NIEO), UNGA Resolution 3201 (S-VI), 
adopted in 1974; and  Article 2 of the 1974 C harter of Economic Rights and  Duties of States, 
which specified th a t the right included ‘possession, use, and  disposal, over all its natu ra l 
resources’. Several developed S tates voted against this resolution.
89 Birnie and  Boyle (2002), 138. See generally Brownlie (1979), and  Schrijver (1997).
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advantages of in ternational co-operation for the economic development of 
developing countries, notably through the exchange of technical and  scientific 
inform ation in the  developm ent and  use  of the resources.
There is universal recognition th a t S tates are fully entitled  to exploit the 
n a tu ra l resources in  their own territories. B ut th is  does not in any way imply 
th a t S ta tes in exploiting their resources may cause significant harm  to other 
S tates. In fact, a lthough the principle of perm anen t sovereignty over na tu ra l 
resources h a s  been reiterated  as such, it is in practice qualified by treaty and 
custom ary  ru les concerning the conservation of n a tu ra l resources and 
environm ental protection.90 This supports the proposition th a t sovereignty is in 
effect lim ited in m atters  th a t concern the in terna tional com m unity as a  whole.
This point m ay be exemplified by Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm 
D eclaration on the H um an Environm ent which affirms th a t ‘S tates have, in 
accordance w ith the C harter of the United N ations and  the principles of 
in ternational law, the  sovereign right to exploit their own resources p u rsu a n t to 
their own environm ental policies, and  the responsibility  to ensure th a t 
activities w ithin their ju risd iction  or control do not cause dam age to the 
environm ent of o ther S tates or of areas beyond the  limits of national 
ju risd ic tion .’ This principle was reiterated in Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio 
D eclaration on Environm ent and  Development, w hich also referred to 
‘developm ental policies’, and  recognised by the ICJ as  a rule of general 
custom ary  in terna tional law.91
2 .3 .4  T h e  P r in c ip le  o f  E quitab le an d  R e a so n a b le  U tilisa t io n
On the b asis  of s ta te  practice, the principle of equitable and  reasonable 
u tilisation, ‘the key principle of international law in th is  a rea ’,92 was laid down
90 Id. See, e.g. the 1968 African Convention, and the 1992 CBD.
91 In its advisory opinion on The Legality o f the Threat or Use o f  Nuclear W eapons, ICJ Reports
(1996), 241-2, p ara .29, the Court affirmed that The existence of the general obligation of States 
to ensure th a t activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environm ent of other 
S tates or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating 
to the environm ent’. This was recalled by the ICJ on the G abcikovo-Nagym aros Project case, ICJ 
Reports (1997), 41, p ara .53.
92 C om m entary to Article IV of the 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules.
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initially in the  1966 ILA Helsinki Rules (Articles IV and  V).93 It soon found 
support from several bodies, such  as the B rund tland  G roup of Legal Experts, 
who included ‘equitable u tilisa tion’ in their Draft Convention on Environm ental 
Protection and  Sustainab le  Development.94 Later it w as included in the 1997 
UN W atercourses Convention (Articles 5 and 6), and  in a  num ber of regional95 
and  b ilateral in terna tional agreem ents.
Equitable and  reasonable utilisation consists of the right of the riparian  State 
to u se  the  w aters of the w atercourse to the sam e degree as the other riparian 
S tates. This right is based on the theory of the sovereign equality of States. The 
right to use  the w ater by the w atercourses S tates are ‘qualitatively equal to, 
and  correlative with, those of other w atercourse S ta te s ’.96 However, th is  does 
not m ean th a t each State concerned is entitled to an  equal share  of the uses 
and  benefits of the  w atercourse; nor th a t the w aters are divided into equal 
portions.97 R ather it m eans th a t each State is entitled to use  the w ater ‘in such 
a  m an n er as to achieve the m axim um  benefit for all w ith a  m inim um  of 
detrim ent to each ’.98 B ut how does th is principle of equitable and  reasonable 
use  assum e legal expression, and  how is it applied in practice?
Even w ithin a  fram ew ork of legal principles and  concepts accepted by the 
parties in the  negotiation of a  treaty  regarding the  u se  of the w aters of an 
in terna tional w atercourse, the problem of concretisation of such  principles into 
ru les  defining the  legal regime rem ains to be solved. Applying the principle of 
equitable an d  reasonable utilisation requires a  complex determ ination. As, for 
in stance , w ith the  delim itation of continental shelves in accordance with 
equitable principles, the scope of the right of equitable u tilisation depends on 
the facts an d  c ircum stances of each individual case, and  specifically on a 
weighing of all relevant factors. For th is purpose, Article V of the 1966 ILA
93 Although Article 3 of the 1961 IDI Salzburg Resolution had already referred to it.
94 See M unro and  Lam m ers (1987), 72-5.
95 Such as  the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention, Article 2(2), and  the 2000 SADC 
Revised W ater Protocol, Article 3(7) and (8).
96 1994 ILC’s Draft Articles, 88-135, 98. See also com m ent (a) to Article IV of the 1966 ILA 
Helsinki Rules.
97 Id.
98 Lipper adds th a t equitable utilisation requires ‘beneficial u se ’, i.e., th a t an  use should only 
be protected in so far as  it reaches ‘sufficient economic or social benefits to its u se r so th a t it is 
reasonable, u n d er all circum stances, th a t its continuation should be considered’. Lipper (1967), 
63.
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Helsinki Rules and  Article 6 of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention provide a 
useful guide for the m anner in which S tates are to im plem ent th is  principle, by 
setting forth assessm en t c rite ria"  to be followed by each State to ensure 
com pliance.100 According to Article 6 of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention, 
these include:
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological, 
factors of a natural character;
and other
(b) The social and economic needs of each State concerned;
(c) The population dependent on the watercourse;
(d) The effects of the use or uses on the other co-riparian States;
(e) The existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of 
resources and the costs of measures taken to that effect;
the water
(g) The availability of alternatives, of corresponding value, to a particular
planned or existing use.
This list of criteria, which is not exhaustive,101 clearly indicates the need for 
collaborative w ork between geographers, engineers, econom ists and  lawyers in 
the application of in terna tional law. The priority and  weight given by each State 
to each factor h a s  ‘to be determ ined by its im portance’ in a  comparative 
judgm ent of all factors (Article 6(3)). Approaches adopted by S tates have been 
diverse, w ith the  m ajor problem  in applying th is  principle being quantifying the 
weight of the  different u ses, and  assessing  the benefits derived therefrom, as 
well as  the ir c o s ts .102 One m ethod suggested to m easure  these benefits takes 
into acco u n t ‘all costs likely to be caused by the alteration  of the w ater flow and 
of the  u sa g e s ’.103 In order to apply the principle of equitable utilisation, it seems 
clear th a t the  n a tu ra l characteristics of the flow should  constitu te  the basis for 
the sharing  of th e  w ater volume, and  for th is  purpose  the collection and 
exchange of d a ta  an d  inform ation on the w atercourse is essen tia l.104
"  For a com prehensive study  of these criteria, see Fuentes (1996).
100 C om m entary to Article 6, 1994 ILC’s Draft Articles, 101.
101 Article 13 of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules adds the term  ‘hydrogeographic’ to paragraph (a), as 
the Rules also consider groundw ater, and two other factors, namely, ‘the sustainability of 
proposed or existing u s e s ’, and  ‘the minimization of environm ental h a rm ’.
102 Although ‘in the light of ju risp rudence...the m ost relevant factors to be taken into account 
are those related to the w ater requirem ents of the sta tes  concerned .’ See Fuentes (1996), 412.
103 See for the problem s of quantification, Hafner (1993), 140.
104 See infra s .4.2.
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The central problem  of th is  principle is, in fact, its application in practice, since 
it does not in itself provide legal certainty and  it frequently requires a complex 
balancing process. Article 6(2) of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention 
a ttem pts  to answ er th is  question by suggesting the entry  into consultations 
between w atercourse S tates Svhen the need a rise s’. This m eans th a t th is form 
of co-operation is dependent upon the request of one w atercourse State. This 
falls sh o rt of requiring w hat we consider essential for an  efficient process th a t 
aim s a t ‘a tta in ing  optim al and  sustainab le  u tilization’ of the w atercourse 
(Article 5(1)).
For th is reason, the  estab lishm ent of institu tional m echanism s or the creation 
of a jo in t com m ission would undoubtedly  be useful, no t only a t the m inisterial 
level for the determ ination of policies, b u t, m ost im portantly , a t the technical 
level for the  analysis and  exchange of d a ta  and  inform ation and  for the 
im plem entation of the policies.105 This h as  been recognised over time in 
different reg ions.106 Nevertheless, there is as yet no obligation requiring the 
estab lishm ent of jo in t m echanism s or com m issions to facilitate co-operation 
th rough  positive jo in t m anagem ent.107
It h as  been argued by Fuentes th a t the principle of equitable and  reasonable 
u tilisation  does no t depend on the principle of co-operation for its operation, 
since the form er is a  principle of general in terna tional law and  may be applied 
by a  th ird  party  arb itrato r in the context of the judicial settlem ent of 
d isp u te s .108 It is subm itted  th a t an  exam ination of the  relevant international 
jud icial decisions poin ts to a  different conclusion.109
At th is  stage a  d istinction  m ust be drawn betw een the  im plem entation of the 
principle of equitable and  reasonable u tilisation in the  context of diplomatic 
relations betw een the  S tates interested, and  in the  context of a  d ispute already 
brought before an  in terna tional court or tribunal. In the  first case, S tates face 
the difficult ta sk  of determ ining w hat is equitable and  reasonable. If the
105 See also 1986 McCaffrey’s Second Report, 132, para. 177.
106 See, e.g. Article V of the 1968 African Convention, and, more recently, Article 5 of the 2000 
SADC Revised W ater Protocol, and Article 9 of the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention.
107 See infra s .5.2.
108 Fuentes (1998), 128-9.
109 In particular, the Lake Lanoux arbitration, and the Gabcikovo-Nagym aros Project case.
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riparian  S ta tes have already concluded an  agreem ent regarding the 
w atercourse concerned, it is likely th a t they have already agreed on some form 
of apportionm ent of the w ater or institu tionalised  some form of co-operation -  
m ost obviously the exchange of some relevant inform ation. If S tates have not 
yet en tered  into any sort of agreem ent, it is clear th a t some form of 
co-operation is required  in order to apply the substan tive  principle. How would 
it be possible to determ ine w hat is equitable and  reasonable w ithout the 
necessary  d a ta  and  inform ation on the different p a rts  of the  river basin  or the 
p lanned  u se s  of o ther riparian  S tates? A State could unintentionally  ‘discover 
the lim its of its rights only by depriving ano ther S tate of its equitable sh a re ’.110 
It m ay be logically deduced, as a  m atter of com m on sense, th a t as a  m inim um  
an obligation to exchange inform ation ex ists .111
In the second case, in the few instances concerning in terna tional w atercourses 
brought before in terna tional courts and  tribunals, the  legal question was one of 
in terpretation  and  application of treaty  ru les -  an  application of the principle of 
co-operation - , and  the role of the court or trib u n a l h as  been limited to 
assessing  w hether a  particu lar S ta te’s conduct h ad  been equitable and 
reasonable, or to pointing out w hat was not considered equitable and 
reasonable, ra th e r  th an  determ ining how  th is  should  be atta ined  in the 
particu lar case. The following case illustrates this.
In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case ,112 after citing the judgem ent of the 
PCIJ in the  River Oder case regarding the com m unity of in terest of riparian 
S ta te s ,113 the  ICJ held th a t Slovakia, by its un ila tera l diversion of the D anube 
and  by un ila tera lly  assum ing control of a shared  resource, had  deprived 
H ungary of ‘its  righ t to an  equitable and  reasonable  share  of the na tu ra l 
resources of th e  D an u b e’.114 The Court pointed ou t th a t the D anube is not only 
a  shared  in te rn a tio n a l w atercourse, bu t also an  in terna tional boundary river to
110 1987 McCaffrey’s Third Report, 23, para.32.
111 It may also be argued th a t o ther procedural obligations are required. See infra Ch.4. In fact, 
for riparian  S tates, the exchange of data  and inform ation ‘serves to foster the minimal 
co-operation essential to their beneficial use of their shared  w ater resources. The objective here is 
to avoid costly and  unnecessary  d isputes by promoting, through m inim al duties, essential 
co-operation between the S ta tes concerned.’ 1982 Schwebel’s Third Report, 103-4, para. 158.
112 (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgm en t of 25 Septem ber 1997. For an  analysis of the case, see infra 
s .3.2.6.5.
113 See infra s .3.2.6.2.
114 P aras.85 and  152.
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which the principle of the  perfect equality of all riparian  S tates applies. 
However, the  C ourt did no t specify w hat the equitable an d  reasonable solution 
would be. Instead , the Court required the parties to resum e co-operation 
w ithout prescrib ing the resu lts  to be reached by fu rther actions. The Court 
explained its position as follows:
In this case, the consequences of the wrongful acts of both Parties will be wiped out ‘as 
far as possible’ if they resume their co-operation in the utilisation of the shared water 
resources of the Danube, and if the multi-purpose programme, in the form of a 
co-ordinated single unit, for the use, development and protection of the watercourse is 
implemented in an equitable and reasonable manner. What it is possible for the Parties 
to do is to re-establish co-operative administration of what remains of the Project.115
As m entioned before, the m ajor problem in applying the principle under review 
is the weighting of the different u ses  and  assessing  and  balancing the benefits 
derived therefrom , and  th is  requires policy decisions th a t go beyond the legal 
field. T hus, it is argued th a t although theoretically speaking international 
courts and  trib u n a ls  m ay apply the substantive principle to the particu lar case, 
th is  is no t realistic in practice w ithout some form of co-operation ex ante or ex 
post betw een the  riparian  States.
It also confirm s th a t the ICJ, like other courts or tribunals , limited itself to 
saying w hether a  particu la r conduct had  been equitable or reasonable -  which 
indeed w as usually  the question brought before the Court -  b u t did not and 
could n o t say w hat exactly an equitable and  reasonable  u se  is, since th is 
depends on a  nu m b er of different factors which vary with the situation and 
context.
2 .3 .5  T h e P r in c ip le  o f  P r ev en tio n  o f  S ig n if ic a n t  T ran sb ou n d ary  
H arm
The principle of the  ‘harm less use of territory’, or sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedas, ‘is a  reflection of the sovereign equality of S ta te s .’116 In the 1955 8th 
edition of O ppenheim , edited by Sir Hersch L auterpacht, the  principle was 
explained as follows:
115 Para. 150.
116 McCaffrey (1993), 107.
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The responsibility of a State may become involved as the result of an abuse of a right 
enjoyed by virtue of International Law. This occurs when a State avails itself of its right 
in an arbitrary manner in such a way as to inflict upon another State an injury which 
cannot be justified by a legitimate consideration of its own advantage . . . The duty of 
the State not to interfere with the flow of a river to the detriment of other riparian 
States has its source in the same principle. The maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedas [so use your property as not to harm that of another], is applicable to relations 
of States no less than to those of individuals; it underlies a substantial part of the law 
of torts in English law and the corresponding branches of other systems of law; it is one 
of those general principles of law recognised by civilised States which the Permanent 
Court is bound to apply by virtue of Article 38 of its Statute.117
It is supported  by in ternational courts and  tr ib u n a ls ,118 in b ila tera l119 and 
m ultilateral tre a tie s ,120 and  it is expressly provided for in Article 7 of the 1997 
UN W atercourses Convention.121 Most doctrine recognises th a t th is  principle is 
already p a rt of the  corpus of custom ary in ternational law .122
The obligation no t to cause significant tran sb o u n d ary  h arm  to the environm ent 
of ano ther S tate h a s  two corollaries. On the one h and , it implies an  obligation 
of prevention, of due diligence, a  negative obligation. On the other hand, an 
obligation requiring positive action, which consists of elim inating or mitigating 
the harm  already caused. The causing of harm  generates sta te  responsibility ex 
p o st facto .123
117 O ppenheim  (1948), 313-4; (1955), 345-7.
118 See e.g. Trail Sm elter  Arbitration (1938, 1941), and Corfu Channel Case (1949). In relation to 
the environm ent, see the Legality o f the Threat or Use o f  Nuclear W eapons Case (1996). In the 
context of in terna tional watercourses, see Lake Lanoux Arbitration (1957) and the 
G abcikovo-Nagym aros Project Case (1997). On state responsibility, see generally infra Ch.6.
119 See, e.g. Art. IV of the 1909 Boundary W aters Treaty between C anada and the United 
States.
120 See, e.g. Article 2 of the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention. This regional convention 
has  as m ain purpose the prevention, control and reduction of transboundary  impact. See also 
Article 16 of the 1968 African Convention.
121 See com m entary to Article 7 of the 1994 ILC’s Draft Articles, 102.
122 See, e.g. Caflisch (1989), 139; McCaffrey (2001), 380; Tanzi and Arcari (2001), 160; Birnie 
and  Boyle (2002), 310-1; Dellapenna (2003); and  the com m entary to Article 16 of the 2004 ILA 
Berlin Rules. See also B runnee (1989), 806, and H ohm ann (1994), 197, who argue th a t the 
prohibition to cause significant pollution is a norm  of ju s  cogens.
128 See infra Ch.6.
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In the context of in ternational w atercourses, th is  duty  relates m ost obviously to 
pollution; th is  m ay have different sources, such  as  agricultural run-off, 
industria l effluents, or dom estic sewage. Issues of w ater quantity , however, 
m ay be involved as  well.124 This m ay be the case w here the upstream  State 
transfers  w ater from one river system  to ano ther w ithin its territory, or where 
there is a  release of a high quantity  of w ater from a  dam  upstream , or where 
consum ption  is so high th a t the volume of w ater flowing dow nstream  is 
reduced  to the  ex tent th a t it causes significant harm , such  as  drying out the 
river bed and  consequently  dam aging the aquatic ecosystem , or no t leaving a 
sufficient volume of w ater for household w ater supply.
In the Lake Lanoux A rbitration,125 it m ay be inferred from the C ourt’s 
explanation concerning the diversion of 25 per cent of the flow of the Carol 
River, th a t it accepted the principle th a t an  u p p er riparian  State acts 
unlawfully if it modifies the w aters of a  river in their n a tu ra l condition causing 
serious in jury  therefrom  to a lower riparian  State. The Court noted th a t Spain 
could have argued th a t due to the complexity of the  proposed works there 
could be no assu ran ce  of restitu tion  of w ater in quality or quantity  to the 
n a tu ra l con tribu tion  of Lake Lanoux to the Carol River. Since Spain did not 
argue th is, the  T ribunal felt it could no t consider it. From another point of view, 
the neighbouring S tate cannot object to the w orks carried out by another 
riparian  State, u n less  its  own in terests in the fresh w aters are affected 
su b stan tia lly .126
As with the  principle of equitable utilisation, problem s exist with the practical 
application of th is  principle, notably with the determ ination of the threshold. 
The s tan d a rd  of due diligence, or the taking of ‘all appropriate m easu res’, is 
also considered in  order to determ ine ‘significant’ h a rm ;127 and  also to verify if 
the harm  resu lts  from inequitable or unreasonable u s e .128
124 This is the reason  why is the ILC did not confine the scope of Article 7 of the 1997 UN 
W atercourses Convention to m atters of water quality.
125 For an  analysis of th is case, see infra s.4.3.1.3.
126 O ther cases referring to this principle include, e.g. Connecticut v. M assachusetts  282 US 
660 (1931).
127 The ILC used  on its earlier drafts other term s such  as ‘serious’ an d  ‘appreciable’ harm.
128 The criteria to which the degree of diligence is required may vary. For this criteria, see 
Nollkaemper (1993), 40.
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There is continuing  debate as to the balance to be s tru ck  between the two 
substan tive principles. If an  upstream  State decides to build a dam  and a 
hydro-electric power p lan t on an transboundary  river as a  m easure to help 
develop the  region, b u t th is use would interfere w ith the am ount of water 
available dow nstream  for irrigation on a land, the population of which largely 
depends on agricu lture for its subsistence, is the p lanned  use  equitable and 
reasonable even though it produces significant harm ?
A m ethod of balancing the two substantive principles considered by the ILC 
gives priority to the obligation not to cause significant harm  by labelling th is 
use  inequitab le .129 However, Article 7 of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention, 
which reflects the com promise achieved in the m atter, favours the principle of 
equitable u tilisa tion :130 a  S tate should take ‘all appropriate  m easures to prevent 
the causing  of significant h a rm ’; b u t if th is  nevertheless occurs the harm ing 
State h as  first the  obligation to enter into consu lta tions w ith the affected State 
in order to determ ine the extent to which the harm ful u se  is equitable and 
reasonable, and  secondly w hether the harm ing S tate should  ad just its use  and 
take appropriate  m easures to elim inate or m itigate such  harm . In other words, 
the causing  of significant harm  does not necessarily  engage the responsibility 
of the harm ing  S ta te .131
Another related  problem  is th a t of the content of the h u m an  right to w ater.132 
This right, w hich ‘entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically 
accessible and  affordable w ater for personal and  dom estic u se s ’,133 has 
obviously im plications a t the in ternational level. For instance, in negotiations, if 
a  riparian  S tate  argues th a t the quantity  of w ater it needs is for the survival of 
both  h u m an  beings and  other living beings, and  o ther co-riparian argues th a t it 
requires a  certa in  am oun t of water for the production  of hydro-electricity or
129 This prim acy was defended earlier by McCaffrey, who argued th a t it is easier to determ ine
th a t this obligation h a s  been breached than to determ ine the limit of a use as equitable and
reasonable, and  th a t th is prim acy would be in a form to protect w eaker S tates th a t have suffered 
the harm , for ‘it is not open to the stronger state to justify a use giving rise to the harm  on the
ground th a t it is equ itab le’. See McCaffrey (1989), 510.
130 See McCaffrey (1998), 21-22.
131 See infra Ch.6.
132 On the h u m an  right to water, see generally, e.g. Salm an and  Mclnerney-Lankford (2004) or 
Dubreuil (2006).
133 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15, adopted 
on 26 November 2002. This in terprets Articles 11 and 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and  C ultural Rights, which refer to the right to an  adequate standard  of living 
and  the right to the h ighest attainable standards of health.
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irrigation, the  form er h as  priority in the u se  of the  w ater. This is because 
‘priority in the  allocation of w ater m u st be given to the right to w ater for 
personal and  dom estic u s e s ’,134 th a t is, h u m an  life and  health  always takes 
precedence over economic developm ent.135 B ut in fact, in the m ajority of cases, 
th is  should  no t affect the other w ater uses, as the am oun t of w ater necessary 
for the basic h u m an  needs of the population is very sm all in com parison to the 
large quan tities  u sed  for economic developm ent.136
Since the  facts and  circum stances of the cases vary enorm ously, d ispu tes may 
be avoided by im plem enting these ‘flexible’ princip les137 th rough  the application 
of several procedural ru les derived from the general obligation to co-operate, 
such  as the obligation to provide inform ation on p lanned  m easures, which may 
be common to all cases and  more precise in co n ten t.138 Indeed, it h as  been 
argued -  th rough  a  ra th e r overstretched deduction -  th a t these procedural 
obligations, and  a fortiori the  general obligation to co-operate, are norm s of ju s  
cogens due to their ‘indirect linkage to the occurrence of significant pollution 
and  its indispensability  for the co-existence of the com m unity of S ta tes’. This 
a rgum ent of juristic  inevitability139 is based  on the  prem ise th a t the obligation 
no t to cause significant harm  to the environm ent of o ther S tates is itself a norm  
of ju s  cogens.140 However, there is no convincing evidence to support such a 
prem ise.
2 .3 .6  T h e P r in c ip le  o f  G ood N e ig h b o u r lin ess
As w ith the  no significant harm  principle, the principle of good neighbourliness 
derives from the  Roman law m axim ,141 followed by the com m on law doctrine, of 
sic utere tuo u t  a lienum  non laedas  (so use  your own property as not to injure 
your neighbour). This principle was then  developed by using  a  com parative law
134 Id.
135 Fitzm aurice (2001), 462.
136 Dubreuil (2006), 5.
137 See McCaffrey (1998), 23, para .32.
138 See infra Ch.4.
139 Presented by D enm ark and The N etherlands in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases; ICJ 
Reports (1969), 29, p a ra .37.
140 B runnee (1989), 806, and  Hohm ann (1994), 197.
141 E.g. Berber (1959), 196. This is, however, considered uncerta in  by some writers, such as 
Lammers (1984), 570.
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approach from the abuse of rights d o c t r i n e 14? and  asserted  by A ndrassy143 as 
p art of in terna tional law .144 It is recognised in several international 
in s tru m e n ts .145
This principle is interconnected with the obligation of S tates not to cause 
significant harm . Good neighbourliness m eans th a t S tates allow some form of 
m inim al dam age.146 It derives from the physical in terdependence of co-basin 
S tates and  im plies reciprocity.147 In the relations betw een riparians th is may be 
illu stra ted  by the fact th a t the w ater received by the  lower riparians will not 
have the sam e quality as th a t originally coming from the  spring.
Although the explicit reference to the principle w as no t introduced in the 
wording of Article 8 on the Principle of Co-operation in the 1997 UN 
W atercourses Convention,148 there is a reference to it in Paragraph 6 of the 
Pream ble to the Convention.
Some au th o rs  argue th a t the principle of good neighbourliness provides the 
limit to the du ty  no t to cause significant harm  in so far as it involves ‘a  duty to 
tolerate to a  certain  extent harm ful effects caused  by activities not in 
them selves unlaw ful, und ertak en  in neighbouring S ta te s ’.149 In fact, it is widely 
accepted th a t in a  w atercourse some degree of harm ful effect will necessarily be 
caused, w hich illu stra tes  the im portance of the determ ination of a threshold at 
w hich dam age m ay entail liability. The im portance of th is  threshold  is evident 
in the  d iscussion  of the terminology used  in Article 7 during  the ILC’s different
142 See Politis (1925). For example, the harm ful diversion of w aters by the upstream  States may 
not be the exercise of a legal right, bu t an  abuse of th a t right due to the negative consequences 
th a t m ay produce on the other State. On the theory of abuse of rights, see e.g. Berber (1959), 
195-210, Lam m ers (1984), 572-7, and Jennings and W atts (1992), 407-10.
143 See A ndrassy  (1951).
144 For the doctrinal evolution of the principle, see McWhinney (1991), 428-431, and Lammers 
(1984), 563-569.
145 Such as  Article 74 of the UN Charter, and Article 10 of the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses 
Convention, which m entions good neighbourliness as one of the basis for consultations. See also 
the Lake Lanoux arb itra tion , 24 ILR (1957), a t 197. While arguing th a t France needed Spain’s 
consent to proceed with w orks in its territory, Spain recognised th a t ‘A State has the right to use 
unilaterally the p art of a  river which traverses it to the extent th a t its use  is likely to cause on the 
territory of ano ther S tate a limited harm  only, a minimal inconvenience, which comes within the 
bounds of those th a t derive from good neighbourliness’.
146 See Lam m ers (1984), 568.
147 Lester (1963), 833.
148 Proposed by Portugal, and supported by Argentina, Iraq and  Germany, all downstream  
States.
149 Hafner (1993), n.57.
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drafts and  the  final text of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention. The term s 
un d er d iscussion  were those of ‘significant’, ‘se rio u s’, and  ‘appreciable’ harm . 
In addition, in the 1994 Draft Articles, the ILC proposed the s tandard  of ‘due 
diligence’, which w as later on altered in the Sixth Com m ittee to ‘all appropriate 
m easu res’, th u s  u sing  the sam e terminology as the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses 
Convention and  the 1982 UNCLOS.
The concept provides guidelines, b u t it lacks ‘precise ru les for determ ining 
rights and  du ties flowing from neighborship in concrete s itu a tio n s .’150 These 
lacunae have been filled by procedural obligations, such  as consultations, 
which require an  assessm en t of the potential im pact of p lanned activities and 
works on o ther S tates.
2 .3 .7  T h e P reca u tio n a ry  P r in cip le
Originating in national law, the precautionary  principle or approach h as  gone a 
long way to become one of the m ost significant principles of m odern 
in ternational environm ental law .151
Though no t consistently  defined,152 the precautionary  principle is expressed in 
Principle 15 of the  1992 Rio Declaration on Environm ent and  Development in 
the following term s:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied 
by states according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
This principle calls for environmental decision-m aking a t an early stage. 
Accordingly, protective m easures m ust be adopted even in the absence of a 
scientifically proven risk, provided th a t the risk  is plausible. This approach
150 Lester (1963), 833.
151 For an  exam ination of the precautionary principle, see e.g. H ohm ann (1994), Freestone and 
Hey (1996), and  Fitzm aurice (2001), 259-279. In the latest edition of Principles o f Public 
International Law, Brownlie finally recognises the precautionary  principle as an  emergent, but 
still evolving, legal principle. Brownlie (2003), 275-6.
152 E.g. Freestone (1994), 23, and Sands (2003), 267 and 272. See also Hohm ann (1994), 334, 
for a sum m ary of the differentiation between the precautionary  principle and the principle of 
preventive action.
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changes the  role of scientific da ta  and  m ay shift the bu rden  of proof,153 since 
‘[i]t requires th a t once environm ental dam age is th rea tened  action should be 
taken  to control or abate  possible environm ental interference even though there 
may still be scientific uncerta in ty  as to the effects of the  activities.’154
In reality, th is  principle or approach ‘helps determ ine w hether a risk is 
sufficiently foreseeable and  serious to require a  response, bu t it cannot 
determ ine w hat th a t response should b e’.155 In o ther words, the m ethod of how 
to control the risk  or the judgm ent of w hat level of risk  is acceptable is left for 
policy m akers and  politicians, ra ther th an  scientists or co u rts .156
While the principle is adopted by a  growing num ber of S tates and  international 
organisations both  in trea tie s157 and  as a m atte r of policy,158 its meaning, 
precise con ten t and  im plications are still ra th e r  vague.159 The practice of 
in ternational courts and  tribunals  and  of the S ta tes appearing before them  
have con tribu ted  to its  clarification.160
In the Nuclear Tests II case, New Zealand relied on the  precautionary  principle, 
arguing th a t France should  provide evidence th a t the introduction of 
radioactive m aterial by the nuclear test would not cause dam age to the m arine 
environm ent, an d  contended th a t the precautionary principle was very widely 
accepted in contem porary in ternational law .161 Similarly, in the
153 C ontrary to the traditional approach, the shift here m eans th a t it is the potential actor who 
w ishes to carry  ou t the activity th a t has to prove th a t it will not cause harm  to the environment. 
See S ands (2003), 273.
154 Freestone (1994), 211.
155 Birnie an d  Boyle (2002), 120.
156 Ibid., 119.
157 E.g. the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention, Article 2(5).
158 See Article 23 of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules.
159 This includes issu es  as  to selective application, different th resholds of harm , burden of 
proof, and consequences of application. See Birnie and  Boyle (2002), 119-120. Trouwborst 
identified three core elem ents of the principle am idst the definitions used  by States in different 
contexts. They are: (1) a  th rea t of harm, (2) uncertainty, and  (3) action. Trouw borst (2006), 286. 
McIntyre and  Mosedale contend th a t effective and  satisfactory im plem entation of the principle 
can be achieved, inter alia, by m eans of precautionary assessm ent, the setting of precautionary 
s tan d ard s and  the discharge of ancillary inform ational obligations. McIntyre and Mosedale
(1997), 241.
160 The ECJ h as  applied the principle and referred to it as a ‘general principle of Community
law’. Case C -132 /03  Codacons [2005] ECR p.1-4167, p ara .35. See also, e.g. Case T -13/99  Pfizer
Animal Health v Council [2002] ECR p.11-03305, p a ra .l 14.
161 New Zealand Request, para. 105. See also the d issen t opinion of Judge W eeramantry, ICJ 
Reports (1995), 342.
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Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, both H ungary and  Slovakia invoked the 
p recautionary  principle. Again, the ICJ did no t expressly refer to the principle, 
b u t it m ade references in passing to H ungary’s claim th a t the principle justified 
the term ination  of the 1977 Treaty and the need of the parties to take 
precautionary  m easu res .162
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna C a ses ,^  both New Zealand and  A ustralia invoked 
the p recau tionary  principle. In its order of 27 A ugust 1999, the International 
T ribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) did no t express its opinion on the 
approach, b u t considered th a t there was scientific uncerta in ty  regarding 
m easures to be taken  to conserve the stock (para. 79) and th a t the parties 
should ‘act with prudence and  caution to ensure  th a t effective conservation 
m easures are taken  to prevent serious harm  to the  stock (para. 77). In his 
separate opinion, however, Judge Treves m entioned th a t the precautionary 
principle is inheren t in the very notion of provisional m easures, and  th a t the 
requirem ent of urgency is satisfied only in the light of the precautionary 
app roach .164
In the MOX Plant Case, Ireland claimed th a t the  United Kingdom had  not 
applied the principle and  th a t it had  the burden  of dem onstrating  th a t no harm  
would arise from the  operation of the p lan t.165 In its  order of 3 December 2001, 
ITLOS sta ted  th a t ‘prudence and caution require th a t Ireland and the United 
Kingdom co-operate in exchanging inform ation concerning risks or effects of 
the  operation of the MOX plan t and in devising ways to deal with them , as 
ap p ro p ria te ’ (para. 84)
A m uch-debated  issue concerns the legal s ta tu s  of th is principle.166 
In ternational co u rts  and  tribunals have been re lu c tan t to recognise explicitly 
the custom ary  in terna tional law character of the  principle. Although some
162 ICJ Reports (1997), 62, para.97 and 68, para. 113.
163 (New Zealand v. J a p a n ; Australia v. Japan) Provisional M easures, p a ras .77-9.
164 Separate opinion, p a ra .8. See also separate opinions of Judge Lang and A d Hoc Judge 
Shearer.
165 S tatem ent of Claim of 25  October 2001 (para.34), before ITLOS. Ireland also claimed it in its 
Memorial of 26 Ju ly  2002 (para.6.21), before the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal.
166 See Birnie and  Boyle (2002), 118. For an  analysis into the s ta tu s  of the precautionaiy 
principle in in ternational law, see e.g. McIntyre and  Mosedale (1997) and  Trouwborst (2002).
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w riters defend th a t it is still evolving,167 recently m ore w riters contend th a t it 
h as  already developed into a  binding rule of custom ary  in ternational law .168 
Trouw borst sum m arises the evolution of the principle as follows:
In an attempt to reconstruct the principle’s legal development, it can be held that a 
period of ambiguity, similar to the one described by the ICJ in the 1974 Fisheries 
Jurisdiction case existed during the roughly five years preceding the 1992 UNCED. 
Nevertheless, although in hindsight many writers -  rightly, it is submitted here -  
propose the Rio Conference as a major landmark in the legal evolution of the principle, 
on the basis of currently available information it is difficult and perhaps impossible to 
pinpoint with certainty the exact moment at which the metamorphosis of the 
precautionary principle from a non-binding principle into a mandatory one occurred. . . 
This does not detract from the fact, however, that at some point within a period of 
roughly one and a half decades, starting with its explicit emergence in international 
discourse in the mid-eighties, the precautionary principle has developed into a binding 
norm of customary international law.169
The relation of th is  principle of environm ental law with the principle of 
co-operation in the  context of w ater resources m ay be felt in different w ays,170 
the m ost ap p aren t of which relates to the obligation to provide da ta  and  
inform ation on a  river basin  or p lanned works, including environm ental im pact 
assessm ents. A pertinen t question is, for example, w hether in the context of 
in terna tional w atercourses the planning S tate should  be prevented from 
proceeding with its  project on the basis of the p recau tionary  principle if it does 
no t have sufficient data. Application of a  p recau tionary  approach may be 
justified  in th is  case by several reasons. These m ay include the lack of or level 
of u n ce rta in ty  concerning da ta  available, the lack of environm ental im pact 
a ssessm en t p rocedures concerning the p lanned  m easures, the political 
m ishandling of th e  scientific information, or a  h istory  of w eak compliance with 
the existing legal regime. Particular treaties seek to rem edy these problems, for
167 E.g. S ands (2003), 279, although he asserts th a t the principle is already a custom ary rule 
in the context of the E uropean  Union, and th a t there is already enough broad support to argue 
that the principle reflects custom ary law.
168 E.g. McIntyre an d  Mosedale (1997), 241, and Trouw borst (2002), 286.
169 Trouw borst (2002), 276.
170 See Article 2(4) of the 1994 Danube Convention, which estab lishes a direct link between the 
precautionary principle and  the principle of co-operation.
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instance, by specifying d a ta  collection m ethods an d  techniques. Nevertheless, 
the application of the  principle requires a case-by-case an alysis .171
2 .3 .8  T h e P r in c ip le  o f  S u sta in a b le  D e v e lo p m e n t
Sustainab le  development, defined as ‘development th a t m eets the needs of the 
p resen t w ithout com promising the ability of fu tu re  generations to m eet their 
own n eed s’,172 is a  concept th a t expresses a  goal to be achieved both at the 
national and  in ternational level.173 As a legal term , its  em ergence com prises two 
m ain dim ensions: environm ent and  development. B ut in in ternational law the 
norm ative con ten t of th is  concept is ra ther vague and  still evolving.174 While 
incorporated in num erous in ternational and national legal in s tru m en ts ,175 and 
referred to in different in ternational decisions, the legal s ta tu s  of the concept is 
still u n c lea r.176 Nonetheless, it h as  been argued th a t ‘the  very idea of 
susta inab le  developm ent is enough to point [a court or] tribunal tow ards a 
coherent approach  to a  decision in cases where developm ent and  environm ent 
conflict’.177
In the context of in ternational w atercourses the concept of sustainable 
developm ent w as referred to for the first tim e by the ICJ in the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case ,178 where the C ourt recognised th a t the ‘need 
to reconcile econom ic development with protection of the  environm ent is aptly 
expressed in the  concept of sustainable developm ent’.179 Judge  W eeramantry, in 
h is  separa te  opinion, distinguishes h is view from th a t of the Court. He 
considers su sta in ab le  development to be ‘m ore th an  a  m ere concept, bu t as a
171 Sands (2003), 279.
172 The concept w as p u t forward by the World Commission on Environm ent and Development 
(WCED), also known as  the B rundtland Commission. WCED (1987), 43.
173 See generally, e.g. Fuentes (1998); Sands (1999), and (2003), 252-66; Fitzmaurice (2001), 
47-64; Hafner (2003).
174 For an  account of its evolution, see the 2002 ILA Report on the Legal Aspects of Sustainable 
Development, 4-6.
175 Such as  the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (Article 8), or the 1999 Convention on 
the Protection of the Rhine (Article 3). The 1997 UN W atercourses Convention speaks only of the 
principle of ‘susta inab le  u tilization’ (Article 5(1)).
176 See, e.g. Boyle and  Freestone (eds.)(1999), 16; and Lowe (1999), 20.
177 Lowe (2000), 217.
178 For an  analysis of the case, see infra s .3.2.6.5.
179 ICJ Reports (1997), 67, para. 140.
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principle with norm ative value’.180 Further, he explains th a t the principle of 
susta inab le  developm ent is th u s  a  part of m odern in terna tional law by reason 
not only of its inescapable logical necessity, b u t also by reason  of its wide and 
general acceptance by the global com m unity’.181
In an  a ttem pt a t defining the legal contours of the concept, the ILA adopted the 
2002 ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of In ternational Law Relating to 
S usta inab le  Development, which reflect some of the principles of the 1992 Rio 
D eclaration. They are the duty  of S tates to ensure  susta inab le  use of na tu ra l 
resources; the principle of equity, both  in ter-generational and 
in tra-generational,182 and  the eradication of poverty; the  principle of common 
b u t differentiated responsibilities;183 the principle of the precautionary 
approach to h u m an  health , n a tu ra l resources and  ecosystem s;184 the principle 
of public partic ipation and  access to inform ation and  justice; the principle of 
good governance; and  the principle of integration and  interrelationship, in 
particu lar in relation to h u m an  rights and  social, economic and  environm ental 
objectives.185 These principles reveal the very wide scope of the concept.
The principle of sustainab le  development im plies co-operation. The ILA 
recognises th a t the du ty  of co-operation is an essential du ty  in the achievem ent 
of global susta inab le  development and the protection of the environm ent, as 
well as in the a tta inm en t of equity in the developm ent opportunities of 
developed an d  developing countries, and  for the  eradication of poverty 
(para. 2 .3).186 S ta tes are under th is duty to co-operate, b u t other relevant 
actors, su ch  as  in ternational organizations, corporations, non-governm ental 
organizations an d  civil society, ‘shou ld ’ also co-operate (para. 3 .1).187
180 Ibid., 88.
181 Ibid., 95.
182 That is, the need to preserve the natu ral resources for the benefit of present and future 
generations.
183 This im portan t principle includes two elements. First, the common responsibilities of S tates 
for the protection of the environm ent a t national, regional and global levels; and second, the need 
to take into accoun t the economic and developmental situation of the State and  its contribution 
to the em ergence of environm ental problems. Fitzmaurice (2001), 65.
184 See supra  s .2.3.7.
185 That is, su sta inab le  development involves a com prehensive and  integrated approach, which 
also includes the needs of curren t and future generations.
186 See in particu lar principles 5, 7 and 27 of the 1992 Rio Declaration and  Ch.2 on 
International Co-operation for Sustainable Development of the 1992 Agenda 21.
187 In its 2002 Report on the Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development the ILA considers th a t 
‘the principle of the duty to co-operate’ is well-established in in ternational law.
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A con trast m ay be draw n between the concept of susta inab le  development and 
th a t of co-operation. Both concepts are only referred to in general term s in 
in ternational trea ties and  decisions, and  their concrete application varies from 
case to case. However, their na tu re  differs. Sustainab le  developm ent is a goal 
or asp iration , and  th u s  it is the taking into account of the concept in the 
decision-m aking process which is relevant. Conversely, co-operation, in the 
context of in ternational rivers, is a m eans to a tta in  optim um  utilisation and 
protection of the  w atercourse, and  th u s  it is the outcom e which is relevant.
These two principles in teract in several different con tex ts.188 Principle 27 of the 
1992 Rio D eclaration estab lishes this relationship in general term s. It reads as 
follows:
States and peoples shall co-operate in good faith and in a spirit of partnership in the 
fulfilment of the principles embodied in this Declaration and in the further development 
of international law in the field of sustainable development.
Com plem enting the Pream ble of the Declaration, which recognizes ‘the goal of 
establishing a  new and  equitable global partnersh ip  th rough  the creation of 
new levels of co-operation am ong States, key sectors of societies and  people’, 
Principle 7 specifies th a t the purposes of co-operation on sustainable 
developm ent are ‘to conserve, protect and  restore the hea lth  and  integrity of the 
E a r th ’s ecosystem ...’.
While m any  decisions regarding sustainab le  developm ent are m ade a t the 
national level as  p a rt of policy decisions, in ternational co-operation is of the 
essence to im plem ent these decisions, as is widely show n in international 
treaties and  o ther docum ents. Fresh water, like o ther n a tu ra l resources,189 is 
no exception.190
188 On the relationship  between these two principles, see the 2002 ILA Report on the Legal 
Aspects of Susta inable Development, 7.
189 Such as  fisheries. See, e.g. Articles 5, 8 and 20 of the 1995 UN Agreement Relating to the 
Conservation and  M anagem ent of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.
190 See, e.g. Article 5 of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention and  Article 3(1) of the 1992 
Helsinki W atercourses Convention.
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2 .3 .9  T he P r in c ip le  o f  G ood F a ith
At the h ea rt of the concept of co-operation lies the fundam ental principle of 
good faith, 191 the foundation of all aspects of in ter-s ta te  relations. In 
in ternational law, as in dom estic legal system s, all obligations are to be fulfilled 
in good faith. In the words of Hugo Grotius:
For good faith, in the language of Cicero, is not only the principal hold by which all 
governments are bound together, but is the key-stone by which the larger society of 
nations is united. Destroy this, says Aristotle, and you destroy the intercourse of 
mankind. 192
As stated  by the tribunal in the Lake Lanoux arb itra tion , ‘there is a  general and 
w ell-established principle of law according to w hich bad  faith is not p resum ed’, 
and  a  State is entitled to rely on the word of ano ther S ta te .193 This was later 
reiterated by the ICJ in the Nuclear Tests Case, b u t th is  time expressly 
recognising good faith as an  inheren t com ponent p a rt of the principle of 
co-operation. The Court explained th a t ‘One of the  basic principles governing 
the creation and  perform ance of legal obligations, w hatever their source, is the 
principle of good faith. T rust and  confidence are inheren t in international 
co-operation, in particu la r in an  age when th is  co-operation in m any fields is 
becom ing increasingly essen tia l’.194 One of these fields is undoubtedly  th a t of 
n a tu ra l resources.
The principle u n d er discussion is referred to in num erous international 
docum ents, su ch  as  the UN C harter,195 and  the 1970 D eclaration on Principles 
of In te rnational Law concerning Friendly Relations and  Co-operation among 
S tates in A ccordance with the C harter of the UN. In the law of treaties this 
principle is acknow ledged as being essential. This is shown in the pream bles to
191 For an  exam ination of the principle of good faith in in ternational law, see Schwarzenberger 
(1957), 15ff; Chen (1953), 106-60; O’Connor (1991); White (1994); Goodwin-Gill (2004); and Kolb 
(2006).
192 (1625) De Jure Belli ac P ads, Book III, Ch.25: Conclusion.
193 24 ILR (1957), 126.
194 ICJ Reports (1974), 268, para.46. The cited dictum  implies th a t the principle of good faith 
applies also to un ila tera l acts. See Virally (1983), 132. But in the Border and Transborder Armed  
Actions case the ICJ added th a t the principle of good faith ‘is not in itself a source of obligation 
where none would otherw ise exist’. ICJ Reports (1988), 105, p a ra .94.
195 See Article 2(2).
111
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of T reaties196 and  the 1978 Vienna 
Convention on Succession of S tates in Respect of Treaties, which declare th a t 
the principle of good faith, together with the principles of free consent and 
pa c ta  su n t servanda , are universally recognized. In fact, th is principle is 
considered no t only to be the basis b u t also an  integral p art of the principle 
pa c ta  su n t se rv a n d a , 197 which is enshrined in Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. In the G abcikovo-Nagym aros Project case 
the ICJ s ta ted  th a t the rule pacta  su n t servanda , as reflected in Article 26, 
required the parties to find an  agreed solution w ithin the  co-operative context 
of the 1977 Treaty. The Court explained th a t ‘Article 26 com bines two 
elem ents, which are of equal im portance. It provides th a t “Every treaty in force 
is binding upon  the parties to it and  m u st be perform ed by them  in good faith .” 
This la tter elem ent, in the Court's view, implies th a t, in th is  case, it is the 
purpose of the  Treaty, and  the in tentions of the parties in concluding it, which 
should prevail over its  literal application. The principle of good faith obliges the 
Parties to apply it in a reasonable way and in such  a  m an n er th a t its purpose 
can be realized.’ (para. 142).
In effect, the C ourt also applied the general rule of in terp re ta tion  of treaties laid 
down in Article 31 of the  1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Article 31(1) provides th a t a treaty shall be in terpreted  in good faith in 
accordance w ith the ordinary m eaning of its term s in their context and in the 
light of the object and  purpose of the treaty.
As regards trea ties  which are not yet in force, S tates are obliged to refrain from 
acts w hich would defeat the object and  purpose of the treaty  after having 
signed it or expressed  their consent to be bound by the treaty, th u s  implying a 
good faith co n d u c t.198
In the context of in ternational natu ra l resources, as  in m ost other fields, th is 
principle is also m entioned in num erous treaties and  other international
196 See also Articles 26 and  31(1), which are declaratory of custom ary rules. Virally (1983), 
130.
197 See Virally (1983), 132, and Fitzmaurice (2003), 183.
198 Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In the sam e line, Article 7 
of the 1961 IDI Salzburg Resolution provides th a t ‘during negotiations, every State m ust, in 
conformity with the principle of good faith, refrain from undertak ing  the works or utilizations 
which are the object of the dispute or from taking any other m easures which might aggravate the 
d ispute or render agreem ent more difficult.’
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docum ents.1"  It is clear from the analysis of these trea ties and  docum ents, of 
o ther sta te  practice, as  well as of in ternational case law, th a t good faith is 
required in the perform ance of various specific obligations of co-operation.200
In the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention, the  link with the principle of 
co-operation w as inserted  explicitly by the Sixth Committee in the wording of 
Article 8 on the general obligation to co-operate.201 In addition, the obligation to 
en ter into consu lta tions V ith  a  view to negotiating in good faith ’ for the 
purpose of concluding an agreem ent is enshrined  in Article 3(5) and  may be 
triggered by a single w atercourse State when it considers th a t the provisions of 
the Convention need to be adapted  to a particu la r w atercourse.202 Also in 
relation to these obligations, the Convention provides in Article 17(2) th a t 
S tates m u st in good faith pay reasonable regard to the rights and  legitimate 
in terests  of the o ther S tate during consultations and  negotiations.203
Generally speaking, and  as in other areas of the law,204 the more vague the 
specific du ties to co-operate and the more open the procedures involved are, 
the more im perative it is for S tates to act in good faith. And th is is always 
presum ed of actors in the  in ternational legal order.205
2 .3 .1 0  T h e P r in c ip le  o f  th e  P e a ce fu l S e t t le m e n t  o f  In tern a tio n a l 
D isp u te s
Over cen turies, S tates and  in ternational organizations have created substantive 
and  p rocedural ru les in order to settle d ispu tes peacefully. This principle h as  
its foundation  in the text of the UN Charter. Article 2(3) and  (4) provides th a t 
‘[a]ll M em bers shall settle their international d ispu tes by peaceful m ean s’, and 
th a t ‘[a]ll M em bers shall refrain in their in ternational relations from the th reat 
or u se  of force’, th u s  expressly prohibiting recourse to force.206 In addition to
199 E.g. Principle 7 of the 1978 UNEP Principles on Shared N atural Resources.
200 A good example is th a t of the obligation to negotiate. See infra s .4 .5 .1.
201 See infra s .3 .2 .3 .2  and  3.2.4.3.
202 See also Articles 2(6) an d  9 of the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention.
203 See also Article 10 of the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention. See infra s .4 .5 .1.
204 See, e.g. in relation to international dispute settlem ent, Peters (2002), 133.
205 See, e.g. Virally (1983), 132.
206 Except in the case of a right to self-defence in the event of an  arm ed attack.
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these, Article 33 of the UN C harter estab lishes an  obligation for the Parties to 
‘seek a  so lu tion’ by peaceful m eans in the cases w here the continuance of the 
d ispute ‘is likely to endanger the m aintenance of in ternational peace and 
security ’.207 But, as Brownlie argues, there is ‘no obligation in general 
in ternational law to settle  d isp u tes’.208
The UN h a s  reiterated  th is  obligation and  further elaborates it in some UNGA 
reso lu tions.209 This principle may also be found in o ther regional or bilateral 
in stru m en ts  with a  focus on co-operation.210 In addition, in the Nicaragua case 
the ICJ affirmed th a t th is  principle is already p a rt of custom ary in ternational 
law.211
Different p rocedures for peaceful d ispute resolution m ay be freely chosen by 
the parties in the  dispute. These include direct negotiation, enquiry, good 
offices, m ediation, conciliation, arbitration, and  judicial settlem ent.212 Most 
in ternational d ispu tes are, nonetheless, resolved by diplom atic m eans, on the 
basis of the legal advice provided by in ternational law experts.
S tates are som etim es bound  by specific m eans for d ispu te  settlem ent under 
regional or b ilateral treaties. This is particularly  im portan t in the context of 
w ater d isputes. In th is  respect, Article 52(2) of the UN C harter reads th a t States 
parties should  ‘m ake every effort to achieve pacific settlem ent of local d isputes 
th rough  su ch  regional arrangem ents. . . before referring them  to the UN 
Security C ouncil’. This is so in the context of d ispu tes over n a tu ra l resources 
since m ost of them  are in fact of regional or local character.
207 See generally H utchinson (1993), who argues th a t there is an  obligation to take action to 
resolve d ispu tes in som e o ther cases.
208 Brownlie (2003), 671.
209 See, e.g. the 1970 Declaration on Principles of In ternational Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and  Co-operation among States in accordance with the C harter of the UN, which 
stipulates th a t the parties to a dispute have an obligation ‘to refrain from any action which may 
aggravate the situation  so as  to endanger the m aintenance of in ternational peace’, and the 1982 
Manila Declaration on the Pacific Settlement of International D isputes, UNGA Resolution 37 /10 , 
of 15 November 1982.
210 This m ay be illustrated  by Article 111(4) of the C harter of the Organization of African Unity, 
and Article 23 of the C harter of Organization of American States.
211 ICJ Reports (1986), p a ra .290. For a criticism of this assertion  by the Court, see H utchinson 
(1993), 117-9.
212 For an exam ination of the obligation to negotiate and its relation to other m eans of dispute 
settlem ent, see infra s .4.5.2.
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D isputes concerning w ater resources relate in one way or another with 
co-operation or its  absence. When S tates decide to settle a  d ispute by peaceful 
m eans according to Article 33 of the UN C harter, and  they bring the dispute 
before a  court or tribunal, th is may be taken  as  indicating th a t alternative 
forms of co-operation a t their disposal, in particu la r negotiations, have not 
succeeded.
3
T h e  C o n c e p t  o f  
C o - o p e r a t i o n
A word has a meaning, more or less vague; but the meaning is 
only to be discovered by observing its use: the use comes first, and 
the meaning is distilled out o f it. The relation o f a word to its 
meaning is, in fact, o f the nature o f a causal law ... 
Bertrand Russell, On Propositions: What They Are and
How They Mean, 1919
The concept of co-operation is widely used today. B ut in different contexts 
different m eanings m ay be identified, in m ost in stan ces associated with its 
specific applications. So the question is w hether there are any  circum stances in 
which the  express u se  of the term  ‘co-operation’ m ay have legal implications, 
particu larly  on the  in ternational plane.
We have seen  in the previous chapter how the principle of co-operation 
in tertw ines w ith several other principles of in terna tional law. But the 
vagueness of the  term  allows for its use w ithout the  identification of any 
substance  or application, th a t is, w hat S tates, in terna tional organisations or 
private en tities are  required to do in practice. T hus, even if the obligation to 
co-operate is ap p aren t, its application h as  to be determ ined in the light of all 
the facts and  c ircum stances of each individual case. Hence, the principle needs 
to be exam ined for its  own legal character and  its  legal consequences to be 
determ ined.
This chap ter begins by focusing on the essence of the  principle of co-operation 
in general and  in  the  context of the law of in terna tional w atercourses. The
m eaning of the term  co-operation and  its varian ts, including de facto -
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diplom atic -  and  de jure co-operation, is exam ined in s ta te  practice, notably in 
its absorption into in ternational legal in strum en ts, in the relevant international 
case law, and  in the views of publicists.
In addition, a  com parative analysis of the role and  application of the duty to 
co-operate in relation to other fields related to the protection of the 
environm ent is m ade.
3 .1  In G eneral
The concept of co-operation has been used  for cen tu ries in political discourse 
with no legal con ten t and  is still widely used  today; it is u sed  in m ost instances 
in a  procedural sense to indicate attem pts to resolve differences. But in 
in ternational law co-operation is a  frequently u sed  term -of-art. It is a general 
concept com prising a  series of obligations in different con tex ts.1
Generally speaking, co-operation may be defined as  the action of working 
together for the sam e purpose or on the same task . At the in ternational level, 
the concept im plies the jo in t work of two or m ore S tates, or international 
intergovernm ental and  non-governm ental organizations, or private entities, for 
a  com m on purpose so th a t all may share the benefits.
In th is  sense, the  em phasis of co-operation lies on the  collective action of States 
engaged in jo in t projects for the common well-being or progress, a jo in t effort 
tow ards a  com m on end where States recognize th a t the m utual benefit 
outweighs any  individual advantage.2 Although a t the bilateral level the 
c ircum stances of the  particular case are addressed, it is with m ultilateralism  
th a t in terdependence is recognized a t regional and  global level.
1 See, e.g. Lowe an d  W arbrick (eds.)(1994), where co-operation was examined as a principle 
related to the environm ent, terrorism, and UN peacekeeping; and  Delbriick and Heinz 
(eds.)(2002), where th is concept is related to the in ternational protection of Hum an Rights, 
international economic law, and  international dispute settlem ent.
2 The advantages of, and conditions for, co-operation have been analyzed by applying game 
theory and the p risoner’s dilemma by Axelrod (1990) and Benvenisti (1996) in interdisciplinary 
studies with a stronger focus on political science and  in ternational relations. For its legal 
implications, see also Benvenisti (2002). For an  overview of these perspectives, see infra s .3.2.7.
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Nevertheless, it is the exam ples of failure to co-operate, due to its often serious 
consequences, th a t raise aw areness th a t it is necessary . There is no doubt, 
however, th a t co-operative action is far more frequent th an  its absence. This is 
dem onstrated  by the num ber of agreem ents continuously  being concluded.
Friedm ann u sed  the expression the ‘in ternational law of co-operation’ to 
characterise  the  general m ovement th a t changed the principles and s tructu re  
of in terna tional law, which originated in the n ineteen th  century  and developed 
after World War II, as opposed to the ‘in ternational law of coexistence’ between 
sovereign States. The la tter was defined as ‘a set of ru les of abstention, of 
ad justm en t and  delim itation between different national sovereignties’. 
Conversely, the  ‘in ternational law of co-operation’ w as defined as positive rules 
in an  expanded in ternational legal order th a t includes new subjects of 
in ternational law.3 This development of in ternational law requiring States to 
co-operate in order to a tta in  objectives beneficial to all is more evident in areas 
such  as th a t of transboundary  na tu ra l resources. A lthough Friedm ann was 
speaking of in ternational co-operation in practice ra th e r th an  of a  legal 
obligation, h is concept of in ternational law a tte s ts  th a t the term  may denote 
not only passive diplom atic relations between S tates, b u t also to an  expanded 
type of in terna tional relations, the regulation of w hich calls for positive action 
with the purpose of achieving a  common goal. Indeed, the concept of 
co-operation m ay be considered as a m eans of active an d  practical expression 
of ‘in terdependence’ am ong S tates.4
W hether as  a  general purpose, a  principle or a  treaty  obligation, the concept of 
co-operation is u sed  in various in ternational legal in stru m en ts  applicable to 
widely different areas, from the Charter of the United N ations5 and  General 
Assembly R esolutions6 to bilateral and  m ultilateral conventions on the 
protection of th e  environm ent.7
3 See Friedm ann (1969), 92-93. See also Friedm ann (1964).
4 Pinto (1986), 133.
5 Articles 1(3), 55 an d  56.
6 E.g. UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV), adopted on 24 October 1970, containing the ‘Declaration 
on Principles of In ternational Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
in Accordance with the C harter of the UN’; or UNGA Resolutions 2995 (XXVII), of 15 December 
1972, and 3129 (XXVIII), of 13 December 1973, on co-operation between S tates in the field of the 
environm ent.
7 E.g. Articles 2(2), 3 and  4 of the 1985 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer; or 
para.9 of the Preamble, Articles 3(5) and 4(1) of the 1992 Convention on Climate Change.
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The frequent u se  of the concept in different legal in stru m en ts  raises the 
question of its legal s ta tu s . Is it ju s t  a  guiding purpose or is it a m eans to 
achieve an  end? As well as a  treaty  obligation, does it also constitu te a  general 
principle of law or a  rule of custom ary in terna tional law? And are these 
distinctions a t all relevant in practice?8
W ithout en tering  into a  ju risp ruden tia l discussion, it seem s appropriate here to 
briefly consider the distinction between principles and  ru les.9 According to 
D w orkin,10 principles are requirem ents of ju stice  or fairness or some other 
dim ension of morality. They point towards a  resu lt and  rem ain relevant even 
when they do no t prevail. They have a  dim ension of weight and  im portance and 
their relative weight h as  to be taken into accoun t w hen they intersect or 
conflict. They ‘do not set out legal consequences th a t follow autom atically when 
the conditions provided are m et’, bu t sta te  ‘a  reason  th a t argues in one 
direction, [and] do[...] no t necessitate a particu lar decision... All th a t is m eant, 
when [one says] th a t a  particu lar principle is a  principle of ... law, is th a t the 
principle is one which officials m u st take into account, if it is relevant, as a 
consideration inclining in one direction or ano ther’.11
Conversely, ru les are ‘functionally im portan t’, since they stipulate the answ ers, 
dictate the resu lt. They operationalize the social goal argued by the principle 
and  set ou t the legal consequences. When two ru les conflict, one of them  
canno t be a  valid ru le .12
This d istinction , however, is not always easy to draw. The difference may be 
limited to a  m a tte r  of form since sometim es principles and  rules play m uch the 
sam e role. Term s such  as ‘equitable’ or ‘reasonab le’ contained in a  rule make 
its application to some extent dependent upon  the principles or policies lying 
beyond it, m aking  ‘th a t rule itself more like a principle’.13
8 For practical reasons, the expressions ‘principle of co-operation’, ‘general obligation to 
co-operate’, and  ‘du ty  to co-operate’ will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis.
9 For a sum m ary of the debate on the subject, primarily between H art’s positivist legal theory 
and Dworkin’s theory of adjudication, see Freeman (2001), 347-350.
19 See Dworkin (1977), 22-8.
11 Ibid., 26.
12 Ibid., 27.
13 Ibid., 28.
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Brownlie considers th a t general principles of in terna tional law are ‘primarily 
abstractions from a m ass of ru les [that] have been so long and  so generally 
accepted as  to be no longer directly connected with s ta te  practice’.14 However, 
he w arns against the ‘inappropriateness of rigid categorization of the sources’. 
Principles m ay be discernible bu t their application h as  to be determ ined in the 
light of all the  facts and  circum stances of the particu lar situation.
In in terna tional law, ‘m any term s th a t are inherently  vague both for reasons of 
legal in terpretation  and  for political expediency -  “reasonable”, “equitable”, and  
“significant”, for example -  m ake precise definitions difficult during 
negotiations.’15 The concepts leave room for the parties  to decide w hat they 
m ean in practice from the context and  in the light of the object and  purpose of 
the treaty. The vagaries of particu lar treaty  drafting exercises cause a num ber 
of in terpretation  problem s.
Indeed, the concept u n d er scrutiny is a  very ab s trac t one, leading to legal 
uncerta in ty  in m any contexts. The work of in ternational courts and  tribunals, 
in ternational bodies and  learned societies, such  as the International Law 
Com m ission (ILC), the In stitu t de Droit In ternational (IDI) and  the International 
Law Association (ILA), and  the writing of publicists, help to clarify its scope, 
content, and  legal s ta tu s .
3 .2  In th e  C o n te x t  o f  I n te r n a t io n a l  W atercourses
In the context of international w atercourses, the principle of co-operation is 
articu la ted  as  a  general obligation in several in stru m en ts. In addition to the 
1997 UN W atercourses Convention and  o ther regional and  particu lar river 
treaties, th is  obligation is contained in num erous intergovernm ental and  
non-governm ental instrum ents, of different n a tu re , quite a  few of them  
focusing on environm ental protection. In an a ttem pt to establish  the scope, 
content, and  legal s ta tu s  of the obligation of co-operation, these in strum ents 
are exam ined below.
14 Brownlie (2003), 18-9.
15 Beach e ta l. (2000), 13.
120
3 .2 .1  G en era l P u rp o ses
The purposes of the obligation to co-operate have been identified in several 
in stru m en ts  in the  context of in ternational w atercourses. The reasoning is th a t 
since in terna tional w ater resources are shared, co-operation is crucial.16
Like the 1994 ILC Draft Articles, the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention and 
regional conventions set out a general form ulation of the purposes of 
co-operation.17 This is because more specific purposes m ay vary depending on 
certain  factors, such  as the geographical characteristics of the river basin, or 
the uses and  needs of the w atercourse S ta tes.18
A commonly referred to purpose is the effective m anagem ent and 
adm inistration  of the w atercourse system s, including the development of 
harm onized policies, program m es and strategies. O ther general purposes 
frequently m entioned include the optimal u tilisation  of the w ater resources, the 
equitable and  reasonable sharing of resources betw een the w atercourse States, 
the susta inab le  u se  and  development of the river basin , the prevention, 
m itigation or elim ination of transboundary  harm , and  the protection and 
conservation of the environm ent of the w atercourse system  and  the 
environm ent influenced by such  system s, such  as  the m arine environment. 
Co-operation appears as the sine qua non condition for achieving all these 
goals.
B ut besides these specifically in ternational w ater resources-related purposes, 
other general purposes typically linked to in terna tional co-operation are also 
relevant. Some derive from existing or em erging principles of public 
in ternational law. These comprise, inter alia, the prevention and  settlem ent of 
d isputes, the  im plem entation and enforcem ent of in ternational regimes, the 
protection and  advancem ent of environm ental rights, public access to relevant 
inform ation, as well as public participation in environm ental decision-making, 
and  the investm ent in capacity-building.
16 See, e.g. 1983 Evensen’s First Report, 173, para. 103.
17 E.g. Articles 5(2) and  8 of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention, and  Article 2(6) and  9 of 
the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention.
18 See the 1994 ILC Report, 106.
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3 .2 .2  T he G en era l O b liga tion  to  C o-op era te  a n d  i t s  A p p lica tio n s
F urther to the general reference to the need for, and  obligation of, co-operation, 
the concept is u sed  in some cases with a specific m eaning. In the law of 
in ternational w atercourses, the principle of co-operation is m anifested 
prim arily th rough  specific procedural rules. The ‘Procedural Law of 
C o-operation’,19 which h as  evolved significantly in recent decades, aim s at 
providing S tates with some guidance as to the best m anner of m aintaining 
co-operation on a  continuous basis concerning their common resources.20 Most 
procedural obligations developed from recom m endations and  rules of scholarly 
associations, and  gained consistency through treaty  practice, th u s  indicating 
an increasing willingness of S tates to have recourse to them  in order to avoid 
conflict.
The procedural ru les play a  decisive role in the  im plem entation of the 
substantive principles of equitable and  reasonable u tilisation  and of diligent 
prevention of significant transboundary  harm , as  well as in the protection of 
the environm ent. They help to ensure th a t in the decision-m aking process 
concerning existing and  planned uses of w ater resources the in terests of other 
S tates potentially affected are taken  into account.21
B ut which are the  concrete obligations to co-operate? These procedural rules 
are, inter alia, the  obligation to exchange da ta  and  inform ation, the obligation 
to notify p lanned  m easures and  environm ental im pact assessm ents, the 
provision of em ergency information, the obligation to en ter into consultations, 
and  the obligation to negotiate in good faith. They have evolved towards more 
intensive degrees of co-operation, notably through the adoption of an integrated 
m anagem ent approach  and the establishm ent of jo in t in stitu tional m echanism s 
or com m issions, an d  m erit separate assessm en t.22
Higgins (1994), 136.
20 Tanzi and  Arcari (2001), 21.
21 See infra s .4.1.2.
22 For the exam ination of these corollaries, see infra Ch.4, and  for the different forms and levels 
of co-operation, see infra C h.5.
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3 .2 .3  R e s o lu t io n s , D ec la ra tio n s , an d  S tu d ie s  b y  S ch o la r ly  
A s so c ia t io n s  an d  In tern a tio n a l O r g a n isa tio n s
To date the law related to in ternational w atercourses h as  been largely 
developed by s ta te  practice and has been the subject of several attem pts at 
codification by learned bodies.23 These include the IDI and  the ILA, each of 
which h a s  h ad  th is topic on its agenda over several years. B ut it was the work 
of the ILC for over two decades th a t led to the adoption by the UNGA of a 
fram ework convention on the m atter, the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention.24
While the ILC worked on the subject, the in ternational com m unity m onitored 
its progress. The increasing attention paid to w ater resources m atters over the 
past three decades led to a series of in ternational conferences and a 
m ultiplication of soft law instrum ents. These take differing approaches to the 
legal aspects  of in ternational co-operation over shared  n a tu ra l resources.
3 .2 .3 .1  R esolutions and Studies o f the In stitu t de Droit
International and the International Law A ssociation
The IDI and  the  ILA have over time favoured the lim ited sovereignty theory.25 In 
1961, the IDI adopted a t its Session a t Salzburg a  Resolution on the Utilization 
of Non-Maritime International W aters (Except for Navigation) reinforcing this 
theory. In its  Preamble, it recognises th a t ‘the m axim um  utilization of available 
n a tu ra l resources is a  m atter of common in te re st’ and  th a t ‘in the utilization of 
w aters of in te rest to several States, each of them  can  obtain, by consultation, 
by p lans estab lished  in common and by reciprocal concessions, the advantages 
of a  m ore ra tiona l exploitation of a  n a tu ra l resource’. This was the recognition 
of the need for co-operation.
Subsequently , th e  ILA adopted in 1966 the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the 
W aters of In ternational Rivers as a  statem ent of existing ru les of international 
law on the sub jec t of the uses of w aters of an  ‘in terna tional drainage b as in ’,26
23 F urther to the 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules, the m ost noteworthy com prehensive work is the 
2004 ILA Berlin Rules.
24 On the work of the ILC, see supra  s .2.1.3 and infra s .3 .2.3.2, and on the 1997 UN 
W atercourses Convention, see infra s .3.2 A .3.
25 See supra  s .2.2.3.
26 For the different approaches towards international water resources, see supra  s. 1.2.
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an im portan t codification of th is area of in ternational law. The Helsinki Rules, 
although non-binding, represent the first effort a t identifying in an 
all-em bracing m an n er the rights and  obligations of S tates over fresh water.
All uses of the  w aters were considered through a  com prehensive m anagem ent 
approach so as to optimise basin  w ater use. The Rules provide th a t each basin  
S tate is entitled  to ‘a  reasonable and equitable share  in the beneficial u se ’ of 
the w aters (Article IV and  V), subject to local factors. However, the duty to 
co-operate is no t m entioned expressly. Nevertheless, the recognition of the need 
for co-operation between co-riparians m ay be taken  to be implied, since the 
Rules recom m ended the adoption of some procedural ru les.27
In 1972, however, the ILA set forth a  specific obligation to co-operate in its 
Articles on Flood Control. It went on to specify some of the  m odalities this 
co-operation could assum e.28 The Article read as follows:
A rticle 3
C o -o p era tio n  w ith  re s p e c t  to  flood co n tro l m ay , by a g re e m e n t b e tw een  b a s in  S ta te s , 
in c lu d e  am o n g  o th e rs :
(a) co llec tio n  a n d  e x c h an g e  of re le v a n t d a ta ;
(b) th e  p re p a ra tio n  of su rv e y s , in v es tig a tio n s  a n d  s tu d ie s  a n d  th e ir  m u tu a l  exch an g e;
(c) p la n n in g  a n d  d es ig n in g  of re le v an t m e a su re s ;
(d) e x e c u tio n  o f flood co n tro l m e a su re s ;
(e) o p e ra tio n  a n d  m a in te n a n c e  of w orks;
(f) flood fo re c a s tin g  a n d  c o m m u n ica tio n  of flood w a rn in g s ;
(g) s e t t in g  u p  o f a  re g u la r  in fo rm a tio n  serv ice c h a rg e d  to  t r a n s m it  th e  h e ig h t of w a te r  
levels  a n d  th e  d isc h a rg e  q u a n titie s .
This is the  first time th a t the ILA asserted  th a t there was an existing 
in ternational law obligation falling upon basin  S tates to co-operate.29 This was 
the opinion of th e  majority, after a discussion on w hether by choice of the word 
‘shou ld ’ the article should have only a  soft law charac ter.30 The scope of the 
obligation w as considered by some, such  as M anner, as  uncertain , since the
27 These are the obligation to exchange data and inform ation and  the obligation to notify 
(Article XXIX).
28 These were included in Ch.VI on ‘Flood Control’ of the 1999 ILA Campione Consolidation.
29 Bourne (1996), 179.
30 Com ment to Article 2.
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practical requirem ents were not specified in any detail ‘by either law or 
custom ’.31
Thus, Article 3 encourages w atercourse S tates to conclude specific agreem ents 
on flood control and  provides a  non-exhaustive list of the ‘m ost urgent and 
m ost u su a l m easu res ’.32 B ut the ILA recognised th a t these m easures ‘do not 
rep resen t righ ts or obligations based on custom ary  law or on general 
p rincip les’;33 they required an  express agreem ent between governments. The 
m ost im portan t consideration was th a t there w as no obligation w ithout 
previous consent.
The 1979 IDI A thens Resolution, devoted to the pollution of rivers and lakes, 
also includes a  ru le which specifically im poses on S tates an  obligation ‘a t the 
in ternational level, [of] co-operation in good faith with the other S tates 
concerned’ (Article IV(b)). This obligation is required in order to comply with the 
duty  not to cause pollution in the w aters of in terna tional rivers and  lakes 
beyond S ta tes’ boundaries and  the duty to prevent and  m itigate any form of 
pollution. The Resolution went on to specify w hat, in th is  context, co-operation 
entailed. Article VII reads as follows:
1. In  c a rry in g  o u t  th e ir  d u ty  to  co -o p era te , S ta te s  b o rd e r in g  th e  sam e  h y d ro g rap h ic  
b a s in  sh a ll, a s  fa r  a s  p ra c tic a b le , especia lly  th ro u g h  a g re e m e n ts , r e s o r t  to  th e  following 
w ay s o f co -o p e ra tio n :
a) in fo rm  c o - r ip a r ia n  S ta te s  reg u la rly  of all a p p ro p r ia te  d a ta  o n  th e  p o llu tio n  of th e  
b a s in , i t s  c a u s e s ,  i ts  n a tu re , th e  d am ag e  re s u lt in g  from  it a n d  th e  p reven tive  
p ro c e d u re s ;
b) no tify  th e  S ta te s  co n c e rn e d  in  d u e  tim e o f an y  a c tiv itie s  en v isag ed  in  th e ir  ow n 
te r r ito r ie s  w h ic h  m ay  involve th e  b a s in  in  a  s ig n ific an t th r e a t  of t r a n s b o u n d a ry  
p o llu tio n ;
c) p ro m p tly  in fo rm  S ta te s  th a t  m ig h t be affec ted  by a  s u d d e n  in c re a s e  in  th e  level of 
t r a n s b o u n d a ry  p o llu tio n  in  th e  b a s in  a n d  ta k e  a ll a p p ro p r ia te  s te p s  to  re d u c e  th e  
effec ts o f a n y  s u c h  in c re a se ;
31 The 1972 ILA Articles on Flood Control, 23. Berber also believed th a t if any general 
principles of law existed, they were all so vague th a t they were incapable of immediate 
application, such  as  the principle of good neighbourliness. The 1972 ILA Articles on Flood 
Control, 45.
32 Comment to Article 3.
33 Id.
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d) c o n s u lt  w ith  e a c h  o th e r  o n  a c tu a l  or p o ten tia l p ro b le m s  of t r a n s b o u n d a ry  p o llu tio n  
of th e  b a s in  so  a s  to  re a c h , by m e th o d s  of th e ir  ow n cho ice , a  so lu tio n  c o n s is te n t 
w ith  th e  in te re s ts  of th e  S ta te s  co n c e rn e d  a n d  w ith  th e  p ro tec tio n  of th e  
en v iro n m e n t;
e) c o -o rd in a te  o r  pool th e ir  sc ien tific  a n d  te c h n ic a l re s e a rc h  p ro g ra m m e s  to  co m b a t 
p o llu tio n  o f th e  b a s in ;
f) e s ta b l is h  by co m m o n  a g re e m e n t e n v iro n m e n ta l n o rm s , in  p a r tic u la r  q u a lity  n o rm s  
for th e  w ho le  o r p a r t  o f th e  b as in ;
g) s e t  u p  in te rn a tio n a l  c o m m iss io n s  w ith  th e  la rg e s t te rm s  o f re fe ren ce  for th e  e n tire  
b a s in , p ro v id in g  for th e  p a rtic ip a tio n  o f local a u th o r i t ie s  if th is  p roves u se fu l, o r 
s tre n g th e n  th e  po w ers  o r co -o rd in a tio n  o f ex is tin g  in s t i tu t io n s ;
h) e s ta b l is h  h a rm o n iz e d , co -o rd in a te d  o r u n ified  n e tw o rk s  for p e rm a n e n t  o b se rv a tio n  
a n d  p o llu tio n  co n tro l;
i) develop  sa fe g u a rd s  for in d iv id u a ls  w ho m ay  be affec ted  by p o llu tin g  ac tiv itie s , b o th  
a t  th e  s ta g e s  o f p re v en tio n  a n d  co m p e n sa tio n , by  g ra n tin g  o n  a  n o n -d isc r im in a to ry  
b a s is  th e  g re a te s t  a c c e s s  to  ju d ic ia l a n d  a d m in is tra tiv e  p ro c e d u re s  in S ta te s  in  
w h ich  s u c h  a c tiv itie s  o rig in a te  a n d  by se ttin g  u p  c o m p e n s a tio n  fu n d s  for ecological 
d am ag e  th e  o rig in  o f w h ich  c a n n o t  be c lea rly  d e te rm in e d  o r w h ich  is  of ex cep tio n a l 
m a g n itu d e .
The term  shall ind icates the character of an obligation, b u t the caveat ‘as far as 
practicable’ adds an  elem ent of uncertainty. This is obviously explained by the 
fact th a t some of the  obligations here specified are no t directly applicable bu t 
require fu rther agreem ents with the other basin  S tates. That is also, justifiably, 
the reason  why the Article recom m ends the conclusion of specific agreem ents 
for the application of the different modalities of co-operation.
In step  w ith its  1972 ILA Articles on Flood Control, and  the 1979 IDI Athens 
Resolution on Pollution, the ILA adopted the 1982 M ontreal Rules on Water 
Pollution. Article 4 of the Rules im poses on S tates the duty  to co-operate with 
the other S ta tes  concerned in order to give effect to its provisions. The ILA, once 
again, considered  th is  duty a general principle ‘th a t is now generally 
accepted’,34 an d  th is  time the adoption of the Article m et with no opposition.35
The 1982 M ontreal Rules also include a  set of procedural rules. Articles 5, 6, 
and  10 set ou t m andatory  rules, such as  the regular exchange of all relevant
34 Com ment to Article 4.
35 Bourne (1996), 189.
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and reasonably  available d a ta  on the pollution of the  w aters of the basin, the 
obligation to notify in due time of any activities in their territories or of any 
sudden change of circum stances th a t may cause or increase w ater pollution in 
other S tates, the obligation of consultation on ac tual or potential problem s of 
w ater pollution in the drainage basin, and  the  obligation to enter into 
negotiations w hen it is contended th a t the conduct of a State is not in 
accordance w ith its obligations under the Articles. The relevance of the 
procedural ru les here is tha t, although they were already laid down in the 1966 
ILA Helsinki Rules, they had  then  the character of m ere recom m endations.
Several of these and other studies also recom m end the establishm ent of some 
form of institu tional m echanism  or jo in t com m ission as a m eans for 
m aintaining system atic co-operation.36
In the 2004 Berlin Rules on W ater Resources, the ILA adopted Article 11 which 
provides for an  obligation to ‘co-operate in good faith in the m anagem ent of 
w aters of an  in ternational drainage b as in ’. It decided to use  the sam e concept 
adopted in its 1966 Helsinki Rules, the concept of drainage basin, ra ther than  
the concept of international watercourse system  adopted in the 1997 UN 
W atercourses Convention, as the latter had  been the resu lt of a  compromise.37 
B ut similarly to th a t Convention, it expressly links th is  obligation with the right 
of basin  S tates to participate ‘in any co-operative regime th a t em erges’.38 The 
ILA affirmed th a t the duty  to co-operate is ‘the m ost basic principle underlying 
in terna tional w ater law ’.
3 .2 .3 .2  The Work o f the International Law C om m ission
The issue  of the  inclusion of the principle of co-operation in the draft articles 
on the law of th e  non-navigational uses of in ternational w atercourses and of its 
scope w as d iscussed  in a  num ber of sessions of the ILC.39 Two Special 
R apporteurs subm itted  drafts in their reports.49
36 See infra s .5.2.
37 On th is controversy, see s. 1.2.
38 Com ment to Article 11. See also Article 10 on participation by basin  States.
39 See in particu lar the debate in the meetings (2003rd-2008th) of the 39th session in 1987, 
Yrbk. ILC [1987], Vol.I, 70-96.
40 1983 E vensen’s First Report, 174; 1984 Evensen’s Second Report, 113; 1987 McCaffrey’s 
Third Report, 28.
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Special R apporteur Evensen suggested a  ‘general principle of co-operation’ 
am ong S tates in a  draft article subm itted in h is F irst Report, as well as some 
other procedural ru les u n d er the same heading.41 In h is Second Report, the 
Special R apporteur proposed the addition of a second paragraph  to em phasise 
th a t w atercourse S tates need appropriate assis tance  from international 
organizations, such  as the UN, FAO, UNESCO and  WHO.42
It m ay be of significance th a t at th a t time the Special Rapporteur explained the 
inclusion of the Article on ‘General principles of co-operation and  m anagem ent’ 
on the grounds th a t it was increasingly recognised, notably in the UN C harter 
and other in ternational instrum ents, th a t in ternational co-operation and 
in ter-sta te  m anagem ent and  adm inistration were necessary  ‘as an  international 
political principle and  as a  principle of progressive in ternational law as well’.43 
This is confirm ation th a t he considered th is  principle to be part of the 
‘progressive developm ent of international law’ role of the ILC, ra ther th an  th a t 
of codification.
Subsequently, Special R apporteur McCaffrey in h is Third Report surveyed the 
support for th is  general obligation in in ternational agreem ents, decisions of 
in ternational courts  and  tribunals, declarations and  resolutions adopted by 
intergovernm ental organisations, conferences and  m eetings, and studies by 
intergovernm ental and  non-governm ental organisations relating to the principle 
of co-operation.44 McCaffrey’s draft Article 10 separated  the general obligation 
to co-operate from other procedural obligations, as well as from the issues 
regarding m anagem ent. The text follows closely the wording of Article IV(b) of 
the 1979 IDI A thens Resolution and  Article 4 of the 1982 M ontreal Rules.
The debate on Article 10 at the ILC’s 39th session focused on the existence and 
n a tu re  of a  general obligation under in ternational law to co-operate. Several 
m em bers were of the  view th a t the obligation of co-operation was an obligation 
of conduct and  an  ‘um brella’ concept, since it com prised other more specific
41 Article 10 on 'General principles of co-operation and m anagem ent’, 1983 Evensen’s First 
Report, 174.
42 YrbkILC[ 1984], Vol.I, 102.
43 1984 Evensen’s Second Report, 112.
44 See 1987 McCaffrey’s Third Report, 23-8.
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obligations. This obligation existed under in ternational law as apparen t from 
in ternational in stru m en ts  and state practice. Co-operation, it was argued, 
‘enabled the sovereignties involved to coexist positively while preventing 
possible a b u se s ’.45
Conversely, o ther m em bers believed th a t there w as no general obligation on 
S tates to co-operate under international law, even if there was a  need for this 
co-operation am ong w atercourse States. Co-operation was considered a m eans 
to achieve a  goal, b u t did not have the na tu re  of a  legal obligation. Therefore, 
the wording of the Article should be cautious. Nevertheless, even if the 
obligation h ad  no firm foundation in custom ary law, the  ILC under its m andate 
for the progressive development of in ternational law could propose the 
obligation to co-operate de lege ferenda.
This divergence of opinion was no obstacle to the inclusion of an  article on 
co-operation. The drafting would have to reflect these differences. Special 
Rapporteur McCaffrey suggested th a t an  ab strac t obligation to co-operate 
would not serve the purpose, since it was ‘not a  du ty  to take part with other 
S tates in collective action, b u t ra ther a  duty to work tow ards a common goal’.46 
He explained th a t th is  m ean t th a t a  w atercourse S tate w as not under a  duty to 
participate in the  works planned by another w atercourse State, b u t it had  the 
obligation no t to prevent th is  project from being d iscussed  between them .47 He 
also agreed with Yankov’s proposition to refer in the Article on co-operation to 
its  specific purposes and  objectives, as well as to the principles of international 
law on w hich co-operation was based.48
The final version of Article 8 on the ‘General obligation to co-operate’ of the 
1994 ILC Draft Articles modified the draft suggested by Special Rapporteur 
McCaffrey in the  light of the discussion within the ILC.
The divergent opinions expressed by the ILC m em bers in its m eetings were 
echoed in the m eetings of the Sixth Committee. Article 8 was expanded into two 
paragraphs, w ith the following wording:
45 Yrbk ILC [1987], Vol.II, Pt.2, 21.
46 McCaffrey, Sum m ary records of the meetings of the 39th session, Yrbk ILC [1987], Vol.I, 95.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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A rticle 8 (G eneral O bligation  to  C o-operate)
1. W a te rc o u rse  S ta te s  sh a ll  co -o p era te  on  th e  b a s is  o f so v ere ig n  eq u a lity , te rr ito r ia l 
in teg rity , m u tu a l  b en e fit a n d  good fa ith  in  o rd e r  to  a t ta in  o p tim a l u tiliza tio n  a n d  
a d e q u a te  p ro te c tio n  of a n  in te rn a tio n a l w a te rco u rse .
2. In  d e te rm in in g  th e  m a n n e r  of s u c h  co -o p e ra tio n , w a te rc o u rse  S ta te s  m ay  co n s id e r 
th e  e s ta b l is h m e n t  of jo in t  m e c h a n ism s  o r co m m iss io n s , a s  d ee m e d  n e c e s sa ry  by th em , 
to  fa c ilita te  c o -o p e ra tio n  o n  re le v an t m e a s u re s  a n d  p ro c e d u re s  in  th e  lig h t of 
ex p e rien ce  g a in ed  th ro u g h  co -o p e ra tio n  in  ex is tin g  jo in t  m e c h a n is m s  a n d  co m m iss io n s  
in  v a r io u s  reg io n s.
The d iscussions both in the ILC and in the Sixth Committee reveal the 
difficulties surrounding  the question of the legal s ta tu s  of the concept of 
co-operation. At least un til 1997 when the UN W atercourses Convention was 
approved by the UNGA, one could defend any of the  positions on the m atter 
with persuasive argum ents supported by different or even, ironically, by the 
sam e authorities.
Apart from its work on in ternational w atercourses, the  ILC also exam ined the 
concept of co-operation for the purposes of its work on the topic of the 
in ternational liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not 
prohibited by in ternational law.4(3 In th is context, the  ILC adopted the 2001 
Draft Articles on Prevention of T ransboundary Harm  from H azardous Activities 
on the basis  of Special R apporteur Pem m araju Sreenivasa Rao’s Reports, and 
recom m ended the UNGA to elaborate a  convention based  on them. The Articles 
concern the  tak ing  of preventive m easures in respect of activities not prohibited 
by in tern a tio n al law which involve a  risk of causing significant transboundary  
harm  th ro u g h  their physical consequences.
The 2001 D raft Articles include, of course, more specific forms of co-operation, 
i.e., p rocedural obligations, such as notification, consultation  and  exchange of 
inform ation. As w ith its previous work on the non-navigational uses of 
in ternational w atercourses, the ILC laid down an  obligation to co-operate in 
Article 4 as follows:
49 See infra s .6.3.2.
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S ta te s  c o n c e rn e d  sh a ll  co -o p e ra te  in  good fa ith  a n d , a s  n e c e s s a ry , see k  th e  a s s is ta n c e  
of on e  o r m o re  c o m p e te n t in te rn a tio n a l o rg a n iz a tio n s  in  p re v en tin g  s ig n ifican t 
tra n s b o u n d a ry  h a rm  o r a t  a n y  ev en t in  m in im izing  th e  r is k  thereo f.
This im poses on the S tate of origin (i.e., the S tate u n d er the jurisdiction or 
control of w hich the activities are planned or carried out), and  on the States 
likely to be affected, an  obligation to co-operate in good faith. But since the 
context is lim ited to hazardous activities, the purposes of th is co-operation is 
clearly confined to the prevention of significant transboundary  harm  or in 
m inimizing the risk  of such  harm . This corresponds to a  duty  of due diligence, 
which is also dealt with in the ILC’s previous work on international 
w atercourses.
The reference to a  principle of co-operation in these Draft Articles confirms the 
direct relationship  between the substantive obligation of prevention of causing 
significant transboundary  harm  and the procedural obligation of co-operation 
as a  fundam ental general principle for its application. Moreover, in the 
com m ent to Article 4, the ILC uses repeatedly the  expression ‘principle of 
co-operation’. The ILC seem s to accept Brownlie’s earlier view th a t the ‘duty of 
S tates to co-operate with each other in m itigating transboundary  
environm ental r isk s ’ is an  em ergent principle of in ternational law. But the 
content and  application of the principle rem ain vague.50
3 .2 .3 .3  Declarations and R esolutions o f R elevant International 
C onferences and Organizations
Co-operation as  lex ferenda  may be found in num erous instrum ents of 
in tergovernm ental and  non-governm ental n a tu re  from the late 1950s.51 For 
instance, Article 3 of the Charter of Economic Rights and  D uties of States calls 
for co-operation in  relation to shared na tu ra l resources in general, and  Special
50 Brownlie (1998), 286. Curiously, Brownlie in the 2003 edition removed this suggestion. He 
now praises the d raft articles as providing a creative and  original regime for the prevention of 
transboundary  harm  and  the managem ent of risk; bu t as qualifying the substance of the articles 
as radical, and  as  asserting  th a t ‘there are no substantive lim itations on the activities which 
States may u ndertake on their own territory’, Brownlie seem s to be regressing from his earlier 
proposition.
51 See, e.g. UN (1975); Principle XII of the 1968 European W ater Charter; UNGA Resolution 
2995 (XXVII), of 15 December 1972, and 1973 UNGA Resolution on Co-operation in the Field of 
the Environm ent.
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Rapporteur McCaffrey considered th a t it also applied to international 
w atercourses.52
Many in ternational policy guidance principles of co-operation have already 
been the subject of recom m endations from different in ternational organisations 
or conferences. Several international conferences h ad  w ater high on the 
agenda, for example, the UN Water Conference, held at Mar del Plata, 
Argentina, in M arch 1977, and  the Interregional Meeting of International River 
O rganizations, convened by the UN in Dakar, Senegal, in May 1981. These 
conferences called for co-operative action and  recom m ended the establishm ent 
of com m issions a t the in ternational or regional levels or for the specific river 
basin. They do not, however, prescribe an  obligation. The Mar del Plata Action 
Plan, adopted by the 1977 UN W ater Conference, m ade a  distinction between 
regional and  in ternational co-operation.53
These recom m endations were reiterated in su bsequen t conferences. Of 
particu lar relevance is the 1972 Stockholm D eclaration of the UN Conference 
on the H um an Environm ent. Principle 24, representing  a  political com m itm ent 
to in ternational co-operation in issues related to environm ental protection, 
stipu lates th a t
... C o -o p e ra tio n  th ro u g h  m u ltila te ra l o r b ila te ra l a r ra n g e m e n ts  o r o th e r  a p p ro p ria te  
m e a n s  is  e s s e n tia l  to  effectively co n tro l, p rev en t, re d u c e  a n d  e lim in a te  ad v e rse  
e n v iro n m e n ta l  effec ts  re s u lt in g  from  ac tiv itie s  c o n d u c te d  in  all sp h e re s , in  su c h  a  w ay 
th a t  d u e  a c c o u n t  is  ta k e n  of th e  sovereign ty  a n d  in te re s ts  o f all S ta te s .
Thus, th e  Action Plan, adopted by the Conference, also provides in 
Recom m endation 51 for co-operation in relation to in ternational watercourses.
The 1972 Stockholm  Declaration and Action Plan contributed  directly to the 
1978 UNEP Principles on Shared N atural Resources, which also embody the 
obligation to co-operate in Principle 1 and  provide for several of its applications 
in other principles.
52 See also 1987 McCaffrey’s Third Report, 26.
53 Recom m endations 84-89 and 90-103, respectively.
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In 1992, Agenda 2 1,54 one of the key resu lts  from the UN Conference on 
Environm ent and  Development (UNCED/Earth Summit), s ta ted  in Chapter 
18:4 th a t co-operation am ong riparian S tates ‘may be desirable in conformity 
with existing agreem ents an d /o r  other relevant arrangem ents, taking into 
account the  in terests  of all riparian  States concerned’,55 the  wording indicating 
a policy objective ra th er th an  a legal obligation.
The 1992 Rio Declaration, however, contains a  num ber of principles 
incorporating the obligation of S tates to co-operate for different purposes,56 as 
well as setting out different forms of co-operation. Principle 27, however, covers 
more generally the principle of co-operation lato sensu. It declares th a t
S ta te s  a n d  p eo p le  sh a ll co -o p e ra te  in  good fa ith  a n d  in  a  sp ir i t  o f p a r tn e rs h ip  in  th e  
fu lfilm en t o f th e  p r in c ip le s  em b o d ied  in  th is  D e c la ra tio n  a n d  in  th e  fu r th e r  d ev e lo p m en t 
of in te rn a tio n a l  law  in  th e  field of s u s ta in a b le  d ev e lo p m en t.
This wording underlines the im portance attached  to in ternational co-operation 
by the in ternational com m unity as a  whole, and  the political com m itm ent made 
by governm ents. B ut even though th is is drafted in apparently  binding term s, 
the Rio D eclaration w as no t generally intended to create legal relations.
While in ternational conferences continue to d iscuss w ater issues, policy 
docum ents and  reports calling for S tates to co-operate and  underlining the role 
of in terna tional organizations in assisting S tates in w ater resources m atters 
continue to m ultiply a t an  exceptionally rapid pace.57
3 .2 .4  G en era l an d  R eg ion a l C o n v en tio n s
Specific b ila tera l or m ultilateral treaties on particu lar rivers or basin  system s 
are needed, as  em phasized by A ndrassy,58 and  recognised in several
54 Ch. 18 deals with the protection of the quality and supply of freshw ater resources and 
outlines specific ac tions and  strategies for those responsible for sustainable m anagem ent and 
use of freshw ater resources. It is considered a comprehensive b lueprin t for governmental action.
55 Italics supplied.
56 See Principles 5, 7, and 12, and para.3 of the Preamble to the 1992 Rio Declaration.
57 See infra s .5.3.3.
58 A ndrassy (1959), 182.
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in ternational in stru m en ts  and  in the literature, to en su re  the m ost equitable 
and  reasonable utilisation of international w atercourses. Such treaties have 
been negotiated, in terpreted and  applied worldwide.59 Many international 
w atercourses, however, are not governed by specific treaties, and  rely instead 
on general or regional conventions and  existing ru les of custom ary 
in ternational law. As in other areas of the law, general or regional conventions60 
provide a  precise legal framework for S tates Parties,61 or may regulate one 
specific u se  of the w aters.62
The attem pts a t codifying parts  of th is area of the law have generated several 
conventions aim ed a t providing the legal fram ework for in ter-sta te  relations. 
Many of these conventions refer to the need for co-operation or prescribe it as a 
general obligation.
3 .2 .4 .1  The Convention on Environm ental Im pact A ssessm ent in a 
Transboundary Context
The Convention on Environm ental Impact A ssessm ent in a T ransboundary 
Context (the ‘1991 Espoo Convention’)63 was adopted by the Senior Advisers to 
G overnm ents on Environm ental and  Water Problem s of the Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE) at their fourth session held in Espoo, Finland.
This Convention provides a  framework for transboundary  environmental 
im pact assessm en t (EIA). It sets forth, originally for the  ECE region, a num ber 
of p rocedural rights and  obligations for the Parties to ensure th a t the 
environm ental transboundary  im pact of certain  proposed activities are 
considered in  the decision-making process and  a t an  early stage of planning. 
These include an  obligation of notification before the EIA (Article 3) and the 
obligation to en te r into consultations on the basis of the EIA docum entation
59 See infra s .3.2.5.
60 Such as the 1968 and  2003 African Convention.
61 The paradigm atic example here is the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention, since it has 
universal application.
62 E.g. the 1923 Convention Relating to the Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting more 
than  one State.
63 Signed on 25 February 1991, by 30 signatories, and entered into force on 10 Septem ber 
1997. There are now 41 Parties to the Convention. On 27 February 2001, the second Meeting of 
the Parties held in Sofia, Bulgaria, decided to am end the Convention and allow other UN Member 
States to accede to the Convention This is an im portant step, as it widens the potential 
geographical scope of application of the Convention, from regional to universal.
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(Article 5).64 It adopts an  integrated approach, requiring a comprehensive 
environm ental assessm en t of the proposed activity and  of alternatives to it. 
This differs from the subject-m atter approach taken  by previous treaties. The 
Convention provides for the notification of the potentially affected State before 
the EIA takes place in order to facilitate consulta tions whenever these are 
required. Furtherm ore, it provides for the public to be informed so th a t it may 
partic ipate in the process.
Appendix I to the Convention lists 17 types of proposed activities which are 
likely to cause significant adverse transboundary  im pact. The list, however, is 
not exhaustive.65 Several of these activities relate or m ay be related to water 
resources. This covers, for example, therm al and  nuclear power stations, the 
construction of ports and  inland waterways, large dam s and  reservoirs, and 
groundw ater abstraction  activities.
Paragraph 3 of the Preamble refers to the determ ination of the Parties to 
‘enhance in ternational co-operation’ on the sub ject-m atter of the Convention, 
nam ely assessing  environm ental im pact in particu lar in a  transboundary  
context. Here, logically, as in so m any in ternational treaties, co-operation refers 
to conduct in general in order to achieve a  substantive goal.
As a  fram ework convention, Article 8 -  ‘Bilateral and  M ultilateral Co-operation’ 
-  calls for the Parties to continue existing, or en ter into new, agreem ents or 
a rrangem ents in order to im plem ent the obligations un d er the Convention. 
Appendix VI specifies elem ents of th is co-operation. These include setting up  
in stitu tional arrangem ents or enlarging the m andate  of existing ones, or of 
other different m easures. However, the term  ‘m ay’ u sed  consistently clearly 
indicates th a t  any of the forms of co-operation m entioned there are 
suggestions, ra th e r  th an  obligations.
64 See infra s .4.3.2.
65 S tates may en ter into consultations to consider other activities.
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3 .2 .4 .2  The C onvention on the Protection and Use o f
Transboundary W atercourses and International Lakes
The Convention on the Protection and  Use of T ransboundary  W atercourses and 
International Lakes66 (the ‘1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention’), like the 
1991 Espoo Convention, was concluded under the auspices of the ECE. This 
regional convention h as  as chief purpose the taking by S tates of ‘all appropriate 
m easu res’ to prevent, control and reduce any transboundary  im pact (Article 
2(1)). In particu lar, these m easures should ensure th a t the transboundary  
w aters are u sed  in a reasonable and equitable way, and  with the aim of 
ecologically sound and rational w ater m anagem ent, as  well as the conservation 
of w ater resources and environm ental protection, and, where necessary, the 
restoration of ecosystem s (Article 2(2)).
In Paragraph 1 of the Preamble to the Convention it is recognised th a t 
enhanced  co-operation is essential in order to accom plish effectively the 
protection and  use  of transboundary  w atercourses and  in ternational lakes. 
This co-operation is set forth in the Convention as a  general obligation ‘on the 
basis of equality and  reciprocity’ (Articles 2(6) and  9(1)). Given its character as 
a  fram ework Convention, co-operation is im plem ented prim arily through the 
conclusion of particu lar bilateral and  m ultilateral agreem ents or other 
arrangem ents to define the riparian S ta tes’ ‘m u tu a l relations and conduct’ 
regarding the prevention, control and reduction of transboundary  im pact 
(para. 8 of the Preamble, and  Articles 2(6) and  9)). B ut in contrast to the 1991 
Espoo Convention, co-operation here is prescribed as an obligation, and 
specifically includes the obligation to establish  jo in t bodies.67
In addition, th e  obligation to co-operate is supplem ented by a  series of 
procedural obligations. These include, inter alia, the obligation to establish and 
im plem ent jo in t program m es for m onitoring the condition of the transboundary  
w aters and  for assessm en t of any transboundary  im pact (Article 11), the 
obligation to exchange data  and information regularly (Articles 6 and 13), the 
obligation to u n d ertak e  joint research and developm ent activities (Articles 5 
and 12), the obligation to provide emergency inform ation and m utual
66 Signed a t Helsinki, Finland, on 17 March 1992, by 26 S tates, and  entered into force on 6 
October 1996. There are now 36 Parties to the Convention.
67 See infra s .5.2.
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assistance (Articles 14 and  15), and the obligation of consultation (Article 10). 
This h as  to be achieved on the basis of 'reciprocity, good faith and  good 
neighbourliness’ (Article 10), and through jo in t bodies (Article 9(2)). Although a 
regional Convention, its influence has extended far beyond its boundaries.68
Several additional instrum en ts  followed the Convention. The 1999 Protocol on 
W ater and  H ealth is particularly relevant as it provides an  u n u su a l s tructure  
and  approach  to co-operation. Articles 11 to 14 of the  Protocol refer to different 
spheres of in ternational co-operation. First, it sets ou t a  general obligation to 
co-operate in in ternational actions in support of the objectives of the Protocol 
and  in the im plem entation of national and  local p lans (Article 11). But the 
obligation is m ade more precise in the following Articles: Article 12 provides for 
co-operation concerning transboundary  w aters, listing different forms of 
promoting jo in t and  co-ordinated in ternational action; and  Article 14 provides 
for in ternational support from other parties for the action required a t the 
national and  local levels.
3 .2 .4 .3  The U nited Nations Convention on th e Law o f the
Non-navigational Uses o f International W atercourses
Although no t yet in force, the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention69, a universal 
framework convention, is the resu lt of a  long process of codification and 
progressive developm ent of international law by the ILC on the topic of the law 
of the  non-navigational uses of international w atercourses. Thus, it has  been 
said to provide ‘decisive evidence th a t the u tilisation regime of international 
w atercourses h a s  rules which form part of custom ary in ternational law’.70
68 On the im portance of UNECE Conventions in the pan-E uropean context and beyond, see 
Bosnjakovic (2001), 263-282.
69 Adopted by UNGA Resolution 51/229 , of 21 May 1997. In accordance with Article 34, the 
Convention was opened to all States and regional economic integration organizations for 
signature. So far only 16 States have ratified the Convention (Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iraq, 
Jordan , Lebanon, Libya, Namibia, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, South Africa, 
Sweden, Syria, and  Uzbekistan). Article 36 of the Convention requires 35 S tates to ratify, accept, 
approve or accede it for its entry into force.
70 B ruhacs (1993), 77. See also McCaffrey (1998), 26-27, where the former Special R apporteur 
asserts the in ternational custom ary character of the obligations to use the international 
w atercourse in an  equitable and reasonable m anner, not to cause significant harm , and to notify 
potentially affected riparian  States of planned m easures on the in ternational watercourse.
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However, uncerta in ty  still rem ains concerning the legal s ta tu s  of some of its 
provisions.71
Once in force, the Convention will provide the fram ework for ‘w atercourse 
agreem ents, w hich apply and ad just the provisions of the Convention to the 
characteristics and  uses  of a particular in ternational w atercourse or part 
th e reo f (Article 3). The Convention applies to u ses  of international 
w atercourses and  their w aters for purposes other th a n  navigation, and urges 
m easu res of protection, preservation and m anagem ent related to those uses 
(Article 1).
The Convention lays down in Article 8(1) a  general obligation to co-operate ‘on 
the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, m u tu a l benefit and good 
faith ’. This general enunciation of the principle is in tended to enhance the 
‘norm ative force of o ther provisions of the Convention on specific aspects of 
co-operation’.72 In addition, the Article specifies the two purposes of the 
obligation as the  ‘optimal utilisation and  adequate protection of an 
in ternational w atercourse’, th u s  establishing a clear link between the rules on 
the use  and  the ru les on the protection, preservation and  m anagem ent of 
in ternational w atercourses.73
The 1997 UN W atercourses Convention also lays down in Article 5(2) the 
principle of participation, which, according to the wording of the article, 
includes bo th  the right of riparian States to utilise the w atercourse and the 
du ty  to co-operate in the protection and development thereof. The obligation of 
S tates to co-operate is, in the view of the ILC, one of the com ponent parts  of the 
obligation of participation. The form of co-operation suggested in Article 8(2) is 
the estab lish m en t of joint m echanism s or com m issions ‘to facilitate 
co-operation on relevant m easures and procedures’.74
71 As observed by Benvenisti (1996), 414 n.176, T he . . . convention h as  a dual character: 
m any of its provisions are non-binding, yet the instrum ent is supposed to reflect existing law. 
The text is therefore unclear on the rights and obligations of riparians absen t an agreem ent.’ On 
the issue of the legal s ta tu s  of the obligation to co-operate stricto sensu , see infra s .3.2.7, and of 
the procedural applications, see infra Ch.4.
72 Tanzi and Arcari (2001), 183.
73 See also com m ents 1, 2 and 6 to Article 8, and com m ent 1, and  17 to Article 9 of the 1994 
ILC Draft Articles. See also Nollkaemper (1993), 155-8.
74 On the issue of non-binding institutional co-operation, see infra s .5.2.
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The Convention also lays down several procedural obligations75 which are 
corollaries of the general obligation to co-operate. These include the duty to 
exchange d a ta  and  inform ation (Article 9 and  11), the duty  to notify planned 
m easures with possible adverse effects (Articles 12 to 16), the duty to enter into 
consultations, and  ‘if necessary’ to negotiate concerning planned m easures 
(Articles 11 and  17). As the m ain concern of the Convention is the m anagem ent 
of the entire in ternational w atercourse, it requires consultations and suggests 
the estab lishm ent of jo in t m echanism s or com m issions to th is effect.76
A large num ber of in ternational w atercourses are no t governed by specific 
treaties, and  rely instead  on m ultilateral conventions and  existing rules of 
custom ary in ternational law. In th is respect, the  1997 UN W atercourses 
Convention is of the u tm ost im portance. Even though  it is not yet in force, its 
framework character ‘may nevertheless offer appropriate term s of reference for 
the parties to a  w atercourse dispute to reach a  m utually  agreeable assessm ent 
on a  case-by-case b as is .’ Tanzi observes th a t ‘the  Convention provides an 
obligation of co-operation as the catalyst for achieving such  a m utually 
agreeable a sse ssm en t’.77 In the context of in ternational w atercourses, there is ‘.
. . the objective need th a t a  legal principle in the  field be drafted in m ost 
general term s in order to encom pass the m ultifarious geographical, economic, 
technological, and  political features applying to different prospective, or actual, 
u tilisations of a  given in ternational w atercourse .^
The 1997 UN W atercourses Convention is said to reflect the difficulty of 
m erging legal and  hydrologic intricacies.79 It com bines im portant principles, 
such  as  co-operation and  jo in t m anagem ent, as  well as equitable and 
reasonable u se  and  the obligation not to cause appreciable harm , the 
relationship  of which m irror the complex u pstream /dow nstream  conflict. This 
is undoubted ly  true , b u t it is an inescapable characteristic  of any agreem ent or 
arrangem ent betw een States on the m atter of shared  w ater resources.
75 See infra Ch.4.
76 M anagem ent includes planning of sustainable development, promotion of rational and 
optimal utilisation, protection and control of watercourses (Article 24).
77 Tanzi (1998), 467-8.
78 Ibid., 469.
79 Beach e ta l.  (2000), 14.
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Due to the sensitivity of the subject and  divergent positions adopted by States 
a t the UN Sixth Committee, it is believed th a t th is  Convention, although 
adopted by the UNGA, will never enter into force. The fear is th a t the 
Convention will have the sam e fate as the failed attem pt to establish a 
universal regime with the 1923 Convention relating to the Development of 
Hydraulic Power Affecting More th an  One S tate.80 Although the need for more 
ratifications of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention is acknowledged by 
governm ents and  in ternational organisations, for instance in the W ater for 
Peace’ them e sessions of the 2003 Third World W ater Forum ,81 the Ministerial 
D eclaration a t the end of th a t forum yet again did no t include a reference to the 
Convention. It seem s evident th a t although S tates recognise several obligations 
in the field in soft law instrum ents, there is not yet the political will required for 
governm ents to accept them  in legally binding term s.
Nevertheless, the u ltim ate test of th is legal regime is th a t of its im plem entation, 
when the fram ework is actually applied to very different w atercourse system s in 
a  variety of regional contexts.
3 .2 .4 .4  The EC Water Framework D irective
In order to contribute to the im plem entation of the obligations stem m ing from 
the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention, as well as other international 
conventions on w ater protection and m anagem ent, the EC adopted Directive 
2 0 0 0 /6 0 /EC, known as the ‘EC Water Framework Directive’ (or WFD).82 A 
m ajor in s tru m en t concerning w ater policy, the Directive m u st be transposed 
into the  dom estic legal order not only of the 15 M ember S tates at the time of 
adoption, b u t from May 2004, of 10 more Member S tates, and  12 on Jan u a ry  
2007 w ith accession of Romania and Bulgaria.
This Directive provides a  framework for action by EC Member S tates to achieve 
efficient, in tegra ted  w ater resources m anagem ent a t the river basin  level by 
preventing w ater degradation, and in linking susta inab le  development to the 
quantitative a ttrib u tes  of water supply. It revives the river basin  approach and
80 This Convention was ratified by eleven States only.
81 Franz (2003).
82 Directive 2 0 0 0 /6 0 /EC of the European Parliam ent and of the Council, of 23 October 2000, 
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of w ater policy. It entered into force 
on 22 December 2000. On the WFD see, e.g. Savenije and van der Zaag (2000), or Gotz (2005).
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provides for the establishm ent of a single river basin  m anagem ent plan by the 
riparian  Member S tates in order to optimise the m anagem ent of European 
transboundary  w atercourses (Article 13). This requires close co-operation, 
notably th rough  co-ordination of adm inistrative s tru c tu res  and com petent 
au thorities w ithin river basin  districts (Article 3). As a  framework Directive, it 
requires im plem entation struc tu res  to be established a t the national and 
regional level.
The Directive em braces the river basin  as a geographical and legal un it which 
reflects the recognition of the interdependence of basin  S tates and the need for 
some form of co-operation.83 But the Directive goes fu rther to create a ‘river 
basin  d istric t’ as  its basic m anagem ent u n it.84 The concept developed from the 
geography of drainage basins as a un it for p lanning  and  m anagem ent 
purposes.
While adopting an  ecosystem -based approach for w ater resource m anagem ent 
and  w ater policy, the principle of co-operation is the basis  for the co-ordination 
of adm inistrative s tru c tu res  to support m easures to control discharges. The 
quantitative w ater aspects are addressed here only as  a  com ponent of water 
quality.
The Directive prescribes a  veiy high level of co-operation between States and 
provides a  key point of reference for other States.
3 .2 .4 .5  The 1995 and 2000  Southern African D evelopm ent 
Com m unity Water Protocols
In 1995, the  Southern  African Development Com m unity (SADC) States 
concluded a  Protocol on Shared W atercourse System s in the SADC Region.85 
This Protocol, concluded to a large extent for the purpose of establishing river 
basin  m anagem ent institu tions (Articles 3 to 6), h a s  never been implemented.
83 See, e.g. Pream ble p a ras .(13) and (35), and Article 2(13), which defines river basin as ‘the 
area of land from which all surface run-off flows through a sequence of stream s, rivers and, 
possibly, lakes into the sea a t a single river m outh, estuary  or delta’.
84 Article 2(15), which defines ‘river basin d istrict’ as ‘the area of land and sea, made up of one 
or more neighbouring river basins together with their associated groundw aters and coastal 
waters, which is identified under Article 3(1) as the m ain u n it for m anagem ent of river b asins.’
85 Adopted in Johannesburg , on 23 August 1995. The Parties to the Protocol were the then ten 
m em bers of the SADC, except for Angola.
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This w as due to the fact that, soon after its conclusion, the 1997 UN 
W atercourses Convention was adopted and  S tates felt the need to include in 
their Protocol fundam ental principles th a t were ab sen t initially. Hence, th is fact 
may be in terpreted  as suggesting th a t S tates do not regard those principles as 
part of custom ary  in ternational law, b u t ra ther a  preferred statem ent of lex 
ferenda. The 1995 Protocol was subsequently  replaced by the 2000 SADC 
Revised W ater Protocol,86 some of whose term s were taken  directly from the 
1997 UN W atercourses Convention.
The overall objective specified in Article 2 of the 2000 SADC Revised Water 
Protocol is ‘to foster closer co-operation for judicious, sustainable and 
co-ordinated m anagem ent, protection and  u tilisation of shared  w atercourses 
and advance the SADC agenda of regional integration and  poverty alleviation.’ 
For the purposes of the Protocol some general principles are to be applied such 
as th a t of close co-operation with regard to the  study  and  execution of all 
projects likely to have an  effect on the regime of the shared  w atercourse (Article 
3(5)) as well as on the protection and  development of the w atercourse as part of 
a principle of participation (Article 3(7)(b)). The la tter is an  exact reproduction 
of Article 5(2) of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention.
The Protocol also provides procedural rules. In Article 3(6), it im poses an 
obligation to exchange available information and  d a ta  of a  certain  type.87 Other 
specific provisions follow the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention in their 
general term s, and  occasionally even ipsis verbis.88
In addition, the  2000 SADC Revised Water Protocol provides in Article 5 an  
institu tional fram ework for its im plem entation, establishing four committees at 
different levels and  with diverse functions, and  requires from w atercourse 
S tates the estab lishm en t of commissions, w ater au thorities or w ater boards.89
This Convention is of in terest as the first Convention in the region on common 
utilisation and  m anagem ent of shared w atercourses.
86 Signed in Windoek, on 7 August 2000, by 13 Member States, and entered into force on 22 
Septem ber 2003. The only State which did not sign it was the Democratic Republic of Congo.
87 See infra s .4.2.
88 See, e.g. Article 4.
89 See Salm an (2001).
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3 .2 .4 .6  Other Relevant Legal Instrum ents
The obligation to co-operate is affirmed in some other international 
environm ental treaties of global or regional application the am bit of which 
includes transboundary  w ater resources.90
As w ith w ater-orientated treaties, the duty to co-operate is sometimes 
expressed in general term s, usually  in relation to the im plem entation of the 
objectives of the treaty91 or in relation to specific purposes,92 sometimes 
transla ted  into specific applications,93 and  often calling for the establishing of 
institu tional m echanism s.94
A significant example is the 1985 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer, which provides in Article 2(2) general obligations to protect hum an 
health  and  the environm ent against adverse effects resulting  or likely to resu lt 
from h u m an  activities which modify or are likely to modify the Ozone Layer. 
This includes, for example, the obligation to co-operate by means of systematic 
observations, research and information exchange
It should be noted th a t although the term  shall implies a legal obligation, the 
overall wording indicates th a t th is is not precise and  th a t its application 
depends on factors such  as means at disposal and  capabilities. It is the legal 
reflection of the  different levels of development of S tates.
The following Articles apply the general obligation. Article 3 sets forth an 
obligation for the parties to co-operate directly or through com petent 
in ternational bodies in the conduct of research and  scientific assessm ents and
90 For the 1982 UNCLOS and the 1992 CBD, see infra s.3.3.
91 E.g. Article XVI(l) of the 1968 African Convention and Article XXII of its 2003 revised 
version; Article 1 of the 1978 Treaty for Amazonian Co-operation; para .4 of the Preamble, Article 
2(1), and 3(1) of the 1992 Industrial Accidents Convention; Articles 3(5) and 4(1 )(e) of the 1992 
Convention on Climate Change; Articles 3, 4(2), and 12 of the 1994 UN Convention to Combat 
Desertification; or Article 5 of the 1992 CBD. See infra s .3.3.2.
92 E.g. Article 14 of the 1989 Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lome and Article 32 of the 
ACP-EC Cotonou Agreement.
93 E.g. Articles 3(2), 4, 5, 10, 12, 14-17 of the 1992 Industrial Accidents Convention; Articles 
4(1), 5, 6(b) of the 1992 Convention on Climate Change; or Articles 8 and  14 of the 1995 UN 
Agreement Relating to the Conservation and M anagement of Straddling and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks.
94 E.g. Article 17 of the 1992 Industrial Accidents Convention.
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system atic observations, and  to ensure the collection, validation and 
transm ission  of research  and observational d a ta  through appropriate world 
da ta  centres in a  regular and  timely fashion. In addition, Article 4 provides for 
co-operation in the legal, scientific and  technical fields, particularly through 
the exchange of d a ta  and  information and  the developm ent and  transfer of 
technology an d  knowledge, and  specifies the forms to apply the obligation.
3 .2 .5  B ila tera l an d  M u ltila tera l T re a tie s  o n  In ter n a tio n a l  
W a terco u rses
From the eighteenth century, in ternational treaties have been predom inant in 
regulating in tersta te  relations concerning in ternational w atercourses. The 
num ber of treaties and the variety of sub ject-m atter covered increased 
considerably with tim e.95 Traditional treaties were concerned with establishing 
w atercourse boundaries96 or with navigation.97 Subsequently, agreem ents were 
concluded for regulating specific w ater utilisation m ethods, such  as irrigation, 
flood control, or hydro-electric power generation, or a  specific w ater project. 
Consequently, o ther u ses, if m entioned in the agreem ent, were regulated only 
by connection to the principal utilisation.
This is the  case of the large num ber of treaties governing the planning, 
construction , operation, and  regulation of effects of dam s on international
95 There are several lists of treaties, some of them  by region. For a comprehensive chronological 
list of treaties, see, e.g. Sohnle (2002), 469-519; for a list of treaties by region, see Wolf, UNEP, 
and FAO (2002), Atlas o f International F reshw ater Agreem ents, also at 
http: / /www. transboundaryw aters.orst.edu/p u b lic a tio n s /a tla s /, which is based on FAO’s 
legislative d a tab ase , FAOLEX at h ttp ://fao lex .fao .org /fao lex /. the jo in t UNEP, IUCN and FAO 
gateway to environm ental law, ECOLEX at http: /  / www ecolex.org. and the Oregon State 
University’s T ransboundary  Freshwater Dispute D atabase and its International Freshwater 
Treaties D atabase a t http: / / www.transboundaryw aters.o rst.edu /.
For lists and  texts of the treaties concerning the non-navigational u ses of international 
w atercourses, see FAO (1993) on rivers in Europe, FAO (1995) on rivers in Asia, and FAO (1997) 
on rivers in Africa. For more recent treaties, see FAO’s database at 
h ttp ://fao lex .fao .org /fao lex /index .h tm . which also provides national legislation.
In 1993, the UNECE also compiled systematically a list of bilateral and  m ultilateral agreem ents 
and other arrangem ents concluded within the UNECE region. See UNECE’s website for an 
update a t http: / / w w w .unece.org /env/w ater/partnersh ip /part621  .h tm .
96 E.g. the 1864 Luso-Spanish Boundaries Treaty, or 1909 U S /C anada Boundary W aters 
Treaty.
97 E.g. the 1921 Barcelona Convention and Statute, or the 1922 S ta tu te  of Navigation of the 
Elbe.
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w atercourses.98 Many of these treaties reveal a  high degree of co-operation. In 
general, they follow the model of contractual agreem ents, notably by balancing 
S ta tes’ in terests. Generally speaking, there are four m ethods of co-operation.99 
The first concerns dam s built by one State for its own benefit. The treaties are 
concerned w ith the effects of dam s on other S tates and  their regulation, where 
the paym ent of com pensation for any damage caused  or the right to receive 
some electric power in re tu rn  may be provided for. 100 Similarly, the second 
concerns the construction of a  dam  by one State b u t on behalf of both S ta tes.101 
There are only a  few of these treaties. Conversely, there are num erous treaties 
providing the th ird  modality of co-operation. Each State constructs and 
operates a p art of the jo in t project, b u t they estab lish  a  jo in t commission or 
arrange ano ther m echanism  to supervise or co-ordinate the works. In the 
alternative, S tates m ay delegate their tasks to specific agencies.102 Finally, 
S tates m ay estab lish  or authorise a separate entity  to construct and operate 
the project on their behalf. This entity may be an  in ternational organisation, 
such as Itaipu Binacional, established by Brazil and  Paraguay specifically for 
the project,103 or a  concessionaire, i.e., a  com pany created u n d er the domestic 
law of one State, w hether already in existence or to be established for the 
purpose. This m ethod w as frequently used  in E urope.104 It should be noted th a t 
the WCD prom oted a  model of a  basin-wide agreem ent, which in tu rn  may 
provide the fram ework for particu lar projects.105
The agreem ents on dam s seem to develop tow ards the use  of separate entities 
ra th e r  th a n  direct S tate supervision, be th a t for reasons of efficiency or to 
encourage foreign investm ent.106
According to a  study, the majority of treaties on in ternational w atercourses 
since 1874 are bilateral and focus on a sole w ater u s e .107 From the total of 145
98 For a survey of existing treaty practice on the subject, see Happold (2005).
99 See Happold (2005), 583-589, and the examples provided therein.
100 E.g. the 1959 Lake Inari Agreement.
101 E.g. the 1949 Owen Falls Dam Agreement.
102 E.g. the 1986 Lesotho Highlands Water Project.
103 See the 1973 Treaty of Itaipu.
104 E.g. the 1969 Agreement concerning the Development of the Rhine.
105 Happold (2005), 603.
106 Ibid., 589.
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treaties exam ined, 124 (86%) are bilateral treaties, and  only 21 treaties (14%) 
are m ultilateral. Most of the treaties focus on hydro-electric power generation 
(57 tre a tie s /39%) or w ater supply (53 tre a tie s /37%).
These types of use, together with the increased dem and for water, required the 
estab lishm ent of some form of jo int institu tional m echanism .
More recently, the num ber of treaties shifting the focus from the mere 
allocation of w aters to an  integrated m anagem ent approach is increasing. In 
fact, the provision of m echanism s of co-operation in the development of w ater 
resources of river basins in their entirety or in p a rt reflect a  more modern 
approach in negotiations. Although the issues to be negotiated have become 
more complex, more recent treaties cover a  wider range of subject-m atter, and 
provide for a  more integrated approach. The field of application of the treaties 
provides for both  quantitative and qualitative protection of w ater resources, as 
well as w ater m anagem ent issues. S tates recognise th a t in th is way they may 
better protect and  preserve the river environm ent and  m ay maximise the 
benefits derived from the river basin  by pooling the advantages of each State 
derived from geographical characteristics. Recent treaties dem onstrate a trend 
tow ards the  conclusion of more comprehensive agreem ents between basin 
S tates, on the one hand , and  the adoption of m ore detailed rules regarding 
procedures, notably w ithin a  joint institutional m echanism , on the o ther.108
This is the  case with the Iberian Peninsula’s treaties. In the 1960s, Portugal 
and  Spain concluded two treaties which focused on the specific use of water for 
hydro-electric power generation. Following the evolution of international w ater 
law in Europe, in particu lar the UNECE Conventions, the 1998 Luso-Spanish 
Agreement estab lishes a  Jo in t Commission for the application and development 
of the Treaty an d  covers a wide regulatory scope with quite precise procedural 
ru le s .109
107 For the list of 145 water treaties adopted from 1874 until 1996, see Beach et al. (2000), 
5Off. and 132ff.
108 B ruhacs (1993), 61, referred to two different situations: when the purpose of the treaty is to 
co-ordinate the use  of the water, it usually sets forth some prohibitions; when its purpose is to 
carry out a jo in t utilisation, than  the agreement has to provide detailed regulation.
109 See the 1964 River Douro Treaty, the 1968 Luso-Spanish Rivers Treaty, and the 1998 
Luso-Spanish Agreement. On the transboundary water issues of the Iberian Peninsula see, e.g. 
Crucho de Almeida (2000), 279-99.
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There are several other cases. For instance, the Treaties of Peace between Peru 
and  Ecuador -  the 1998 Brasilia Accords which m ark  the end of a bilateral 
d ispute. The approach adopted by the negotiators is an  original one since the 
Global and  Definitive Peace Agreement includes a  series of specific agreem ents 
dealing with different issues in an  integrated and com prehensive m an n er.110
N otw ithstanding th is  trend, in practice in ternational treaties are not based on 
the idea of com m unity of in terests, bu t are negotiated agreem ents focusing on 
particu lar in terests. Hence, m any of the docum ents adopt practical solutions 
with limited reference to general principles.
Some treaties, however, use  the term  co-operation stricto sensu, i.e., not only 
for its political connotation, b u t implying duties. Most treaties refer to 
co-operation in relation to substantive obligations or for the im plem entation of 
one or more purposes of the treaty .111 Exam ples include the 1994 Treaty of 
Peace between Jo rd an  and  Israel (Article 6(2)) and  Article VI of Annex II), the 
1994 D anube Convention (Article 2).
O ther treaties refer to co-operation in connection with different general 
principles, such  as good faith, good neighbourliness, sovereign equality, and 
territorial integrity, as an  indication of its legal b a s is ,112 for example, the 1995 
Mekong River Agreement (Article 4). But m ost treaties on w atercourse uses -  
and  they are num erous -  specify one or more forms of co-operation.113 As many 
treaties lay down quantitative specifications of obligations, or set forth 
technical arrangem ents, they cover a  variety of procedural obligations, such as 
the provision of d a ta  and information, the regulation of m ethods of notification 
and  consu ltation , or the establishm ent of jo in t m echanism s or com m issions.114
110 These include a ‘Comprehensive Agreement for Border Integration, Development and 
N eighbourliness/ a  Foundation Agreement on the Adm inistration of the Zarumilla River basin, as 
well as the ‘Regulation for the Management of the Zarumilla Canal and the Use of its W aters’, 
which estab lishes a Perm anent Binational Commission for the Adm inistration of the Zarumilla 
Canal and the u tilisation  of its waters.
111 Earlier treaties also refer specifically to the obligation to co-operate. These include the 1960 
Indus W aters Treaty (Article VII); the 1963 Niger Basin Act (Article 4); the 1964 S tatu tes relating 
to the developm ent of the Chad Basin (Article 1); the 1972 S ta tu te  of the Senegal River (Article 2).
112 McCaffrey, Yrbk ILC [1987], Vol.I, 95.
113 See infra s.5.1.
114 B ruhacs (1993), 61.
147
3 .2 .6  C o -o p era tio n  V iew ed  from  th e  B en ch : D e c is io n s  o f  
In te r n a tio n a l C ourts an d  T ribunals
In the contem porary history of the law of in ternational w atercourses, only a few 
disputes have actually been adjudicated by in ternational courts and tribunals. 
Most controversies on international water resources are resolved by 
negotiations and  the adoption of some form of agreem ent. In m any instances 
S tates are re luc tan t to have recourse to a  th ird  party  for settling the dispute 
peacefully.115 This may be explained by the fact th a t shared  n a tu ra l resources 
are, in the m ajority of cases, of crucial im portance to the S tates involved. The 
sensitive issues raised, such  as the limitation of the S ta te ’s sovereignty, then 
fuel the sentim ent of national pride causing p ressu re  on the Government to 
m aintain  a  firm position while defending their national in terests before 
co-riparians.
The following cases have addressed the problem  of sharing the flow of a 
particu lar in ternational river. Although m ost of these cases tu rn  on the 
in terpretation  of existing treaties, the cases brought before the Perm anent 
Court of In ternational Ju stice  (PCIJ), the Central American Court of Justice, 
arbitral tribunals, and  the  ICJ, also assisted  the clarification of the existence or 
absence of ru les of custom ary international law and  general principles of 
in ternational law on the subject.
For our pu rposes, the cases examined here are those which refer directly to the 
obligation of S tates to co-operate in relation to shared  w ater resources, and 
also those w hich contribute to the clarification of th is  principle by pointing to 
different form s of its implementation. The relevant cases relating to the Law of 
the Sea are described la ter.116
115 See supra  s .2 .3 .10, and infra s A .5.
116 See infra s .6 .2.3.2.
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3 .2 .6 .1  San  Juan  R iver  Arbitration and Case 117
On 15 April 1858 N icaragua and Costa Rica concluded the C anas-Jerez Treaty, 
the Treaty of Limits, delimiting their common boundaries. This Treaty 
recognised in Article IV th a t parts  of the bank  of the San J u a n  River belonged 
to Costa Rica. It further set out in Article VI the exclusive ‘dominion and 
sovereign ju risd ic tion ’ of Nicaragua over the w aters of th a t river, and the 
‘perpetual right of free navigation’ of Costa Rica for the purposes of commerce. 
In addition, Article VIII gave Costa Rica a right to be notified and  consulted 
prior to any canal or tran sit contracts projected by N icaragua together with a 
right of veto. In urgent cases Costa Rica’s opinion h ad  to be rendered within 
the period of 30 days after the receipt of com m unication. The only exception 
where Costa Rica’s opinion was only advisory w as where its ‘n atu ra l righ ts’ 
were not injured.
When a  d ispute arose regarding the validity of the Treaty of Limits, the parties 
subm itted  the question to the arbitration of the United S tates Government by a 
Convention of 24 December 1886. The Convention provided th a t if the Treaty 
was determ ined to be valid, some questions of in terpretation  should be decided. 
These included the  issue of the obligation to consult before granting canal 
contracts.
President Cleveland of the United States, the Arbitrator, held in his Award of 22 
M arch 1888 th a t Costa Rica was not bound to concur with Nicaragua in the 
expenses necessary  to keep navigation on the river free or to improve it for the 
common benefit. He further decided th a t Costa Rica could not prevent 
N icaragua from executing a t its own expense and  within its own territory 
im provem ent w orks, provided th a t such works did not resu lt in the occupation 
or flooding or dam age of Costa Rican territory, or in the destruction or serious 
im pairm ent of C osta Rica’s navigation rights. Costa Rica had  the right to 
dem and indem nification for any places belonging to it on the right bank  of the 
River San J u a n  w hich m ight be occupied w ithout its consent, and  for any lands 
on th a t b an k  th a t m ight be flooded or dam aged in any other way in 
consequence of the  works of improvement. In addition, N icaragua was not
117 See Robb (1999), 15ff. See the Award rendered by US President Grover Cleveland on 22 
March 1888, and  the Judgm ent of the Central American Court of Justice  (Costa Riva v. 
Nicaragua) of 30 Septem ber 1916.
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allowed to m ake any gran ts for purposes of canal construction on its territory 
Svithout first asking the opinion’ of Costa Rica, as provided in Article VIII of the 
Treaty of Limits.
The aw ard also clarified the expression ‘n a tu ra l r ig h ts’ in Article VIII of the 
Treaty of Limits. The term  included the rights th a t Costa Rica possessed in the 
soil recognised in the Treaty as belonging exclusively to it in the common 
h arbours , in the River San Ju a n , and possibly o ther unspecified rights. These 
rights were deemed to be injured in any case where the territory belonging to 
Costa Rica was occupied or flooded; where there w as an encroachm ent upon a 
common harbour injurious to Costa Rica; or w here there was such as 
obstruction or deviation of the River San Ju a n  as to destroy or seriously im pair 
navigation a t any point where Costa Rica was entitled to navigate.
The arb itra to r also held th a t besides consultation, consen t by Costa Rica was 
required where the construction of an inter-oceanic canal would involve an 
injury to the n a tu ra l rights of Costa Rica. In th is  case, Costa Rica was entitled 
to dem and com pensation for any concessions which it agreed to make.
Nevertheless, w ithout ever notifying or consulting Costa Rica, Nicaragua 
negotiated an d  concluded with the United S tates the Treaty for the 
C onstruction of an  Inter-Oceanic Canal on 5 August 1914, the 
B ryan-Cham orro Treaty. By th is treaty, N icaragua granted the US Government 
'th e  unencum bered  and exclusive rights necessary  and  convenient for the 
construction , operation and  m aintenance of an  inter-oceanic canal by way of 
the San J u a n  River and the Great Lake of Nicaragua, or by any other route in 
N icaragua territo ry ' (Article 1). The term s of perform ance were to be agreed 
between the  two governm ents on deciding to build the  canal.
Costa Rica s ta rted  proceedings against N icaragua in the  Central American 
Court of Ju s tic e  on the grounds th a t N icaragua by concluding the 
Bryan-Cham orro Treaty violated its rights u n d er the Treaty of Limits and  
President C leveland’s Award. Costa Rica claimed inter alia th a t it had  not been 
consulted in regard  to the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, and  th a t since there were 
potential in ju ries to its territory, Nicaragua needed its consent.
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The Central American Court of Justice , by decision of 30 Septem ber 1916, 
declared th a t the Government of N icaragua by granting rights for the 
construction of the inter-oceanic canal by way of the River San Ju a n  had  
violated the obligation to consult Costa Rica prior to agreeing on any canal 
project th a t could affect Costa Rica’s ‘n a tu ra l r ig h ts ’. The obligation to notify 
and to consu lt im posed by the C anas-Jerez Treaty, and  confirmed by President 
Cleveland’s Award, should have been carried ou t sufficiently early for practical 
resu lts  to be possible, i.e., for the decision-m aking process to benefit from the 
opinion of Costa Rica. The proposed work necessarily implied the occupation of 
Costa Rica’s shore, inundation of its territory and  the use  of its affluents, th a t 
is, it involved the violation of Costa Rica’s na tu ra l rights. Therefore, its consent 
was required. The question of the stage a t which the obligation to consult m ust 
be discharged w as also addressed. It was not necessary  to wait un til these 
n a tu ra l rights h ad  suffered concrete and m aterial in jury  or until the site of the 
planned work had  been located to determ ine w hether Costa Rica had  to be 
notified and  consulted. The Court asserted  th a t it w as a principle of in ter-sta te 
relations th a t a  S tate was entitled to dem and ‘redress, in the nam e of its 
fundam ental rights of existence and preservation, for an  act th a t involves a 
simple m enace or danger to the development of those rig h ts ’ . 118
Although it concerned the construction of treaty  obligations, some general 
conclusions m ay be draw n from the case. Firstly, it is worth noting th a t the 
parties agreed on procedural rules, including the right of veto in some 
circum stances, in the case of improvement works.
Secondly, the  obligation to consult is well-characterised. Even though this case 
is not often referred to, the decision contributed to the clarification of w hat 
consultation en tails  and  when the obligation is triggered. Consultation to be 
m eaningful shou ld  take place as an  act prelim inary to any final decision, also 
as a preventive m easure, i.e., at a  time conducive to obtaining some practical 
resu lt and  certainly before any harm  has occurred. In fact, the Treaty of Limits 
did not concede to Costa Rica the right to be consulted  solely in regard to its 
own exclusive in terests, bu t for the purpose of its pointing out the 
inconveniences th a t the concession m ight occasion to either country, i.e., to 
their common in te re s t . 119
118 Robb (1999), 39.
119 Ibid., 37-8.
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Thirdly, it is in teresting to note th a t the diplomatic exchanges between the two 
States shows th a t Nicaragua had  repeatedly complied with the obligation to 
consult Costa Rica before the decision and  had  exchanged views on the subject 
of canal concessions. In fact, the history of the two S tates, in particu lar at the 
time the Treaty of Limits was concluded, shows th a t the diplomatic relations 
between them  were strengthened. Hence, any im portan t undertak ing  on a 
com m on resource would naturally  involve a  jo in t decision-m aking procedure.
Again in a d ispute concerning the navigational and  related rights of Costa Rica 
on the San J u a n  River, th is State brought a case against Nicaragua to the ICJ 
in Septem ber 2005. In its application, Costa Rica argues, inter alia, th a t 
Nicaraguan conduct h as  prevented Costa Rica from free and  full exercise and 
enjoym ent of its rights on the San J u a n  river, notably by im posing restrictions 
on the navigation of Costa Rican boats and  their passengers. This conduct also 
prevented Costa Rica from fulfilling its obligations u n d er existing agreem ents. 
According to Costa Rica, Nicaragua h as  not co-operated in order to solve this 
dispute. On the contrary, its National Assembly h as  passed  a resolution 
th reaten ing  to im pose economic sanctions against Costa Rica in the event of its 
bringing the d ispute to the Court. In addition, it h as  rejected different attem pts 
by Costa Rica to resolve the dispute by diplomatic m eans or other alternative 
peaceful m eans, such  as mediation through the Organization of American 
S tates or in ternational arbitration.
Albeit in  the  context of specific treaties m ainly on navigation, and in the 
sequence of recen t international decisions, th is m ay be another occasion for 
further consideration  of the applications of the obligation to co-operate.
3 .2 .6 .2  C ase R ela tin g  to  th e  T errito ria l J u r isd ic tio n  o f  th e
In tern a tio n a l Com m ission o f  th e  R iver O der 120
The PCIJ was called upon  to resolve an issue relating to navigation in the River 
O der.12i The relevance of this case for our purposes lies in the concept of 
‘com m unity of in terest of riparian S ta tes’, which w as articulated  for the first
120 (Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, United Kingdom, and Sweden/Poland), 
Judgm ent of 10 Septem ber 1929, PCIJ (1929), Series A, 5-32.
121 For an  analysis of the case, see, e.g. Lammers (1984), 505-7; or McCaffrey (2001), 180-3.
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time by the PCIJ, and  so introduced into the general law applicable to 
w atercourses.
The River Oder was internationalised by Article 331 of the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles . 122 Like other European rivers, such  as the D anube or the Elbe, the 
Oder and  all navigable parts  of its system Svhich naturally  provide more than  
one State w ith access to the sea’ was declared in ternational for the purposes of 
free navigation.
Under Article 341 of the Treaty of Versailles, an  International Commission 
would adm inister the River Oder, which had  ‘to define the sections of the river 
or its tribu taries to which the international regime shall be applied’. The Court 
was asked to decide w hether the jurisdiction of the In ternational Commission 
of the Oder extended to two tributaries of the Oder, the W arthe (Warta) and the 
Netze (Notec), which were situated  in Polish territory, and  in the event of an  
affirmative finding, to establish which law should govern the determ ination of 
the upstream  limits of th a t jurisdiction.
Since the  navigability of the W arthe and the Netze in Polish territory was 
assum ed, the Court had  to deal with the question of w hether the part of the 
two tribu taries above the Germ an frontier could be regarded as providing more 
th an  one State w ith access to the sea. The six governm ents m aintained tha t 
th is  condition w as fulfilled since th is applied to the waterway as such and not a 
p articu la r p a rt of its course.
Although the  case tu rned  essentially on treaty  construction, the PCIJ 
considered it necessary  to analyse the principles governing international fluvial 
law in general. The essential principle on which it based its decision was th a t of 
‘com m unity of in te rest of riparian S ta tes ’123 which the Court said had  developed 
since the 1815 Final Act of the Congress of V ienna . 124 S tates had  then  agreed 
on the u sefu lness of rivers for navigation and on their internationalization, the 
benefits of w hich should be shared among no t only riparians, b u t also 
non-riparians. The Court affirmed the principle in the following terms:
122 The regime of internationalization also applying to the River Oder arises out of Articles 332 
to 337.
123 At 27.
124 Also in the context of navigation, in particular Articles 108 and  109.
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T his co m m u n ity  of in te re s t  in  a  nav igab le  river b eco m es th e  b a s is  of a  co m m o n  legal 
rig h t, th e  e s s e n tia l  fe a tu re s  of w h ich  a re  th e  p erfec t e q u a lity  of all r ip a r ia n  S ta te s  in  th e  
u s e  of th e  w ho le  c o u rse  o f th e  river a n d  th e  ex c lu s io n  of a n y  p re fe re n tia l privilege of 
an y  on e  r ip a r ia n  S ta te  in  re la tio n  to th e  o th e r s .125
The Court concluded th a t the Treaty of Versailles adopted the sam e standpoint 
as the  Final Act of V ienna and  of the treaty law th a t applied and  developed the 
principles of th a t Act . 126 Therefore, Article 331 m u st be interpreted also in the 
light of the principle of com m unity of interest, th u s  clearly pointing to the 
conclusion th a t ‘the internationalization of a  waterway traversing or separating 
different S tates does not stop short a t the last political frontier, bu t extends to 
the whole navigable river ’. 127 Since the Court h ad  already observed th a t the 
territorial lim its of the adm inistration of the International Commission 
coincided with those of the internationalisation m entioned in Article 331, the 
Court concluded th a t the jurisdiction of the Com m ission extended to the 
portions of the two tribu taries of the Oder in Polish territory.
The value of the  C ourt’s reasoning is fully apparen t in the context of navigation; 
b u t the im plications drawn by writers from th is decision in the construction of 
a  theory of com m unity of in terest128 seem som etim es overstretched. The actual 
wording of the judgm ent limits its scope to navigable rivers, referring to the 
1919 Treaty of Versailles, the 1815 Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, and the 
1921 B arcelona Convention and S tatu te on the Regime of Navigable Waterways 
of In ternational Concern. The Court in reaching its conclusions referred only to 
treaty  practice concerning navigation and, although it m entions the principles 
governing in terna tional fluvial law in general, it m ade no reference to state 
practice in relation to any other use. This is relevant, because navigation as 
such is a  u se  th a t does not change the quantity  of the water. Moreover, the 
concepts u sed  were very vague and of a general na tu re , such  as ‘ju s tice ’ and 
‘utility ’. 129 As explained by Lammers,
128 At 27.
126 At 29.
127 Id.
128 See supra  s .2.2.4.
129 Lammers (1984), 507.
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For fo rm s of u s e  o th e r  th a n  n av ig a tio n , th e  legal n o tio n  of th e  c o m m u n ity  of in te re s t  
co u ld  n o t, o f c o u rse , find  exactly  th e  sam e  ap p lica tio n . As a p p e a rs  from  th e  p ra c tic e  of 
S ta te s , e a c h  r ip a r ia n  S ta te  m ay  m ak e  s u c h  o th e r  u s e  of th e  w a te r  on ly  w ith in  th e  lim its  
of its  ow n te rrito ry .
However, the reasoning of the Court has led au tho rs, such  as Lipper , 130 
Lam m ers , 131 an d  McCaffrey , 132 to consider the concept of com m unity of in terest 
equally applicable to non-navigational u se s . 133
Lipper bases h is conclusion on several factors: the  language and  reasoning of 
the decision; the fact th a t the ‘requirem ents of ju stice  and  the considerations of 
utility’ m entioned by the Court also apply to non-navigational uses; and last, 
b u t certainly not least, the fact th a t if state sovereignty is in tact when foreign 
vessels en ter into the territory of a  State for the purposes of navigation, then ‘a 
fortiori, S tates would have the right to use the w aters of such  river within their 
own territory subject to “the perfect equality of all riparian  S ta tes” so to do ’. 134
Although it is no t clear from the decision, Lamm ers considers it probable th a t 
the Court viewed the legal concept of ‘com m unity of in terest of riparian S tates’ 
as the basis  for legal solutions of problems not only of navigation ‘to which the 
in ternational character of an  international w atercourse would give rise’, but 
also of problem s related to other uses, even though  it would be applied 
differently, since S tates m ake other uses within the boundaries of their own 
territory. Also the ideas of a ‘perfect equality of all riparian  S ta tes’ and the 
‘exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian  State in relation to 
the o th e rs ’ could be applied to other u se s . 135
McCaffrey justifies the extended interpretation of the C ourt’s reasoning by 
pointing ou t th a t the features of a river upon which the Court reached its 
findings also su p p o rt the proposition th a t co-riparians have a  ‘common legal 
righ t’ in relation to non-navigational uses. However, he recognises th a t the
13° Lipper (1967), 29.
131 Lammers (1984), 507.
132 McCaffrey (2001), 181-2.
133 The ICJ applies the concept explicitly to non-navigational u ses in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Project case. See infra s .3.2.6.5
134 Lipper (1967), 29.
135 Lammers (1984), 507.
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common legal right here is th a t of equitable u tilisation, i.e., all riparians have a 
right, the application of which depends on certain  facts and  conditions, ra ther 
th an  the sam e rights of u s e . 136
This case also provides an early example of the role of an  international 
com m ission with limited powers and functions, such  as  the determ ination of its 
own ju risd iction  and  the preparation of projects of revision of existing 
in ternational agreem ents and  regulations . 137
3.2 .6 .3  The D iversion o f  W ater fro m  th e  M euse 138
This case concerns a  d ispute regarding the construction  of w ater works in the 
Meuse both in Belgium and  in the Netherlands. The River Meuse rises in 
France, and  near Givet it enters Belgium. After crossing th is  country, it then 
forms the frontier with the Netherlands before it en ters its territory above 
M aastricht. A few kilom etres below M aastricht, the Meuse again forms the 
frontier between the N etherlands and Belgium un til it en ters the N etherlands 
and  flows into the North Sea.
Belgium and  the N etherlands concluded a Treaty on 12 May 1863139 where they 
agreed to ‘settle perm anently  and definitively the regime governing diversions of 
w ater from the Meuse for the feeding of navigation canals and irrigation 
ch an n e ls’. Later, in 1925, the two States signed another Treaty with a  view to 
settling all differences regarding the construction and  enlargem ent of new 
canals, b u t the  F irst Cham ber of the D utch Parliam ent refused to ratify it. 
Despite th is, both  Belgium and the N etherlands began the construction of 
canals, barrages and  locks.
Although bo th  parties to the dispute had  referred in their written and oral 
pleadings to the  application of the general rules of in ternational river law, the 
PCIJ decided th a t the controversy should be determ ined solely by interpreting 
and applying the  1863 Treaty. The Court found th a t neither party  had  violated 
its obligations u n d e r the Treaty. The Court recognised only th a t the rights
136 McCaffrey (2001), 182. See also supra  s .2.3.4.
137 Article 343 and  344.
138 (Netherlands/Belgium), Judgm ent of 28 Ju n e  1937.
139 UN (1963), 550.
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u nder the Treaty should be protected. When com m enting on the diversion of 
the w ater from different points of the Meuse other th an  the feeder referred to in 
the Treaty into canals situated  in both countries, b u t not explicitly referred to 
in the Treaty, the  Court said:
As re g a rd s  s u c h  c a n a ls , ea ch  of th e  two S ta te s  is  a t  lib e rty , in  its  ow n te rrito ry , to 
m odify th e m , to  en la rg e  th em , to tra n s fo rm  th em , to  fill th e m  in  a n d  even to  in c re a se  
th e  v o lu m e of w a te r  in  th e m  from  new  so u rc e s , p rov id ed  th a t  th e  d iv ers io n  of w a te r  a t  
th e  tre a ty  feed er a n d  th e  vo lum e of w a te r to be d isc h a rg e d  th e re fro m  to m a in ta in  th e  
n o rm a l level a n d  flow in  th e  Z u id -W illem sv aart is n o t affec ted .
The in terest in th is case lies in the fact th a t the Court, in relying solely on 
treaty law to decide the dispute, placed the agreem ent between the parties as 
the crucial elem ent in limiting S ta tes’ activities and  ultim ately in solving the 
dispute. Since the Court did not analyse w hether the parties had  violated 
general in ternational fluvial law by constructing w ater works independently of 
the other co-riparian, it is not possible to draw  conclusions as to w hether 
S tates have a  wide degree of freedom to do as they please in their own territory 
in the absence of voluntarily assum ed treaty com m itm ents.
3 .2 .6 .4  L ake Lanoux  Arbitration 140
In 1957 the ‘com m unity of in terests’ approach w as again reflected in another 
in ternational decision . 141 The case concerned the diversion of the waters of the 
Lake Lanoux, s ituated  entirely in French territory, to the Ariege River, which 
flows th rough  France into the Atlantic Ocean, for the purpose of an  
hydro-electric project. The international dim ension arose because, although the 
elevation betw een Lake Lanoux and the Ariege River could be used  to generate 
hydro-electricity, the  lake drained naturally  into Spain via the rivers Carol and  
Font-Vivre and  thence into the M editerranean Sea.
The initial project approved by the French Governm ent did not contem plate 
restitu tion  of the  w ater so diverted, bu t on com plaint by Spain France offered 
to com pensate Spain financially. The planned diversion am ounted to 25 per 
cent of the flow of the river, the waters of which were relied upon in Spain for
140 (France v. Spain), Award of 16 November 1957.
141 For an  analysis of the case, see, e.g. Laylin and Bianchi (1959), Lammers (1984), 508-517; 
or McCaffrey (2001), 197-203.
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irrigation. France then  modified the project in order to provide full restitu tion  in 
am ount of w ater still on French territory via an  underground  tunnel to the 
in ternational River Carol. Fearing th a t its rights and  in terests would be 
adversely affected by the French works, Spain claimed th a t the project would 
alter the n a tu ra l conditions of the hydrographic basin  of Lake Lanoux by the 
diversion of w aters into the Ariege River. In addition, by m aking restitution of 
the w aters to the River Carol physically dependent upon hum an  will, th is 
would lead to a  de facto preponderance of one S tate over the other, ra ther than  
to the preservation of the equality of the parties S tates as provided for by the 
Treaty of Bayonne of 26 May 1866 and by the Additional Act of the same date. 
This Treaty delimited the frontiers between France and  Spain from Andorra to 
the M editerranean Sea, and  its Additional Act provided ‘Regulations applicable 
over the whole Frontier in either Country, and  relative to the preservation of the 
Boundary M arks, to Cattle and Pasturage, to Properties divided by the Frontier, 
and  the enjoym ent of the W aters common to b o th ’. 142 Spain also claimed th a t 
under the 1866 Treaty of Bayonne such works could only be undertaken  with 
its consent.
The Tribunal h ad  to decide w hether France was breaching  the provisions of the 
1866 Treaty of Bayonne and the Additional Act by carrying out the works for 
the u tilisation of the w aters of Lake Lanoux w ithout prior agreem ent between 
the two Governm ents.
Although the questions presented by the compromis relate solely to treaty law, 
the T ribunal found th a t in interpreting the Treaty and  Additional Act it should 
also ‘take in to  account the spirit th a t guided the framing of the Pyrenean 
Treaties as well as the ru les of international common law ’. The Tribunal then  
set out a  n u m b er of considerations concerning the rights and  obligations of 
S tates in relation to international w atercourses un d er general international 
law.
The Tribunal considered th a t the dispute could be reduced to two fundam ental 
questions. The first question was w hether the French schem e and proposals 
would constitu te  them selves a violation of the rights of Spain recognized by the 
provisions of the  1866 Treaty of Bayonne and the Additional Act. If not, the
142 24 ILR (1957), 102.
Ibid., 121.
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second question was w hether the execution of the works constitu ted  a  violation 
of the provisions of the 1866 Treaty of Bayonne and the Additional Act because 
there h ad  been no prior agreem ent between the two Governm ents or because 
the procedure laid down in Article XI of the Additional Act to the Treaty of 
Bayonne h ad  no t been observed. According to th is  Article, France had  to give 
prior notice of works th a t could change the course or the volume of a 
w atercourse flowing into Spain, so th a t the in terests  th a t could be involved on 
both sides would be safeguarded.
The Tribunal rejected the Spanish argum ents, notably due to the fact th a t 
France had  given a  guarantee as to the am ount of w ater to be restitu ted, th u s  
in fact benefiting Spain with an  increase in volume. In relying on France’s 
com m itm ent in th is respect, the Tribunal considered th a t Spain could not 
claim to have insufficient guarantee, since ‘there is a  general and 
w ell-established principle of law according to which bad faith is not 
p resum ed . ’144 Therefore, the Tribunal concluded th a t the works planned by 
France were no t in violation of the 1866 Treaty and  Additional Act.
The Tribunal fu rther held th a t France did not need the  prior agreem ent of 
Spain to undertake  the proposed works. In addition, France h ad  complied with 
its obligations u n d er Article XI of the Additional Act by notifying Spain of its 
p lanned works, including the diversion project, by consulting with Spain prior 
to initiating the project, and  by subsequently altering its original plan, so th a t 
the w aters would reach  Spain from the sam e point on the frontier, with no 
dim inution in volume, in order to accommodate Spanish  interests.
In its reasoning, the Tribunal made several general points related to riparian 
procedural righ ts  and  duties of States in their co-operative relations. The 
Tribunal acknowledged th a t
In  fact, S ta te s  a re  to d a y  perfectly  co n sc io u s  of th e  im p o rta n c e  of th e  con flic ting  
in te re s ts  b ro u g h t in to  p lay  by th e  in d u s tr ia l  u s e  of in te rn a tio n a l  rivers , a n d  of th e  
n ec e ss ity  to  re co n c ile  th e m  by m u tu a l co n cess io n s . T he only  w ay to  a rriv e  a t  su c h  
co m p ro m ise s  o f in te r e s ts  is  to  co n c lu d e  a g re e m e n ts  o n  a n  in c re a s in g ly  co m p reh en siv e  
b a s is . In te rn a t io n a l  p ra c tic e  re flects  th e  co nv ic tion  th a t  S ta te s  o u g h t to  strive  to  
co n c lu d e  s u c h  a g re e m e n ts : th e re  w ould  th u s  a p p e a r  to  be a n  o b lig a tio n  to  a c c e p t in
144 Ibid., 126. For the principle of good faith, see supra  s .2.3.9.
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good fa ith  a ll c o m m u n ic a tio n s  a n d  c o n tra c ts  w h ich  co u ld , by a  b ro a d  c o m p ariso n  of 
in te re s ts  a n d  by rec ip ro ca l good will, p rovide S ta te s  w ith  th e  b e s t  co n d itio n s  for 
co n c lu d in g  a g re e m e n ts .145
But, as the Tribunal explained,
In effect, in  o rd e r  to  ap p re c ia te  in  its  e sse n ce  th e  n e c e s s ity  for p rio r  ag reem en t, one 
m u s t  en v isag e  th e  h y p o th e s is  in  w h ich  th e  in te re s te d  S ta te s  c a n n o t  re a c h  ag reem en t. 
In  s u c h  ca se , it m u s t  be ad m itte d  th a t  th e  S ta te  w h ich  is  n o rm a lly  co m p e te n t h a s  lo st 
i ts  r ig h t to  a c t  a lo n e  a s  a  re s u lt  of th e  u n c o n d itio n a l a n d  a rb itra ry  o p p o sitio n  of 
a n o th e r  S ta te . T h is  a m o u n ts  to ad m ittin g  a  ‘rig h t of a s s e n t ’, a  ‘r ig h t of v e to ’, w h ich  a t  
th e  d isc re tio n  of on e  S ta te  p a ra ly se s  th e  exerc ise  of th e  te rr ito r ia l ju r isd ic tio n  of 
an o th e r .
T h a t is  w hy  in te rn a tio n a l  p rac tice  p re fe rs  to  re s o r t  to  le s s  ex trem e so lu tio n s  by 
co n fin in g  itse lf  to  ob lig ing  th e  S ta te s  to seek , by p re lim in a ry  n eg o tia tio n s , te rm s  for a n  
ag reem en t, w ith o u t s u b o rd in a tin g  th e  exerc ise  of th e ir  c o m p e te n c e s  to  th e  co n c lu s io n  
of s u c h  a n  a g re e m e n t.146
The Tribunal th u s  held th a t international law does not require prior consent by 
the notified State for the im plem entation of the proposed m easures by the 
planning State. The Tribunal, on analysing state  practice, concluded th a t ‘the 
rule th a t S tates m ay utilize the hydraulic power of in ternational w atercourses 
only on condition of a  prior agreem ent between the in terested  States cannot be 
estab lished  as  a  custom , even less as a general principle of law ’. 147
While considering the existence of the obligation to notify and to consult, the 
Tribunal seem s to suggest th a t there is a principle of general application 
according to w hich ‘A State wishing to do th a t which will affect an international 
w atercourse canno t decide whether another S ta te’s in terest will be affected; the 
other S tate is the  sole judge of th a t and h as  the right to information on the 
proposals ’ . 148 The Tribunal then proceeded to characterise consultations and 
negotiations . 149
148 Ibid., 129-30.
148 Ibid., 128.
147 Ibid., 130.
148 Ibid., 119.
149 See infra s .4.4 and  s .4.5.
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Though the Tribunal em phasized the im portance of p lanning States taking into 
consideration o ther riparian  S ta tes’ interests in their in ternational projects, it 
nevertheless seem s clear from the award th a t the Tribunal did not believe 
riparian S tates to be under the obligation to undertake works designed to 
promote the  in terests  of other States, w hether up stream  or dow nstream , nor to 
adopt ‘form s of w ater utilization which would lead to optimal use of the waters 
considering all in terests involved ’, 150 as the concept of ‘com m unity of in terest’ 
h as  be constructed  to imply . 151
This award h as  undoubtedly been the m ost insightful international decision 
into the im plications of the obligation to co-operate to date.
3.2 .6 .5  The Case concerning th e  G abcikovo-N agym aros P r o je c t152
The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case generated great expectations in the 
in ternational legal com m unity since it was regarded by m any as am opportunity 
for the Court to develop the law relating to environm ental protection . 153 As to 
the obligation to co-operate and in ternational w atercourses, the judgm ent 
seem s to have clarified several issues. Paradoxically, the  case continues on the 
docket of the C ourt due to the need for supervision of the application of, or 
indeed the failure to comply with, the very obligation to co-operate.
In 1977, H ungary and  Czechoslovakia concluded a  Treaty constituting an 
in tegrated  jo in t project for a hydro-electric power development, a navigation 
and  flood control investm ent programme, and the estab lishm ent of a regime for 
the project . 154 P art of the project consisted of the construction and operation of 
a m ajor system  of dam s and barrages on the stre tch  of the River D anube 
between B ratislava and  B udapest where the m ajor p art of the boundary 
between the  two S ta tes is constituted by the m ain channel of the river. One of 
the series of locks w as to be built at Gabcikovo on a  31 km  bypass canal in
150 Lammers (1984), 517.
151 See supra  s .2.2 .4  and  s .3.2.6.2.
152 (Hungary/Slovakia), judgm ent of 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports (1997), 7.
153 See, e.g. Kiss (1997), 72-3. For critical analyses of the judgm ent, see, e.g. Stec and Eckstein 
(1997), Lammers (1998), Sohnle (1998), and McCaffrey (2001), 186-197.
154 The 1977 Treaty concerning the Construction and Operation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
System of Locks, concluded in Budapest, on 16 September 1977.
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Czechoslovak territory, and  the second a t Nagymaros in Hungary. The Treaty 
also provided for the construction of a dam  in D unakiliti by Hungary, so th a t 
the bypass canal could be filled, and the hydro-electric power p lan t and  ship 
locks a t Gabcikovo operated. Works on the project s tarted  in 1978. But in 
1983, on H ungary’s initiative, the S tates agreed by two Protocols signed on 10 
October to slow down the work on the project and  postpone putting  the power 
p lan ts into operation. On 6  February 1989 the Parties agreed a further Protocol 
to accelerate the  project.
Nonetheless, on 27 October 1989, due to in tense dom estic political pressure, 
the H ungarian Government suspended the works while awaiting the results 
from various studies. Subsequently, Hungary decided to abandon the works at 
Nagymaros and  Dunakiliti, alleging economic and  environm ental reasons, 
notably th a t it entailed grave risks to the H ungarian environm ent and the water 
supply of B udapest. Despite an immediate pro test by Czechoslovakia, and 
continuous negotiations during th is period, the Parties failed to reach an 
agreem ent.
Having already carried out a  substan tia l part of the works, Czechoslovakia then 
considered some alternatives to the original project. In 1991, the Czechoslovak 
Governm ent s ta rted  working on an alternative solution, known as V ariant C’, 
which included the unilateral diversion of the flow of the D anube on to its 
territory (80% to 90%), the construction of an  overflow dam  a t Cunovo, and a 
levee linking the  dam  to a  bypass canal and  additional works. In response, 
H ungary pro tested  and  argued th a t its access to the w ater of the River Danube 
would be affected adversely by the operation of the works envisaged under this 
scheme. A lthough discussions had  continued un til then , H ungary term inated 
the 1977 Treaty w ith effect from 25 May 1992. On 15 October 1992, 
Czechoslovakia began the work to allow the closing of the D anube, and from 23 
October 1992 proceeded to dam  the river.
On 7 April 1993, after unsuccessful m ediation efforts by the European 
Commission, H ungary and  Slovakia -  which along with the Czech Republic had  
become a  successor S tate following the break-up of Czechoslovakia -  concluded 
a  Special A greem ent155 to subm it to the ICJ certain  issues arising out of
155 Entered into force on 28 Ju n e  1993. 32 ILM (1993), 1293.
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differences regarding the im plem entation and  the term ination of the 1977 
Treaty on the construction and operation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros barrage 
system. On 2 Ju ly  1993, H ungary and Slovakia jointly subm itted  the dispute to 
the ICJ.
In its Original Application, H ungary focused, inter alia, on the breach by 
Czechoslovakia -  since 1993, by Slovakia -  of several aspects of the obligation 
to co-operate. H ungary claimed th a t Slovakia h ad  failed to negotiate in good 
faith and  th u s  to prevent the dispute, to notify in good time its p lans to engage 
in activities th a t could cause significant transboundary  adverse effects, and 
subsequently  to en ter into consultations in good fa ith . 156
In its Judgm en t of 25 Septem ber 1997, the Court found th a t both Hungary and 
Slovakia h ad  breached their in ternational legal obligations: Hungary by 
abandoning its works and  purporting to term inate the 1977 Treaty, and 
Slovakia by having unilaterally p u t Variant C into operation. The Court held 
th a t the S tates m u st negotiate in good faith while taking into consideration 
the factual situation  th a t developed since 1989 and  find an  agreed solution in 
order to ensure  the achievem ent of the objectives of the  1977 Treaty, which it 
declared w as still in force. The Court further held th a t un less  the two States 
otherwise agreed, a  jo in t operational regime m u st be established in accordance 
with the 1977 Treaty. Since, according to the Treaty, the m ain s tructu res  of the 
System  of Locks are the jo int property of the parties, their operation m ust take 
the form of a  co-ordinated single unit, and  th u s  the benefits of the project m ust 
be equally shared  (para. 144). It followed tha t decisions on the im plem entation 
of the project were in fact to be made by the parties them selves (paras. 134-7). 
The Court underlined  th a t in future negotiations the S tates should take into 
account as a  key issue the project’s im pact upon, and  its im plications for, the 
environm ent, and  should  th u s  evaluate its risks on the basis of current 
in ternational s tan d a rd s  (para. 140).
In addition to contributing  in this way to environm ental law , 157 the ICJ m akes 
in its  reasoning and  in the operative p a rt of its judgm ent several 
pronouncem ents relating to the obligation to co-operate.
156 Original Application of 22 October 1992, paras.27, 29 and 30, superseded by the Special 
Agreement.
157 Nevertheless, the ICJ was criticised for having not taken  the opportunity to provide more 
detailed guidance on issues such as the relationship between the right to equitable and
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While reflecting on the im portance of the D anube to the development of the 
riparian  S tates, the Court justifies the need for co-operation, notably for the 
production of hydro-electricity:
17. T he D a n u b e  h a s  a lw ays p lay ed  a  v ita l p a r t  in  th e  co m m erc ia l a n d  econom ic 
d ev e lo p m en t o f i ts  r ip a r ia n  S ta te s , a n d  h a s  u n d e r lin e d  a n d  re in fo rced  th e ir  
in te rd e p e n d e n c e , m ak in g  in te rn a tio n a l co -o p e ra tio n  e s se n tia l .  Im p ro v em en ts  to th e  
n av ig a tio n  c h a n n e l  h av e  e n a b le d  th e  D a n u b e , now  lin k ed  by c a n a l to  th e  M ain a n d  
th e n c e  to th e  R h ine, to becom e a n  im p o rta n t n av ig a tio n a l a r te ry  co n n e c tin g  th e  N orth  
S ea  to  th e  B lack  Sea. In  th e  s tre tc h  of river to w h ich  th e  c a se  re la te s , flood p ro tec tio n  
m e a s u re s  h av e  b e e n  c o n s tru c te d  over th e  c e n tu r ie s , fa rm in g  a n d  fo restry  p ra c tise d , 
a n d , m o re  recen tly , th e re  h a s  b een  a n  in c re a se  in  p o p u la tio n  a n d  in d u s tr ia l  ac tiv ity  in  
th e  a rea . T he c u m u la tiv e  effects on  th e  river a n d  on  th e  e n v iro n m e n t of v a r io u s  h u m a n  
ac tiv itie s  over th e  y e a rs  h av e  n o t all b een  fav o u rab le , p a r tic u la r ly  for th e  w a te r  regim e.
Only by in te rn a tio n a l  co -o p e ra tio n  co u ld  ac tio n  be ta k e n  to  a llev ia te  th e s e  p rob lem s. 
W ate r m a n a g e m e n t p ro je c ts  a lo n g  th e  D a n u b e  h av e  fre q u e n tly  so u g h t to com bine 
n av ig a tio n a l im p ro v e m e n ts  a n d  flood p ro tec tio n  w ith  th e  p ro d u c tio n  of electricity  
th ro u g h  h y d ro e le c tr ic  pow er p la n ts . T he p o te n tia l of th e  D a n u b e  for th e  p ro d u c tio n  of 
h y d ro e lec tric  p o w er h a s  b e e n  ex tensive ly  exp lo ited  by so m e r ip a r ia n  S ta te s . The h is to ry  
of a t te m p ts  to  h a r n e s s  th e  p o te n tia l of th e  p a r tic u la r  s t re tc h  of th e  river a t  is su e  in  
th e se  p ro c eed in g s  e x te n d s  over a  2 5 -y ear perio d  c u lm in a tin g  in  th e  s ig n a tu re  of th e  
1977 T reaty .
After citing the PCIJ’s decision on the River Oder case, the ICJ explicitly applied 
for the  first tim e the concept of ‘community of in te re s t’ to the non-navigational 
uses of in terna tional watercourses. The Court considered the principle 
‘streng thened ’ by m odern developments in in ternational law, ‘as evidenced’ by 
the adoption of the  1997 UN W atercourses Convention (para. 85). From its 
specific application to the case before it, it is clear th a t a  riparian  State may not 
unilaterally  assu m e control of a shared resource, as Slovakia had  done with the 
diversion of the  river, ‘thereby depriving Hungary of its  right to an  equitable 
and reasonable share  of the n atu ra l resources of the D anube.’ The Court seem s 
to recall the prim acy of the right to an equitable and  reasonable utilisation of 
the river, which it seem s to construct as the ‘common legal righ t’ referred to in
reasonable utilization and the obligation to prevent significant environm ental harm . See, e.g. 
Sands (2003), 477.
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the River Oder case, as suggested by McCaffrey . 153 The Court, however, has 
shed no further light on the content of the concept nor its legal implications.
In addition, the adoption of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention was the 
only evidence referred to by the Court, and th is  on its own seem s ra ther 
limited. First, because obligations sometimes credited to the concept of 
‘com m unity of in te rest’, such as integrated and jo in t m anagem ent of the river 
basin  and  the establishm ent of joint in stitu tions , 159 are not required by the 
C o n v e n t i o n . 159 Secondly, because the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention had  
been adopted by the UNGA only four m onths prior to the judgm ent, had  been 
signed by three S tates only, and of the three S tates voting against the 
Convention two were key regional riparian S ta tes . 161 Moreover, after the heated 
debate th a t the Convention generated in the Sixth Committee, its entering into 
force was not to be realistically expected in the near future. One may therefore 
deduce th a t the Court gave considerable weight to the long process of 
elaboration of the draft Convention by the ILC, especially bearing in m ind the 
fact th a t some of the judges were former m em bers of the ILC. 162
Nevertheless, th is  pronouncem ent is at least an  indication th a t the ICJ 
considers the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention as an  ‘authoritative 
in strum en t in the field ’. 163 Consequently, and  as the Court seeks to be 
consisten t and  build on its own ju risp rudence , 164 one m ay expect the Court to 
adopt a  sim ilar view in fu ture cases.
Still, it is n o t surprising  th a t the Court has been criticised for not having made 
a  thorough exam ination of state practice or opinio juris to ascertain  the law, 
ra th er tak ing  a  short-cu t by invoking the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention as
153 McCaffrey (2001), 182.
159 See supra  s .2.2 .4
160 Even if these requirem ents are present in the 1977 Treaty regime now ordered by the Court 
to be re-established between the parties to the dispute. See para. 141.
161 China and  Turkey. The third State voting against the Convention was Burundi.
162 In particular, the President of the Court, Judge Schwebel, a former Special Rapporteur.
163 McCaffrey (2001), 193.
164 Higgins (1994), 203.
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evidence of the development of m odem  international law, th a t is, a  ‘reflection of 
evolving custom ary law ’. 165
The issue here is not so m uch w hether the Convention is evidence of the 
development of international law per se, b u t ra th e r w hether the ICJ had  
developed the  law. In other words, the question is one of the limits of the 
C ourt’s jud icial function. Judge Higgins, in her Hague Academy lectures, 
form ulates the question: ‘should [the Court] merely say as m uch as it has to 
say to decide the issue before it, or should it consciously contribute to the 
development of norm s by offering views on a wider and  less restrictive basis ? ’166
Strictly speaking, the role of the ICJ -  as indeed of other international courts 
and tribunals -  is, on the one hand, to settle d isputes, the judgm ents of which 
are only binding upon the parties before it in accordance with Article 59 of the 
S tatu te of the Court, and on the other hand, to provide specific advisory 
opinions to certain  UN bodies . 167 The ICJ itself h as  recognised th is limitation in 
its powers. In the  South West Africa cases, the Court asserted:
As is  im p lied  by th e  o p en in g  p h ra s e  of A rticle 38 , p a ra g ra p h  1, of its  S ta tu te , th e  C o u rt 
is  n o t a  leg isla tive  body. I ts  d u ty  is  to  app ly  th e  law  a s  it f in d s  it, n o t to m ak e  it.
It is  a lw ay s o p en  to  p a r tie s  to  a  d isp u te , if th ey  w ish  th e  C o u rt to  give a  dec ision  on a  
b a s is  of ex aequo et bono, a n d  a re  so ag reed , to invoke th e  pow er w h ich , in  th o se  
c irc u m s ta n c e s , p a ra g ra p h  2 of th is  sam e  A rticle 38  co n fe rs  o n  th e  C o u rt to give a  
d ec is io n  o n  th a t  b a s is , n o t-w ith s ta n d in g  th e  p ro v is io n s of p a ra g ra p h  1. Failing  th a t, th e  
d u ty  o f th e  C o u rt  is  p la in .168
But the C ourt does not simply apply existing ru les to facts. It considers the 
circum stances to which rules are m eant to be applied, it elaborates on the 
content of norm s, and  it expands upon uncerta in  issues, th u s  inevitably 
contributing to the  development of international law . 169
165 Benvenisti (2002), 201. See also Boyle (1997), where Boyle argues th a t the Court poured 
‘new law in old bottles’.
166 Higgins (1994), 204.
167 Article 65 of the S tatu te of the ICJ.
168 (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), ICJ Reports (1966) 6, 48, p aras .89-90.
169 Higgins (1994), 202.
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Although decisions are deemed a  subsidiary source of in ternational law, 
according to Article 38(l)(c) of the S tatute of the Court, in practice the reality is 
quite different: judgm ents and opinions of the Court are widely accepted and 
‘treated as authoritative pronouncem ents upon  the curren t state of 
in ternational law ’,170 even if occasionally based on debatable grounds . 171 Their 
decisions inevitably have an im pact in future cases dealing with the same legal 
issues, and  are likely to produce consistent fu ture practice . 172
Giving the example of the decision in the p resen t case, Benvenisti argues th a t 
the ICJ h as  been granted by the international legal system  ‘the power -  and 
duty -  to offer legislative, Pareto-superior rem edies’ when m ultinational 
negotiations, such  as those leading to the adoption of the 1997 UN 
W atercourses Convention, fail to reach an  efficient resu lt or never take place 
due to conflicting in te rests . 173 The ICJ, th u s, h as  ‘the power to create new law 
under the pretext of “finding” existing custom ary in ternational law .’ In other 
words, S tates accept the authority  of the Court to form ulate custom  as the sole 
institu tion able to develop the law and act in their best in terests and  those of 
the in ternational com m unity as a  whole . 174
In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project decision, the ICJ concluded th a t both 
parties had  carried out wrongful acts and ordered them  to fulfil their obligation 
of reparation  th rough  the resum ption of co-operation in the utilisation of the 
shared  w ater resources of the Danube, and  the im plem entation of the 
m ulti-purpose project in an equitable and  reasonable m anner, th u s  
re-establish ing  a  ‘co-operative adm inistration of w hat rem ains of the Project’ 
(para. 150).
For the re-estab lishm ent of the joint regime, the Court cited Article 5(2) of the 
1997 UN W atercourses Convention . 173 This provides for the obligation of
170 Id. Their ‘persuasive force’ depends on several factors, such as  the quality of its reasoning 
or the term s of the compromis. See commentary to Principle 10 of the 2000 ILA London Principles 
ofCIL, 19.
171 Benvenisti (2002), 212.
172 Id.
173 Ibid., 203.
174 Id. and 212. Benvenisti (2002), 204ff. also argues that the legislative function of the ICJ is 
itself based in custom ary international law.
175 See also Judge W eeramantry dissenting opinion in the K asik ili/S edu du  Island  case, ICJ 
Reports (1999), 1045, where he affirmed the need to set up  a  jo in t in ternational regime between
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‘partic ipation’ by a  State in the use, development and  protection of an 
in ternational w atercourse in an equitable and  reasonable m anner, a new 
concept p u t forward by the ILC, linking explicitly the right of a State to utilise 
the w atercourse to the duty to co-operate in its protection and  development. 
But beyond ordering the parties to negotiate, the Court did not elaborate on the 
obligation to co-operate. The Court recalled in th is  context w hat it had  
previously said in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases as to how negotiations 
should be carried o u t . 176 However, it asserted th a t it w as ‘not for the Court to 
determ ine w hat shall be the final resu lt of these negotiations to be conducted 
by the Parties. It is for the Parties themselves to find an agreed solution th a t 
takes account of the objectives of the Treaty, which m u st be pursued  in a joint 
and integrated way, as well as the norm s of in ternational environmental law 
and the principles of the law of international w atercourses’ (para. 141).
A few reasons m ay be p u t forward to explain th is decision. The Court has 
several tim es taken  occasion to convey its preference for not stipulating in 
detail the fu ture conduct of the parties in order to allow them  the freedom 
necessary to proceed with negotiations. In ordering the parties to co-operate, 
the Court evidently intended to send the parties back  to the negotiating table. 
This may be explained by the fact th a t the n a tu re  of the problem of shared 
n a tu ra l resources in itself requires the parties to continue co-operating in a 
variety of different ways, especially since in the wider frame of their relations 
wider issu es  would need solving. The Court also em phasises th a t the 
substan tive  ru les of international law need to be complied with. In this case the 
rule of equitable and  reasonable utilisation had been breached, and in order for 
th is violation no t to recur, the Court recognised it to be necessary not only to 
assert the  violation of the rules bu t for the parties them selves to prevent these 
violations in the  fu tu re  through co-operation. As with m any boundary disputes, 
a totally prescriptive decision would not be the best solution, since the issues 
involved in the  case are complex and may require fu rther or indeed continuous 
co-operation.
This type of solution h as  many known advantages. The decision em phasized 
the essential po in ts, and  resolved m any legal issues, th u s  removing obstacles
Botswana and  Namibia in order to safeguard the environm ental in terests of the Island, and 
where this question is discussed in some detail.
176 See supra  s .2.3.9, and infra s.4.4.
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to the required co-operation. The judgm ent ‘clearly seeks to shield in ternational 
politics from the influence of domestic politics ’. 177 As both  parties have V o n ’, 
th is could internally justify both the G overnm ent’s recourse to the high cost of 
action brought before the ICJ and the resum ption of the required negotiations 
close to election time.
A contrario, the  decision may be criticised for not having gone far enough. The 
Court left the dispute unresolved by requiring the parties to re tu rn  to the 
negotiating table -  a  course which had  previously proved unsuccessful. In fact, 
on 3 Septem ber 1998, Slovakia filed a  request for an  additional judgm ent. In its 
request, Slovakia sta tes th a t the Parties conducted a  series of negotiations on 
the modalities for executing the C ourt’s judgm ent and  initialled a draft 
framework agreem ent, which was approved by the Governm ent of Slovakia on 
10 M arch 1998. Slovakia, however, contends th a t ‘on 5 M arch 1998, Hungary 
postponed its approval and, upon the accession of its new Government 
following the May elections, it has  proceeded to disavow the draft Framework 
Agreement and  now further delays im plem enting the Ju d g m en t’. Hence, 
Slovakia seeks a  determ ination of the m odalities for executing the Court’s 
judgm ent. Slovakia bases its request on the Special Agreement of 7 April 1993 
(Article 5), whereby the parties jointly subm itted their original dispute to the 
Court.
On 7 December 1998 Hungary filed a  w ritten sta tem ent of its position in 
response to Slovakia’s request for an additional judgm ent. Although the Court 
h as  no t yet acted upon these subm issions, it has  requested  the parties to keep 
the C ourt inform ed of the progress of negotiations on the im plem entation of its 
ruling.
The obstacles to settlem ent seem indeed to arise mostly from domestic politics 
and institu tions. Internal public pressure on both governm ents to take 
unilateral action originally led to the dispute. Although public support for 
settlem ent h a s  been fragile, the decision of the Court ordering the parties to 
renegotiate the existing regime may now be invoked by both governm ents 
internally, notably  against the opposition, to show th a t despite political 
p ressu res for un ila tera l action, the outcome would be the sam e and the State
177 Benvenisti (2002), 136.
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would still be bound by its international obligations. The successful resolution 
of the d ispute still depends on the governm ents’ willingness and ability to 
prepare the public to accept the term s of a settlem ent which will inevitably 
involve significant concessions.
3 .2 .6 .6  Pulp M ills on th e  R iver U ruguay 178
A recent case, still before the ICJ, concerns the construction of two pulp mills 
on the banks of the River Uruguay near the U ruguayan town of Fray Bentos. 
The project is situated  within 25 km  from the Argentine town of Gualeguaychu, 
a popular tourist resort on the Argentine side of the River Uruguay. The project 
consists of two greenfield eucalyptus Kraft pulp mills u sing  Elemental Chlorine 
Free (ECF) technology to produce air-dried pulp (ADP), which is the primary 
raw m aterial for the production of paper and paper-related  products. Contrary 
to the Totally Chlorine Free (TCF) bleaching process, the ECF technology 
resu lts  in the em ission of dioxins through the u se  of chlorine dioxide. It is 
expected th a t the  mills will produce a combined total of abou t 1.4 million tons 
of pulp per year. The project represents the largest foreign investm ent in the 
history of U ruguay and  an im portant source for local employment. If 
completed, th is  would be the largest cellulose mill project in the world.
In May 2006, Argentina filed an application institu ting  proceedings against 
U ruguay concerning alleged violations by Uruguay of its obligations under the 
S ta tu te  of the  River Uruguay, a bilateral treaty signed on 26 February 1975.
The purpose  of the  S tatu te is ‘to establish the jo in t m achinery necessary for the 
optim um  an d  rational utilization of the River U ruguay’ (Article 1), which is 
shared by the  two States and partially constitu tes their jo in t boundary. The 
S tatu te governs, inter alia, ‘the conservation, utilization and  exploitation of 
n a tu ra l resources and  the prevention of pollution’ and  establishes an 
Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay (CARU), which has functions 
of regulation an d  co-ordination.
In its application, Argentina claims th a t U ruguay authorized unilaterally the 
construction of the  two pulp mills on the River U ruguay, despite A rgentina’s
178 (Argentina v. Uruguay). See generally the ICJ’s website a t http: / / www.ici-cii.org and Bekker 
(2006 ).
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repeated pro tests both to the Government of U ruguay and  to CARU, without 
complying with the procedure of prior notification and  consultation established 
in the S tatu te.
Argentina also claims th a t the construction and  subsequen t com m issioning of 
the two pulp  mills will have adverse environm ental and  other effects upon it 
and  its catchm ent area. These include ‘significant risks of pollution of the river, 
deterioration of biodiversity, harm ful effects on health  and  damage to fisheries 
resou rces’, and  ‘extremely serious consequences for tourism  and other 
economic in te rests’. In fact, the m ain point of contention between the two 
States is w hether the pulp mills would comply with existing international 
norm s concerning effluent emissions. Uruguay asse rts  th a t the existing 
environm ental studies into the im pact of the mills in term s of atm ospheric 
em issions and liquid effluents reveal th a t th is will no t be such  as to trigger the 
notification requirem ents within CARU. Argentina h as  rejected these EIA 
studies claiming th a t they are biased, excessively optim istic, and  incomplete, 
and has asked for additional information and  for a  more comprehensive and 
independent in ternational study regarding the potential environmental and 
other effects of the two mills. In addition, it asks for full reparation for the 
injury caused  by U ruguay’s breach of its obligations u n d er the Statute, notably 
of notification and  consultation.
A rgentina s ta tes  that, following the change of governm ent in Uruguay in March 
2005, the  two S tates set up  a  bilateral High-Level Technical Group in order to 
resolve the d ispute between them. However, neither these meetings nor the 
presiden ts of the  two countries have been able to reach  a  settlem ent.
Argentina also requested  the indication of provisional m easures requiring 
Uruguay, inter alia, to suspend the authorizations for the construction of the 
mills and  the  ac tua l building work on them  pending a  final decision by the 
Court. It also asked  for an  order requiring U ruguay to co-operate in good faith 
with A rgentina in order to ensure the optim um  and  rational utilisation of the 
River Uruguay, an d  to refrain from any other action which m ight aggravate or 
extend the d ispu te  or render its settlem ent more difficult.
On 29 November 2006, Uruguay subm itted its own request to the Court for the 
indication of provisional m easures. It contended th a t organized groups of
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Argentine citizens had  blockaded a vital in ternational bridge over the Uruguay 
River and  th a t such  an action was causing enorm ous economic damage to 
Uruguay, w ithout Argentina having taken any steps to p u t an end to the 
blockade. U ruguay asked the ICJ to order Argentina to take all reasonable and 
appropriate steps to prevent or end the in terruption of tran sit between the two 
countries, and  to abstain  from taking m easures th a t m ight aggravate the 
d ispute or prejudice the rights of Uruguay in d ispute before the ICJ.
On 13 Ju ly  2006 and on 23 Jan u ary  2007, the Court gave its decisions. In 
both  Orders, the Court found th a t the circum stances, as they then presented 
them selves to it, were not such  as to require the indication of provisional 
m easures. On the first Order, the Court observed th a t there is ‘nothing in the 
record to dem onstrate th a t the very decision by U ruguay to authorize the 
construction of the mills poses an im m inent th rea t of irreparable damage to the 
aquatic environm ent of the River Uruguay or to the economic and social 
in terests of the riparian  inhab itan ts on the Argentine side of the river’ 
(para. 73). Yet the Court made clear that, by proceeding with the work, 
Uruguay ‘necessarily bears all risks relating to any finding on the m erits tha t 
the Court m ight later m ake’ (para. 78) and  th a t the construction of the mills at 
the cu rren t site cannot be deemed to create a fait accompli.
The ICJ em phasized ‘the im portance of the need to ensure environmental 
protection of shared  na tu ra l resources while allowing for sustainable economic 
developm ent’ (para. 80), and  recognised th a t ‘the detailed provisions of the 
1975 S ta tu te , which require co-operation between the parties for activities 
affecting the  river environment, created a com prehensive and progressive 
regim e’. It also noted  th a t the establishm ent of the Administrative Commission 
of the River Uruguay, ‘a  jo int m echanism  with regulatory, executive, 
adm inistrative, technical and  conciliatory functions, en trusted  with the proper 
im plem entation of the rules contained in the 1975 S tatu te  governing the 
m anagem ent of the shared  river resource’ is ‘of significance’. Furtherm ore, the 
Court sta ted  th a t the procedural m echanism  p u t in place under the 1975 
Statu te constitu ted  ‘a  very im portant p a rt’ of th a t treaty  regime (para. 81).
In both O rders, the  Court affirms th a t the parties are required ‘to fulfil their 
obligations u n d e r international law’, and in particu lar ‘to im plem ent in good 
faith the consultation  and co-operation procedures provided for by the 1975
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Statute, w ith CARU constituting the envisaged forum  in this regard ’. 179 In 
addition, the Court encourages both Parties ‘to refrain from any actions which 
m ight render more difficult the resolution’ of the dispute.
Having decided not to indicate provisional m easures in both requests, the 
Court will still have to consider the admissibility of the application and the 
m erits of the  case. As with m ost of the cases exam ined, the dispute is based on 
an existing treaty  regime. Since this regime w as originally agreed by the 
parties, and  in line with its previous decision on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Project case, the ICJ stresses the im portance of the  S ta tes’ compliance with the 
treaty procedural requirem ents to co-operate and  to consult within the 
framework of the bilateral commission. When deciding on the m erits, the ICJ 
will be given another opportunity to contribute to the clarification of the 
obligations to notify, to consult and to co-operate lato sensu.
3 .2 .6 .7  Concluding Remarks on International Decisions
To invoke the need for, or the practice of, co-operation seems to attract 
acceptance in political fora when th is is done in s ta tem ents  of general principle. 
B ut w hen specific forms or m eans of giving effect to th is co-operation are 
proposed with some precision, the risk of losing political support increases . 180 
This divergence is well illustrated with the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case. 
The im plem entation of the order of the ICJ for the parties to co-operate was 
im paired by the  lack of political support in governm ent elections. All agreed 
th a t co-operation was needed. But the prospects for th is dwindle when 
relations are m arked by d istrust and suspicion. This is especially so because 
am ong sovereign S tates past experience supports on several occasions the 
suspicion th a t  a  system  of interdependent works or w ater control will be 
abused.
Obviously, w here disputes are brought before an  in ternational court or 
tribunal, co-operation -  even where it has been tried -  h as  failed. It is th u s  
interesting to observe th a t m ost recent decisions point tow ards a reiteration by 
courts and  trib u n a ls  of the obligation th a t S tates m u st co-operate with each
179 Para.82 and  p ara .53, respectively.
180 See Pinto (1986), 134, in the context of economic development through co-operation.
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other on shared  n a tu ra l resources . 181 This seem s to send a  m essage to the 
States involved in sim ilar circum stances th a t there are issues th a t the parties 
to a  controversy should resolve among them selves, and  th a t they should 
overcome the political stalem ate by the resum ption of negotiations.
Equally, S tates involved in cases brought before in ternational courts or 
tribunals have invoked as part of their litigation strategy argum ents based on 
the breach  of the obligation to co-operate or of one of its applications . 182 This 
indicates th a t States now expect the courts to continue to dem and compliance 
not only with substantive rules bu t also with procedural ones.
Moreover, d ispu tes show a trend towards focusing on issues of sustainable use 
and environm ental protection, as well as on lim its im posed on the use of 
shared n a tu ra l resources, ra ther than  on control of the resources or 
concessions for its exploration . 188 This also m eans th a t the  legal duties involved 
will place greater weight on continuing procedural obligations.
3 .2 .7  Som e T h eoretica l P ersp ectives on  C o-operation
The problem of sharing  international water resources is one of the situations 
which m ay be represented in the ‘iterated prisoner’s dilem m a’, where the game 
is played repeatedly. Thus, contrary to the u su a l resu lt of individual players 
defecting in a  one-time gam e , 184 the incentive to defect is overcome by the 
th rea t of pun ishm en t, which in tu rn  leads to a  potential co-operative outcome. 
Axelrod, in  h is  theory on the evolution of co-operation , 188 concluded th a t ‘[i]n a 
vast range of s ituations m utual co-operation can be better for both sides than  
m utual defection. The key to doing well lies not in overcoming others, b u t in 
eliciting their co-operation . ’188 As there is no central authority  capable of 
enforcing co-operation between States, he speaks of two requisites for its
181 See also the cases related to the Law of the Sea, infra s.6.2.3.2.
182 See, in particular, the Mox Plant Case, infra s.6.2.3.2.
183 Schrijver (1997) 164-8, and Higgins (1999), 111.
184 In fact, in game theory’s prisoner’s dilemma, players chose different actions in order to 
maximise their re tu rns. B ut the main feature is th a t it provides a formal modelling approach to a 
situation in which decision-m akers interact with others.
185 Axelrod (1990). See also Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), and  Axelrod and Dion (1988).
186 Axelrod (1990), 190.
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development: first, the existence of reciprocity, where those involved are able 
and willing to work together; and  secondly, the long-term perspective, where the 
parties concerned in teract and perceive th is regular action as  beneficial and a 
long-term n eed . 187
In the case of successive States, the upper riparian  is probably less aware of 
the need and  value of co-operation th an  the lower riparian . 188 Viable 
co-operation may only exist when States recognize reciprocal advantages and 
are able and  willing to offer and accept these. B ut it is with the regulation of 
the rights and  obligations of S tates in treaties th a t th is  co-operation is m ost 
effective in practice, even if treaties do not cover the entire co-operative 
relationship between them . 189 As relationships regulated  by treaties vary from 
bilateral to regional or global, there is the risk  of an  erosion of the perception of 
interdependence of States, since the elem ent of reciprocity may be diluted by 
the num ber of S tates involved and  by the num ber of issu es under discussion . 190
Moreover, as in the p risoner’s dilemma, since S tates can  enjoy the benefits of 
environm ental protection by other S tates w ithout incurring  costs, they do not 
have an incentive to protect the environm ent . 191 However, if every State relies 
on others to protect it, then  environm ental degradation continues and the 
outcome is worse for all S tates th an  if they shared  the responsibility and cost of 
environm ental protection.1^  The principle of co-operation between States 
appears the only effective m eans to resolving th is problem . 198
This dilem m a and  the need for co-operation have been recognised in particular 
in the environm ental field, thus leading to a  proliferation of m ultilateral 
treaties. These, in tu rn , have led to further interdependencies and  closer 
integration betw een na tions . 194 This further enhances the imperative of 
co-operation, as  non-cooperation in one area can affect the position defended 
by a State in another. Moreover, failure to participate in such  co-operative
187 Ibid., 173.
188 On the continuing tension between upstream  and downstream  States, see supra  s. 1.4.2.
189 Pinto (1986), 135-6.
190 Axelrod (1990).
191 Except for the obvious incentive of reducing friction with their co-riparians.
192 Perrez (1998), 552-554.
198 Ibid., 581.
194 See C harney (1993), 529.
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regimes dim inishes the ability of S tates to influence the very establishm ent of 
international regimes and to safeguard their in terests  within those regim es . 195
The principle of co-operation involves the recognition th a t independent action is 
not sufficient to achieve common goals and requires a  com m itm ent by States to 
take into account the interests of other S tates, to share authority  and to 
sacrifice, to a  certain extent, unilateral action in favour of co-ordinated 
activity . 196 This may only be invoked where S tates need or seek to achieve 
common or related goals and are th u s  fairly in terdependen t . 197 In the context of 
in ternational w ater resources a common goal is, for example, sustainable 
developm ent . 198
Based on the iterated prisoner’s dilemma and on the  theory of collective action 
applied to transboundary  resources , 199 -  co-operation as a  long-term effort 
founded on collective action for an indefinite period of time -  Benvenisti 
suggests th a t long-term co-operation is the key to sustainab le  and optimal 
resource m anagem ent. However, the m anagem ent of na tu ra l resources is 
particularly susceptible to domestic pressure from groups to withdraw from 
their in ternational treaty  obligations , 200 or indeed no t to enter into them  in the 
first place.
As national legal ru les and institutional arrangem ents concerning the uses of 
n a tu ra l resources shape each S tate’s ability to commit itself to international 
obligations and  to comply with them , 201 ‘the stricter the rules precluding 
un ila tera l exit from treaty obligations, the stronger a  sta te  party ’s com m itm ent 
to long-term  co-operation, and the lower the uncertain ty  as to possible future 
b reaches ’. 202
Increasing su p p o rt for the integrated m anagem ent approach, including by the 
ICJ on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, m ay influence the development
195 See Chayes (1995), 75.
196 Perrez (2000), 521, and Stoll (1996), 47.
197 Stoll (1996), 40.
198 Ibid., 92. See su pra  s.3.2.1.
199 Benvenisti (2002), 31-42.
200 Ibid., 134 and  185.
201 Ibid., 132.
202 Ibid., 135 and  185.
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of the rules on co-operation between States, as it could lead to a shift from a 
Lotus-based approach, where States are free to act and  any lim itation to their 
sovereignty h as  to be proven, to the contrary approach, where it is the State 
seeking to avoid co-operation and responsibility th a t bears the burden of 
proof . 203
Like several other rules of international environm ental law, the content of the 
obligation to co-operate is dynamic and still evolving. Thus the assertion of its
legal s ta tu s  m ay generate some controversy . 204 B ut its significance as a
principle in guiding policy and as a  negotiating tool in the construction of
international environmental regimes is ind ispu tab le . 205
The weight of opinion am ongst modern writers supports  the doctrine that, in 
international environm ental law, co-operation is a  general legal principle . 206  
However, only a  few elaborate on its content and  legal s ta tu s . 207 As a treaty 
obligation, due to being general and ra ther abstract, its  interpretation for the 
purposes of im plem entation also raises difficulties.
The s ta tu s  of the obligation to co-operate as general custom ary international 
law m ay also be determ ined in relation to in ternational water resources 
through the analysis of the legal s ta tu s  of its different applications . 208
In the context of common offshore oil and gas deposits, Ong asserts  th a t there 
is an  extensive body of authority in support of a  general obligation to 
co-operate in the exploitation of common or shared resources. Judge J e s s u p ’s 
separate opinion in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases2 0 9  em phasises this,
203 Benvenisti (2002), 178. For the Lotus principles, see supra  s.2.2.1.
204 As dem onstrated  by the discussions in the ILC. See supra  s .3.2.3.2.
205 See Dupuy (1991).
206 See, e.g. Kiss (1997), 64; Kiss and Shelton (2000), 259-261; and Sands (2003), 249-251. 
See also Dupuy (2000), 22, who argues that the general principle of co-operation in international 
law is of a general custom ary nature. This is dem onstrated by the considerable num ber of 
treaties and o ther legal instrum ents aimed specifically a t establishing and reinforcing 
co-operation, th u s  implementing the obligation in all sectors and  a t all levels of international life, 
th u s reflecting a ‘truly universal opinio ju r is ’.
207 See e.g. H ohm ann (1994), 197, who argues th a t the general obligation to co-operate has 
been ‘firmly estab lished’ and has become so indispensable to international environm ental law 
that it should be considered, together with the obligation not to cause significant environm ental 
harm , a ju s  cogens norm. Accord Brunnee (1989), 806. See supra  s .2.3.5.
208 See infra s .4.3.1.5.
200 ICJ Reports (1969) 3, 82.
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in particu lar where he states th a t ‘the principle of in ternational co-operation in 
the exploitation of a na tu ra l resource is well estab lished  in o ther international 
practice’, th is  being the practice relating to in ternational river b as in s . 210
Based on the  prem ises of the theory of co-operative sovereignty , 211 Perrez 
argues th a t the existence of a  general duty to co-operate with regard to 
environm ental issues is ‘firmly established ’212 in  in ternational law today as 
treaty  law, custom ary international law, and  as a  general principle of law. This 
au tho r adds th a t ‘even without prescribing concrete behaviour, the general 
duty  to co-operate is able to set a  general framework for S tate behaviour ’. 213 Yet 
in the context of international water resources th is  obligation to co-operate has 
not always been recognised by international law . 214
It is evident th a t ‘there are different forms, in tensities and stages of 
co-operation ’21 s and  consequently the concrete obligations to undertake specific 
co-operative activities vary significantly in in ternational law . 210 One theory 
distinguishes between different levels of concrete co-operation ‘according to 
their im pact on the S ta tes’ freedom of m anoeuvre, and  the S ta tes’ readiness to 
agree on such  co-operation . ’217 To illustrate the usefulness of such  a 
distinction, an  example relevant to international w atercourses is pu t forward: it 
is more difficult for S tates to agree on the creation of an international 
institu tion  or regime and participation in the adoption and im plem entation of 
common m easures th an  to accept an obligation to undertake jo int scientific 
research .
In the  context of international w atercourses, the existence of concrete 
obligations to co-operate th a t have emerged over time \vhile still leaving a 
certain degree of autonom y to the States, nevertheless do have more th an  a 
minimal im pact on the S tates’ freedom and independence ’. 213 However, they are
210 Ong (1999), 796 and  798.
211 See supra  s .2.3.2.
212 See Perrez (2000), 259 and 283.
213 Ibid., 261. Accord  Sohnle (2002), 327.
214 For the evolution of water rights, see supra  s.2.2.
213 Perrez (2000), 260.
210 See infra C h.5.
217 Perrez (2000), 304.
213 Ibid., 317.
178
still short of requiring positive joint m anagem ent.219 In o ther words, concrete 
obligations ‘are still short of requiring the S tates to join a  treaty  regime or to 
establish an  organization or a common institu tion with ample com petences to 
deal with all the issues arising out of the common use  of the international 
w atercourse.’220 None of the existing concrete obligations to co-operate ‘require 
States to give u p  all their autonom y and freedom ’. Hence, the theory of 
co-operative sovereignty does not go as far as the theory of common 
m anagem ent, which requires positive joint m anagem ent.
As to the legal n atu re  of the general obligation of co-operation, Sohnle calls it a 
‘perfect legal ru le ’,221 the degree of constraint of which depends on the text 
containing it, on the degree of detail of the form ulation of the obligation, and on 
the existence or not of treaty and institutional arrangem ents.
3 .3  C o-operation  in R e la te d  Areas
For the purposes of our study, it is useful to examine briefly the presence of the 
principle of co-operation in other areas related to n a tu ra l resources. Although 
the law of in ternational w atercourses h as  its own line of evolution, it is 
influenced by, and  absorbs, some of the principles from other areas such as the 
Law of the Sea, and  biodiversity.
3 .3 .1  N o te  o n  G roundw aters
G roundw aters rep resen t about 97% of the world’s freshw ater resources. In 
m any areas groundw ater is the largest source of public drinking w ater and  the 
m ost sensitive freshw ater resource.
G roundw aters have not received as m uch attention in the past as surface 
water. A lthough there are a few international in stru m en ts  and  studies from
219 Id. See also infra s .5.2.
220 Id.
221 Sohnle (2002), 327.
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scholarly associations dealing specifically with groundw aters,222 the 1997 UN 
W atercourses Convention generally applies also in relation to in ternational 
groundw aters, except for confined transboundary  aquifers.223 B ut the need to 
address the specific questions of this water resource h as  been recognised.224 
Currently, u n d er the topic ‘Shared na tu ra l resou rces’, the ILC is preparing a 
set of 19 draft articles on the law of transboundary  aquifers.225
Article 7 of the 2006 Draft Articles provides for a  general obligation to 
co-operate in sim ilar term s to those of Article 8 of the 1997 UN W atercourses 
Convention, b u t it already includes ‘sustainable developm ent’ as one of its 
bases. In addition, although not yet using m andatory  term s, paragraph 2 
provides th a t aquifer States ‘should establish  jo in t m echanism s of 
co-operation’. The draft articles include several specific obligations of 
co-operation, some similar to those provided for in the 1997 UN W atercourses 
Convention, such  as the obligation to exchange d a ta  and  inform ation regularly, 
bu t also others, such as monitoring or the prom otion of scientific, educational, 
and technical co-operation with developing States.
3 .3 .2  C o -o p era tio n  an d  th e  Law o f  th e  S ea
The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 226 is the result of 
in tense negotiations during the 1970s. A reflection of its time, the Third 
Conference on the Law of the Sea worked on a new legal regime which had  the 
idea -  th en  fashionable -  of ‘the common heritage of m ankind’ am ong its 
foundations. It is not surprising then th a t the obligation to co-operate is 
contained in th is  m ultilateral treaty in a variety of contexts.227 However, as with
222 E.g. the Bellagio Draft Treaty, or the 1986 ILA Seoul Rules.
223 See the 1997 ILC Resolution on Confined Transboundary Groundwater.
224 See Ch.VIII, and  particularly Article 42, of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules.
225 See the 2006 ILC Draft Articles on the Law of T ransboundary Aquifers, and commentary. 
See also e.g. Eckstein (2007).
226 Concluded in Montego Bay, Jam aica, on 10 December 1982, and entered into force on 16 
November 1994. There are now 155 Parties to the Convention.
227 This is explained by the ICJ in the Fisheries Jurisdiction  Case, ICJ Reports (1994), 23-4, 
para. 53, in the following m anner:
The very fact of convening the third Conference on the Law of the Sea evidences a m anifest 
desire on the p art of all S tates to proceed to the codification of th a t law on a universal basis, 
including the question of fisheries and conservation of the living resources of the sea. Such a 
general desire is understandable since the rules of international m aritim e law have been the
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the law of in ternational w atercourses, the concept of co-operation does not 
always form a  legally binding obligation with a clear legal content and  practical 
im plications.228
The obligation of co-operation appears expressly or implicitly throughout the 
1982 UNCLOS. The drafting term s used  leave no doubt of the intention of the 
negotiators of the Convention to give legally binding force to the obligation.229 
The 1982 UNCLOS includes both examples of the obligation to co-operate 
drafted in general term s with little h in t as to scope or frequency, and occasions 
where the obligation is thoroughly elaborated. In the first case, the wording 
often leaves room for argum ent as to the specific conduct required to comply 
with the legal obligation. This manifestly may lead to allegations of breach of 
the obligation.280
The duty  to co-operate appears in relation to different areas, namely to m arine 
areas within national jurisdiction, to the high seas,231 to landlocked and 
geographically disadvantaged S tates,232 to the sea-bed beyond national 
jurisdiction,233 and  in relation to m atters such  as the protection and 
preservation of the m arine environment, m arine scientific research,234 the
product of m utual accommodation, reasonableness and co-operation. So it was in the past, and 
so it necessarily is today. In the circum stances, the Court, as a court of law, cannot render 
judgm ent sub  specie legis ferendae, or anticipate the law before the legislator has laid it down.’
228 On the obligation to co-operate and the 1982 UNCLOS, see Pinto (1986).
229 The obligation is often expressed in m andatory terms, by use of the verb shall.
230 See generally infra Ch.6.
231 For example, in the repression of piracy (Article 100). See, in particular, Article 118 on the 
general obligation of S tates to co-operate with each other in the conservation and m anagem ent of 
living resources of the high seas. This article also specifies some of the forms th a t this 
co-operation m ay take for S tates whose nationals exploit identical or different living resources in 
the sam e area, such  as  the obligation to negotiate, and the obligation to establish regional or 
subregional organisations for th a t purpose. In addition, the 1995 UN Agreement Relating to the 
Conservation and  M anagem ent of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks specifies in even 
greater detail the forms and  m echanisms for international co-operation.
232 See, e.g. Articles 129 and 130.
233 In relation to the Area, see, for example, Article 143(3), which specifies some forms of 
co-operation regarding m arine scientific research, and Article 144(2), which requires co-operation 
among States and  between them and the International Seabed Authority in relation to transfer of 
technology and scientific knowledge relating to activities in the Area. The Convention provides 
here some exam ples of how co-operation may be implemented.
234 Section 2 of Part XIII of the 1982 UNCLOS deals exclusively with international co-operation 
regarding m arine scientific research. Article 243 provides for co-operation between States and 
international organizations specifically through the conclusion of bilateral and m ultilateral 
agreem ents, and  Article 244 requires co-operation to promote the flow of scientific data  and 
information and the transfer of knowledge.
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development and  transfer of m arine technology,235 and  to archaeological and 
historical objects found at sea.
The influence of the 1982 UNCLOS on the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention 
is apparen t both  in the substantive work of the ILC and  in its drafting. In m any 
instances a  parallel may be drawn between the ru les on the law of the sea and 
those on in ternational watercourses. For example, in relation to the areas 
un d er national jurisdiction, Articles 64, 65 and  66(3)(b), (4) and  (5), provide for 
an  obligation of co-operation between coastal S tates and  other States, directly 
or through international organisations, concerning the m anagem ent and 
conservation of certain living resources w ithin the exclusive economic zone, 
such as highly migratory species, m arine m am m als, and  anadrom ous stocks. 
Article 64, for instance, as Article 8 of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention, 
provides th a t co-operation aims at ‘ensuring conservation and  promoting the 
objective of optim um  utilization’ of the resource.
Similarly, the provisions regarding rights of land-locked States and of 
geographically disadvantaged States include an  express obligation of 
co-operation between the coastal State and other S tates concerned (Articles 
69(3) and  70(4)). This obligation arises when the coastal State has the capacity 
to harvest the  entirety of the allowable catch of the living resources in its 
exclusive economic zone. Co-operation is specified as ‘the establishm ent of 
equitable arrangem ents on a bilateral, subregional or regional basis to allow for 
partic ipation of developing’ land-locked States or geographically disadvantaged 
S tates of the sam e subregion or region in the exploitation of the living 
resources ‘as  m ay be appropriate in the circum stances and on term s 
satisfactory to all p a rtie s’. For the im plem entation of th is  provision, several 
factors specified in Articles 69(2) and 70(3) should be taken  into account.
Also, in relation to activities in an area of the  seabed beyond national 
jurisdiction w hich extends into the national jurisd iction  of a  coastal State, 
Article 142(2) provides th a t co-operation is required in the form of
235 Further to Article 144(2) referred to above, Section 2 of Part XIV of the 1982 UNCLOS deals 
with international co-operation regarding the development and  transfer of m arine technology. 
Articles 266(1) and  268(e) provide for a general obligation, which is specified in several other 
articles. See, in particular, Articles 269 and 270, which specify different forms of co-operation. 
These include the establishm ent of programmes of technical co-operation; the promotion of 
favourable conditions for the conclusion of agreem ents, contracts and other similar 
arrangem ents, un d er equitable and reasonable conditions; and  the undertak ing  of projects and 
promotion of jo in t ventures and other forms of bilateral and m ultilateral co-operation.
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consultations and a  system  of prior notification so th a t the rights and 
legitimate in terests  of the State concerned are taken  into consideration. But 
here, w hen the  activities may resu lt in the exploitation of a  m ineral deposit, 
prior consent is required.
Part XII of the  1982 UNCLOS deals with the protection and  preservation of the 
m arine environm ent, and the obligation to co-operate appears often throughout 
its 11 sections. Article 194 stipulates the obligation of S tates to take, 
individually or jointly ‘as appropriate’, all m easures necessary to prevent, 
reduce and  control pollution of the m arine environm ent from any source, and 
lists some of these m easures in paragraph (3). In the sam e line, Article 23 of 
the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention provides th a t
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, in co-operation with 
other States, take all measures with respect to an international watercourse that are 
necessary to protect and preserve the marine environment, including estuaries, taking 
into account generally accepted international rules and standards.
Article 197 of UNCLOS provides for a  general obligation of S tates to co-operate 
directly or th rough  international organizations on a  global or regional basis in 
the form ulation and  elaboration of in ternational rules, standards and 
recom m ended procedures for the protection and  preservation of the marine 
environm ent.236 Like the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention, the 1982 UNCLOS 
expands on different forms of co-operation, notably for the purpose of 
preventing, mitigating, or eliminating the effects of pollution, bu t it goes even 
further. The 1982 Convention requires the notification of im m inent or actual 
dam age (Article 198), the joint development and  promotion of contingency 
plans against pollution (Article 199), the provision of ‘information necessary to 
prevent and  control damage to the health  and safety of persons and to the 
m arine environm ent’ (Article 242(2)), and the promotion of studies, the 
undertak ing  of program m es of scientific research and  the support to the 
exchange of d a ta  and  information on pollution of the m arine environm ent 
(Article 200).
236 An example is the conclusion of the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the C aspian Sea, signed in Tehran on 4 November 2003, between Iran, 
Azerbaijan, K azakhstan and the Russian Federation. The Convention was negotiated under the 
auspices of UNEP and  had financial support from the UN, the European Union and the World 
Bank. It aim s to reverse ecological and environmental dam age in the Caspian Sea area caused by 
industrial pollution, sewage and oil refinery leaks.
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The content and  application of the obligation to co-operate h as  also been dealt 
with in the context of Law of the Sea disputes. Of particu lar relevance are the 
MOX Plant Case and the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases brought before the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). These are d iscussed in 
Chapter 6.
3 .3 .3  B iod iversity : an  O verall O b ligation  o f  C o-op eration
The concept of biological diversity is defined in Article 2 of the 1992 Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD) as ‘the variability am ong living organism s from all 
sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, m arine and  other aquatic ecosystems 
and the ecological complexes of which they are part; th is  includes diversity 
within species, between species and of ecosystem s.’237 Thus, the objectives of 
the Convention are the conservation of biodiversity and  the sustainable use of 
its com ponents, both in-situ and ex-situ of ecosystem s and  n atu ral habitats, the 
fair and  equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic 
resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by 
appropriate transfer of relevant technologies (Article 1).
Biodiversity aim s to cover several areas. Thus, the 1992 CBD238 -  the result of 
four-year long negotiations -  adopts an ecosystem approach and focuses not 
only on in land w aters, b u t also on forests, agriculture, m arine and  costal areas, 
and  dry and  sub-hum id  lands. The CBD was signed in Rio de Janeiro  on 5 
Ju n e  1992 by 167 S tates and the European Community and  entered into force 
on 29 D ecem ber 1993. The num ber of Parties to the Convention, now 189 
States and  the  European Community, leaves no doubt of its significance. On 
the basis of the  CBD, the Conference of the Parties, the Secretariat and  other 
bodies continue to work on the development and  im plem entation of national 
policies and  regimes.
237 The Convention also defines sustainable use  as ‘the use of com ponents of biological 
diversity in a way and a t a  rate th a t does not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, 
thereby m aintaining its potential to meet the needs and asp irations of present and future 
generations.’CBD Secretariat (2001).
238 On the s ta tu s  and im plementation of the Convention, see generally the Secretariat’s website 
a t h t tp : / / www.biodiv.org.
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Freshwater, along with atm ospheric, m arine, and  land-based  pollution, and the 
use of n a tu ra l resources increasingly have transboundary  effects. These resu lt 
in the degradation of shared resources and th rea ten  biodiversity. The 1992 
CBD recognises the need for international co-operation to achieve its aims and 
provides in Article 5 for an obligation to co-operate in general term s. It reads as 
follows:
E ac h  C o n tra c tin g  P arty  sh a ll, a s  fa r a s  p o ssib le  a n d  a s  a p p ro p ria te , co -o p era te  w ith  
o th e r  C o n tra c tin g  P arties , d irectly  or, w h ere  a p p ro p r ia te , th ro u g h  co m p e te n t 
in te rn a tio n a l o rg an iza tio n s , in  re sp e c t of a re a s  b ey o n d  n a tio n a l ju r isd ic tio n  a n d  on  
o th e r  m a tte r s  of m u tu a l  in te re s t, for th e  co n se rv a tio n  a n d  s u s ta in a b le  u s e  of biological 
d iversity .
Though th is is a  general obligation, the expression as fa r  as possible and as 
appropriate indicate th a t its implem entation is left to the consideration of the 
S tates them selves. However, like m ost fram ework m ultilateral watercourse 
treaties and the 1982 UNCLOS, the Convention also lays down several concrete 
duties of co-operation. The list is long and  detailed, b u t often includes the same 
proviso as the form ulation of the general obligation.239
Of particu lar relevance is the obligation concerning im pact assessm ent in 
Article 14(c), which provides the obligation to ‘promote, on the basis of 
reciprocity, notification, exchange of information and consultation on activities 
u n d er their jurisdiction or control which are likely to significantly affect 
adversely the biological diversity of other States or areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisd iction , by encouraging the conclusion of bilateral, regional or 
m ultilateral arrangem ents, as appropriate’.
The CBD includes o ther relevant obligations, such as the obligation to notify in 
the case of im m inent or grave danger or damage and  to initiate action to 
prevent or minimize such  danger or damage (Article 14(d)); to promote national 
arrangem ents for emergency responses to activities or events, w hether caused 
naturally  or otherw ise, which present a  grave and im m inent danger to 
biological diversity and  encourage international co-operation to supplem ent 
such national efforts (Article 14(e)); to give access and  to transfer technology
239 E.g. the obligation  ‘to co-operate, as appropriate, w ith other S ta tes  and international 
organ izations in developing educational and public aw aren ess p rogram m es’ in Article 13(b).
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(Article 16); and  to exchange information (Article 17). Here, the CBD also 
specifies some of the types of information, such  as  exchange of resu lts  of 
technical, scientific and  socio-economic research, as  well as inform ation on 
training and  surveying programmes, specialized knowledge, indigenous and 
traditional knowledge as such. It also lays down a  provision on technical and  
scientific co-operation to be promoted through in ternational and  national 
institu tions in implementing the Convention, inter alia, th rough the 
developm ent and im plem entation of national policies (Article 18). In addition, 
the CBD also provides in Article 18(3) for the estab lishm ent of a clearing-house 
m echanism  to promote and facilitate technical and  scientific co-operation.
Biodiversity concerns are included in ongoing assessm en ts  and initiatives on 
water resources and  inland water. These include, e.g. the IUCN’s Freshwater 
Biodiversity A ssessm ent, the Global International W ater A ssessm ent (GIWA), 
and the UN World W ater Assessm ent Programme (WWAP).240
The Convention affirms in the Preamble th a t the conservation of biodiversity is 
a ‘common concern of h um ank ind ’, th u s  expanding the u su a l territorial limit of 
responsibility of S tates to their own national jurisdiction. It is an example of 
the trend  in m ultilateral treaties on environm ental m atters of ‘common 
concern’, where co-operation is an  essential elem ent with legal protection.241 
Nevertheless, the Convention does not seem to limit the jurisdiction of S tates 
concerning biological resources or technologies. B ut it lays down the obligation 
to co-operate as the ‘m echanism ’ by which the m utual exchange of concessions 
is to be reached .242 In fact, it is noted in the Preamble th a t Tiltimately, the 
conservation and  sustainable use of biological diversity will strengthen friendly 
relations am ong S tates and contribute to peace for h u m an k in d ’.
Notw ithstanding the num ber of parties to the Convention, in 2002, ten years 
after it w as opened for signature, the Conference of the Parties adopted in 
decision V I/26 a  Strategic Plan for the CBD which was developed in order to 
guide its fu rther im plem entation at the national, regional and  global levels. In 
th is docum ent, the obstacles to the im plem entation of the Convention were
240 See the Report on the Status and Trends o f B iodiversity o f  Inland Water E cosystem s  
prepared by the CBD Secretariat (2003).
241 For other conventions, see supra  s .3.2.4 and 3.2.5.
242 Wolfrum (1996), 388.
186
identified. Besides the lack of political will and  support to im plem ent the 
Convention, and  the limited public participation and  stakeholder involvement, 
those specifically on collaboration/co-operation were the lack of synergies at 
the national and  international levels, lack of horizontal co-operation among 
stakeholders, lack of effective partnerships, and  lack of engagem ent of the 
scientific community. Since the 2002 World Sum m it on Sustainable 
Development, several scientific reports have confirmed the gravity of the 
situation  worldwide, as biodiversity loss im pacts on im portant aspects of 
h u m an  life, such  as food security, vulnerability to n a tu ra l d isasters, energy 
security, and  access to clean water and raw m aterials. As with w ater-related 
issues, a  network of different participants besides governm ents, such as NGOs, 
is crucial to achieve the goals laid down in the CBD.
4
T h e  P r o c e d u r a l  C o r o l l a r i e s  o f  
t h e  P r i n c i p l e  o f  C o - o p e r a t i o n 1
The p r o c e s s  o f  so u n d  p h ilo so p h iz in g , to m y  m ind, c o n s is ts  
m a in ly  in p a s s in g  fro m  th o s e  o b v io u s, vagu e, a m b ig u o u s  
th in gs, th a t w e  f e e l  q u ite  s u r e  of, to so m e th in g  p re c ise , clear, 
defin ite , w h ich  b y  reflec tion  a n d  a n a ly s is  w e  f in d  is  in v o lv e d  
in th e  va g u e  th in g  th a t w e  s ta r t  fro m , a n d  is, so  to s p e a k , th e  
rea l tru th  o f  w h ic h  th a t  v a g u e  th in g  is  a  so r t o f  s h a d o w .
Bertrand Russell, 
The P h ilo so p h y  o f  Logical A to m ism , 1918
F urther to the general reference to the need for, and  obligation of, co-operation, 
the concept is used  in m any cases with a specific meaning. In such  cases 
co-operation is m anifested primarily through individual procedural rules. This 
C hapter exam ines these concrete applications of the principle of co-operation, 
and  their evolution, especially in conventional state practice. These procedural 
ru les include the  obligation to exchange data  and  inform ation regularly, the 
obligation to notify planned m easures, environmental im pact assessm ents, and  
emergency inform ation, the obligation to enter into consultations, and  the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith. The exam ination of these rules aim s at 
identifying their m ain strengths and critical w eaknesses, as well as their 
im portance outside specific treaty regimes.
1 This chapter is based on a chapter published in Boisson de Chazournes and Salman 
(eds.)(2005), 281-339; and on a paper presented a t a UNESCO Conference and published in the 
Conference Proceedings, Castelein and Bogardi (eds.)(2004), 299-315.
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4 .1 .  The Princip le  o f  C o-opera t ion  and its
C orollaries
4 .1 .1 .  P roced u ra l R u les Id en tified
There are num erous examples of unilateral acts of S tates th a t could involve 
actual or potential detrim ent to the in terests of other States. In the 1960s, 
Brazil decided to construct a dam  of enorm ous proportions in the P arana River, 
which is shared  between Brazil, Paraguay and  Argentina. After Brazil and 
Paraguay agreed to construct the dam  under a  condom inium  regime for the 
purposes of hydro-electric power generation,2 Argentina, the downstream  State, 
protested at having been excluded from the negotiating table. Today, however, 
the Itaipu Hydro-electric Power Plant, still the largest in operation in the world, 
located in the stretch  of the frontier between Brazil and  Paraguay, is also the 
subject of an  agreem ent concluded in 1979 betw een these three States, which 
integrates the different P arana River projects and  provides for the 
establishm ent of technical co-operation.3
Decades later, sim ilar situations continue to occur. However, not all differences 
end with the same reasonable results. This is the case, for instance, with 
C hina’s decision, w ithout notifying, or consulting with, other riparian States, to 
construct eight dam s on the Mekong River, which will produce significant 
adverse effects downstream , notably by reducing the flow.4 Another example is 
the case of Turkey’s decision to carry out the controversial South Eastern  
Anatolia Project (GAP Project), which comprises the construction of a  series of 
dam s on the E uphra tes  and Tigris Rivers, w ithout giving advance notification of 
the project to Syria and  Iraq.5 These situations raise the following questions:
• Does the principle of co-operation impose any substantive lim itations on the 
activities th a t S tates may undertake in their own territory?
2 The 1973 Treaty of Itaipu.
3 See supra  s. 1.3.1. and  infra s.6.2.6.
4 See infra s .6.2.
5 Id.
189
• Are there any procedural requirem ents th a t have to be satisfied before a 
State can unilaterally undertake works th a t actually interfere or may 
substan tia lly  interfere with the rights of other S tates?
• Do S tates generally notify or consult other S tates in the absence of a  treaty 
before em barking on planned projects or activities which may entail 
transboundary  harm ?
• Does a  potentially affected State have a  right to veto the im plem entation of 
p lanned works by another State?
The answ er to these questions requires exam ination of the specific procedural 
duties, which are corollaries of the general obligation to co-operate. Although 
interconnected, these are independent rules, and  should be assessed  
separately as to their scope, legal s ta tu s  and  application. They may vary 
considerably in each case in their im plem entation, depending to a great extent 
on the m echanism s established between the parties in bilateral or m ultilateral 
treaties. In th is  regard, both the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention and 
the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention play an  im portant role in providing 
possible model ru les.6 B ut it m ay be asserted, as a  general statem ent, th a t the 
ru les of the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention are more stringent and 
detailed th an  those of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention, especially the 
procedural ru les.7 Indeed, as a  universal framework convention, the latter 
allows for considerable flexibility.*1
4 .1 .2 .  T h e R o le  o f  Procedural R u les in  th e  Law o f  In tern a tio n a l 
W a terco u rses
Procedural ru les are intended to regulate the relations between States, w hether 
established on a  regular basis, such as the obligation to exchange da ta  and 
inform ation on the condition of the watercourse, or on specific occasions, such 
as the obligation to notify planned m easures. In fact, the procedural corollaries 
of the obligation to co-operate are formal ru les of com m unication par excellence 
between S tates w hatever the underlying subject-m atter. They play a  decisive
6 See supra  s .3.2.4.
7 Tanzi (2000), 53.
8 For a comparative analysis of the two conventions, see Tanzi (2000).
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role in the im plem entation of the substantive principles of equitable and 
reasonable utilisation and of diligent prevention of significant transboundary  
h a rm , 9 and  in the protection of the environm ent of in ternational w atercourses. 
These ru les serve primarily a preventive function, b u t if harm  h as  nevertheless 
been caused  to another State, they come into play in order to elim inate or 
mitigate such  harm .
The principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation is a  general and flexible 
principle requiring rules of procedure for its im plem entation. Otherwise, 
situations could frequently occur where, for example, a  State would only find 
out its equitable share by unintentionally depriving ano ther State of its own 
share. In presenting th is possible scenario, Special R apporteur McCaffrey 
explains:
It cannot lightly be presumed that state practice has created such a legal state of 
affairs, since this would mean that the norm of equitable utilization, in effect, creates 
disputes rather than avoiding them. There would be no legal certainty in respect of 
States’ use of international watercourses [...] the practice of States does attest to the 
existence of a procedural complement to the substantive norm of equitable utilisation. 
Without the sharing of data and information and without prior notification of planned 
projects or new uses, the doctrine of equitable utilization would be of little use to States 
in planning their watercourse activities; it would be of use principally for third-party 
dispute settlem ent.10
In fact, the  scope of the right of equitable and reasonable utilisation depends 
on the facts and  circum stances of each individual case. B ut the m ajor problem 
in applying the  principle under review is one of weighing the relevant factors, 
i.e., the different u ses  and needs, and assessing and  balancing the benefits 
derived therefrom .11 This clearly requires policy decisions th a t go beyond the 
legal field.
The obligation no t to cause significant transboundary  harm  also requires 
different procedural ru les to be complied with. Should harm  occur, the issue of 
the responsibility of the State is raised. These rules then  help in m easuring the
9 See the 1987 McCaffrey’s Third Report, 23, para.35.
10 Ibid., para.36.
11 See supra s .2.3.4.
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degree of diligence of the S tate’s conduct,12 and  consequently the level of 
com pensation th a t m ight have to be paid .13
These procedural obligations aim at ensuring participation of all interested 
States in the decision-making process concerning planned m easures or new 
uses of the  w atercourse, th u s  enabling the S tates likely to be affected to 
express their concerns, to assess the effects of the proposed activities on the 
environm ent and  on the territory of the other S tates, and  to take adequate 
m easu res .14 Hence, the substantive decisions reached by each riparian State 
take into consideration potential transboundary  harm  from planned works or 
existing uses of the w aters and the in terests of the S tates likely to be affected. 
This follows the m odem  approach to w ater resource m anagem ent which 
‘requires basin-wide planning ex ante, ra th e r th a n  accommodation of 
conflicting uses ex p ost’,15 th u s  confirming th a t the substantive principles and 
the procedural ru les ‘form an integrated whole’.16
Last, b u t certainly not least, at the dom estic level, the rules under 
consideration are part of the due process of good governance, since they assist 
in preventing arb itrary  decision-making by introducing m andatory external 
factors.17
Each procedural rule will now be examined separately.
4 .2 .  The Obligation to  E xchange Data and
Inform ation
States have a  right to require relevant and available da ta  and information from 
other riparian  S tates relating to the physical characteristics of a  shared  river 
and to p resen t and  p lanned  uses in order to determ ine their rights and  comply
12 Okowa (1996), 332-3.
13 See infra Ch.6.
14 Okowa (1996), 277.
15 1987 McCaffrey’s Third Report, 23, para.34.
16 Id.
17 Okowa (1996), 278.
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with their obligations under the principle of equitable and  reasonable 
utilisation and  their obligation not to cause significant transboundary  h a rm .18
The general obligation to exchange da ta  and  inform ation between riparian 
S tates is well established in treaty practice, in addition to finding support in 
declarations and resolutions adopted by intergovernm ental and  in ternational 
non-governm ental organizations. Initially, and  in particu lar through the work 
of scholarly associations, the obligation under consideration was pu t forward 
as a  m ere recom m endation,19 b u t soon afterw ards its  legally binding character 
was recognised.20
This obligation has been inserted in num erous m ultilateral and bilateral 
treaties of different regions relating to in ternational rivers in term s requiring 
continuous compliance. This practice shows a  wide recognition of the need for 
the system atic exchange of different types of inform ation of a technical, 
scientific, or adm inistrative nature. Although the  types of data  and information 
to be shared  regularly are not always specified in the treaties, frequently they 
relate to the general conditions of the aquatic environm ent, the m easurem ent 
of w ater flow, extractions, releases from reservoirs, sources of pollution, etc. 
Hydrographic data, for instance, relate generally to the m easurem ent, 
description and  m apping of the waters of the watercourse, to the properties of 
water, including water flow, and to its distribution. But information may also 
include o ther w ater-related m atters, such as weather forecasting.
The provisions vary from those of general character,21 to detailed ones 
concerning no t only the exchange, bu t also the collection and  processing of the 
data  and  inform ation relating to the international w ater resource. A good 
example is the 1960 Indus W aters Treaty, which contains in Article 6 a set of 
very elaborate ru les on the exchange of data  concerning w ater flow and
18 See Articles 9 and  11 of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention and  Article 13 of the 1992 
Helsinki W atercourses Convention.
19 See recom m endation 3 of the 1958 ILA New York Resolution, which was the basis for Article 
XXIX(l) of the 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules. For the evolution of the obligation, see Bourne (1972), 
172, reprinted in W outers (ed.)(1997), 161-3. For a survey on the m atter, see 1988 McCaffrey’s 
Fourth Report.
20 E.g. Article VII of the 1979 IDI Athens Resolution on Pollution, Article 5 of the 1982 ILA 
Montreal Rules on W ater Pollution, and Article 56 of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules.
21 E.g. Article 3(6) of the 2000 SADC Revised Water Protocol.
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extractions.22 Furtherm ore, unless the da ta  and  inform ation are to be provided 
at the request of other S tates,23 the frequency of the exchange may be 
specified.24 Several treaties also set forth the obligation to provide different 
types of d a ta  and  information related to a  specific u se23 or on specific 
occasions, such  as in the case of planned m easures26 and  in emergencies.27
States m ay establish joint databases and develop rules for rapid information 
exchange in crisis situations, such as floods, droughts, or accidental pollution. 
They m ay also exchange information on national w ater policy plans, including 
basin  action program m es and plans, as well as the revisions made to relevant 
laws and regulations.28 The com m unications between the parties may take 
place through a  joint established body, or between the  departm ents of different 
Ministries, such  as N atural Resources, Public Works, or Agriculture. This may 
be illustrated  by the 1994 Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan , which 
provides in Article VI of Annex II concerning w ater-related m atters an obligation 
to exchange relevant da ta  on water resources through the Jo in t Water 
Committee established under Article VII.29 Similarly, the collection of data  on 
w ater flow is often one of the m ain task s  en trusted  to joint commissions or 
other bodies. S tates frequently establish observation stations, even (with 
consent) on other S ta tes’ territory, in order to facilitate the collection of the da ta  
and  inform ation. This may be exemplified by the 1960 Indus W aters Treaty 
concluded between India and Pakistan, which provides in Article VII for 
co-operation in the collection of data  and information through the 
estab lishm ent of observation stations since ‘the two Parties recognize th a t they 
have a  com m on in terest in the optimum development of the rivers’.
The purposes of the  provisions concerning the exchange of d a ta  and  
inform ation are varied: primarily, they aim at m aintaining an equitable
22 Another example is the 1998 Luso-Spanish Agreement, which lays down detailed rules in 
Annex 1, Articles 4(2)(a) and  Article 5.
23 E.g. Article VI(2) of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty; Article 13(3) of the 1992 Helsinki 
W atercourses Convention; and  Article 5(3) of the 1998 Luso-Spanish Agreement.
24 E.g. Article VI(1) of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty.
25 E.g. Article 18 of the 1987 ZACPLAN.
26 See infra s.4.3.1. and 2.
27 See infra s.4.3.3.
28 E.g. Article 5(2) of the 1998 Luso-Spanish Agreement.
29 See also the 1996 Declaration of Principles of Co-operation on W ater-Related M atters.
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allocation of the w aters and preventing transboundary  harm , and, more 
recently, they aim at attaining optimum utilisation of the w aters and 
consequently maximising the benefits for all riparian  States. This is particularly 
evident in agreem ents establishing joint institu tional m echanism s to im plem ent 
planning and  development schem es for the entire river basin  so as to facilitate 
co-operation between w atercourse S tates.3° In th is  respect, the several projects 
of technical assistance supported by one or more donors, which promote, inter 
alia, the  collection, analysis and exchange of relevant d a ta  and information, are 
of particu lar significance.31 In addition, based on specific m echanism s provided 
for in treaties, the regular publication of da ta  and  o ther relevant information 
allow States to determ ine in certain cases if dam age h as  occurred.32
The 1997 UN W atercourses Convention contains several relevant provisions. It 
lays down in Article 9 the obligation to exchange d a ta  and  information on the 
condition of the w atercourse ‘on a regular b as is ’.33 It m akes a  general reference 
to the type of da ta  and  information to be provided, namely, information of a 
‘hydrological, meteorological, hydro-geological and  ecological nature and related 
to w ater quality as well as related forecasts’ (Article 9(1)). The Convention lacks 
a  substantive description as to the specific inform ation to be submitted. This 
may be justified by the fact th a t the ILC and the UN Sixth Committee 
considered th a t the provisions on the subject should be sufficiently flexible to 
take into account the wide variety of circum stances to which they m ust apply. 
Indeed, the Convention is intended merely to provide guidelines to S tates which 
m u st th en  ad ju st its  provisions to the characteristics and uses of the particular 
w atercourse by concluding other agreements (Article 3(3)). Hence, there is a 
need to identify the  da ta  and information th a t is required to be exchanged 
between the riparian  States. This need has been recognised at the international 
level.34 Since m ultilateral framework conventions only provide general guidance,
30 See, e.g. the 1994 OKACOM Agreement. For the role of OKACOM, see Pinheiro, Gabaake, 
and Heyins (2002).
31 E.g. the Project on the Environmental Protection and Sustainable M anagement of the 
Okavango River Basin, funded by GEF in co-operation with UNDP, and  executed by FAO, or the 
Project for the Jo in t Integrated Management of the Maputo Basin, also funded by GEF in 
co-operation with UNDP, UNEP and the World Bank, and executed by FAO on behalf of UNDP.
32 E.g. Article 7 of the 1999 Protocol on Water and Health.
33 The 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention provides for this obligation in Article 13 in more 
detail, bu t it is not exhaustive.
34 For example, the Interregional Meeting of International River Organizations held a t D akar in 
1981 concluded th a t ‘Since data  gathering, processing and dissem ination for complex shared 
water resources system s is costly and is a continuous process, it is more than  normally 
im portant th a t the system  States agree quite specifically on the kinds of data  needed for different
195
it is left for the parties to bilateral or m ultilateral regional or river basin  treaties 
to agree on precisely w hat da ta  and information should be exchanged.
Some agreem ents providing for this obligation refer to the exchange of available 
data  and  inform ation.35 This is mainly due to d a ta  constrain ts which could 
cause problem s of compliance. One of the critical issues concerning the 
Mekong basin  is precisely the obtaining of relevant and  exact data. This was 
recognised by the CEO of the MRC Secretariat in August 2003, who stated  th a t 
‘[g]etting the right kind of data  is a  crucial first step for successful 
cooperation.’36 These constraints concern the quality and  availability of water 
data, for instance, due to the lack of adequate m easuring  instrum ents or the 
lack of long-term records. B ut some of these m ay be solved by agreem ent 
between the parties, for example, by allowing access to their territory for 
purposes of da ta  collection and observation or for the installation of flow 
m easuring devices.
Most da ta  on w ater availability and use  exist only at the national level, and not 
at the basin  level. This includes d a ta  and inform ation on basic variables, such 
as w ater flow and  withdraw als, aquifer recharge rates, etc. Although surface 
water m onitoring program m es are well developed in m any States, water quality 
monitoring is often rudim entary  or nonexistent. At present m ost S tates still 
lack groundw ater monitoring, both in term s of its quantity  and quality, on 
storage capacity and  use. The data  and information on socio-economic 
variables essential for an  integrated approach to w ater resources m anagem ent 
is occasionally difficult to obtain. These variables include population density 
and d istribution  in relation to water resources, income distribution, the degree 
of dependence on in land w aters and the biodiversity they support, food 
production from in land  w aters, etc.37
Problems m ay also arise from the cost of collecting and  processing the da ta  and 
inform ation as these usually  require expensive m onitoring networks. A balance 
m ust be reached in order to allow the economic and  social development of the
purposes, and on the schem e for their collection. With respect to the basic hydrologic d ata  and 
operational information, however, a free and ample flow on a timely basis is called for a t all 
tim es’. UN (1983), Part 1, p a ra .49, conclusion 11.
35 E.g. Article 5 of the 1998 Luso-Spanish Agreement.
36 Joern  Kristensen, a t the State of the Basin Report launch.
37 CBD Secretariat (2003), 90.
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States while not imposing an onerous burden  on o ther States. Here, the 1997 
UN W atercourses Convention provides some guidance: the obligation to 
co-operate relates to ‘readily available’ data  and  inform ation, b u t if th is data  
and inform ation is not readily available, S tates have an  obligation of due 
diligence to provide the requested information, th a t is, S tates should ‘employ 
the best efforts to comply with the request’. However, a  State ‘may condition its 
compliance upon paym ent by the requesting State of the reasonable costs of 
collecting and, where appropriate, processing such  da ta  and  inform ation’ 
(Article 9(2)). This solution had  already been adopted, for instance, in the 1960 
Indus W aters Treaty (Articles VI(2) and VII(l)(b)), and  in the 1992 Helsinki 
W atercourses Convention (Article 13(1) and  (3)).38
Technical cooperation is fundam ental across the  various sectors involved in 
water resources m anagem ent because the ‘lack of appropriate information often 
gives rise to simplified assum ptions held by riparians about each other. Yet, 
river m anagem ent is such  a complex field th a t it requires sound and precise 
knowledge of the hydrological, biological, chemical, etc. processes at play. Jo in t 
river p lans will th u s  only be credible when based on accurate data  and 
accurate assum ptions. Moreover, technical cooperation will enhance the 
effectiveness of the m itigation of basin-wide or even regional disasters, such as 
floods and  d rough ts’.39
The requirem ent of provision of data  and information appears in m any 
instances connected with the obligation to enter into consultations.40 This is 
explained by the fact th a t meaningful consultations may only take place if 
relevant inform ation h as  previously been provided to all riparian  States or to 
those S tates likely to be affected by planned m easures.41 In fact, the obligation 
to exchange d a ta  and  information is the minim al co-operation and a 
‘precondition for the  realisation of higher degrees of co-operation’.42
38 This Convention uses the expression ‘reasonably available’ data. See also Article 67 of the 
2004 ILA Berlin Rules on sharing  expenses in different circum stances.
39 Savenije and van der Zaag (2000), 34.
40 E.g. Article 13 of the 1984 Cabora Bassa Project Agreement.
41 For instance, UNGA Resolution 3129 (XXVIII), para.2, adopted in 1974, underlined the 
im portance of co-operation to be developed ‘on the basis of a system  of information and prior 
consultation’. In the sam e line, see Article 3 of the 1974 C harter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States.
42 Tanzi and Arcari (2001), 195. Although recognising the im portance of this obligation, Sohnle 
considers the obligation to consulte and negotiate the minimal form of co-operation between 
States. Sohnle (2001), 349-50.
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In th is respect, Article 11 of the UN W atercourses Convention lays down a 
general obligation of each watercourse State to provide the other riparian 
States w ith information concerning the possible effects upon the condition of 
the in ternational w atercourse of m easures they plan to undertake and  to 
consult w ith them  in th is regard. This article goes beyond the notification 
requirem ent set forth in Article 12 and subsequent articles, since it requires 
not only the exchange of information on the possible significant adverse effects 
b u t also on the positive effects of the planned works. This exchange of 
inform ation and consultation aims to prevent problem s arising from a 
unilateral assessm ent of the effects of the project.43
It should be noted th a t Article 12 of the UN W atercourses Convention also lays 
down an obligation to provide ‘available technical d a ta  and information ... in 
order to enable the notified S tates to evaluate possible effects of the planned 
m easu res’. This obligation is, in fact, implicit in the obligation to notify planned 
works or u ses  with possible adverse effects.44
As with Article 302 of the 1982 UNCLOS, Article 31 of the 1997 W atercourses 
Convention sets forth an  exception to the obligation of provision of data  and 
inform ation in the cases where the disclosure of these data  and information 
would be contrary to the essential interests of defence or security of the S tate.45 
To avoid a  situation  where the potentially affected State would ‘be left entirely 
w ithout inform ation concerning those possible effects’,46 Article 31 qualifies th is 
exception by providing th a t States have an obligation to co-operate in good 
faith ‘with a  view to providing as m uch information as possible under the 
circum stances’. It should be pointed out that, un less there is a  state of 
necessity, S tates m ay no t invoke this exception in the event of a breach of the 
principle of equitable and  reasonable utilisation or the no-harm  rule.47
43 See the 1994 ILC Report, 111.
44 Bourne (1972), 174.
45 See also Article 56(5) of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules, which specifies the cases where States 
need not provide information, e.g., if this would compromise intellectual property rights, 
including commercial or industrial secrets.
46 The 1994 ILC Report, 132.
47 See Tanzi and Arcari (2001), 200-1.
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In 1972, Bourne argued th a t the general obligation to exchange data  and 
information regularly had  not yet attained the s ta tu s  of a  rule of international 
law.48 More recently, Tanzi has suggested th a t the 1997 UN W atercourses 
Convention h as  crystallised the obligation to exchange d a ta  and  inform ation on 
the condition of the w atercourse -  a minimal form of co-operation -  into a rule 
of general custom ary international law.49 The sam e reasoning m ay be applied 
when exam ining the existing evidence supporting an  identical proposition in 
relation to o ther procedural ru les.50
Conversely, the obligation to exchange da ta  and  inform ation concerning 
planned m easures which might cause serious in juries to co-basin S tates was 
emerging, even in 1972, as a  rule of general custom ary international law or as 
a  general principle.51 Since then  international law h as  evolved, and  it may be 
argued th a t th is  obligation is now part of the corpus of custom ary international 
law.52
4 .3 .  The Obligation o f  N o t i f ic a t io n
4 .3 .1 .  T he E v o lu tio n  o f  th e  O bligation  o f  N o tifica tio n
4.3 .1 .1  Concept
The obligation to notify planned m easures arises when a riparian  State in tends 
to carry out new  activities on its territory on an  in ternational river and  these 
entail a risk  of affecting other riparian States. These activities m ight concern 
the construction of a  dam  and a  hydro-electric power plant, or a  reservoir for 
irrigation purposes or flood control. The planning State m ust notify these 
S tates before the proposed new works or change of previously existing use are 
implemented, and  provide relevant technical d a ta  and  information, including
48 See Bourne (1972), 174.
49 See Tanzi and Arcari (2001), 196.
50 See infra s.4.3.1.5.
51 Bourne (1972), 173 and  175.
52 For a general discussion of the legal s tatus of procedural rules, see infra s .4.3.1.5.
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the resu lts  of any im pact assessm ent, relating to the activity and  risks involved, 
as well as the potential harm  to the States likely to be affected.
The purpose of the notification is to allow the potentially affected S tates to 
make their own evaluation of the situation and  to initiate a  period of 
consultations during which the planning State m ay take into account the 
in terests of the potentially affected States. This obligation also arises in 
emergencies, so th a t the potential affected S tates m ay take some m easures to 
mitigate the harm ful effects.53
4 .3 .1 .2  The Work of Scholarly Associations
Both the Institu t de Droit International (IDI) and  the International Law 
Association (ILA) contributed to the development of the ru les on the notification 
procedure.
In 1961, the IDI adopted at its Salzburg session a  resolution on the ‘Utilization 
of Non-Maritime International W aters (Except for Navigation)’ where it 
established in Article 5 the m andatory requirem ent of prior notification in case 
the works or utilisation of the w aters might produce serious effects on the use 
of those w aters by other States. In addition, Articles 6 to 8 set forth a 
notification procedure: in the event th a t an objection is m ade, S tates should 
en ter into negotiations in order to reach an agreem ent within a  reasonable 
period of time; and  during negotiations States should, in accordance with the 
principle of good faith, absta in  from implementing the works or utilisation of 
the w aters or from taking any other m easure th a t could aggravate the 
situation.
Subsequently, the ILA included rules on notification in the 1966 Helsinki 
Rules, a  m ilestone in the ILA’s work on the law of in ternational w atercourses. 
The inclusion of th is  procedure in Chapter 6, entitled ‘Procedures for the 
Prevention and  Settlem ent of D isputes’, is explained by the fact th a t the 
Committee considered it very im portant for the avoidance of d isputes and  one 
of the m ost difficult questions encountered in connection with the settlem ent of 
d isputes.54 B ut in con trast to the IDI’s Salzburg Resolution, these ru les have
53 See infra s.4.3.3.
54 See com m entary to Article XXIX, 520.
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the n a tu re  of m ere recom m endations. Article XXIX(2) stipu lates th a t a  State 
should, regardless of its location in a drainage basin , ‘furn ish  to any other 
basin State, the in terests of which may be substantially  affected, notice of any 
proposed construction or installation which would alter the regime of the 
basin ’. In addition, it is recommended in Article XXIX(3) th a t a  State providing 
the notice afford the notified State a reasonable period of time in which to 
assess the im pact of the proposed m easures and  to furn ish  its views to the 
planning State. Since prior notice is not m andatory, the Committee considered 
th a t the S tate proposing the change should not be penalized for failure to 
comply with these recom m endations. Nevertheless, Article XXIX(4) in fact 
provides a  sanction: if the planning State fails to give notice to other basin  
States, it will not be allowed to avail itself of any right which may derive from 
tem poral priority in use. Even though the 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules fail to 
m ention the extent to which a  State may secure a  recognised advantage 
through priority of u se ,55 th is  rule, which finds no support elsewhere, has been 
criticised for allowing a  situation where the substantive rights of the planning 
State could be seriously affected while the other basin  S tates have not suffered 
any harm  from the  lack of prior notice.56
Several o ther studies and  resolutions have been adopted supporting the 
obligation concerned.57 However, it was the work of the International Law 
Commission for more than  20 years on the topic of the law of the 
non-navigational u ses  of international w atercourses th a t m ade the m ost 
significant contribution to the codification and  progressive development of 
in ternational law on the notification procedure, in particu lar the 1994 ILC Draft 
Articles w hich after intense discussions at the UN Sixth Committee led to the 
text of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention.
55 P. 522.
56 For a criticism of Article XXIX(4), see Bourne (1972), 160.
57 Further to the 1966 Helsinki Rules, the ILA confirmed the obligation of prior notification in 
the 1980 ILA Belgrade Articles (Articles 7 and 8), in the 1982 M ontreal Rules on W ater Pollution 
(Articles 5 and 6), and in the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules (Article 57). See also Article II of the 1986 ILA 
Seoul Com plementary Rules.
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4 .3 .1 .3  L ake Lanoux  Arbitration 58
The landm ark  case59 th a t unquestionably contributed  to the development of the 
law concerning the notification procedure is the  Lake Lanoux arbitration 
between France and  Spain. It concerned the diversion of the w aters of the Lake 
Lanoux to the  Ariege River with full restitu tion still on French territory to the 
in ternational River Carol. The planned diversion am ounted  to 25 per cent of the 
flow of the river, the waters of which were relied upon  in Spain for irrigation. 
Fearing th a t its rights and interests would be adversely affected by the French 
works, Spain claimed th a t under the Treaty of Bayonne, of 26 May 1866, such  
works could only be undertaken with its consent. In the  award of 1957, the 
arbitral trib u n a l considered the existence of procedural obligations, nam ely the 
obligations to notify, to consult and to negotiate with the potentially affected 
States.
The tribunal h ad  to decide, inter alia, w hether France h ad  complied with the 
procedure laid down in Article XI of the Additional Act to the Treaty of Bayonne, 
before proceeding with its project of diverting the w aters of Lake Lanoux. 
According to th is  article, France had to give prior notice of works th a t could 
change the course or the volume of a  w atercourse flowing into Spain, so th a t 
the in terests  th a t could be involved on both sides would be safeguarded. The 
trib u n al held th a t France had complied with its obligations under Article XI by 
notifying Spain of its planned works, including the diversion project, by 
consulting with Spain prior to initiating the project, and  by subsequently  
altering its original plan, so th a t the w aters would reach  Spain from the same 
point on the frontier, in order to accommodate Spanish  in terests.
The tribunal also held th a t international law does no t require prior consent by 
the notified State for the implementation of the proposed m easures by the 
planning State. The tribunal stated tha t
58 (France v. Spain), Award of 16 November 1957. For a more detailed analysis of the case, see 
supra  s .3.2.6.4.
59 See also the San Juan River Arbitration and Case (1888) and  (1916), supra  s .3.2.6.1.
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the rule according to which States may utilise the hydraulic force of international 
watercourses only on condition of a prior agreement between the interested States 
cannot be established as a custom, or even less as a general principle of law.60
This aw ard w as based on the term s of a  treaty, b u t the exam ination of the 
procedural ru les by the arbitral tribunal w ent beyond the interpretation of 
those treaty  provisions. Among other statem ents, the tribunal seem s to suggest 
th a t there is a  principle of general application according to which
[a] State wishing to do that which will affect an international watercourse cannot decide 
whether another State’s interest will be affected; the other State is the sole judge of that 
and has the right to information on the proposals.61
This assertion  im plies an  obligation to notify p lanned works and to consult 
with the o ther co-riparians in the context of an in ternational w atercourse.62
4 .3 .1 .4  The Notification Procedure in the 1997 UN Watercourses 
Convention
The 1997 UN W atercourses Convention provides a  detailed notification 
procedure from Articles 11 to 19 based on the experience of the World Bank,63 
and  to a  great ex tent on existing conventional practice.
Article 12 lays down the obligation of the planning State to notify the proposed 
m easures with possible significant adverse effects to all potentially affected 
S tates prior to im plem enting them. This raises a t the ou tse t two issues: the 
need for identification of ‘planned m easures’, and  the clarification of the 
expression ‘significant adverse effect’ upon other w atercourse States.
As to p lanned  m easures, the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention fails to 
produce a  listing, even non-exhaustive, of the types of activities th a t require 
notification, e.g. the  construction of a  dam  or other hydraulic works beyond a
60 24 ILR (1957), 130.
61 Ibid., 119.
62 Bourne (1972), 166.
63 See infra s .4.3.1.6.
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certain scale.64 However, since the planned m easures to be notified are those 
th a t m ay have significant adverse effect, th is  seem s to exclude small-scale 
works, e.g. m inor alterations or additions to an  ongoing project.66
The Convention does not identify the form of relevant injury. It m akes a 
distinction betw een the expression ‘significant adverse effect’ used  in Articles 
12 and  26 and  ‘significant harm ’ used  in Article 7(1) regarding the due 
diligence obligation. This seem s to indicate th a t the threshold  established for 
the obligation to notify is lower than  th a t which deals with damage which 
entails liability. This raises the question of who assesses the character of the 
potential significant adverse effects.66 According to Article 12, it is the notifying 
State itself which m akes th is  assessm ent, since notice m u st be given before it 
decides to im plem ent the  m easures or before it gives private entities perm ission 
to im plem ent the  p lanned  m easures. However, in the event th a t the planning 
State does not consider the  planned works to produce significant adverse 
effects or simply if it decides not to notify potentially affected States, the 
notification procedure m ay be triggered by the la tter S tates as soon as they 
become aware of the proposed activities. This procedure of notification upon 
request is set forth in Article 18(1).67 This is intended for situations where 
States likely to be affected have ‘reasonable grounds to believe th a t another 
State is planning m easures th a t m ay have a significant adverse effect upon it’. 
For th is reason, the request h as  to be accom panied by a  docum ented 
explanation setting forth these grounds.68 In the event th a t the planning State 
considers th a t it is no t u n d er an  obligation to notify, it h as  to inform the 
potentially affected S tate of th is  and  justify it. If nevertheless th is State is not 
satisfied with the explanation of the planning State, it m ay promptly ask  to 
enter into consultations and  negotiations. Moreover, it may request the
64 Instead of ‘planned m easu res’, Article 57 of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules uses the terms 
‘programs, plans, projects, or activities’.
65 Similarly, the ILC regarding the topic of injurious consequences arising out of acts not 
prohibited by international law, which includes the work on prevention of transboundary damage 
from hazardous activities, does not include a list of activities th a t should be subjected to the 
obligation to notify, leaving the determ ination on an ad hoc basis. See Article 1 and commentary 
to the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of T ransboundaiy  Harm from Hazardous Activities, 
and infra s.6.3.2.
66 Sohnle suggests th a t the ideal solution would be to leave the appreciation of the character of 
the effect of the project to an  independent organ with m anagem ent functions, such as the one 
established in Article 7 of the 1975 S tatute of the River Uruguay. In case of dispute, the issue 
should be referred to a  court or tribunal. See Sohnle (2002), 344.
67 Following the sam e term s of Article 3(7) of the 1991 Espoo Convention.
68 See also Article 57(3) of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules.
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suspension of the works for a  period of six m onths, ‘u n less  otherwise agreed’ 
(Article 18(3)). This is in line with the case law established  by the Lake Lanoux 
arbitration, where the tribunal considered th a t a  notifying State ‘cannot decide 
w hether ano ther S tate’s interest will be affected’ since the State likely to be 
affected is ‘the sole judge of th a t and  has the right to inform ation on the 
proposals’.69 In th is  case, the results of any environm ental im pact assessm ent 
carried out by the planning State are necessary  to justify  the lack of 
notification of the planned works.70
It should be noted  th a t Article 12 requires ‘tim ely’ notification. This term, 
although no t precise, is intended to require notification a t an  early stage in the 
project, th u s  perm itting meaningful consultations and, if necessary, 
negotiations. Some bilateral and m ultilateral treaties set forth specific bu t 
varied time fram es for the provision of notification for different reasons. As 
early as  1926, South  Africa and Portugal agreed th a t a  w ritten notification of 
planned w orks should  be provided two years prior to the im plem entation of any 
project for the  u se  of the waters of the Kunene River in order to allow the other 
State to express its intention to join the project.71 Similarly, the 1959 Nile 
W aters Agreement provided in Article 111(2) th a t Egypt m u st give two years’ 
notice of the intention to s tart the execution of the jo in t projects specified in the 
previous paragraph  to build certain works in the territory of the Republic of 
Sudan in order to allow the parties to negotiate the precise term s of the 
schem e.
Another issu e  arising from the scope of the notification requirem ent is th a t of 
the identification of its addressees. Criticism h as  been m ade to the effect th a t 
the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention provides only for the State which 
in tends to im plem ent new m easures to notify potentially affected S tates ra ther 
than  all w atercourse S tates,72 as is required, for instance , by the World B ank.73 
It should be noted, however, tha t the in terests of all w atercourse S tates are 
already protected u n d er Article 11. That is to say, p lanning  S tates have a 
general obligation to exchange information and  consu lt all o ther w atercourse
69 Lake Lanoux arbitration, 119.
70 Tanzi and Arcari (2001), 207.
71 Article 2 of the 1926 Kunene River Agreement.
72 Article 57 of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules adds th a t 'com petent international organizations’ 
may also be the addressees of the notification.
73 See infra s .4.3.1.6.
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States on the possible effects of the planned m easures on the condition of the 
in ternational watercourse. Moreover, any State m ay seize the initiative and 
request from the planning State notification of the project in accordance with 
Article 18 if it h as  some evidence th a t the activity p lanned by other w atercourse 
State will interfere with its rights by having a significant adverse effect on its 
territory.
The 1997 UN W atercourses Convention also provides, in Articles 13 to 17, a 
procedure su b seq u en t to notification. According to Article 13, the notified State 
is given a  period of six m onths,74 which may be extended for another six-m onth 
period upon  req u est in case of special difficulty, to study and  evaluate the 
possible effects of the planned m easures on its territory and  to reply to the 
notifying S ta tes w ith its findings. Within this period of time, the notifying State 
is prohibited from implementing or perm itting the im plem entation of the 
planned m easu res w ithout the notified S tate’s consent, which, in tu rn , may ask  
for additional d a ta  and  information (Article 14). The purpose of th is timeframe 
is, th u s, to prevent any abuse by the notified State, since otherwise th is would 
am ount to adm itting a  right of veto ‘which at the discretion of one State 
paralyses the  exercise of the territorial jurisdiction of an o th er’.75
However, if w ithin the period of six m onths from the notification the notified 
State does no t reply, Article 16(1) provides tha t the notifying State may proceed 
with the im plem entation of the planned m easures, as long as these are in 
accordance with the notification and relevant inform ation provided and do not 
resu lt in an  inequitable or significantly harm ful use  of the watercourse. In fact, 
the absence of a  reply may be taken as acquiescence in the im plem entation of 
the proposed activities, and  th u s  the notified State m ay be precluded from 
subsequently  objecting to the implementation of these activities. Yet, if these 
activities violate the  obligation of equitable and reasonable utilisation and the 
obligation no t to cause significant harm , there  is no presum ption of 
acquiescence and  the  notified State may claim com pensation after the period of 
six m onths. The notifying State is, therefore, u n d er an  obligation to take all 
appropriate m easu res to eliminate or mitigate such  harm .76 Nevertheless,
74 Some treaties also specify a different period for reply. But o ther treaties, as well as the IDI 
and the ILA, use  the more flexible expression ‘reasonable period of tim e’. See Article 6 of the 1961 
IDI Salzburg Resolution; and  Article XXIX(3) of the 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules.
75 See Lake Lanoux arbitration, 128. See also Tanzi and Arcari (2001), 208.
76 Tanzi and Arcari (2001), 209.
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Article 16(2) provides th a t the claim for com pensation m ay be offset by the 
costs incurred  by the notifying State in the im plem entation of its planned 
m easures after the expiration of the time for the reply. In th is case, Tanzi 
argues th a t there  is a  presum ption th a t the planning State acted in accordance 
with its due diligence obligation, since it notified the S tate likely to be affected.77
If the notified S tate does not object to the project, it h a s  the obligation to inform 
the notifying S tate accordingly ‘as early as possible’, and  the latter State may 
sta rt the im plem entation of its project. If, on the other hand , the notified State 
considers the  p lanned  m easure to be inconsistent with the provisions of 
Articles 5 and  7, it h a s  the obligation to inform the notifying State and to a ttach  
a docum ented explanation setting forth the reasons for the finding (Article 15). 
The S tates m u st th en  en ter into consultations and, eventually, negotiations 
‘with a view to arriving a t an  equitable resolution of the s itua tion ’ (Article 17(1)).
Article 19 estab lishes an  exception to the regular notification procedure ‘in the 
event th a t the im plem entation of planned m easures is of the u tm ost urgency in 
order to protect public health , public safety or other equally im portant 
in te rests’, such  as protecting the population from the danger of flooding.78 The 
planning State may im m ediately proceed to im plem ent the m easures, b u t it has 
to m ake a formal declaration of the urgency of these m easures and  provide 
relevant d a ta  and  inform ation w ithout delay to the S tates likely to be affected. 
Upon request, the S ta tes m ay promptly enter into consultations and 
negotiations. This procedure is, however, susceptible to abuse .79
Since the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention is a fram ework convention, some 
delegations a t the  Sixth Committee of the UNGA considered the notification
77 Id.
78 1994 ILC Report, 118. The situations covered by this article are different from those covered 
by Article 28 on notification in emergency situations. See infra s .4.3.3.
79 Sohnle (2002), 348. Sohnle criticises the imposed timeframes of the 1997 UN W atercourses 
Convention’s notification procedure since it arguably leads to abuses. If a notifying State follows 
the regular procedure, it m ight have to suspend its works for 18 m onths. But if it decides not to 
notify and refuses to notify even a t the request of the potentially affected State, it might ju s t 
suspend its works for six m onths during the period of consultations and negotiations. It may be 
argued, however, th a t the planning State is under a duty of due diligence, and therefore it will 
have to prove, notably through an  environmental im pact assessm ent, that it has fulfilled its 
obligation and  th a t the p lanned m easures do not adversely affect the other riparian States.
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procedure to be too detailed.80 Yet, there was not m uch  debate about it within 
the Working Group of the Sixth Committee.
4 .3 .1 .5  Notification Procedure in State Practice
The ILC carried ou t surveys of the authorities supporting the principles of prior 
notification and  consultation.si The large num ber of treaties containing these 
principles illu stra tes  the widespread practice of S tates willing to notify and 
consult other S ta tes in the case their planned conservation or new engineering 
works could affect o ther S ta tes’ interests or u ses of an  in ternational river.ss 
State practice is consisten t and  not simply based on treaty .83 In m ost instances, 
the duty of notification of p lanned m easures is provided in the framework of an 
institu tional arrangem ent.84
The issue of the legal s ta tu s  of the rule still needs to be addressed. If the rule 
exists in general custom ary in ternational law it applies to all S tates irrespective 
of w hether they are bound  by a  treaty .85 General ru les of procedure are more 
likely to become rules of custom ary  international law th an  detailed rules, such  
as the six-m onth period to reply to notification.
The obligation of notification h a s  been considered by several au thors as a rule 
of general custom ary in terna tional law.85 Authors who support th is contention 
rely heavily on treaty practice, b u t th is  seems to be inconclusive. There is in
80 This criticism was m ade mainly by upstream  States, such  as  Turkey, Ethiopia, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and  France.
81 These surveys included in ternational agreem ents, decisions of international courts and 
tribunals, declarations and resolutions adopted by intergovernm ental organizations, conferences 
and meetings, and studies by intergovernm ental and international non-governmental 
organizations. See 1987 McCaffrey’s Third Report, 28-35, p aras .60-87; and 1982 Schwebel’s 
Third Report, 105-110, paras. 170-186. See also Bourne (1972) and (1972a); and Kirgis (1983), in 
particular Ch.II, 16-87.
82 1987 McCaffrey’s Third Report, 30, para .72.
83 See Kirgis (1983). For exam ples of recent practice in Africa, see Okidi (1997), 176-7.
84 This is the case, for instance, of the 1994 OKAKOM Agreement, Article 1(3); or of the 1975 
Statute of the River Uruguay, which provides a detailed notification procedure.
85 Unless the persisten t objector rule applies. See infra n. 111.
86 See, e.g. Bourne (1972), 173 and 175, who in 1972 suggested that the rule was in the 
process of crystallization, and  in 1992 asserted th a t the obligations to exchange information, to 
notify, to consult and  to negotiate form already part of custom ary international law, Bourne 
(1992) 72; Caflisch (1989), 167; McCaffrey (1998), 27, and (2001), 406-7; and Tanzi and Arcari 
(2001), 204 and 210. Tanzi suggests th a t the whole notification procedure set out in the 1997 UN 
W atercourses Convention, with the exception of the temporal details, reflects rules of custom ary 
international law.
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fact an  extensive num ber of States th a t have been participating in th is practice 
in a  consistent m anner. Yet, the assessm ent of the value of the large num ber of 
treaties containing procedural obligations in the process of formation of 
custom ary in ternational law requires considerable caution. Several argum ents 
may be p u t forward. First, because of the diversity of factual situations to 
which custom ary  rules would apply, it may be argued th a t they exist, if a t all, 
only with regard to some regions . 87 Although procedural rules, by their very 
nature , have clear common denominator characteristics which allow them  to be 
applied independently  of a  specific region, they m ay simply not be applied or 
accepted worldwide. It is not ju s t geographical particularities th a t could cause 
particular custom  to emerge. Other factors are relevant, such  as cultural and 
social factors. Kirgis p u ts  the issue into perspective as follows:
As a rule... general custom is less important than regional custom in the law of 
drainage basins, since all states interested in any given basin will usually be within the 
same region. General custom becomes important primarily when state practice is 
inconclusive in a particular region and there is no reason to regard practice elsewhere 
as unsuited to basins in that region.88
Secondly, it may be argued th a t the fact th a t th is area of the law has a 
preponderantly conventional character is ipso facto contradictory to the 
existence of ru les of custom ary  international law . 89 This argum ent, however, 
does not stand , and  th a t is precisely due to the diversity of river basins. Even if 
States believe a  norm  to be obligatory, the difference between basins would 
always require treaties which provide for specific detailed rules to be agreed 
and  applied between riparian  States.
Thirdly, the fact th a t so m any treaties evidence a  relatively consistent 
normative p attern  m ay arguably dem onstrate th a t S tates believe th a t some 
form of principle or ru le is obligatory , 90 or a t least it m ay indicate w hat the 
international com m unity as a  whole considers to be good policy91 in similar
87 E.g. Berber (1959), 114.
88 Kirgis (1983), 86-7.
89 B ruhacs (1993), 72.
90 Griffin (1959), 58, who adds th a t in the law of international drainage basins treaties are 
particularly persuasive evidence of ‘law-creating international practice’, a t 50.
91 Or ‘equitable’. See Mendelson (2002) on the possible legal significance of bilateral maritime 
delimitation agreem ents.
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situations. These consistent patterns may be a  source or reflection of normative 
expectations also for non-parties . 92 State practice in th is  respect is not 
conclusive, since the existence of opinio iuris m ay not be p resum ed . 93 Thus, to 
assert the existence of th is rule as general custom ary in ternational law it is 
essential to clearly dem onstrate the belief by S tates th a t th is obligation exists 
as a  legal duty, outside the treaty framework . 94 This belief would emerge from 
the practice of S tates parties to bilateral or m ultilateral treaties in relation to 
States non-parties and  from the practice of S tates non-parties am ongst 
themselves.
Although the World B ank policies and good practices have contributed directly 
to the practice of S ta tes and  to the development of the  law by its influence in 
the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention, state practice in th is regard may be 
taken as reflecting the conditionality of the World Bank financing policy . 95 Also, 
it may be argued th a t S ta tes occasionally notify other S tates in the course of 
good neighbourly relations, or simply because they consider it opportune at a 
given time, w ithout the conviction of this being a legal obligation.
Principle 19 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environm ent and Development, for 
example, m ay arguably serve as an  indication of the view of the international 
com m unity as a  whole on the  relevant obligation. It provides for procedural 
ru les in the following general term s:
States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant information to potentially 
affected States on activities that may have a significant adverse transboundary 
environmental effect and shall consult with those States at an early stage and in good 
faith.
The fact th a t th is  s ta tem en t of principles was approved by consensus indicates 
its emerging legal significance . 96 B ut this principle focus only on environmental 
effects and, as w ith m any other international in strum ents, the weight of this
92 Kirgis (1983), 19.
93 See Principle 25 of the 2000 ILA London Principles of CIL.
94 Com m entary to Principle 25 of the 2000 ILA London Principles of CIL, 48.
95 See infra s .4 .3 .1 .6 .
96 Birnie an d  Boyle (2002), 105. See also Principles 28, 32 and 33, and respective
com m entaries, of the 2000 ILA London Principles of CIL, 55-56, 61-6.
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declaration is limited as it does not have binding force, since resolutions of 
in ternational organizations and conferences generally lack binding force . 97
More significant is the work of the ILC for over 20 years on the topic of the law 
of the non-navigational uses of international w atercourses. Procedural rules 
were drafted  by different special rapporteurs in several reports and  later on 
discussed in the  Sixth Committee. Following its practice, the ILC has not 
specified w hether it considered these rules as lex lata or lex feren da98 However, 
some weight m ay be given to the fact th a t procedural rules were not 
controversial during  the negotiation of the Convention and  th a t they were 
adopted with the  opposition of only three upstream  rip a rian s . 99 The Convention 
was finally approved by the UNGA in 1997 with 103 votes in favour, 27 
abstentions, an d  only th ree votes against . 100
It is noteworthy th a t, while the ILC was working on the draft rules, they were 
already influencing s ta te  practice . 101 One good example is the 1992 Helsinki 
W atercourses Convention. This regional framework Convention subsequently 
led to the conclusion of p articu la r treaties in Europe.
The fact th a t the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention is not yet in force and only 
16 States have as  yet ratified it may be seen to limit the weight th a t could be 
given to the argum ent th a t  the Convention has assisted  in the crystallization of 
the emerging p rocedural ru les into rules of general custom ary international 
law, or even codified existing ru le s . 102 However, th is  m ay be explained by the 
fact th a t other key articles, such  as those on the settlem ent of disputes, were 
very controversial, and  no t due to any rejection of the procedural rules under
97 See also Article 3 of the 1974 C harter of Economic Rights and  Duties of States, which was 
not adopted by consensus, b u t by a majority of 97 States; the UNGA Resolution 2995 (XXVII), of 
15 December 1972, UN D oc.A /R ES/2995 (1973); the 1973 UNGA Resolution on Co-operation in 
the Field of the Environm ent; and  the 1978 UNEP Principles on Shared Natural Resources.
98 McCaffrey and  Sinjela (1998), 106. However, the former Special Rapporteur asserts the 
international custom ary  charac ter of the obligations to use the international watercourse in an 
equitable and  reasonable m anner, not to cause significant harm , and to notify potentially 
affected riparian  S ta tes of planned m easures on the international watercourse. See, e.g. 
McCaffrey (1998), 26-27.
99 Ethiopia, Rwanda, and  Turkey. McCaffrey a ttribu tes considerable weight to this fact. See 
McCaffrey (2001), 406.
100 These were the votes of China, Burundi, and Turkey.
101 See e.g. McCaffrey and  Sinjela (1998), 106.
102 See com m entary to Principle 26 of the 2000 ILA London Principles of CIL, 49-50.
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discussion . 103 In addition, it may also be argued th a t m any States parties to 
existing particu lar treaties regulating the uses of their w atercourses see only 
limited advantages in ratifying the Convention . 104 Nevertheless, the influence of 
the Convention on subsequent treaties is evident . 103 Some States have even 
expressly recognised tha t the principles and ru les em bodied in the Convention 
reflect international law . 106
The representative character of state practice m ay also be open to question. 
Some key regional States, such as Turkey , 107 C hina and  Brazil -  upstream  
States of large international river basins -  m ight challenge the legal s ta tu s  of 
the obligations of prior notification and consultation. The conduct of these 
States seem s to indicate th a t they do not accept these obligations. It is 
arguable th a t in the face of opposition by a State whose in terests  are specially 
affected, an  emerging rule may not m ature into a  rule of general custom ary 
international law . 108 However, in contrast to the Legality o f the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons case, where nuclear States could prevent a  general rule 
emerging since their strategic and possible use of the w eapons was global, here 
the particu lar in terest of the three States is more local. Thus, it may be argued 
th a t their persisten t objection may operate only in the narrow  sense of 
excluding them  ra ther th an  preventing the rule from coming into being.
In the alternative, i.e., if it is argued that the rule already exists, the rule of the 
persis ten t objector might be invoked , 109 since these S tates have rejected the 
procedural ru les in their practice. This argum ent requires careful analysis of 
these S ta te s ’ practice as to consistency while the rule of in ternational custom  
was being formed. The reason for these S tates’ position seem s to be the fact
103 See McCaffrey and  Sinjela (1998), 104; and Tanzi and Arcari (2001), 281-3.
104 McCaffrey and  Sinjela (1998), 105.
105 For example, on the 2000 SADC Revised Water Protocol, or the 1995 Mekong River 
Agreement.
106 E.g. para .4 of the Preamble of the 2002 Incomaputo Tripartite Interim  Agreement.
107 Further to voting against the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention, Turkey also objected to 
Part III on Planned M easures, with the exception of Article 11, since it challenged its nature of 
general custom ary international law.
108 See com m entary to Principle 14, of the 2000 ILA London Principles of CIL, 23-26.
109 A persistent objector is a State that can ‘exclude itself from the operation of the new rule’ by 
manifesting its d issen t to th a t practice before it h as  developed into a rule of general custom ary 
international law. See Mendelson (1998) 228; and com m entary to Principle 15 of the 2000 ILA 
London Principles of CIL, 27-29.
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th a t they have been involved in d isputes with their dow nstream  neighbours 
after having taken  unilateral action.
Considering the existing evidence, and the fact th a t th is  area of the law is 
continuously evolving, it is possible to argue th a t there is sufficient evidence to 
support the  conclusion th a t a rule of general custom ary in ternational law has 
emerged. A ru le  of regional custom ary law h as  unquestionably  m atured, 
notably in Europe, and  is th u s  binding on the S tates accepting it. In addition, it 
may be argued th a t a  rule of particular custom ary in ternational law has 
emerged betw een S tates recognising it, which is no t geographically confined 
and th u s  no t regional or local in the strict sense of the term. That is, the 
particular procedural rule binds States who are not neighbours 
geographically . 110 In any  event, there is little doubt th a t if a  dispute is referred 
to in ternational adjudication or arbitration, the court or tribunal, in line with 
the dicta of Lake Lanoux’s award and the IC J’s decision in the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case , 111 will consider the rule of prior notification 
to be p art of the corpus of general custom ary in ternational law. It m ust be 
underlined th a t procedural ru les are sine qua non conditions for compliance 
with the substantive ru les of equitable and reasonable utilisation and of 
prevention of significant transboundary  harm . 112
F urther to th is  d iscussion  of the legal s ta tu s  of procedural ru les in the law 
applicable to in terna tional w atercourses, it has  been argued th a t in the 
in ternational law of the  environm ent generally, ru les of prior notification and 
consultation in cases of environm ental risk are ru les of general custom ary 
international law . 110 This being the case, and even considering the natu re  of lex 
specialis of the law of in ternational w atercourses, these custom ary rules m ust 
be applied in the field of shared  w ater resources.
110 Mendelson (1998), 194.
111 See supra  s .3.2.6.5.
112 See su pra  s .4.1.2.
113 Birnie and  Boyle (2002), 126-9. For a contrary view, see Okowa (1996).
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4 .3 .1 .6  The Impact o f World Bank Policies
The World Bank, as an international financial institu tion , h as  since its 
inception been financing projects on international w atercourses, which enables 
it to im pose conditions on the procedures for the pro jects’ im plem entation . 114 
Over the years, the  im portance of the role of the World Bank in enhancing 
co-operation am ongst S ta tes 115 and compliance with its procedural applications 
has increased. This m ay be evidenced by the wording u sed  in the revised Word 
Bank O perational Policies on Projects on International W aterways116 where the 
Bank urges S ta tes  to ‘negotiate in good faith with other riparians to reach 
appropriate agreem ents or arrangem ents’ and offers its  assistance for this 
purpose . 117
The World B ank developed policies which required the application of 
notification procedures in the  absence of agreem ent on the m atter. These 
policies are m ore dem anding than  th a t of the 1997 UN W atercourses 
Convention, since they require the notification to all riparian  States, both 
upstream  and  dow nstream , for all proposed projects, notably the construction 
of new dam s or irrigation projects, w hether these may have significant adverse 
effects or not. According to these requirem ents, notification has to provide 
sufficient project details in  order to enable the other riparians to determine 
w hether the proposed project may cause appreciable h a rm . 118 Furtherm ore, 
notified S tates are norm ally given a ‘reasonable’ period of six m onths to 
respond to the notification. This m ay be shortened in cases of emergency119 or
114 For an  exam ination of the evolution of the World Bank policies for projects on international 
watercourses, and  its contribution to the consolidation of the notification procedure, see 
generally Krishna (1998).
115 This may be illustra ted  by the World B ank’s mediation in the conclusion of the 1960 Indus 
Waters Treaty between India and  Pakistan, or presently the assistance in the development of the 
Nile Basin Initiative. See P itm an (1998); and Salman (2003). See also infra s .5.3.2.
116 The Word B ank O perational Manual: Operational Policies -  Projects on International 
Waterways (OP 7.50), from October 1994; The Word Bank Operational Manual: Bank Procedures 
-  Projects on In ternational W aterways (BP 7.50), from October 1994; and The Word Bank 
Operational M anual: Good Practices -  Projects on International Waterways (GP 7.50), from 
November 1994, reprin ted  in Salm an and C hazoum es (eds.)(1998), 193-201.
The World B ank policy directive for the staff was initially adopted in 1956 -  and later revised 
several times -  because of the difficulties faced by the Bank due to lack of clarity of the rules of
international law in th is area and to respond to existing d isputes between riparian States.
117 OP 7.50, p a ra .3, a t 194.
118 BP 7.50, p a ra .3, a t 198.
119 GP 7.50, p a ra .3, a t 201.
214
extended a t the request of the notified State. In these cases, the World Bank 
has been giving an extension of two to three m o n th s . 120
In case of an  objection by a notified State, the World B ank may appoint one or 
more independent experts to provide an  additional opinion . 121 These 
independent experts, as with the fact-finding com m ission specified in Article 33 
of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention , 122 have no decision-m aking role in 
the processing of the project. Their technical opinion is subm itted  to the World 
Bank for its consideration . 123 These opinions are u sed  by the B ank to enhance 
the authority  of its mediation or conciliation fu n ctio n s . 124 In fact, the role of the 
World Bank is instrum ental in enhancing the ru les in th is  area, given th a t it 
may play a  decisive role in the negotiation betw een the riparians and  in third 
party d ispute resolution procedure . 125
There are, however, three exceptions to the notification requirem ent. These are: 
(1 ) projects involving additions or alterations to any continuing schem es th a t 
require rehabilitation, construction, or other changes which in the judgm ent of 
the Bank will not adversely change the quality or quan tity  of w ater flows to the 
other riparians, and  will not be adversely affected by the o ther r ip a rian s’ 
possible w ater use; (2) water resource studies and  feasibility studies; and  (3) 
projects related to a  tributary of an  in terna tional waterway th a t ru n s  
exclusively in the lowest downstream S ta te . 126
The experience of the World Bank also contributed  directly to Article 30 of the 
1997 UN W atercourses Convention concerning indirect procedures. This Article 
applies in cases where there are ‘serious obstacles to direct contacts between 
w atercourse S ta tes’, e.g. where parties do not have diplom atic relations or are 
in arm ed conflict . 127 In these cases, if the p lanning  S tate  indicates to the Bank 
th a t it does not wish to give notification, the  B ank will itself do so . 128 Similarly,
120 See Salm an (2001a), 1497, n.81.
121 BP 7.50, paras.8-12, 199-200.
122 Ibid., 122.
123 BP 7.50, para. 11, 199.
124 See Tanzi (2001), 153-4.
125 See Salm an (2003), and Pitm an (1998).
126 OP 7.50, para .7, a t 194-5.
127 Article 9, comm. 3, of the 1994 ILC Draft Articles.
128 OP 7.50, para .4, a t 194 and BP 7.50 para.2, a t 197.
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according to Article 30, S tates ‘shall fulfil their obligations of co-operation 
provided for in the ... Convention, including exchange of da ta  and  information, 
notification, com m unication, consultations and  negotiations, through any 
indirect procedure accepted by them ’, th a t is, th rough  th ird  S tates -  usually  
those protecting their in terests under the procedures set out in Articles 45 and 
46 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, or peace 
com m issions, or the  good offices of an  international organisation . 129 But the 
World B ank policy goes even further: if the beneficiary State (the potential 
borrower) also objects to the B ank’s notifying other S tates, the World Bank will 
discontinue processing the project , 130 th u s  m aking clear th a t notification of the 
project is a  sine qua non condition of the B ank’s involvement in any project 
affecting an  in terna tional waterway.
The role of the World B ank in encouraging arrangem ents am ongst riparian 
States h as  contributed  to the  development of in ternational norm s while it has 
been sim ultaneously influenced by the development of international law in this 
field, in ‘a  gradual and  sub tle  process of cross-fertilization ’. 131
4 .3 .1 .7  The Report o f  the World Com m ission on Dams
The Report of the World Com m ission on Dams (WCD) 132 recognises the need for 
co-operation am ong S ta tes for sharing  the w aters and  the benefits derived from 
international rivers, an d  it lays down a strategic priority for guiding 
decision-m aking w ith regard  to dam s nam ed ‘Sharing Rivers for Peace, 
Development, and  Security ’. 133 In th is  regard, the report acknowledges th a t ‘as 
specific in terventions for diverting water, dam s require constructive 
cooperation ’. 134
Particularly relevant to the m atter under consideration is the first 
recom m endation of the  Report, which refers to the need to inform other 
riparian S tates of p lanned  m easures th a t m ay have significant effect on
129 1994 ILC Report, 132.
130 OP 7.50, p a ra .4, a t  194 and BP 7.50 para.2, a t 197.
131 Salm an an d  C hazournes (eds.)(1998), 169.
132 On the WCD and  its report, see also supra  s. 1.5.2.4.
133 Strategic Priority 7: Sharing Rivers for Peace, Development and Security. See World 
Commission on D am s (2000), 251 ff.
134 Id.
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them , 135 and  the th ird  recom m endation, which s ta tes  th a t dam s on shared 
rivers should  no t be built in cases where riparian  S tates raise an  objection 
upheld by an  independent panel . 136 In addition, the Commission recom m ends 
the adoption by S tates of a notification procedure for the building of dam s 
which is m ore sophisticated than  th a t established in the 1997 UN 
W atercourses Convention , 137 and which follows closely the procedure set forth 
in the 1991 Espoo Convention (Article 3). It is suggested th a t S tates proposing 
the building of a  dam  notify the potentially affected States at the planning 
stage, as p a rt of the  strategic im pact assessm ent, and  should allow them  at 
least three m o n ths to identify relevant issues to be included a t the subsequent 
preparatory s tu d ies  and  im pact assessm ents. The notified States have the 
correlative obligation to respond within those three m onths of the notification. 
Subsequently, b u t prior to selecting an option on the shared  river, the notifying 
State should provide the  potentially affected S tates with adequate technical 
information abou t the  proposed project and  the results of any im pact 
assessm ent. The notified State should respond within six m onths of the 
notification. If after th is  period, the parties fail to reach an agreement, an 
independent panel should  be established according to the term s of Article 33 of 
the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention on fact-finding procedures to solve the 
dispute. If th is  panel upho lds the objection raised by the notified State, the 
dam  should no t be constructed . If the dispute rem ains, and  if the parties do 
not have recourse to d ispu te  resolution through international, regional or 
bilateral agreem ents, the  issue  should be referred to the International Court of 
Ju s tic e . 138
In the event th a t the  notified State does not respond w ithin the specified time, 
the notifying S tate m ay proceed with the planning and  building of the dam 
subject to observing the  relevant in ternational law principles and the 
Com m ission’s strategic priorities and  policy principles. In case a State fails to 
notify a  potentially affected State of the proposed project, the latter should be 
able to request an d  receive relevant inform ation and  express its views. If th is is 
denied, the Com m ission recom m ends recourse to the ICJ.
135 Ibid., 252-3.
136 Ibid., 254.
137 For the description of the recommended procedure, see ibid., 306.
138 Ibid., 254.
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These recom m endations follow, to a  certain extent, the procedure on planned 
m easures set forth in Part III of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention . 139 But 
they go beyond its rules: first, as with the notification procedure set forth in the 
1991 Espoo Convention, by providing for a notification procedure in two stages, 
th u s  increasing  the  com m unication required between the States; and secondly, 
by recom m ending th a t dam s should not be built in cases where riparian States 
raise an  objection th a t is upheld  by an  independent panel. Unfortunately, the 
Commission h a s  no t ascertained  w hether these or other notification procedures 
have been followed in p ractice . 140 In fact, in con trast to its work carried out in 
other areas, the  Com m ission failed here to p resen t recom m endations based on 
empirical d a ta . 141
Despite th is shortcom ing, the Report addressed issues of international water 
resources law, th u s  bringing them  for the first time to the international fora 
debating dam s on in terna tional rivers . 142 The Report, however, is not a legally 
binding docum ent.
4 .3 .2 .  T he N o t if ic a t io n  o f  E n v iro n m en ta l Im p a ct A sse s sm e n ts
Since the n ineteen th  century , several treaties have included the obligation to 
carry out stud ies of possible effects prior to the im plem entation of a  project on 
an in ternational w atercourse . 143 In m odern treaties, th is  obligation seems also 
to have focused on the  requirem ent on States to conduct environm ental im pact 
assessm ents (EIA) . 144 These consist of prelim inary viability studies of projects 
th a t also evaluate th e  effects of the proposed activities on the environm ent of 
the planning S tate an d  of o ther potentially affected States. Although they aim 
at ensuring th a t the  environm ental effects are taken  into account at an early 
stage in the decision-m aking process a t the dom estic level, they also seem to
139 See su pra  s .4 .3 .1 .4 .
140 Salm an (2001b), 287. For an  analysis and criticism of the Report, see also Salman (2001a).
141 Salm an (2001a), 1501.
142 Salm an (2001b), 288.
143 See, e.g. Article 26 of the 1864 Luso-Spanish Boundaries Treaty.
144 The u se  of th is  term  and  not of the more general term  ‘im pact assessm ents’ in the 1997 UN 
W atercourses Convention is criticised by McCaffrey, since these assessm ents of the 
transboundary  im pacts of new activities should not be limited to those on the environment. 
McCaffrey (2001), 408.
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foster the participation of the other basin  S tates in im plem enting the 
substantive principles of equitable utilisation in the use, development and 
protection of the w atercourse, and the exercise of due diligence in preventing 
any harm  th e re to . 145 This is because the potentially affected State, once notified 
of the study, m ay participate in the procedure itself or en ter into consultations 
or negotiations w ith a  view to reaching a  satisfactory resolution of the situation.
The obligation to conduct environmental im pact assessm ents, although 
expressly provided for in num erous in ternational and  regional legal 
in stru m en ts , 146 an d  w ell-established in domestic law , 147 h as  not yet attained the 
s ta tu s  of a  rule of general custom ary international law, th a t is, it is not binding 
on all S ta tes . 148 The fact th a t the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention does not 
expressly im pose any obligation of conducting EIA clearly reflects the lack of 
opinio fun's . 149 Article 12 concerning notification of planned m easures with 
possible adverse effects provides th a t the notification has to be accompanied by 
available technical d a ta  an d  information ‘including the resu lts of any 
environm ental im pact a sse ssm en t ’. 150 It may literally be construed as m eaning 
th a t States are only obliged to provide the resu lt of any EIA if these are 
conducted.
Nevertheless, it h a s  been  argued th a t when there is a  conventional obligation to 
notify other S tates of p lanned  activities th a t m ay entail a  risk  of causing 
transboundary  harm , the obligation to carry out EIA m ay be taken to be 
implied . 151 If so, it could be argued a fortiori th a t th is  obligation may also be
145 See Tanzi and Arcari (2001), 205.
146 Both treaties on particu la r rivers, such as the 1994 D anube Convention, Article 7(5)(f), 
which follows the term s of the 1991 Espoo Convention, and other general instrum ents, such as 
the 1992 Rio Declaration, Principle 17, the 1992 Agenda 21, p a ras .7 .4 1(b) and 8.4, the 1987 
UNEP EIA Guidelines, Principle 1, or the 1978 UNEP Principles on Shared Natural Resources, 
Principle 5. The practice of international banks, such as the World Bank or the Asian 
Development Bank, also require the conduct of EIA before engaging on projects that may cause 
transboundaiy  harm .
147 Already in 1972, u n d e r the National Environm ental Protection Act of the United States.
148 Okowa (1996), 281. Birnie and  Boyle (2002), 132, argue th a t this obligation already exists 
under general in ternational law in cases of transboundaiy  risk to the environm ent of other States 
or the m arine environm ent. This was also affirmed by the ILA in the 2004 Berlin Rules; see 
comment to Article 29.
149 This does no t exclude, however, the possibility of existing a rule of regional or local, or 
particular custom ary  in ternational law.
150 Italics supplied. See also Article 56(3) in conjunction with Article 57(3) of the 2004 ILA 
Berlin Rules.
151 Okowa (1996), 279.
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implied in all cases where there is an  obligation of notification in the same 
c ircum stances.
Logic suggests, as well as the exam ination of Article 12 in conjunction with 
other provisions, th a t even when such assessm ents are not explicitly provided 
for, the discharge of o ther duties imposed on States, such  as the due diligence 
obligation of prevention of significant transboundary  harm , or the application 
of the p recau tionary  principle , 152 would usually  require some preliminary and 
continuing assessm en ts . Thus, EIA may be deemed to be one of the ‘all 
appropriate m easu res ’ required  to be taken  by S tates according to Article 7 on 
the obligations of S ta tes no t to cause significant harm . In fact, in conducting 
an EIA the p lann ing  S tate is transferring the burden  of proof to the affected 
State. In addition, these  assessm en ts  are fundam ental instrum ents if the 
notified State considers th a t the  im plem entation of the planned m easures 
would resu lt in an  inequitable or harm ful utilisation of the watercourse, and 
Article 17 on consu lta tions comes into play. That is, ‘meaningful consultations 
can only take place if the precise n a tu re  and effects of the proposed activity 
have been investigated ’. 153
But as already sta ted , th is  Convention is not yet in force, and as a  framework 
convention th a t h ad  to reach  a  compromise between the frequently conflicting 
interests of u p s tream  an d  dow nstream  riparian  States, it is not surprising th a t 
it falls short of developing the law and  of establishing a  clear obligation on 
States to conduct w hat is now well recognised in the  in ternational community 
as an essential p rocedural obligation . 154
In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case , 155 the ICJ recognised th a t the 
project’s im pact upon , and  its im plications for, the  environm ent were a key 
issue and  th a t the  im pact and  im plications were considerable. The Court 
stated:
152 See Principle 4(2) of the 2002 ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law 
Relating to S usta inab le  Development.
153 Okowa (1996), 280.
154 Strong evidence of th is contention is Principle 17 of the 1992 Rio Declaration. See Birnie 
and Boyle (2002), 131.
155 For an  analysis of the case, see supra  s .3.2.6.5.
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In o rd e r to  e v a lu a te  th e  en v iro n m en ta l r isk s , c u r re n t  s ta n d a r d s  m u s t  be ta k e n  in to  
c o n s id e ra tio n . T h is  is  n o t only allow ed by th e  w o rd in g  o f A rtic les 15 a n d  19 [of th e  
1977 T reaty], b u t  even  p resc rib ed , to  th e  ex te n t th a t  th e s e  a r tic le s  im p o se  a  co n tin u in g  
-  a n d  th u s  n e c e s sa r ily  evolving -  ob ligation  on  th e  p a r tie s  to  m a in ta in  th e  q u a lity  of th e  
w a te r of th e  D a n u b e  a n d  to  p ro tec t n a tu re .
The C o u rt is  m in d fu l th a t ,  in  th e  field of e n v iro n m e n ta l p ro tec tio n , v ig ilance a n d  
p rev en tio n  a re  re q u ire d  on  a c c o u n t of th e  often  irrev e rs ib le  c h a ra c te r  of d am ag e  to  th e  
e n v iro n m e n t a n d  o f th e  lim ita tio n s  in h e re n t in  th e  very  m e c h a n is m  of re p a ra tio n  of th is  
type of d a m a g e .156
In addition, the  Court affirmed tha t ‘environmental risks have to be assessed 
on a con tinuous b a s is ’. 157 Even though the Court did no t expressly refer to EIA 
nor to the scope of the obligation , 158 th is may be taken  to imply th a t the ICJ 
recognises the im portance of conducting EIA.
At the regional level, existing and future bilateral or m ultilateral treaties on 
particu lar rivers m ay refer to the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention or to 
the 1991 Convention on Environmental Im pact A ssessm ent in a 
T ransboundary  Context in this m atter . 159 The 1992 Helsinki W atercourses 
Convention provides in Article 3(1)(h) for m easures to be taken  to ensure the 
application of EIA in order to prevent, control and  reduce transboundary  
im pact, and  in Article 9(2)(j) for the participation of the jo in t bodies established 
u n d er bilateral or m ultilateral agreements or other arrangem ents in the 
im plem entation of EIA relating to transboundary w aters ‘in accordance with 
appropriate in ternational regulations’. This refers to inter alia the 1991 Espoo 
Convention, also adopted by the UN Economic Com m ission for Europe and  in 
force since 1997. This framework Convention sets s tan d a rd s  for transboundary  
EIA. It se ts  forth the obligations of the Parties to a ssess  the environm ental 
im pact of certain  activities at an early stage of planning. It stipu lates th a t the 
Parties have the  obligation to ‘take all appropriate and  effective m easures to
156 ICJ Reports (1997), 7, 77-8, para. 140.
157 Ibid., 68, para. 112. However, see Judge W eeramantry diss. op. in the Nuclear Tests II case, 
ICJ Reports (1995), 288, a t 344, where he asserts the existence of the principle of EIA, and also 
his sep. op. in the Gabdkovo-Nagym aros Project case, where he also speaks of the principle of 
continuing EIA and  evaluation in relation to projects while in operation. The obligation of prior 
and continuing assessm en t of the environmental im pact of a program , project or activity was also 
recognised by the ILA in Article 29 of the 2004 Berlin Rules.
158 A-Khavari and Roth well (1998), 532.
159 See Bosnjakovic (1998), 47-64.
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prevent, reduce and  control significant adverse transboundary  environm ental 
im pact from proposed activities’ (Article 2(1)). In particu lar, the Convention 
provides for the obligation to notify other parties of any proposed activity th a t is 
likely to have a  significant adverse transboundary  im pact (Article 3(1)). This is 
required to be carried out as early as possible in order to ensure adequate and 
effective consultations. It goes on to specify the procedure of notification, which 
is to take place before the conduct of the EIA to allow the potentially affected 
State to partic ipate  in the process, notably through the exchange of relevant 
information. The Parties to the Convention further agreed in great detail on the 
format for notification under Article 3 . 160 The m ain difference regarding the 
procedure set forth  in  the  1997 UN W atercourses Convention is th a t it allows 
potentially affected S ta tes to participate in the EIA process itself. In addition, 
its time frame is left for the parties to determine.
In Europe, recent b ilateral and  m ultilateral treaties on particu lar w atercourses 
follow the UNECE Conventions and adapt their procedures to the specific 
circum stances of the b asin  concerned. That is the case with the 1998 
Luso-Spanish Agreement, w hich sets forth the obligation to conduct EIA in 
relation to certain  projects and  activities, according to their natu re , dimension 
and location, before th e ir  approval (Article 9(1)). The identification of the 
projects and  activities, as  well as the procedures for the im plem entation of the 
assessm ent, is m ade w ithin a  jo int commission established by the treaty. In 
addition, Annex II specifies the conditions for the identification of these projects 
and activities, and  refers to E uropean Union legislation on the m atter.
The European Union h a s  been developing legislation on EIA over recent 
decades. On EIA procedures, two Directives are of relevance here: Directive 
8 5 /337 /E E C , an d  Directive 2 0 0 1 /4 2 /E C .161 These Directives do not provide for 
the possibility of o ther potentially affected Member S tates to participate in a
160 This includes specific inform ation requirem ents and the form of the notification. See Report 
of the First Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on EIA in a T ransboundaiy  Context, held in 
Oslo from 18 to 20 May 1998, Annex IV, Decision 1/4 on the Form at for Notification and its 
appendix. GENERAL ECE/MP.EIA/2 10 November 1998, also at 
h ttp :/ / w w w .unece.org/env/eia/report.htm #notification .
161 Council Directive 8 5 /337 /E E C , of 27 Ju n e  1985, on the assessm ent of the effects of certain 
public and  private projects on the environment (OJ L 175, 05.07.1985, 40), amended by Council 
Directive 9 7 /1 1 /E C , of 3 March 1997; and on Strategic Environm ental Assessment (SEA), 
Directive 2 0 0 1 /4 2 /E C  of the European Parliam ent and of the Council, of 27 Ju n e  2001, on the 
assessm ent of the effects of certain plans and program m es on the environment (OJ L 197, 
21.07.2001, 30-7). The scope of application of the Directives is very broad and it covers 
num erous o ther categories of projects th a t potentially cause a significant impact on the 
environment.
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two-stage EIA process, as does the 1991 Espoo Convention, since they do not 
provide for information exchange before the preparation  of the environm ental 
assessm ent docum entation . 162 They also do not provide for formal notification, 
bu t ra ther refer to the Torward[ing]’of inform ation on the project and  of the 
environm ental assessm ent report . 163 This m ay be explained by the fact th a t 
these directives lay down a minimum environm ental assessm ent framework, 
and leave procedures to the Member States, having due regard to the principle 
of subsid iarity , 164 and  also by the fact th a t the avoidance of d isputes between 
Member S tates was not perceived as a central purpose of the directives.
In Africa, it m u st be noted th a t treaties regarding in ternational w atercourses 
have also began to expand the importance of EIA by adopting these national 
in stru m en ts’ procedures in their treaty regimes . 165
Further to EIA, S tates have recently been considering carrying out Strategic 
Environm ental A ssessm ents (SEA). While EIA is generally u sed  for evaluating 
the likely environm ental im pact of a proposed development project or activity, 
SEA is intended to be adopted before the EIA, a t policy and  decision-m aking 
level. It allows the identification and prevention of possible environm ental 
im pact a t an  earlier stage in the decision-making process, enabling 
environm ental concerns to be considered together with economic and  social 
ones.
In 2003, the  Protocol on Strategic Environmental A ssessm ent to the 1991 
Espoo Convention was adopted in Kiev, on 21 May 2003 .166 As with other 
UNECE Conventions, the Protocol is open to all UN m em bers. It requires its 
Parties to evaluate the environmental consequences of their p lans and 
program m es. As with other recent international in stru m en ts  on environm ental 
m atters, it provides for extensive public participation in government
162 On the parallel between the 1991 Espoo Convention and  Directive 85 /337 /E E C , see 
Nollkaemper (1993), 189-196.
163 See Article 7 of Directive 85/337/E E C  and Article 7 of Directive 200 1 /4 2 /E C . The latter 
provides for transboundary  consultations to take place within a reasonable time frame agreed 
between the parties.
164 See para.8  to the Preamble of Directive 2001/42 /E C .
165 E.g. the 1987 ZACPLAN, Annex 1, II, C. Article 4(d)(iii) of the 1995 SADC Protocol provided 
that river basin  m anagem ent institutions have, as one of their functions, to promote EIA. 
However, the 2000 SADC Revised Water Protocol seems to take a step backw ards by following the 
terms of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention.
166 Not yet in force.
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decision-m aking in different development sectors. Similarly to the 1991 Espoo 
Convention, it sets forth in Article 10 the procedure for notification and  
tran sb o u n d ary  consultations.
4 .3 .3 .  T h e O b lig a tio n  to  N otify  in  E m erg en cy  S itu a t io n s
In the context of in ternational w atercourses, as in o ther fields related to the 
environm ent , 167 it is now generally accepted th a t S ta tes are un d er an obligation 
to notify o ther potentially affected States in em ergencies th a t may cause 
significant transboundary  harm . These emergencies m ay resu lt from natu ra l 
causes, such  as floods, droughts, tropical cyclones, or from hum an  conduct, 
such  as industria l accidents, or from both . 168 The objective of the prom pt 
notification is to enable all potentially affected S tates effectively to prevent, 
m inim ise or elim inate the harm ful effects on h u m an  life, property and the 
environm ent, by tak ing  all necessary  m easures. Notification m u st contain all 
necessary  inform ation abou t the natu re  of damage, its likely effects and the 
possible p recau tions th a t need to be taken . 169
This obligation is well established in treaty practice. S tates have, in different 
regions , 170 included th is  obligation in num erous bilateral and  m ultilateral 
trea ties related  to w atercourses . 171 In addition, the IDI m ade a contribution to 
the  developm ent of the  rule by setting forth the obligation in relation to a 
‘sudden  increase  in the level of transboundary pollution in  the b as in ’ in Article 
VII(c) of th e  1979 A thens Resolution on Pollution . 172
More recently, an d  a t the regional level, the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses 
Convention provides in Article 14 the obligation to inform  other riparian  Parties 
to the Convention ‘w ithout delay’ about ‘any critical situation  th a t m ay have
167 For instance, in the field of protection of the environm ent from nuclear accidents, where 
this obligation is now well established.
168 The ILC provides some examples, such as a flood caused by earthquake damage to a dam. 
See the 1994 JLC Report, 129, n.397.
169 Comm, to Principle 5 of the 2006 ILC Draft Principles on Allocation of Loss.
170 For example, Article IV(8) in fine  of the 1960 Indus W aters Treaty, and Article 11 of the 
1976 Agreement for the Protection of the Rhine Against Chemical Pollution.
171 For an  exhaustive list of the treaties, see Sohnle (2002), 342, n.213.
172 See also Article 4 of the 1972 ILA Articles on Flood Control.
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tran sb o u n d ary  im pact’. B ut it goes beyond the u su a l notification requirem ent 
and  provides for the obligation of S tates to set up  Svhere appropria te ’173 w arning 
and  alarm  system s, th u s  calling for co-operation betw een S tates a t a stage 
where prevention m ay still be possible . 174 These system s consist of different 
p rocedures to m anage crises, in particular m onitoring, including forecasting, 
the provision of early warning, and  evacuation p lans in case of catastrophes.
Also w ithin the  UNECE, and with a focus on prevention, the Convention on the 
T ransboundary  Effects of Industrial Accidents175 w as concluded with a  view to 
protecting h u m an  beings and the environm ent against industria l accidents. 
This is to be achieved by preventing such  acciden ts as far as  possible, by 
reducing the ir frequency and severity and  by m itigating their effects. The 
Convention provides for the establishm ent and  operation of compatible and 
efficient in d u stria l accident notification system s for the  transm ission  of early 
w arnings, inform ation and assistance requests. In case of an  industria l 
accident or im m inen t th rea t thereof, notification containing the inform ation 
needed to co u n te rac t transboundary  effects is to be provided (Article 10 and  
Annex IX).
The 1997 UN W atercourses Convention, as a  universal fram ework convention, 
also se ts  forth  in  Article 28 the obligation of notification in emergency 
situations. There are certain fundam ental elem ents th a t characterize the 
obligation. Firstly, the  term  ‘emergency’ is defined in paragraph  (1) as a 
‘s itua tion  th a t  causes, or poses an  im minent th re a t of causing, serious h a rm ’, 
hence adopting  a  different terminology from th a t u sed  in the 1992 Helsinki 
W atercourses Convention. Secondly, the time elem ent and  the  m eans to be 
u sed  follow the  term s already used  in other treaties, i.e., the  notification of the 
em ergency originating within its territory should be m ade ‘w ithout delay and by 
the m ost expeditious m eans available’ (Article 28(2)) u p o n  learning of the 
em ergency . 176 Thirdly, and  quite apart from the obligation to notify planned 
m easures, the  notifying State has to notify no t only o ther w atercourse States,
173 This is left to the discretion of States, since the need for the establishm ent of warning 
system s depends on the physical characteristics and uses m ade of each particu lar watercourse.
174 See also Article 15 on m utual assistance.
175 Adopted in Helsinki, on 17 March 1992, and signed on 18 March 1992 by 26 UNECE States 
and the E uropean Community. It entered into force on 19 April 2000. There are now 35 Parties 
to the Convention. See also the 1996 Seveso II Directive.
176 See the 1994 ILC Report, 130.
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b u t also o ther S tates which may be affected, as well a s  ‘com petent in ternational 
organizations’, such  as a  joint river com m ission. The im portance of the 
extended scope of th is  notification requirem ent should  no t be underestim ated. 
The case of a  w ater-borne disease like cholera, w hich m ay spread beyond 
riparian  S ta tes, m ay well serve to illustrate th is  point. Although the particu lar 
case of w ater-borne diseases is not included as an  exam ple of an  emergency in 
Article 28, it is referred to in Article 27. This article provides for a  duty of due 
diligence for w atercourse S tates to prevent or m itigate transboundary  harm ful 
conditions. It differs from Article 28 in th a t it does no t have the elem ent of 
urgency w hich characterizes Article 28. However, a s  sta ted  by Tanzi, ‘the same 
factual s itua tion , being susceptible to escalation m ay, in different points in 
tim e, fall w ith in  the purview of both provisions ’. 177 And here one of the 
in stan ces  provided is th a t of an  upstream  flood th a t causes the sudden 
appearance of w ater-borne diseases.
Like Article 27, Article 28(3) lays down a  duty of action for S tates who have to 
‘im m ediately take  all practicable m easures necessita ted  by the circum stances’ 
to prevent, m itigate or elim inate harm ful effects. In addition, the Convention 
provides in Article 28(4) for the development of contingency plans to respond to 
em ergencies, th e  elaboration  of which is left to the discretion of the S tates since 
it depends on th e  characteristics of each w atercourse . 178 Instead  of providing for 
a responsive action, like the previous paragraphs, paragraph  (4) calls for 
anticipatory action, a s  it requires the joint co-operation of S tates before any 
em ergency situ a tio n  h a s  occurred . 179
Since the adoption of the  1997 UN W atercourses Convention, several new 
treaties have followed its  provisions on th is subject, m ore or less closely, such 
as the 1995 Mekong River Agreement (Article 10), the 1998 Convention on the 
Protection of the  Rhine (Article 5(6)), and  the 2000 SADC Revised Protocol 
(Article 4(5)). The 1998 Luso-Spanish Agreement also provides in Article 11 on 
‘Com m unication, Alert and  Emergency System s’, a  general obligation to notify 
the other w atercourse  State, and  in Articles 18 and  19, a  more detailed 
notification requ irem en t concerning floods and  droughts and  resource scarcity, 
respectively. All of these  recent treaties require the notification to be made to
177 Tanzi an d  Arcari (2001), 223.
178 The 1994 ILC Report, 130.
179 Id.
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the o ther Parties to the treaty and  to a  jo in t com m ission. This seem s to indicate 
th a t S tates, independently  of their region, follow the general term s of the 1997 
UN W atercourses Convention or go further by specifying them  and  assigning to 
jo in t com m issions certain  type of com m unication functions. Jo in t com m issions 
are evidently considered a  privileged link betw een w atercourse States, 
particu larly  w here they have decision-m aking power regarding the taking of 
u rgen t m easu res.
There is enough support in state practice and  case law 180 to affirm with 
conviction the  existence of a general custom ary  obligation to notify in 
em ergencies w hich applies in particular to in terna tional w atercourses . 181 This is 
also su sta in ed  in the literature . 182 As m entioned earlier, th is  obligation is 
recognised in trea ty  regimes for some decades. After the  Chernobyl nuclear 
power p lan t acciden t in 1986 and the claim by several S tates of a  breach of the 
right to be notified, the Convention on Early Notification of a  Nuclear Accident 
w as ad o p ted . 183 The prom ptness of the adoption of th is  Convention as well as 
the large n u m b er of parties dem onstrates, a t least, the  will of S tates to be 
bound  by su ch  an  obligation. The inclusion of th is  obligation in the 1997 UN 
W atercourses Convention without opposition suggests the existence of th is 
obligation in th e  context of international w atercourses.
4 .4 .  T he  O bligation  to  E nter  in to  C o n s u l ta t io n s
C onsulta tion  is a  procedural m echanism  used  to prevent d ispu tes -  a  form of 
negotiation -  w hereby States, based on the inform ation exchanged, d iscuss 
pending issues. An im portant stage of co-operation, consu lta tions are prim arily 
regarded as  an  opportunity  for States to d iscuss the potential im pact of the 
actual or proposed u ses  of the waters, and to prevent, m itigate or eliminate
180 In the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ, although in a  different context, also referred to an 
obligation to give w arning to other States in case they become exposed to known dangers. ICJ 
Reports (1949) 4, 22. This was reaffirmed in the Nicaragua case. ICJ R eports (1986) 14, 112.
181 Although b reaches of the obligation do occur. An example is the cyanide spill from a 
Romanian gold sm elter in Jan u a ry  2000. See infra s.6.2.4.2.
182 See, for example, 1989 McCaffrey’s Fifth Report, a t 113; Okowa (1996), 330-332; or Birnie 
and Boyle (2002), 322-3.
183 The Convention was adopted on 26 September 1986 by 70 S tates, and  entered into force on 
27 October 1986. There are now 101 Parties to the Convention, including some of the States 
possessing nuclear weapons, such as China, France, R ussia, the United Kingdom, and the USA. 
See Article 2 of the Convention.
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their potential or actual adverse effects. B ut it is also the  appropriate occasion 
to d iscuss any other p lans to develop individually or jointly the shared 
resource, or the m easures to protect and  preserve its  environm ent.
In the  Lake Lanoux arbitration, the tribunal explained w hat it considered 
consu lta tions an d  negotiations entailed:
Consultations and negotiations between the two States m ust be genuine, must comply 
with the rules of good faith and must not be mere formalities. The rules of reason and 
good faith are applicable to procedural rights and duties relative to the sharing of the 
use of international rivers.184
It fu rth er explained th a t ‘according to the ru les of good faith, the upstream  
State is u n d e r  the obligation to take into consideration the various in terests 
involved, to seek to give them  every satisfaction com patible w ith the p u rsu it of 
its own in te re sts , an d  to show th a t in th is regard it is genuinely concerned to 
reconcile the  in te re s ts  of the other riparian State w ith its own ’. 185 But the 
tribunal recognises th a t ‘[it] is a delicate m atter to estab lish  w hether such an 
obligation h a s  been  complied w ith ’ . 186
C onsultations m ay take  place after notification of p lanned m easures or upon 
request of any  rip a rian  State. In any event, consu lta tions should take place 
w ithin a  su itab le  tim e in  order to have practical resu lts, th a t is, to benefit from 
the opinion of th e  potentially or actually affected S ta te s . 187 These S tates may 
m anifest their position and  contribute to the decision-m aking process 
concerning existing or p lanned  uses of the w aters of shared  w ater resources. In 
fact, the purpose  of notification with the provision of relevant d a ta  and 
inform ation on p lan n ed  m easures is for the p lanning S tate to take into account 
the in terests  of the  notified State, and if need be to m ake changes in its 
proposed project in order to m eet the concerns of the  potentially affected State. 
Indeed, the  obligation to en ter into consultations com pletes the obligation of 
notification, b u t it m ay come into play w ithout prior notification.
184 24 ILR (1957), 119.
185 Ibid., 139.
186 Id.
187 See the San Juan  R iver Arbitration and Case, supra  s .3.2.6.1.
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In ternational law, however, does not require consen t by the  potentially affected 
State for the  planning  State to im plem ent its m easure. In other words, the 
potentially affected State h as  no right of veto . 188 The danger here is th a t while 
consent is no t given, the planning State m ay no t proceed with the 
im plem entation of the project for an indefinite period of time. B ut once the 
views of the  potentially affected States are p u t forward the planning State may 
not ignore th ese  views. The reverse is also valid, th a t is, if a  notified State does 
not reply to notification and does not en ter into consultations, there is a 
p resum ption  th a t  it h as  acquiesced.
Although general international law appears not to require prior consen t , 189 a 
nu m b er of trea ties  do include it. This is the case of trea ties concluded between 
the  U nited Kingdom and indigenous G overnm ents in Africa and  the Indian 
su b co n tin en t , 190 the  1972 Statute of the Senegal River , 191 or the 1996 M ahakali 
River T reaty . 192 Requiring consent may, in fact, be a  usefu l tool to prevent 
conflicts in cases  w here water is scarce and its allocation is d ispu ted . 193
In 1983, Kirgis concluded from a study of s ta te  practice th a t there is 
considerable evidence in support of the proposition th a t the rule of prior 
consu ltation  is p a rt of general custom ary in terna tional law with a ‘clear 
common denom inato r -  consultation with in terested  s ta te s  is required before 
activities are u n d e rta k e n  th a t could reasonably be expected to cause a change 
in the w atercourse  appreciably damaging their in te re s ts ’ . 194 This h as  also been 
the opinion of o ther au th o rs 195 and scholarly associa tions . 196 As with 
notification an d  th e  exchange of information, th is  ru le  is based  not only on
188 Lake Lanonx  arb itra tion , 139. See also supra  s.4.3.1.3.
189 In the beginning of last century, some authors and the IDI pointed to th is rule, and a large 
num ber of trea ties in Europe included it. See, e.g. Rule I and  II (1) of the 1911 IDI Madrid 
Resolution, an d  Kirgis (1983), 20.
190 For a list of the treaties, see Kirgis (1983), 42; and 1987 McCaffrey’s Third Report, 30, 
n. 108.
191 See Article 4(1).
192 See Article 7.
193 Sohnle (2002), 354. See, for example, Annex II, Article V(l) of the 1994 Treaty of Peace 
between Israel an d  Jo rdan , which provides th a t ‘artificial changes in or of the course of the 
Jo rd an  and  Y arm ouk Rivers can only be made by m utual agreem ent’.
194 Kirgis (1983), 86.
195 E.g. B ourne (1972a), 193.
196 See, e.g. com m ent to Article 8 of the 1982 ILA M ontreal Rules on W ater Pollution, and the 
usage note and  Article 58 of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules.
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treaty  practice b u t also on state  practice outside the  treaty  fram ew ork . 197 There 
are some cases of sta te  practice of consultations in different regions where 
there h as  been no previous agreem ent between the S ta tes regulating their u ses  
of the w aters of the shared river basin. In some cases, notification and  
consu lta tions have taken  place after p ro tests m ade by potentially affected 
S tates. In th ese  cases, S tates entered into consu ltations which eventually led to 
agreem ents.
The obligation to consult other States is well estab lished  in treaty  regimes, th u s  
providing evidence th a t States recognise the im portance of consultations as a 
m eans of preventing disputes. For example, the case of the Aswan High Dam 
project is considered in this m atter ‘normatively significant and tends to 
support a  ru le  of consultation, at least before final action is tak en . ’198 After the 
U nited Arab Republic decided to build the Aswan High Dam, Sudan protested 
claim ing its  righ t to be consulted in a timely fashion. This led to negotiations 
w hich cu lm inated  in the conclusion of the 1959 Nile W aters Agreement before 
the ac tua l bu ild ing  of the dam.
Another im p o rtan t exam ple is the 1968 African Convention on Conservation of 
Nature an d  N atu ral Resources, concluded w ithin the framework of the 
O rganization of African Unity . 199 It contains a  general clause establishing an 
obligation of S ta tes  to ‘ac t in consultation’ and, if the  need arises, the setting 
up  of in te rs ta te  com m issions -  to study and resolve problem s arising from the 
jo in t u se  an d  for th e  jo in t development and conservation for both surface and  
groundw ater reso u rces  (Article V(2) ) . 200 In addition, Article XIV(3) provides for 
an  obligation to co n su lt Svhere any development p lan  is likely to affect the 
n a tu ra l resou rces of ano ther S ta te’.
The 1997 UN W atercourses Convention provides for consu lta tions in a num ber 
of different co n tex ts . 201 Article 6(2) sets forth a  du ty  to en ter into consultations 
when the need arises  in the application of the  principle of equitable and
197 See the d iscussion  on the evidence of custom  relating to all procedural rules, supra  
s.4.3.1.5.
198 Kirgis (1983), 44.
199 The Convention h a s  30 State Parties. Angola, South Africa and Zimbabwe are not parties to 
the Convention.
200 See also Article VII(3) of the 2003 Revised African Convention.
201 See also Articles 9(2) and  10 of the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention.
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reasonable u tilisation  of the w atercourse and  the weighing of all the relevant 
factors and  circum stances. According to the ILC, th is  m eans th a t th is 
obligation is triggered by the request of any w atercourse S ta te . 202 The wording 
of Article 6(2) is unfortunate . Firstly, for the sake of consistency with the term s 
used  th ro u g h o u t the Convention, it should have u sed  the expression at the 
request o f any watercourse State or a sim ilar expression. Secondly, because it is 
difficult to conceive a  fair determ ination by a w atercourse S tate of w hat are its 
reasonable an d  equitable uses of the w aters w ithout prior exchange of data  and 
inform ation an d  consultation with other w atercourse S tates. This is supported 
by the d ictum  in the Lake Lanoux arbitration, w hich clearly affirmed th a t a 
w atercourse S tate ‘cannot decide w hether ano ther S ta te ’s in terest will be 
affected; the o ther S tate is the sole judge of th a t and  h as  the right to 
inform ation on the p roposals ’ . 203
Article 24(1) provides for the duty to enter into consu lta tions a t the request of 
any w atercourse S tate concerning the management of the  in ternational 
w atercourse. A lthough it seem s to overlap in application, th is  article actually 
extends the scope of the duty  to consult to the protection and  control of the 
w atercourse, including  m onitoring on a continuous basis  and  irrespective of 
the u ses  of th e  w a te rs . 204 Further, Article 7(2) provides for consultation when 
significant h a rm  h a s  occurred so tha t the State causing  the  harm  m ay take ‘all 
appropriate m ea su re s ’ to eliminate or mitigate such  harm . In addition, the 
Convention specifies th a t the parties have to consult ‘w ith a  view to arriving at 
m utually  agreeable m easures and methods to prevent, reduce and  control 
pollution of an  in ternational w atercourse’ (Article 21(3)).
The du ty  u n d e r  consideration applies to both actual and  p lanned u se s . 205  
Article 11 lays down the general obligation of exchange of inform ation and  
consu lta tion  on the possible effects of planned m easu res on the condition of 
the w atercourse. B ut the Convention goes on to specify th a t in the notification 
procedure, shou ld  the  notified State object to the p lanned  m easure  on the 
grounds of inequitab le and  unreasonable use, i.e., its inconsistency with the
202 See the 1994 ILC Report, 102.
203 24 ILR (1957), 119.
204 Tanzi and  Arcari (2001), 216.
205 Thus Article 26 provides for a due diligence obligation and  an  obligation to consult relating 
to the operation, m aintenance, and protection of installations.
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provisions of Articles 5 or 7, or if the S tates concerned disagree as to w hether 
notification of the  proposed project was due, S tates have an  obligation to en ter 
into consu lta tions and  to negotiate under the term s of Articles 17 and  18.206 
The notifying S tate, a t the request of the notified S tate, h as  to suspend  the 
im plem entation of the project207 for a period of six m onths. If after this period of 
time the p artie s  have no t arrived at an equitable resolution of the situation, the 
parties m ay th en  resort to third party d ispute resolution in accordance with 
Article 33.
The two m ost com m on problems which m ay arise in the  process of consultation 
are a  sta lem ate or evidence of unequal bargaining pow er . 2 08 And although prior 
consulta tion  does no t always prevent differences, a  considerable body of expert 
opinion supports  the  presum ption that, despite its  difficulties, prior 
consultation  is u sually  w orth the time, effort, and  expense . 209
4 .5 .  The Obligation to  N e g o t ia te
4 .5 .1 .  C o n s u lta t io n  an d  its  C orrelation  w ith  th e  O b lig a tio n  to  
N e g o t ia te
The negotiation process Viewed as a whole is the principal vehicle for 
cooperation betw een S ta tes ’. 210 Consultation m ay be considered ‘a  prelim inary 
stage to a  negotiation b u t differs from the la tte r w hen the country which 
in itiates the  consultation  is merely seeking the opinion of the country(ies) 
concerned by the  proposed activities or m easu res ’. 211 On the other hand , the 
obligation to negotiate stricto sensu, th a t is, the obligation to negotiate in good
206 In 1961, the IDI in its Salzburg Resolution had already included negotiations with 
obligatory ch a rac te r in Article 6. This Article provides that, following notification, if a State 
objects to the notifying S ta te’s proposed works, the two S tates ‘will en ter into negotiations with a 
view to reaching an  agreem ent within a reasonable tim e’. See also Article VI of the 1956 ILA 
Dubrovnik S ta tem ent of Principles, Article 6 of the 1982 M ontreal Rules on W ater Pollution, and 
Article VII(d) of the 1979 IDI Athens Resolution on Pollution.
207 Although w ithout a precise time frame, see, e.g. Article 62(1) of the 1960 Frontier Treaty.
208 Kirgis offers the example of the rem arks made by the UK delegate in the UN Conference on 
the Law of Treaties, 1st Sess., UN Doc.A/CONF.39/11, a t 420 (1969). Kirgis (1983), 6, n.14.
209 Kirgis (1983), 6, n.14.
210 Rogoff (1994), 183.
211 OECD Doc.ENV (79) 23, a t 6 (1979) referred to by Kirgis (1983), 12, n.27.
232
faith in order to reach  an  agreem ent, is the link betw een o ther procedural ru les 
and  the  m echanism s for the settlem ent of d isputes. Once a  d ispute arises, it 
follows consu lta tion  as a  logical sequence in procedure and  as  the prelim inary 
stage of the  process for its settlem ent . 212 The term s are often used 
in terchangeably  and  m ay even have the sam e legal effects.
The 1997 UN W atercourses Convention m akes a  distinction between 
consu lta tions an d  negotiations. Of particular relevance is the reference in 
Article 17 concerning planned m easures to the obligation to enter into 
consu lta tions and , ‘if necessary, negotiations w ith a  view to arriving at an 
equitable reso lu tion  of the situation’. This article com es into play when the 
notified S tate  objects to the proposed works or u ses. The wording in the article 
seem s to im ply th a t  in certain cases agreem ent should  be sought. Therefore, 
there is a  need  for evidence of the parties’ w illingness to reach  a  compromise. 
Exam ples of th is  ‘equitable resolution’ include m odification of the original 
project in order to elim inate potential adverse effects, ad justm en t of the u ses  by 
either S tate, or th e  paym ent of some form of com pensation acceptable to the 
notified S tate  by th e  planning S tate . 213
In m ultila te ra l conventions on international rivers, the  general obligation to 
negotiate is u su a lly  established as a  pactum de negotiando, since it im poses on 
S tates an  obligation to negotiate in order to reach an  agreem ent, as opposed to 
a  pactum  d e  contrahendo, i.e., an obligation to conclude a  later and  definite 
su b stan tiv e  agreem ent . 214 This may be illustrated  by the 1923 Convention 
relating  to th e  Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting m ore th an  One State, 
w hich s tipu la tes  in Article 4 concerning operations th a t  ‘m ight cause serious 
p rejud ice’ to any o ther Contracting State, th a t the S tates concerned shall enter 
into negotiations with a view  to the conclusion of agreem ents w hich will allow 
such  operations to be executed. Moreover, the trib u n a l in the Lake Lanoux 
a rb itra tion  asse rted  th a t ‘international practice reflects the  conviction th a t 
S tates ought to strive to conclude such ag reem ents’215. However, the effective 
conclusion of the  agreem ent is not imposed: the obligation u n d er review is not
212 Fombad (1989), 709. See also Merrils (1998), 1-26; and  Collier and  Lowe (2000), 20-24.
213 The 1994 ILC Report, 116.
214 On the distinction  between pactum  de negotiando  and  pactu m  d e  contrahendo, see McNair 
(1961), 27-9.
215 24 ILR (1957), 130.
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one of re su lt . 2 16 Accordingly, the obligation to negotiate does not imply th a t the 
conduct would be unlaw ful merely because the negotiations fail to produce an 
agreem ent . 217 This w as recognised by the PCIJ in the  Case of Railway Traffic 
between Lithuania and Poland. The Court clearly sta ted  th a t ‘an  obligation to 
negotiate does no t imply an obligation to reach an  agreem ent \ 218
States m u s t en ter into consultations and negotiate in good fa ith . 219 In other 
words, negotiations am ong States and between S ta tes and  other subjects of 
in terna tional law should be meaningful in order for the  parties to reach an 
agreem ent. This is in line with several decisions of in ternational courts and 
tr ib u n a ls . 2 2 0  The aw ard of the Lake Lanoux a rb itration  explained th a t 
‘according to the  ru les of good faith, the upstream  State is un d er the obligation 
to take into consideration the various in terests involved, to seek to give them  
every satisfaction com patible with the pursu it of its  own in terests, and  to show 
th a t in th is  regard  it is genuinely concerned to reconcile the in terests of the 
other riparian  S tate w ith its ow n ’. 2 2 1  The particu lar circum stances of the case 
are of significant relevance, b u t the tribunal recognises th a t ‘[it] is a delicate 
m atter to estab lish  w hether such  an  obligation h as  been complied w ith ’. 222 The 
tribunal w ent fu rth er by providing examples of conduct of S tates in the course 
of consu ltations and  negotiations which were considered unacceptable. These 
included ‘an  un justified  breaking off of the discussions, abnorm al delays, 
disregard of th e  agreed procedures, system atic refusals to take into 
consideration adverse proposals or interests, and, m ore generally, violation of 
the ru les of good fa ith ’. 223
216 C oncerning the possibility of a unilateral suspension of works the Tribunal explained as 
follows: ‘Further, in order for negotiations to proceed in a favourable climate, the Parties m ust 
consent to su sp en d  the full exercise of their rights during the negotiations. It is norm al th a t they 
should en ter into engagem ents to this effect. If these engagem ents were to bind them  
unconditionally un til the conclusion of an  agreement, they would, by signing them , lose the very 
right to negotiate; th is canno t be presum ed.’ Ibid., 134, para. 18.
217 Kirgis (1983), 14.
218 At 116.
219 See Article 17(2) of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention.
220 See, e.g. the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports (1968), 47, para .85; the 
Fisheries Jurisdiction  case, ICJ Reports (1974), para .78; and
221 24 ILR (1957), 39.
222 Id.
223 Ibid., 128, para. 11. The tribunal refers to the Tacna-Arica Arbitration  and  to the Case o f
R ailw ay Traffic b e tw een  Lithuania and Poland.
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Another arb itra l tribunal explained w hat it considered the content of good faith 
was in the context of a  pactum de negotiando. In the German External Debts 
case, the T ribunal said ‘both  sides would m ake an  effort, in good faith, to bring 
about a  m utually  satisfactory solution by way of a  com promise, even if th a t 
m eant the relinquishm ent of strongly held positions earlier taken. It implies a 
willingness for the purpose of negotiation to abandon  earlier positions and  to 
m eet the  o ther side part way . ’2 2 4  It went further to p u t em phasis on the need 
for S ta tes to solve their differences peacefully, so m uch  so th a t V hen  
d isp u tan ts  have reached a  point of signifying their agreem ent to negotiate an  
ou tstand ing  dispute, the subsequen t negotiations norm ally ought to lead to a 
satisfactory and  equitable re su lt . ’2 2 5
Judge Bedjaoui in h is separate  opinion on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project 
case 226 speaks of the necessity  for the Parties to negotiate again and  to do so in 
good faith. The renegotiation m u st be seen as a stric t obligation, like the good 
faith conduct it implies. This obligation flows not only from the Treaty itself, 
b u t also from general in ternational law as it h as  developed in the spheres of 
in ternational w atercourses and  the environment.
On the sam e case, after recalling its pronouncem ent in North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases and  ordering Hungary and Slovakia to resum e negotiations, the ICJ 
s ta ted  that:
It is not for the Court to determine what shall be the final result of these negotiations to 
be conducted by the Parties. It is for the Parties themselves to find an agreed solution 
that takes account of the objectives of the Treaty, which m ust be pursued in a joint and 
integrated way, as well as the norms of international environmental law and the 
principles of the law of international watercourses.227
22« 47 ILR (1974), 453.
22s Id.
226 ICJ Reports (1997), para.69.
227 Para. 141.
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All these decisions point to the conclusion th a t it is not enough for S tates or 
other parties in a  negotiation to simply attem pt to persuade the o ther side of 
the righ tness of its  views and to refuse to com promise on any po in t . 2 2 8
4 .5 .2 .  N e g o t ia t io n  an d  M eth od s o f  A lte rn a tiv e  D isp u te  R e so lu tio n
Negotiations m ay be deemed a  form of co-operation before any dispute has 
arisen  b u t also as a  m eans of settlem ent of d isputes. Most d ispu tes concerning 
in terna tional w atercourses have been avoided or settled  th rough  negotiations, 
w hether w ithin existing joint institu tions, or a t a  higher political level. 229  
Generally speaking, S tates prefer to seek a  negotiated settlem ent for different 
reasons. N egotiations are the simplest m eans of settling a  d ispute, and  allow 
the parties to re ta in  control over the outcom e as  well as the form, content, 
wording, tim ing an d  presentation of a settlem ent . 230
There are several alternative dispute resolution m echanism s th a t may be used  
in relation to in ternational rivers . 231 In the case w here negotiations are not 
successfu l w ith in  a  reasonable period of time, or the parties simply do not wish 
to deal directly w ith each other, States m ay resort to m ediation or good offices 
provided by an  im partial third party. These are m echanism s for continued 
negotiations, a s  the  role of the third party  is not to resolve the dispute, nor to 
suggest a  m ethod for resolving it, b u t to encourage the S tates to resum e 
negotiations or to provide an additional channel of com m unication . 232 In m ost 
cases, good offices consist simply of a continuation of negotiations, which lead 
the parties to agree on another m eans of settlem ent, such  as arb itration  or 
adjudication. B ut m ediation is the m ethod which seem s to be the m ost flexible 
where the  m ultidisciplinary approach may be adopted m ore effectively. The 
parties m ay partic ipate  in the various phases of the resolution process, the 
public m ay be consulted, and all those who in one capacity or ano ther are
228 See also A egean  Sea Continental Shelf case, ICJ Reports (1978), 43-4, paras. 106, 108; the 
Continental S h elf  (Tunisia/Libya) Interpretation of Judgm ent, ICJ Reports (1985), 229, para .67; 
Judge Gros D issent Opinion in the Continental Shelf case, ICJ Reports (1982), 144-5.
229 See generally McCaffrey (2003).
230 Anderson (1998), 112.
231 On ADR m ethods concerning water resources, see, e.g. Ochoa-Ruiz (2005) and Sohnle 
(2005). See also e.g. Article XXXI of the 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules.
232 Salm an (2003).
236
involved with the basin  may have their say. It m ay also involve 
capacity-building and  training program s for the com m unity involved . 233 So far 
the role of m ediator in d ispute settlem ent in relation to w ater d ispu tes has been 
successfully adopted only once, namely by the World Bank in the dispute 
between India an d  Pakistan in respect of the Indus River B asin . 234
Riparian S ta tes m ay also resort to other non-adjudicative m eans to settle 
d isputes, su ch  as  fact-finding235 and conciliation . 236
Recourse to the  different non-adjudicative and adjudicative m eans of dispute 
settlem ent is suggested in Article 33(3) of the  1997 UN W atercourses 
Convention. After m uch  debate within the UNGA Sixth Committee, the 
Convention leaves th is  to the discretion of S tates, with the exception of 
fact-finding . 237
233 For a distinction between these two methods, see Salm an (2003).
234 See infra s .5.3.2.
235 E.g. through the establishm ent of a commission.
236 See e.g. Ochoa-Ruiz (2005), 367-72.
237 See Article 33(3) to (9).
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F o r m s  a n d  L e v e l s  o f  
C o - o p e r a t i o n 1
E very th in g  is  v a g u e  to  a  d e g r e e  y o u  d o  not rea lize  
till y o u  h a v e  tr ie d  to  m a k e  it p r e c is e  ...
B e rtra n d  R ussell, 
The P h ilo so p h y  o f  L ogica l A to m ism , 1918
There are different form s or types and levels of co-operation concerning 
tran sb o u n d ary  w ater resources: from the m inim um  form of direct exchange of 
fundam ental d a ta  an d  inform ation to the estab lishm ent of jo in t development 
com m issions or o ther institu tional m echanism s for the integrated m anagem ent 
of the river basin . Consequently, the scope of the  obligations to undertake 
specific co-operative actions in international law varies significantly.
It is far easier to argue th a t some sort of action is a  com ponent p art of 
co-operation, th a n  to determ ine which specific form s of action are required for 
th is  obligation to be complied with. Nevertheless, w hen analyzing the variety of 
treaties concluded between States concerning in ternational w ater resources, as 
well as w hen studying different cases, one may identify sim ilar characteristics 
and  trends.
The different form s and  levels of co-operation concerning tran sb o u n d ary  w ater 
resources m u s t be identified in order to s tru c tu re  the concept. This Chapter 
will set ou t an  analysis of the variety and im portance of jo in t in stitu tional 
m echanism s or com m issions as well as the role played by in ternational 
organizations. Finally, the issue of im plem entation is d iscussed .
1 This chap te r is based on a chapter to be published in D ellapenna, J . W., and  Gupta, J. (eds.), 
The Evolution o f  the L aw  an d  Politics o f  Water (forthcoming)
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5.1  The Criteria
The purpose  of th is exercise is to u n d erstan d  the various m odalities of 
co-operation and  to structu re  a concept which is usually  viewed as an  
all-em bracing and  abstract term. The following criteria are suggested: context, 
geographic location, entities involved, time factor, and  n a tu re  of activities.
5 .1 .1  T he C o n tex t Criterion
A fundam ental distinction tha t may be draw n a t the  ou tse t is th a t between 
co-operation for secu rity  and prevention o f  con flicts  and  co-operation for the 
resolution  o f  ex istin g  disputes. The latter in m ost cases takes the form of 
diplom atic negotiations between States, bu t m ay occasionally involve th ird  
parties u s in g  m ethods of dispute resolution, such  as good offices, m ediation, 
fact-finding, conciliation, international adjudication or arb itra tion .2
As to th e  form er, one m ay distinguish between preventive co-operation, th a t 
is, jo in t action  in  order to prevent conflict or transboundary  harm  from 
occurring, an d  ex  p o s t  fa c to  co-operation, th a t is, jo in t operation after 
u n ila te ra l actions or specific accidents, with the purpose of m itigating or 
elim inating existing damage.
W ithin preventive co-operation, one may draw a  fu rther distinction between 
co-operative action in normal circum stances, where th is  is carried ou t on a 
regular basis, such  as  the regular exchange of hydrological data , and  in 
s itua tions w hich change the s ta tu s  quo , such  as  notification of planned 
m easures, like the  construction and operation of a  dam  an d  a  hydroelectric 
power p lan t, or early notification in emergencies, like an  accident potentially 
causing  tran sb o u n d ary  damage.
2 See su pra  s .4.5.2.
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5 .1 .2  The G eographical C riterion
Spatial delim itation obviously plays a  key role in term s of scope of application. 
Co-operation m ay be pursued  and achieved a t global, regional, river basin, 
national and local level.
The geographical scope of co-operation is usually  associated  with in ternational 
borders: co-operation a t State and regional or global level governed by 
in terna tional law. The territorial reach or physical ju risd iction  of co-operation 
between or am ong S tates is delimited by a  drainage or river basin, as the m ost 
widely accep ted  basic hydrological u n it for p lanning  and  m anagem ent 
purposes.3 B u t in some cases the basin m ay be considered w ithout a  particular 
portion for different reasons. For instance, if a region is physically insignificant 
and  h a s  lim ited contribution to the rest of the basin , or is located in a  State not 
willing to partic ipa te  in the basin ’s development. This m ay be illustrated by the 
co-operation estab lished  between the four lower riparians of the Mekong River 
basin  th ro u g h  th e  conclusion of the 1995 Agreement on the Co-operation for 
the S usta inab le  Development of the Mekong River Basin, as China and 
M yanm ar, th e  up stream  States, have decided no t to become Parties to the 
Agreem ent.4
O ther sp a tia l factors include boundary waters, for example in early navigation 
treaties; zones or sub-basins of concentration of projects, such  as the 
construction  and  operation of a m ultipurpose dam  and  storage project on a 
specific a rea  of the basin; or regional development of a  specific area, for 
example of a  neglected or critical geographical region, which may no t coincide 
with the lim itations of one international river basin , b u t m ay include in the 
region portions of m ore th an  one basin .5
Some concrete obligations of co-operation may be applied a t the local level, 
regulated by dom estic law, and others, such as those relating to em ergencies, 
m ay be applied over long distances extending to several S tates. The 1999 
Protocol on W ater and  Health,6 for example, which provides an  u n u su a l
3 See su pra  s. 1.1.
4 Although they have observer s ta tu s a t the Mekong River Commission.
3 UN (1975), 48-54.
6 See supra  s .3.2.4.2.
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s tru c tu re  and  approach to co-operation, considers in Articles 11 to 14 different 
spheres of in ternational co-operation. First, it se ts  out a  general obligation to 
co-operate in in ternational actions in support of the  objectives of the Protocol 
and  in the  im plem entation of national and local p lans (Article 11). But the 
obligation is m ade more precise in the following Article 12, which provides for 
co-operation concerning transboundary  w aters, listing different forms of 
prom oting jo in t and  co-ordinated international action, and  Article 14, which 
provides for in ternational support for the action required at the national and  
local levels.
Co-operation a t the  local level is mainly carried o u t between the local 
adm in istra tion  or governm ent and its com m unities. This ra ises the question of 
public partic ip a tio n .7 International and domestic law play a  fundam ental role 
in prom oting com m unities’ participation in decisions concerning the whole 
basin. In te rn a tio n a l law, through treaties,8 and  resu lting  or parallel domestic 
legislation m ay foster public participation and local governm ent participation in 
the decision-m aking a t different levels. A good exam ple is th a t of projects of 
dam  construc tion . In these cases, affected peoples’ groups m ay p u t forward 
their views an d  concerns and be actively involved in the decision-m aking 
process. This practice is not yet widespread and  m ay sometim es be quite 
complex, frequently  featuring opposing political views, as m ay be illustrated by 
the N arm ada project case in India.9
5 .1 .3  The P articipan t Criterion
Generally speaking, there are three main levels of co-operation.
At the principal level lies inter-state co-operation. This is the traditional 
paradigm  of co-operation under international law over in ternational w ater 
resources. Co-operative action is developed through diplom atic relations and  is 
given effect in treaties and  other forms of s ta te  practice a t bilateral or
7 The principle of public participation and access to inform ation and  justice  h as  been affirmed, 
e.g. by the ILA in the 2002 New Delhi Declaration of Principles of In ternational Law Relating to 
Sustainable Development, which considers its application in strum en tal in pu rsu ing  the objective 
of sustainab le developm ent in an  effective way.
8 E.g. the 1998 A arhus Convention.
9 On the controversy the project has generated internally and  abroad, see, e.g. McCully (2001), 
299-306, Vyas (2001), or Biswas and  Tortajada (2001).
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m ultilateral level. It m ay be based on com m unications between national 
institu tions, or it may be given an independent institu tional form, such  as a 
river basin  com m ission or river authority. It m ay also be developed through 
in terna tional inter-governm ental conferences w here in ternational organizations 
m ay partic ipate .
A fu rther level of co-operation is developed by international 
in ter-governm ental organizations. This level is to some extent external to the 
State, and  h a s  increased in im portance in recen t decades. As the num ber of 
in terna tional organizations increases, so does the  num ber of organizations 
having in te rn a tio n a l w ater-related problems on their agenda. International 
organizations or agencies, such as UNEP, UNDP, UNESCO, or the Organization 
for Security an d  Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), tend  to extend their 
com petences an d  functions in this field. As knowledge and  aw areness of the 
cu rren t global w ater resources situation increases, in ternational organizations 
have been devoting them selves to the topic with diverse objectives. These range 
from assessm en t of resources and capacity-building to security  issues and  the 
financing of w ater pro jects.10
Co-operation also develops a t the intra-state level, th rough  national and  
tra n sn a tio n a l entities. This includes public participation in national 
decision-m aking, in particular on specific environm ental m atters  and  policies.
Civil so c ie ty , particularly  local com m unities and  w ater u s e rs ’ associations 
m ay also con tribu te  to solving their own w ater problem s, such  as the lack of 
w ater supply  or sanitation, through com m unity groups. These express the 
views of the com m unity or of the associations and  bring them  to the  attention 
of local governm ents, and  take initiatives, usually  supported  by NGOs.
Non-governm ental organizations have also been focusing on w ater resou rces’ 
problem s an d  their num ber has rapidly increased in the  p a s t two decades. This 
streng thens civil society and regional co-operation, since they provide a m eans 
for organized citizen participation in decision-m aking processes which concern 
them , as well as prom ote pluralism  by conducting the  in terests  of different 
cu ltu ra l and  ethn ic  identities. Their num ber is indicative of the involvement of
10 For the role played by international organizations in w ater-related m atters, see infra s .5.3.
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civil society and  they are now an im portan t p a rt of the foundations of 
dem ocratic societies. W hether national or in ternational, their role h as  directed 
the a tten tion  of governm ents on w ater problem s and  h as  provided guidance, 
capacity-building, and  help in solving concrete problem s, be they of a legal, 
strategic, or technical nature. A good example is the work of WaterAid, an  
in terna tional NGO established in 1981 as a  registered charity in the UK. 
WaterAid dedicates exclusively to the provision of dom estic water, san itation  
and  hygiene education to the world’s poorest people.11 It works with local 
partner organizations to help local com m unities build and  m aintain w ater and  
san ita tion  projects.
National and m ultinational corporations have also been dedicating 
them selves to w ater issues, mainly by providing financial support to NGOs or 
to specific local w ater projects.
Last, b u t certain ly  no t least, the work of scholarly association s h as been 
crucial to the  developm ent of the law and policies on in ternational w ater 
resources. P articu lar reference should be m ade to the IDI and the ILA, 
com posed of in ternational law experts, which brought together different 
perspectives from  varying national legal system s. In the ILA’s own words:
Indeed, in today’s world this principle [of co-operation] does no longer exclusively relate 
to States, but also applies to international institutions, civil society and the business 
community. . .12
5 .1 .4  The T em poral Criterion
Co-operative action m ay be required for a  lim ited  period o f  tim e, for example, 
for a  specific project governed by a detailed agreem ent, such as flood 
prevention w orks, or for the provision of relevant inform ation in emergencies; 
or for the  estab lishm en t of a long-term relationship, usually  regulated by 
agreem ent and  often involving the establishm ent of a  jo in t body.
11 Currently, WaterAid h as  programmes in 17 countries in Africa and  Asia. See generally their 
website a t h ttp: / / www.wateraid.org
12 The 2002 ILA Report on the Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development, 7.
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Although treaty-based  co-operation continues to exist for sporadic or specific 
p u rp o ses ,13 the clear trend, as treaties tend  to become m ore com prehensive in 
scope,14 is to provide for a stable and  long-term  relationship for the 
m anagem ent of the  geographical area concerned, w hether th is consists of one 
or m ore river b asin s  or parts  thereof.15
5 .1 .5  T he A ctiv ity  Criterion
The general obligation to co-operate may be m anifested in m any different ways 
as the b asis  of s ta te  action, and m ay easily be identified in some concrete 
applications. B u t it may also be implied in o ther obligations. The different 
applications of co-operation, as duties of action, are, generally speaking, 
contained in  in terna tional treaties both expressly and  implicitly, and  in both 
m andatory  an d  soft law terms. The term s u sed  include the obligation to 
‘prom ote’ or ‘seek  to prom ote’ or ‘promote and  facilitate’ or ‘stim ulate and 
advance’ th e  conduct of an activity; or to ‘e s tab lish ’ or ‘prom ote the 
e s tab lish m en t’ or ‘streng then’ an institu tion or regime; or to ‘take effective or 
necessary  m e a su re s ’ to implement a specific course of action.
Co-operation m ay be of a technical, educational, economic, financial, 
adm inistrative, legal or political nature. It also covers a  wide spectrum  of 
activities, su ch  as planning, development, regulation, m anagem ent, 
environm ental protection, use and conservation an d  forecasting.
Procedural co-operation may take a num ber of form s depending on the activity 
perform ed. The m ost common modalities reflecting increasing levels of 
co-operation are as  follows.16
C ollection o f  Data. Exchange o f Data and Inform ation .17 
N otification o f  Planned M easures.18
13 E.g. the 1996 Ganges Waters Treaty, which concerns the sharing  of waters a t Farakka Dam.
14 See supra  s .3.2.5.
15 E.g. the 1998 Luso-Spanish Agreement, which concerns all shared  river basins.
16 Partially based  on Savenije and van der Zaag (2000), 34-5.
17 For an  exam ination of this obligation and examples, see su pra  s .4.2.
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R equests and N otification o f Impact A ssessm en ts .19 
N otification  o f Em ergencies and Warning S ystem s.20 
C onsultations .21 
N egotiation s.22
Transfer o f  Technology/K now -how /C apacity-building/Legal M atters. These 
activities include the exchange of best available technology,23 the exchange of 
scientific an d  technical information and of experience and  research  results, and 
the provision of technical assistance in different w ater-related  m atters .24 They 
naturally  involve form s of hum an resources developm ent, such  as jo int 
education an d  tra in ing  schem es,25 and  the organization of conferences, 
symposia, sem inars , courses, discussions a t the academ ic level. 
C apacity-building is one of the elements of successful treaty  im plem entation, 
as it prom otes th e  balance of capabilities to m anage w ater resources am ong 
riparians. T hus, regional differences may become a  driving force for 
co-operation, n o t only between government departm en ts b u t also between 
educational in s titu tio n s.
Co-operation m ay also be offered for the elaboration of national legislation, 
including s tan d a rd s , procedures and institu tional s tru c tu res, and  as 
assistance  to th e  im plem entation of international s tan d ard s .
Jo in t Projects o f  R esearch and Developm ent. A fu rther step from the 
previous form of co-operation, jo in t projects of research  and  development26 are 
prepared  and  carried  ou t when an  underlying relationship  h as  already been
18 See su pra  s.4.3.
19 See su pra  s.4.3.2.
20 See su pra  s.4.3.3.
21 See su pra  s .4.4.
22 See su pra  s.4.5.
23 E.g. Article 13(4) of the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention and Article XIX of the 2003 
Revised African Convention.
24 These m ay include desertification control, w eather modification and desalination.
25 E.g. Article XX of the 2003 Revised African Convention.
26 E.g. Articles 5 and  12 of the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention.
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developed in the  educational or technical areas. These m ay also encom pass the 
preparation  of surveys, investigations,27 jo in t scientific studies and  
a ssessm en ts28 on a  variety of topics related to river basin  m anagem ent. Such 
activities m ay be better developed in a  netw ork of institu tions com prising 
universities, NGOs, international organizations and  relevant governm ent 
departm ents.
Jo in t Projects o f M onitoring and Com pliance. These jo in t projects serve to 
im plem ent trea ties  and  other regulations,29 an d  usually  include jo int 
program m es for m onitoring the conditions of the  tran sb o u n d ary  w aters and  
assessm en t of any transboundary  im pact.30 They are norm ally carried out 
th rough  jo in t com m issions.
Financial Support. The costs of several activities are to be borne jointly and on 
an equitable b as is  by basin  States co-operating31 or by a  requesting State if the 
activity is perform ed a t its request, un less otherw ise agreed.32 B ut for major 
projects, su ch  as  the construction and operation of large dam s, financial 
support from th ird  S tates, whether riparian or not, and  from development 
banks and  agencies is often necessary, usually  in th e  form of syndicated loans. 
Co-operation is here viewed as a T>asic elem ent in an  effort to overcome m ajor 
constra in ts  su ch  as  the lack of capital and tra ined  m anpow er as well as the 
exigencies of n a tu ra l resource development’.33
Jo in t V entures. These projects -  developed by two or m ore S tates -  include the 
construction  an d  operation of dam s and hydroelectric power p lan ts .34 They 
include the  p repara tion  of feasibility reports, and  im pact assessm en t studies.
27 E.g. Article 3 of the 1972 ILA Articles on Flood Control.
28 Principle 8 of the 1978 UNEP Principles on Shared Natural R esources
29 E.g. Article XVI(2)(b) of the 1968 African Convention and  Article XIV(2)(b) of its 2003 revised 
version, and  Article 66 of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules on com pliance review.
30 E.g. Article 11 of the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention.
31 E.g. Article 25(2) of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention regarding regulation works.
32 E.g. Article 6 of the 1972 ILA Articles on Flood Control, an d  Article 9(2) of the 1997 UN 
W atercourses Convention.
33 Recom m endation 85 of the 1977 Mar del Plata Action Plan. See also Principle 7 of the 1992 
Rio Declaration.
34 E.g. the Lesotho Highlands project; the Kariba dam , in the Kariba Gorge of the Zambezi 
River on the Zambia-Zimbabwe border; or the Itaipu dam , in the stretch  of the frontier between 
Brazil and  Paraguay in the Parana River.
2 4 6
Jo in t D evelopm ent Plans. The preparation and  execution of jo int river basin  
developm ent p lans, including compatible strategies for w ater conservation and 
for the protection of the environment, have the  advantage of being more 
effective th a n  those prepared by States individually. They m ay also require the 
revision of dom estic policies and  legislation for the purposes of 
harm onization .35 Operational rules for large dam s m ay be jointly prepared 
w hen th ese  m ay im pact on more than  one riparian  State. Jo in t action plans 
m ay also  be prepared  for jo in t water use, m anagem ent, w ater pricing, or 
in terbasin  w ater transfer. In an  optimal u tilisation perspective, such  form of 
co-operation is im plem ented within the river basin  as  a  whole and  using an 
in tegrated  m anagem ent approach.36
Institu tion a l M echanism s and Joint C om m issions. The different 
institu tional m echan ism s adopted, or com m issions created, through  which the 
other m odalities of co-operation are im plemented, reflect the existing level of 
co-operation betw een S tates. Through these regular com m unication between 
S tates m ay be m ain ta ined , as well as the m onitoring and  supervision of any 
other co-operative action.
5 .2  T he  V a r ie ty  o f  In te r n a t io n a l  I n s t i tu t io n a l
A rrangem ents
Most of the form s of co-operation referred to above are applied by some 
institu tional m echan ism  or through a  specific com m ission.37 The relations 
between b asin  S ta tes  m ay be based  on institu tional m echanism s of varied type, 
estab lished  th ro u g h  the ir respective com petent m inistries, national w ater 
resources adm in istra tion  organs or councils, or o ther dom estic com petent 
institu tions designated  as  having ultim ate responsibility over w ater resources.38 
The m ain ta in ing  of form al com m unications betw een governm ents does require 
th a t a t the  dom estic level a  struc tu re  is prepared to deal w ith these issues.
35 See Article 62 of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules.
36 See, e.g. Article 6 of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules.
37 See generally C aponera (1992) on national and in ternational institu tions on Chapters 9 and 
12, respectively. For a review of 19 international river com m issions, see Burchi and Spreij (2003).
38 Salm an and  Bradlow (2006), 152.
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These relations m ay also be developed th rough  jo in t institu tions, som etim es 
nam ed com m issions or authorities, created by treaty , with different powers and 
functions, w hether of a  technical, economic and  financial, legal and  
adm inistrative n a tu re .
Jo in t com m issions m ay have an ad hoc character or be established on a 
p erm an en t b a s is ,39 and  may consist of one or m ore bodies. Most com m issions 
are com posed of technical experts appointed in equal num ber by each State. 
But they  m ay also include legal advisers or even governm ent m inisters. For 
example, th e  M ekong River Commission (MRC), established  by the 1995 
Mekong River A greem ent, is an  intergovernm ental organization composed of the 
lower M ekong rip a rian s .40 The MRC has three perm anen t bodies:41 the Council, 
com posed of one cabinet m inister from each m em ber State; the Jo in t 
Committee, com posed of one senior government official from each State; and  
the Secretariat, h ead ed  by the Chief Executive Officer appointed by the 
Council, w ith over 125 staff. Each m em ber S tate h as  established under 
national legislation a  N ational Mekong Committee (NMC) in order to co-ordinate 
local activities w ith  those  of the MRC and to help in im plem enting them.
The powers a n d  functions of jo in t bodies may vary from case to case and 
depend on various factors, such  as the kind of co-operation envisaged, the 
desired degree of involvem ent in international m anagem ent, or the specific field 
of the ad m in istra tion . F irst of all, jo in t institu tions serve as a  channel to 
m aintain  form al com m unications and provide a  forum  for dialogue between 
States. This is fu n d am en ta l to m aintain good neighbourly relations and  to 
prevent an d  settle  d ispu tes. Thus, the exchange of all d a ta  and  information, 
notifications a n d  consu lta tions are usually  carried ou t through  existing joint 
com m issions, as  well as  any jo in t project on scientific or technical research and 
developm ent or m u tu a l assistance. Most jo in t com m issions have powers to 
exam ine, investigate and  in some cases even to resolve problem s arising from 
treaty  im plem entation . They provide a  forum  w here different views are 
expressed an d  m ay be reconciled before a  d ispute arises requiring negotiation 
a t a  h igher level or th ird -party  intervention. In addition, jo in t institu tions may 
be responsib le for the estab lishm ent of observation stations; for advisory and
39 See the 1994 ILC Report, 126, paras.4 and 5.
40 See generally, the MRC website a t h ttp ://w w w .m rcm ekong.org /
41 See Article 12 of the 1995 Mekong River Agreement.
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consultative functions, such  as the evaluation of projects and  the issuing of 
recom m endations; and  for co-ordinating or policy-m aking advice. They may be 
charged with the preparation and execution of projects, and  the establishm ent 
of harm onized standards; and they may have m onitoring functions, such  as the 
investigation of S ta tes’ compliance with the treaty.
The es tab lish m en t of jo in t commissions was recom m ended as early as 1911 by 
the IDI.42 It w as followed by a num ber of other reso lu tions by the IDI43 and the 
ILA.44 Of p a rtic u la r  relevance are the 1976 ILA Articles on International Water 
Resources A dm inistration adopted at the Madrid session, which included an 
annex w ith ‘G uidelines for the Establishm ent of an  International W ater 
Resources A dm inistration’.45 The need for institu tional arrangem ents was 
justified in th ese  term s:
Since diplomatic negotiations are often not sufficient for an effective implementation 
and for an adequate control of the various activities involved, such a co-operation may 
reasonably take place only through the institutionalisation of some form of 
administrative machinery.46
In addition, several international organizations47 and  conferences48 also 
concluded th a t  in ternational river and lake organizations are the ‘appropriate 
bodies for in itia ting  studies and recommending m easures, contingency plans 
and  w arn ing  system s, as well as for conducting the necessary  ongoing review of 
conditions an d  the  adequacy of m easures u n d ertak en .’49
42 Principle II.7 of the 1911 IDI Madrid Resolution.
43 E.g. the 1961 IDI Salzburg Resolution, Article 9; and the 1979 IDI Athens Resolution on 
Pollution, Article VII(g).
44 E.g. the 1982 ILA M ontreal Rules on Water Pollution, Article 7. These provisions have the 
character of recom m endations.
45 This Resolution also includes a List of Agreements setting  u p  a Jo in t Machinery for 
International Drainage Basin W ater Resources M anagement prepared by Rapporteur Dr. Dante 
Caponera. See also Articles 64 and 65 of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules.
46 The 1976 ILA M adrid Articles on Administration, 249.
47 E.g. the Council of Europe, Recommendation 436 (1965), or the UNECE Committee on Water 
Problems, 1971, UN D oc.E /E C E /W ater/9 , Annex II; Principle 2 of the 1978 UNEP Principles on 
Shared N atural Resources. See UN (1975), and the survey included in the 1998 UNECE Berlin 
Recom m endations on T ransboundary  W ater Management.
48 Such as  the 1972 Stockholm Action Plan for the H um an Environm ent, Recommendation 51; 
the 1977 Mar del P lata Action Plan, Recommendation 84, and Resolutions VII and VIII; and the 
1981 UN Interregional Meeting of International River Organizations.
49 Conclusion 5, UN (1983), para.49.
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There is extensive treaty  practice concerning institu tional m echanism s or jo in t 
com m issions.50 Indeed, the earliest form of in ternational organization was the 
Com m ission for Navigation in the Rhine estab lished  in  1815 with power to 
regulate navigation and  to settle d isputes.51
Relevant to the  establishm ent of recent joint in stitu tions is the 1992 Helsinki 
W atercourses Convention. Article 9(2) provides a  clear obligation for co-riparian 
S tates to estab lish  jo in t bodies by agreement, where all consultations are to be 
conducted  (Article 10). A jo in t body’ is defined as any bilateral or m ultilateral 
com m ission or o ther appropriate institutional arrangem ent for co-operation 
betw een riparian  parties. Article 9(2) com prises a  non-exhaustive list of 
functions of jo in t bodies. This reads as follows:
(a) To collect, compile and evaluate data in order to identify pollution sources likely to 
cause transboundary impact;
(b) To elaborate joint monitoring programmes concerning water quality and quantity;
(c) To draw up inventories and exchange information on the pollution sources 
mentioned in paragraph 2(a) of this article;
(d) To elaborate em ission limits for waste water and evaluate the effectiveness of 
control programmes;
(e) To elaborate joint water quality objectives and criteria having regard to the 
provisions of Article 3, paragraph 3 of this Convention, and to propose relevant 
measures for maintaining and, where necessary, improving the existing water 
quality;
(f) To develop concerted action programmes for the reduction of pollution loads from 
both point sources (e.g. municipal and industrial sources) and diffuse sources 
(particularly from agriculture);
(g) To establish warning and alarm procedures;
(h) To serve as a forum for the exchange of information on existing and planned uses of 
water and related installations that are likely to cause transboundaiy impact;
(i) To promote co-operation and exchange of information on the best available 
technology in accordance with the provisions of Article 13 of this Convention, as 
well as to encourage co-operation in scientific research programmes;
(j) To participate in the implementation of environmental impact assessm ent relating 
to transboundary water, in accordance with appropriate international regulations.
50 For a  list of jo in t bodies in Europe and North America, see the UNECE’s website a t 
h ttp ://w w w .u n ece .o rg /en v /w ate r/p a rtn ersh ip /p art6 3 .h tm  (last visited on 15.1.2007).
51 1815 Final Act of the Congress of Vienna. For some exam ples of jo in t m echanism s, see the 
1994 ILC Report, 126, p a ras .389-90 and the references therein. See also the list of agreem ents in 
the 1976 ILA M adrid Articles on Administration.
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The 1997 UN W atercourses Convention on the o ther h an d  does not provide for 
com pulsory institu tional co-operation. Article 8(2), on the general obligation to 
co-operate, and  Article 24(1), specifically on m anagem ent, provide respectively 
th a t W atercourse S tates may consider the estab lishm ent of jo in t m echanism s 
or com m issions’ and  ‘may include the estab lishm ent of a  jo int m anagem ent 
m echan ism ’.52 These articles avoid legally binding language. The
non-com pulsory character of the provisions is explained by the fact th a t some 
States were no t willing to be under an  obligation de contrahendo, th a t is, under 
the obligation to negotiate and  reach a definite agreem ent on the m atter.53
Although m entioning in Article 8(2) th a t S tates should  u se  the ‘experience 
gained th rough  co-operation in existing jo in t m echanism s and  com m issions in 
various reg ions’, the  Convention falls short of providing a  list, even
non-exhaustive, of possible functions for the institu tional m echanism s to be 
estab lished .54
In a com parative analysis of these two framework conventions, Tanzi asserts  
th a t since the  1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention plays a  com plem entary 
role to the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention in m any different areas, here it 
could provide ‘exem plary term s of reference for a  constructive in terpretation of 
Articles 8(2) and  2 4 ’,55 notably through its list of jo in t bodies’ functions. In 
addition, Tanzi ju stifies the lack of a notification procedure in the 1992 
Helsinki W atercourses Convention by the fact th a t th is  Convention provides a
stronger obligation to en ter into agreem ents to estab lish  jo int institu tional
m echanism s. The functions of these m echanism s m ay include ‘the exchange of 
inform ation on existing and  planned uses of w ater and  related installations 
th a t are likely to cause transboundary  im pact’ and  the  participation ‘in the 
im plem entation of environm ental im pact assessm en t relating to transboundary  
w ater’.55 It m ay be argued, however, th a t the potential problem s the notification 
procedure tries to prevent m ay still exist. For instance, the p lanning State may 
commence the im plem entation of its proposed activities before the potentially
52 Italics supplied.
53 See Tanzi and Arcari (2001), 186.
54 Tanzi and  Arcari (2001), 188; Sohnle (2002), 333-4.
55 Tanzi (2000), 33.
56 Article 9(h) and  (j).
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affected S tate h ad  been informed of the proposed m easu res or had  time to 
consider all the potential effects on its territory. Conversely, an  unreasonable 
delay m ay occur in the im plem entation of the p lanned  m easures due to the 
failure of the potentially affected State to react to the inform ation on new u ses 
or due to a  deadlock during negotiations where the parties fail to agree on the 
proposed project. This raises the question of how helpful jo in t arrangem ents 
really are in the  event th a t no rules are estab lished  relating to procedural 
duties.
The ICJ h a s  p ronounced in favour of joint m anagem ent institu tions in the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case.57 Although in the context of a specific treaty 
regime, the  C ourt ordered the parties to resum e negotiations and to 
re-establish  the  jo in t regime which ‘also reflect in an  optim al way the concept of 
common u tilisa tion  of shared  water resources for the achievem ent of the 
several objectives m entioned in the Treaty, in concordance with Article 5(2)’58 of 
the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention. It may be recalled th a t the Court in its 
decision relied on the  Convention as ‘evidence’ of the development of 
in terna tional law .59
Most au th o rs  agree th a t there is no legal requirem ent to establish  jo in t 
in stitu tional m echanism s or bodies. Although s ta te  practice clearly shows 
actual conclusion of agreem ents in th is m atter, and  although there may 
arguably be some evidence of opinio juris,60 it canno t be asserted  with 
confidence th a t  there  is a  duty  to co-operate th rough  jo in t institu tions which 
reflects custom ary  law.61 This is m irrored in the con trasting  texts of the 1992 
Helsinki W atercourses Convention, which provides for the conclusion of 
additional agreem ents and  a  specific obligation for co-riparian S tates to 
establish  jo in t bodies by agreem ent and the 1997 UN W atercourses 
Convention, w hich does not require the estab lishm ent of jo in t institu tions. In
57 Benvenisti (2002), 184.
58 (Hungary/Slovakia), ICJ Reports (1997), 7, para. 147.
59 For an  analysis of th is case, see supra  s .3.2.6.5.
60 Caflisch (1989), 204, considers th a t the negotiation of agreem ents to establish  joint 
institutional arrangem ents may be deemed by States to be obligatory on the basis of the principle 
of the com m unity of interests.
61 Benvenisti (1996), 413; See also Perrez (2000), 317; the 1994 ILC Report, 125, para .2; Birnie 
and Boyle (2003), 305; and the com m entary to Article 64 of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules.
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fact, co-operation in jo in t m anagem ent in stitu tions w as described by ILC’s 
Special R apporteur Evensen as a  ‘principle of progressive in ternational law ’.62
In some in stances the establishm ent of some sort of institu tional m echanism  or 
jo in t body m ight not be considered sufficient by the riparians to deal with 
tran sb o u n d ary  w ater resources. Hence, S tates m ight require the supervisory 
assistance  of in ternational organizations for th is  purpose .63 This may be 
illustrated  by the  1987 Agreement on the Action Plan for the Environm entally 
Sound M anagem ent of the Common Zambezi River System  (ZACPLAN), which 
provides for the  financial support of a  num ber of in terna tional organizations, 
b u t also req u ests  their assistance in im plem enting the  Plan.64
5 .3  T he R ole  o f  In te rn a t io n a l  O r g a n isa t io n s
In ternational organizations have been involved with in ternational w ater 
resources m a tte rs  in m any different ways. These organizations, w hether 
regional or global, intergovernm ental or non-governm ental, have contributed to 
preventing conflict. Their general aim is to prom ote co-operation in order to 
optimize the resources and  share the benefits between S tates and a t the sam e 
tim e to prevent, m itigate or resolve conflicts. B ut their particu lar role m ay vary 
between th a t of being a  source of expertise, or an  adm inistrator, to th a t of a 
facilitator or m ediator. Among their functions, one of the m ost im portan t is ‘to 
provide its  m em bers w ith a  forum  for consultation and  negotiations in actual or 
potential d ispu te  s itu a tio n s .565
5 .3 .1  R eco g n itio n  o f  it s  Im portance
The role of in terna tional organizations in prom oting co-operation between 
S tates concerning w ater resources is recognized in several in ternational stud ies
62 Yrbk ILC [1984], Vol. II, P t.l, 112, para.59.
63 See 1992 Agenda 21, Chs.18 and 38.
64 The request is addressed in Article 4(2) to UNEP, bu t the co-operation of a num ber of 
organizations of the UN System is acknowledged in the Preamble, p a ra .4, in Annex I, p a ras .4 and 
6, and in Annex II, I, para.7  and II, para.21.
63 Merrils (1998), 266.
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and in stru m en ts . Exam ples include recom m endation 85 of the 1977 Mar del 
Plata Action Plan, or Article 10(2) on the general principle of co-operation 
included in the 1984 ILC Special Rapporteur E vensen’s Second Report.66 
N evertheless, no express reference to in ternational organizations was included 
in the 1994 ILC Draft Convention. Hence, in co n trast to the 1982 UNCLOS,67 
the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention does no t require or even refer to the 
possible partic ipation  of international organizations w hen it provides th a t 
S tates shou ld  co-operate in the conclusion of fu rther bilateral and  m ultilateral 
agreem ents (Article 3(5)).68 More recently, however, the  ILC has inserted an 
explicit reference to the potential assistance of in ternational organizations in 
Article 4 of the  2001 ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm 
from H azardous Activities, which lays down an obligation to co-operate. This 
Article, however, does not create any obligation for an international 
organization to respond  to requests  for assistance even from Member S tates 
un less th is  is requ ired  by its constitutional docum ent.
The im portance of the  role of in ternational organizations in promoting 
co-operation h a s  also been asserted  in in ternational decisions. For instance, in 
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, the ICJ explicitly recognized the 
im portance th a t  a  th ird  party  can play in the peaceful settlem ent of 
in terna tional d ispu tes. In respect of the provision of assistance by the 
Com m ission of th e  E uropean  Com m unities in the  dispute, the Court declared 
th a t ‘bo th  P arties can  profit from the assistance and  expertise of a th ird  party. 
The read iness  of th e  Parties to accept such assistance would be evidence of the 
good faith w ith w hich they  conduct bilateral negotiations in order to give effect 
to the Ju d g m en t of the  C ourt.’69
Certain m ateria l c ircum stances call for the intervention of international 
organizations to foster co-operation. One case relates to the exceptional 
c ircum stances w here no direct contact between the  S tates exists,70 which may
66 At 113. O ther exam ples are the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Legal and Institutional 
Aspects of In ternational W ater Resources Development, UN (1975), 119-143; and C h .18, Agenda 
21, 1992, paras. 1 8 .1 2 /2 7 /4 0 /5 0 /5 9 /7 6 /8 5 .
67 See, e.g. Article 243 in relation to m arine scientific research.
68 C ontrary to the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention, the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules have made 
several references to the role of international organizations in transboundary  rivers’ 
m anagem ent. See, e.g. Article 58(1) on consultations.
69 Para. 143. See also para. 113.
70 See also Principle 6(2) of 1978 UNEP Principles on Shared Natural Resources.
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be the resu lt of arm ed conflict, non-recognition, or the absence of diplomatic 
relations. The ILC considered th a t th is issue would be best dealt with by a 
clause specifically providing for indirect procedures. In consequence, with the 
contribution  of the World Bank,71 Article 30 of the 1997 UN W atercourses 
Convention w as drafted. In cases such as those, S tates have the obligation to 
fulfil the  obligation to co-operate through any indirect procedure, for example, 
th rough th ird  S tates, usually  those protecting their in terests  under the 
procedures se t ou t in Articles 45 and 46 of the  1961 Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, peace commissions, or the good offices of an  
in ternational organization.72
A nother form of co-operative action involving in ternational organizations 
includes enlisting  their political and financial support for specific projects. But 
it is th rough  standard-setting  and policy-m aking th a t in ternational 
organizations have become best known, th u s  contributing to the development 
of w ater law. An obvious example is the work produced by UNEP, which 
includes the often cited 1978 UNEP Principles on Shared N atural Resources. In 
addition, in te rna tional organizations also act with varying degrees of success as 
m ediators in  d ispu te  settlem ent.
5 .3 .2  P arad igm atic C ases o f  S u ccess and Failure
The paradigm atic  cases of success and failure of in ternational organizations in 
dealing w ith in terna tional w ater issues distinct from their m ain functions have 
been persisten tly  reported  by the media and have been the subject of different 
analyses.
One of the  m ost well-known cases led to the 1960 Indus W aters Treaty, which 
is generally regarded as a  success story of conflict resolution.73 The World 
Bank, which finances every year a num ber of projects on in ternational 
w atercourses, assum ed  the role of international m ediator in the d ispute 
between India and  Pakistan  regarding the Indus River basin. After a  long
71 This is based on the practice of the World Bank regarding notification of planned works to 
o ther co-riparians. See supra  s .4.3.1.6.
72 The 1994 ILC Report, 132.
73 On the 1960 Indus W ater Treaty case, see, e.g. Pitm an (1998), Salm an and Uprety (2002), 
Ch.2, and Salm an (2003).
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process of negotiations, the parties accepted a  proposal by the World Bank 
involving concessions on both sides. This led to the  conclusion of the 1960 
Indus W aters Treaty, a  complex instrum ent, the m ain purpose of which w as to 
increase the  quantity  of w ater available to the two S tates and  to apportion the 
w ater resources of the Indus equitably between them . However, after th is 
success, an d  although it generated high expectations in the in ternational 
com m unity regarding its potential role as m ediator, the  B ank h as  been directly 
involved only in a  few international water cases.
B ut there are o ther cases of successful m ediation involving other organizations. 
For instance, the role played by UNDP in the negotiation process of the 1995 
Mekong River Agreem ent,74 or the involvement of UNEP in the elaboration and  
im plem entation of the  Zambezi Action Plan included in the 1987 ZACPLAN.75
O ther cases, however, m ay be considered failures. This m ay be illustrated  by 
the history of the d ispu te  between India and  Bangladesh over the use  of the 
w ater resources of the Ganges River.76 Although the two S tates concluded in 
1996 a  Treaty, valid for 30 years, to share the w aters of the Ganges River a t the 
F arakka dam  (barrage), the previous attem pts by the World Bank to m ediate 
h ad  been unsuccessfu l. For over two decades, the d ispute over Ind ia’s 
un ilatera l w ithdraw al of w ater from the Ganges w as considered in different 
fora. F u rth e r to bilateral consultations and negotiations, which led to one 
agreem ent in 1977 and  two M emoranda of U nderstanding in 1982 and  1985, 
the m atte r w as also taken  to the UNGA. But even after the General Assembly 
adopted a  s ta tem en t in November 197677 leading to a  series of m inisterial-level 
talks, the  d ispu te  continued.
After exam ining these cases, Nakayama concludes th a t in ternational 
organizations have h ad  little success as m ediators. He identifies three critical 
conditions or prerequisites for a  successful involvement of an  in ternational 
organization: (1) the  w illingness of the riparian S tates to co-operate, (2) the 
involvement of decision-m akers a t the highest level of the basin  countries, and
74 See, e.g. Nakayam a (1997), 370-3.
75 N otwithstanding the difficulties to actually im plement it. See infra s .5.4.
76 See Nakayam a (1997), 376-9. For a different view, see Salm an and  Uprety (2002). See supra  
s. 1.4.3.
77 GAOR, 31st Session, 8 th Meeting, November 1976, 121, 26.
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(3) neu trality  as a  th ird  party  with financial assis tan ce  u sed  both as ‘stick and  
carro t’.78
5 .3 .3  E xam ples o f  Increasing L evels o f  C o-operation
As the in terna tional com m unity has become m ore aware of the problem s 
relating to fresh  w ater and  its im plications for the fu ture  of the world 
population an d  the environment, the num ber of organizations and  their 
m echanism s prom oting co-operation in the field of w ater resources h as  
significantly increased, and  their role continues to grow, both in scope and  
in tensity .79
5 .3 .3 .1  International Organizations
There are m any in ternational organizations, both  intergovernm ental and  
non-governm ental, w hich have been contributing to the  strengthening of 
co-operation. Besides UN Agencies, such as UNESCO, UNEP, UNDP, FAO, or 
the World Bank, both  regional intergovernm ental organizations, such  the EU, 
and  the  SADC, and  non-governm ental, such as Green Cross International, have 
played an  im portan t role.
This is the  case, for instance, of the Organization for Security  and  
Co-operation in  Europe (OSCE), the world’s largest regional security 
organization, w hich h as  also an active role in prom oting co-operation. The 
com prehensive approach  with which the OSCE views security  is directly related 
to its co-operative approach to solving problems, for instance, by requiring 
consensus for its  decisions.80
In 2002, OSCE partic ipating S tates selected w ater m anagem ent as a topic for 
its Economic Forum , and  since then  water has occupied a  prom inent place on 
its agenda. Several events had  their focus on the issu es related to w ater and  
security, and  OSCE policy was discussed there as  well as  the planning of
78 Nakayam a (1997), 379-81.
79 See generally Salm an (2003a) and (2004).
80 Its decisions are politically b u t not legally binding. It is the m ost im portan t organization in 
Europe with m echanism s for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis m anagem ent and 
post-conflict rehabilitation in its region.
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different w ater-related projects.81 This w as a  recognition by S tates th a t 
environm ental security, one of the various d im ensions of security 
(politico-military, economic, hum an), is closely connected with w ater quality 
and  access to w ater and  th a t environm ental activities are crucial elem ents of 
the organization’s ‘com prehensive approach to secu rity ’. The potential role of 
the OSCE w as discussed and identified in its economic and  environm ental 
dim ension in  prom oting greater co-operation on sustainab le  w ater 
m anagem ent, in identifying and addressing security  risks, and, th u s, in all 
phases of the  conflict cycle, i.e., from enhancing its early w arning and  conflict 
prevention capacity, to crisis m anagem ent and  post-conflict rehabilitation.82 
The OSCE is now directly engaged in a  num ber of projects which contribute to 
confidence-building and  co-operation th roughout the  OSCE area .83
In addition, several organizations were created recently specifically for dealing 
with w ater-related  issues. These include the World W ater Council and  
W ater Aid.84
The World Water Council (WWC) is an in ternational th in k -tan k  established  in 
1996 th rough  the initiative of w ater specialists, the academ ic com m unity and  
other in terna tional organizations in response to an  increasing concern of the 
in terna tional com m unity about w ater issues. The WWC h a s  conceptualised the 
World W ater Forum  (WWF), an  international platform  for debate, in order to 
raise aw areness abou t w ater problems not only a t the h ighest political levels 
b u t also for th e  society in general. The WWF have been jo in tly  organized by the 
WWC and  the  respective host country.85
81 E.g. the project where OSCE rehabilitates a water canal in exchange for weapons handed 
over in the G eorgian-Ossetian zone of conflict.
82 See generally http: / / w w w .osce.org/eea/
83 For example, the OSCE Centre in Almaty, the UNECE an d  the UN/ESCAP have jointly 
assisted on the estab lishm ent of a Kazakhstani-Kyrgyztani w ater com m ission for the Chu and 
Talas Rivers in accordance with the term s of their 2000 Agreement. The project, initiated with 
assistance from international organizations, enhances co-operation between K azakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan on river issues, and may serve as a model of successfu l estab lish ing  of co-operation 
in the region. It also contributes to promote the principles of the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses 
Convention in C entral Asia and  facilitates the accession to it of regional S tates. On the subject, 
see UNECE et al. (2003), the outcome of a joint project carried  ou t by UNECE, UNEP/Regional 
Office for Europe, the Ministry for Natural Resources of the R ussian  Federation, the Swedish 
Environm ental Protection Agency and the Agency for Environm ental A ssessm ent ‘Ecoterra’.
84 See supra  s .5.2.3.
85 The F irst WWF took place in M arrakech, Morocco, in 1997; the Second WWF in The Hague, 
The Netherlands, in 2000; the Third WWF in Yodo River Basin, Ja p a n , in 2003; the Fourth WWF 
in Mexico City, Mexico, in 2006; and the Fifth WWF will take place in Istanbul, Turkey, in 2009.
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After regional and  sectoral consultations, the WWC developed a World Water 
Vision86 so as  to build consensus am ong all relevant actors in the prevention of 
fu rther w ater crises. The World Water Vision, w hich w as presented  at the  2000 
Second WWF in the Hague, is the product of a  com prehensive analysis of the 
world's w ater resources based on contributions from experts involved in 
regional, national, and  sector consultations, and  th u s  provides an authoritative 
diagnosis of w ater resources and m akes recom m endations based  on a vision of 
a better fu ture .
As to UN agencies, the work of UNESCO is of particu la r relevance. Since 1975, 
the International Hydrological Programme (IHP)87 is UNESCO /Division of 
W ater Sciences’ in ternational scientific co-operative program m e in w ater 
research, w ater resources m anagem ent, education and  capacity-building. Its 
principal aim  is to establish  the scientific and  technological bases for the 
rational m anagem ent of w ater resources in relation to w ater quan tity  and  
quality. Among its  m ore specific objectives is the  developm ent of techniques, 
m ethodologies and  approaches for hydrological stud ies, the assessm en t of the 
susta inab le  developm ent of w ater resources, and  the prom otion of research, 
tra in ing  and  education in the water sciences, especially in tegrating developing 
States. It also serves as  a platform for increasing aw areness of global w ater 
issues and  ac ts  as a  catalyst to encourage co-operation and  dialogue in w ater 
science and  m anagem ent, both locally and globally.
UNESCO partic ipa tes in, and co-ordinates, different p artn ersh ip s, alliances 
and  other co-operative m echanism s so as to prom ote its  activities at 
in ternational, regional and  national levels. F u rth er to the  IHP, UNESCO’s 
World Water A ssessm en t Programme (WWAP),88 serves a s  co-ordinator of 
other UN initiatives related to fresh water, i.e., the  recently  created  UN-Water.89 
One of its  goals is to provide a  continuing global a sse ssm en t of the  sta te  and 
trends of the  w orld’s freshw ater resources and  th e ir u se . For th is purpose, it 
published the first UN World Water Development Report: Water for People -
For inform ation on the WWF, see generally the World W ater Council website a t 
http: / /www. w orldwatercouncil.org/
86 Cosgrove and Rijsberman (2000).
87 See their website a t  www.unesco.org/ w ater/ ihp /
88 See generally the WWAP’s website a t http: / / www.unesco .o rg /w ater/w w ap /index .h tm l
89 See infra s .5.3.4.
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Water for Life (WWDR) in 2003, and the second Water, a Shared Responsibility 
(WWDR2) in M arch 2006.
W ithin the WWAP, the programme From Potential C onflict to  Co-operation 
P otential (PC>CP) on the prevention and resolution of w ater-related conflicts is 
of particu la r im portance.90 This programme produced a  report presented a t the 
2003 Third WWF in Kyoto, the Water Security and Peace Report: a Synthesis of 
Studies Prepared Under the PCCP-Water for Peace Process,91 the m ain resu lt of 
the jo in t partic ipation  of different institutions besides UNESCO, such  as Green 
Cross In ternational and  other NGOs, as well as the  participation of the 
academ ic an d  scientific communities.
5 .3 .3 .2  International Partnerships and Jo in t M echanism s and 
Programmes
In addition to the ir own individual activities, in ternational organizations have 
also estab lished  p artn e rsh ip s  and created joint m echanism s and  program m es.
A good exam ple is th a t of the Global Water Partnership (GWP).92 This 
in ternational netw ork w as established in 1996 by the World Bank, UNDP, and  
the Swedish In ternational Development Agency, and  includes a wide variety of 
partic ipan ts, from governm ent institutions and  UN agencies to private 
com panies, as  well as NGOs and m ultilateral development banks. Its m ission is 
to support S ta tes  in the sustainable m anagem ent of their w ater resources by 
prom oting an d  im plem enting integrated water resources m anagem ent.
A nother exam ple is th a t of the Global Environment Facility  (GEF).93 This is a 
financial m echanism  created for the improvement of the global environm ent.94 
It was launched  in 1994 by the World Bank, UNDP and  UNEP in order to foster 
co-operation and  to finance activities concerning different areas related to the 
environm ent su ch  as biodiversity loss, climate change, ozone depletion, land 
degradation, p e rsis ten t organic pollutants and in ternational w aters. GEF is
90 For the PCCP, see, e.g. h ttp : / / www.unesco.org / water / wwap / peep /p d f/ brochure 2. pdf (last 
visited on 30.10.2007).
91 Edited by Cosgrove (2003). See also h ttp :/ / www .unesco.org/w ater /w w ap/
92 See generally its website a t http://ww w .gwpforum .org.
93 See generally its website a t h ttp ://w w w .gefweb.org/
94 On the im pact of GEF, see Sand (1996).
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chosen for projects which are developed and  carried ou t through public and  
private partn ersh ip s with UNDP, UNEP and  the World Bank as GEF 
Im plem enting Agencies,95 th u s  playing fundam ental roles in th is capacity, and  
regional developm ent banks and  other UN agencies, such  as FAO, IFAD or 
UNIDO. Since it w as created, GEF has been involved in over 100 w ater-related 
projects,96 no t only at national level, b u t also a t the regional and  global levels. 
Many of the projects being financed have quite com prehensive goals, such  as 
the in tegrated  m anagem ent of a basin ,97 involving a  num ber of different 
activities, an d  m ost of them  aim at implementing existing agreem ents.98
A nother good illustration  is the Global International Waters A ssessm ent 
(GIWA),99 created  in 1999 and led by UNEP. It is funded to approximately 50 
per cent by GEF, and  aim s to produce a com prehensive and  integrated global 
assessm en t of in ternational waters, comprising m arine, coastal and  surface 
freshw ater areas, as well as groundwaters. In addition, it analyses the 
ecological s ta tu s  of and  the causes of cu rren t problem s in num erous 
tran sb o u n d ary  w ater areas. It then develops scenarios of the future condition 
of the w orld’s w ater resources and it analyzes policy options. With th is analysis 
it provides scientific advice to decision-makers and  m anagers concerned with 
w ater resou rces in  order to tackle the problem s and  th rea ts  detected. The 
com prehensive strategic assessm ent thus developed m ay be used  by GEF and 
its p a rtn e rs  to identify priorities areas and problem s in need of rem edial or 
m itigating actions a t national, regional or global levels. GIWA has created a 
global netw ork  by establishing co-operative links w ith relevant bodies, 
com prising exchange of da ta  and information, co-ordination of program m es, 
jo in t activities, etc.
95 See h ttp ://w w w .u n d p .o rg /g ef/. h ttp ://w w w .unep.org/gef. and  h ttp :/ / www.worldbank/gef
96 W ater projects are divided into three categories: water bodies; integrated land and water 
projects; and  contam inants.
For a  list of GEF’s projects on in ternational watercourses, see 
http: / / www. gefweb.org/m eetings/W aterForum /International% 20W aters. pdf (last visited on 
30.10.2007) or search  h ttp: /  / www.gefonline.org
97 For example, the project for the Jo in t Integrated Development of the M aputo Basin.
98 E.g. the project on the Environmental Protection and  Sustainable M anagem ent of the 
Okavango River Basin, which assists on the im plementation of the 1994 OKAKOM Agreement 
concluded between Angola, Botswana and Namibia.
For a review of GEF’s contribution to the im plementation of w ater-related agreem ents and its 
international w ater programme, see Merla (2002).
99 See generally its website a t http: / / www.giwa.net/
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The OSCE, UNDP and UNEP joined efforts to create the Environm ent and  
Security (ENVSEC) Initiative in au tum n  20 0 2 .1Qo The aim  of the initiative is to 
prom ote susta inab le  resource m anagem ent and  environm ental cooperation to 
reduce insecurity  in Central Asia, the C aucasus and  S outh-E astern  Europe. Its 
m ost im portan t goal is to identify environm ental issu es  th a t have the  potential 
to th rea ten  security, and  to develop activities th a t m ay deal with these issues 
and  th u s  prom ote stability.
5 .3 .4  T he N eed for Co-ordinated A ction
W hat are th e  advantages of such rapid developm ent in the num ber of 
in terna tional organizations dealing with w ater resource issues? Debates, for 
instance, on dam s and  the proper role of the private sector continue. And so 
does the adoption of new resolutions and  declarations of different 
inter-governm ental conferences, displaying in vague language good intentions, 
including the  con tinuous mention of the need for co-operation in shared  w ater 
resources. B u t they  reflect ‘a  clear inability to reach an agreem ent’ on the 
im portan t issues, evidencing the lack of political will in th is  m atter, illustrated  
by the non-ratification of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention. The resu lts  
achieved so far undoubtedly  show progress. C oncerns have, however, been 
expressed regarding the need for co-ordination between the different 
organizations and  agencies working on w ater-related m atters, in order, for 
instance , to avoid duplication of work.101 Moreover, the lack, un til recently, of a 
general in terna tional w ater resources assessm ent h as  been a  serious obstacle 
to the im plem entation of different action p lans as  it w as difficult to identify 
th roughou t the  world priority areas for intervention.
In order to solve th is  problem  the UN created UN-Water in 2003, an  
interagency m echanism  th a t prom otes coherence and  co-ordination of actions 
from UN agencies, such  as program m es and funds, th a t have a  significant role 
in dealing with global w ater concerns and in reaching the w ater-related 
Millennium Development Goals and those of the Decade for Action W ater for
100 NATO is also associated with the initiative. See their websites at 
h ttp :/ / www.iisd.org/ security / e s / policy/ envsec.asp (last visited on 20.8.2007).
101 For a  critical view, see Salm an (2003a) and (2004).
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Life’.102 O ther non-UN institu tions, such as  IUCN -  The World Conservation 
Union, the World W ater Council and the International W ater Association also 
partic ipate in these actions.
UN-Water acts a t global, regional and country level. At global and  regional level 
it is responsible for assessing the s ta tu s  of and  trends in freshw ater 
resou rces.103 Since m any of its agencies have operational activities a t country 
level and  UN-Water is not a m echanism  for direct im plem entation, its 
contribution consists  mainly of providing relevant inform ation, for example, 
country-level policies and  assessm ents, and  access to th is  information.
At regional level, the EU Water Initiative (EUWI)104 is the  European counterpart 
of UN-Water. L aunched a t the World Sum m it for Sustainable Development 
(WSSD) in Jo h an n esb u rg  in September 2002, the EUWI aim s a t reinforcing the 
political com m itm ent to implementing the M illennium Development Goals. With 
an advanced w ater policy and the new European Com m unity W ater Framework 
Directive, the EU created  the EUWI as a basis  for fu ture action and  a 
m echanism  to improve co-ordination of and  co-operation on w ater-related 
activities w ithin the context of an integrated approach  to w ater resources 
m anagem ent. Amongst its objectives is the prom otion of good w ater governance 
and  practices, including the strengthening of institu tional capacity, and the 
im provem ent of partnersh ips, notably for research , technology transfer and 
inform ation sharing. By providing considerable experience and  expertise in 
river b asin  m anagem ent, the EUWI also aim s a t encouraging regional and 
sub-regional co-operation on water m anagem ent issues. F urther to the 
participation of the  European Communities, governm ents and  public sector, it 
encourages the participation of the private sector and  local stakeholders, th a t 
is, civil society, including local communities and  w ater u s e rs ’ associations, the 
w ater industry  and  financial institutions.
102 See its website a t http: / / www.unwater.org. On the specific role of coordinator performed by 
UNESCO’WWAP, see supra  s.5.3.3.1.
103 It publishes periodically the UN WWDR on the state of the world’s freshw ater resources, 
and the report of the Jo in t Monitoring Programme for W ater Supply and  Sanitation on the s ta tu s  
of water supply and  sanitation.
104 See its website a t h t tp : / /www.euwi.net/
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5 .4  The Issu e  o f  I m p le m e n ta t io n
Agreements often offer guidance as to the n a tu re  of im plem enting action to 
com plem ent the  obligation to co-operate. Different applications of the obligation 
are crystallised w ithin the agreem ents them selves into specific detailed 
com m itm ents capable of direct practical im plem entation. B ut provisions on 
im plem entation are not confined to co-operation and  its corollaries. They vary 
to a great ex ten t as  to their nature, and include provisions105 which:
(1) s ta te  th e  general aim and purpose of the form of co-operation;106
(2) list its  objectives with a  reasonable degree of detail;107
(3) list m easu res  aim ed a t achieving such objectives;108
(4) specify protective m easures likely to prom ote th is  form of co-operation;109 
occasionally explicit reference is made to the in te rests  protected under the 
provision. These m easu res should be pu t in place so th a t all parties concerned 
benefit on an  equitable basis. Another factor of critical im portance is the 
creation of jo in t in stitu tions or m echanism s designed to foster specific forms of 
co-operation;
(5) recom m end im plem entation m easures a t the  national and international 
levels.110 At the national level, co-operative action usually  requires the 
p reparation  of legislation, adm inistrative action, and  the  form ulation of policies 
which will guide or direct the actions of State organs, and  the provision of 
incentives and  sanctions in order to assure com pliance by those subject to 
national ju risd ic tio n .111 According to the circum stances of different S tates and 
their needs, the discharge of the obligation is th u s  likely to require th a t certain  
types of financial incentives be offered by Governm ent departm ents or foreign 
investm ent prom otion agencies. At the in ternational level, im plem entation 
requires m ore specific obligations and often the conclusion of additional
105 Based on those suggested by Pinto (1986), 146-154, in the context of the 1982 UNCLOS 
technology transfer.
106 E.g. 1994 D anube Convention, Article 5(1).
107 E.g. Ibid., Article 7(1).
108 E.g. Ibid., Article 6.
109 E.g. Ibid., Article 18(1).
110 E.g. Ibid., Article 5(2).
111 Pinto (1986), 149.
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bilateral or m ultilateral agreem ents to supplem ent or in terp re t the provisions of 
the original agreem ent;
(6) articu la te  the duty to co-operate as the b asis  for the conclusion of 
additional arrangem ents or agreem ents supplem enting or interpreting the 
original tre a ty .112 The point of departure of such  agreem ents may be the general 
obligation to co-operate undertaken  through a regional convention. In order to 
be fulfilled th is  requires th a t States elaborate on the scope and  frequency of the 
action w hich they consider as effective compliance w ith the obligation. The 
purpose of a  supplem entary  agreement is to tran sla te  the general obligation 
into detailed provisions setting out specific prescribed actions, so th a t 
im plem entation can take place and be m onitored by the parties. F urther 
agreem ents detailing the rights and obligations of the parties are essential to 
ensure com pliance. These agreem ents should cover such  m atters as  the tim ing 
of the prescribed actions, financial obligations, national entities responsible for 
task s  assigned, the  establishm ent of joint organs and  the scope of their 
responsibilities, protective m easures in relation to any special risks, and  
eventually form s of settling disputes. The purpose is to conclude a 
self-contained agreem ent and  to make co-operative obligations self-executing, 
w ithout the need  for regular recourse to Governm ents or th ird -party  
m echanism s for in te rp re ta tion .113
Problems of im plem enting existing w atercourse treaties m ay have different 
causes and  m ay arise in any b asin .114 In m any cases they are related to the 
estab lishm ent of institu tional m echanism s or jo in t com m issions, notably 
because th is  requires investm ent and government spending. For example, in 
Africa, several S tates have adopted treaties for the  m anagem ent of their river 
basins, and  w hen these do not function adequately they resort to concluding 
new agreem ents. In addition, difficulties may arise w hen little com m itm ent is 
secured from decision-m akers a t the highest level. This m ay be illustrated  by 
the 1987 ZACPLAN, which was successfully concluded with UNEP’s 
involvement, b u t the im plem entation of which m ight be considered a failure
112 E.g. Article 9 and  para .8 of the Preamble of the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention, 
and Article 3(3) of the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention.
H3 Pinto (1986), 153-4.
n4 For an  analysis of the problem and its several tests in relation to the im plem entation of the
1998 Luso-Spanish Agreement, see Canelas de Castro (2003), 225-232.
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since the necessary  funds were not obtained, including those which were to be 
provided by the governm ents of the riparian  S tates them selves.115
For different reasons, the 1995 Protocol on Shared W atercourse System s in the 
Southern  African Development Community (SADC) Region, which was 
concluded to a  large extent for the purpose of establishing river basin  
m anagem ent institu tions (Articles 3 to 6), has  never been im plem ented. Among 
them  w as the fact th a t soon after its conclusion, the  1997 UN W atercourses 
Convention w as adopted and States felt the need to include in their Protocol 
fundam ental principles th a t were absent initially. The 1995 Protocol was later 
replaced by the  2000 SADC Revised Water Protocol, some of whose term s were 
taken from the  1997 UN W atercourses Convention. The 2000 SADC Revised 
W ater Protocol also provides in Article 5 for an  institu tional fram ework for its 
im plem entation, nam ely the establishm ent of four com m ittees a t different levels 
and  with diverse functions, and requires from w atercourse S tates the 
estab lishm ent of com m issions, water authorities or w ater b o ard s.116
Initiatives regarding capacity-building, financial support, and  good governance 
in order to solve these problems of long-term im plem entation of treaties are 
obviously n eed ed .117 On the other hand, the fact th a t there are few or no 
adequate legal and  institu tional m echanism s am ongst riparian  S tates also 
forms an  obstacle to the provision of available g ran ts, loans and  foreign 
investm ent in the  areas concerned. At present, several donors and  agencies 
support the  im plem entation of watercourse agreem ents in Africa and  
elsew here.118 The increasing num ber of these projects on transboundary  w ater 
resources highlights the recognition of the problem of im plem entation of these 
agreem ents.119
At the European  level, as  the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses Convention does not 
include any specific provision concerning compliance, recent projects aim at
116 Nakayam a (1997), 380.
116 See Salm an (2001).
"7 Okidi (1997), 176-7, 179-80. See also Okidi (1998).
118 This is the case of the Global Environment Facility (GEF). See supra  s .5.3.3.2.
119 Such as  The Mekong River Basin W ater Utilization Project, co-financed by GEF and 
im plemented by the World Bank, or the Project on the Environm ental Protection and  Sustainable 
M anagement of the Okavango River Basin, co-funded by GEF in co-operation with UNDP, and  
executed by FAO.
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prom oting its effective im plem entation. These projects include consideration of 
a com pliance review procedure, com prising reporting, perform ance review and 
evaluation .120
5 .5  A M odel o f  Co-operation: is  it  V iable and is it
N egot iab le?
In the light of the  above examination of the different forms and  levels of 
co-operation in relation to international w atercourses, is it possible to 
construct a  m odel of co-operation?
The idea is no t new. In 1996 Benvenisti proposed the construction  of model 
ru les regarding co-operation through joint institu tions in the m anagem ent of 
shared  w ater re so u rces .121 A set of rules elaborated for jo in t institu tions \vould 
offer negotiating parties a model they could adopt with or w ithout ad justm en ts, 
which would lower the costs of negotiating and designing their in stitu tio n s’.122 
The model would be based  on the concept of co-operation as a  long-term  effort 
based on collective action for an  indefinite period of tim e.123
It is true th a t each  river basin  is different in geographical term s, th u s  requiring 
particu lar conventions, w hether regional, bilateral or m ultilateral, and  a  
separate a ssessm en t of the factors relevant to the  determ ination of equitable 
and  reasonable use . B ut it is no less true th a t in all cases some procedural 
obligations are the  sam e, and  their variations and  variables m ay be foreseen. 
The model ru les proposed by Benvenisti focus on the jo in t institu tional 
framework, w hich is in fact the m ost desirable fram ework for all co-operative 
efforts. B ut these in stitu tions also require ru les of procedure to operate.
120 See the report ‘Geneva Strategy and Framework of Monitoring Compliance with Agreements 
on T ransboundary W aters’, UNECE Doc.MP. W ater/2000/D ecem ber 1999, and also UNECE’s 
‘Draft Guidelines for S trengthening Compliance with and  Im plem entation of M ultilateral 
Environm ental Agreements (MEAS) in the ECE Region’, Task Force on Environm ental 
Compliance and  Enforcement, Report by the Chairm an, D oc.C E P/2003/7 , of 13 December 2002, 
Geneva, Switzerland, adopted a t Kiev in May 2003. See also Article 66 of the 2004 ILA Berlin 
Rules.
121 See Benvenisti (1996).
122 Ibid., 412.
123 See supra  s .3.2.7.
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Moreover, procedural obligations may be applied w ithout the establishm ent of 
jo in t institu tions. It is, therefore, suggested th a t a  model of co-operation should 
be elaborated consisting of rules setting out detailed procedural d u tie s . '24  In 
particu lar, these should concentrate on the exchange of d a ta  and  inform ation 
since th is  is a  sine qua non condition for co-operation and  helps establish  or 
m ain tain  a  com m unication channel between co-riparians. In addition, these 
rules could also focus on the collection and processing of d a ta  and  information. 
As with m uch  of the  work carried out in joint com m issions, the elaboration of 
these ru les require the collaboration of different experts, such as lawyers, 
hydrologists and  engineers.
Confirming th ese  views, which had  already been expressed in 2 0 0 1,125 a  ‘Legal 
A ssessm ent M odel’ (LAM) for transboundary w ater negotiations h as  recently 
been elaborated w ith in  UNESCO’s International Hydrological Program m e.126 It 
aim s to provide rip a rian  States with a  practical tool to determ ine in a  
system atic m an n er the ir legal entitlem ents and  obligations in relation to 
transboundary  w aters, and  to develop and im plem ent national w ater policy in 
accordance with in ternational rights and obligations. This model is 
interdisciplinary an d  is intended to be used  and  applied by persons with 
different backgrounds, mainly those responsible for w ater resources 
m anagem ent w orking w ithin a Government Ministry.
It w as developed th ro u g h  a  practice-oriented and  interdisciplinary approach in 
the context of th ree different situations: focusing on an  upstream  State, China; 
on a  dow nstream  S tate, Mozambique; and on a  S tate sharing  groundw aters, 
Palestine. Hence, it w as designed to be used  by S tates irrespective of their 
position in relation to th e  watercourse.
The LAM consists of two m ain parts: the D ata Collection Tools and  the Method 
of Evaluation. The first p art aim s at assisting S tates in compiling all relevant 
inform ation required for a  comprehensive assessm ent, including d a ta  and 
inform ation of different natu re , for example on the physical environm ent, and
124 In 1980, a  s tudy  on water conflicts concluded th a t ‘[i]t is often not realised th a t it is not 
enough to call for cooperation -  the way such cooperation is to be brought about m ust be spelled 
out in detail.’ See W idstrand (ed.), Water Conflicts and Research Priorities (1980), 172.
125 In the Report prepared for the Centre for Studies and R esearch in International Law and 
International Relations of The Hague Academy of International Law, subsequently  published as 
Ch.8 in Boisson de C hazournes and Salman (eds.)(2005), 281-339.
126 See W outers e t al. (2005).
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on legal, social and  economic aspects. It com prises a  Relevant Factor Matrix 
w hich helps the  identification of the relevant factors; a  Legal Audit Scheme; 
and  a  G lossary of Terms related to economics, hydrology and  law. The second 
p art provides a  methodology for an objective processing and  analysis of the 
inform ation.
This m odel m ay provide guidance for S tates a t different stages of co-operation: 
for agreem ent on the exchange of data  and inform ation, for jo in t river basin  
stud ies, for S tates in the process of negotiating an  agreem ent on w ater use, or 
to facilitate the  resolution of an existing dispute.
The advantages of model rules are clear: first, in  treaty  negotiations, S tates 
m ay adopt or ad ap t the model rules and consequently lower the costs of the 
negotiation process and  facilitate the im plem entation of the substantive 
principles; secondly, they would systematise the alternatives, and  would clearly 
lay down w hat is expected of the parties to the treaty  in term s of co-operation. 
It is m uch  easier to im plem ent and comply with -  or to vary from -  specific 
requ irem ents w hich are clearly set out than  to im plem ent vague and  general 
notions. Given the  n a tu re  of the proposed model ru les, and  following the 
exam ple of the  work prepared by the World Com m ission on Dam s, and  more 
recently from the LAM, their elaboration would require the jo in t work of a 
m ulti-d isciplinary  team .
For all the  reasons already mentioned, such  as different regional 
ch arac teris tics  and  w ater u ses ,127 it is obvious th a t any proposal for the 
elaboration of uniform  detailed rules for all the b asins in the world, or even ju s t  
for some, w ould be inappropriate and not practicable. This notw ithstanding, it 
m ay be argued  th a t it is not too difficult to devise a  m odel of co-operation; th a t 
the cen tral problem  is th a t this model would no t be of m uch  use  un less  a 
su b stan tia l proportion of States were prepared to accept it as  a  model.
This a rg u m en t is valid up to a  certain point. The 1997 UN W atercourses 
Convention, a  framework convention of universal character, m ay be viewed 
itself as  a  m odel of co-operation, since it provides a  legal framework for 
co-operation. And although it was prepared by the  ILC, d iscussed  in the UN
127 See supra  s. 1.3 and s. 1.4.
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Sixth Committee, and  finally adopted by the UNGA, it is no t yet in force. Article 
36 of the Convention requires 35 States to ratify it for its  entry  into force, and 
ten  years la ter only 16 States have so far done so. In fact, due to the sensitivity 
of the subject and  divergent positions adopted by the S tates a t the UN Sixth 
Committee, the Convention may never enter into force. It is evident th a t 
a lthough S ta tes recognise several obligations in the field in soft law 
in stru m en ts , such  as  the duty to co-operate, there is no t yet the political will 
required for governm ents to accept them  in more precise and  onerous term s.
Nevertheless, the  1997 UN W atercourses Convention h as  already produced 
effects a t regional and  local level, th a t is, it h as  served as a  model for the 
conclusion of fu rth e r framework and for particu lar river basin  treaties. This is 
the case, for in stan ce , in Southern Africa. The 2000 SADC Revised W ater 
Protocol, a  fram ew ork convention itself, follows the 1997 UN W atercourses 
Convention closely. And w ithin its am bit other particu lar basin  agreem ents 
have been concluded, such  as the 2002 Incom aputo Tripartite Interim  
Agreement. And the  n u m b er continues to increase. Hence, although a  model of 
co-operation m ay no t ever be accepted universally, it h as  already been followed 
in different regions of the  world.
6C o - o p e r a t i o n  a n d  S t a t e  
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y
The on ly  th in g  th a t w ill r e d e e m  m a n k in d  is  co -opera tion .
Bertrand Russell
The breach  by a  S ta te  of the  obligation to co-operate raises several questions. 
We have seen in  C hap ter 4 th a t the obligation to co-operate m ay be applied 
through different p rocedural rules. But does th is  m ean th a t the violation of one 
of these ru les is necessarily  a  violation of the general obligation to co-operate? 
And if so, w hen claim ing it, does the breach have to be explicitly identified? 
And which S tate carries  the  burden  of proof?
Say, a  S tate fails to notify o ther co-riparian S tates of a  projected dam  on the 
shared  river. Is th is  S tate  liable for not co-operating? And if so, when does 
responsibility arise? Is it only w hen actual damage occurs? And w hat would the 
position be if, after p ro te s t from a  potentially affected co-riparian and the works 
on the dam  have begun, the planning State then  consulted  the protesting 
co-riparian to the  exclusion of o ther co-riparian S tates?
There are several issu es  to be considered when exam ining responsibility arising 
from failure in  co-operation. It is necessary, first, to identify the breach or 
breaches of specific ru les; second, to analyse the conduct of the alleged State in 
breach an d  th e  action taken , if any, by other S tates in relation to th is State; 
th ird , to exam ine the  environm ental, legal, and  political consequences of the 
breach, includ ing  the  assessm ent of any dam age, actual or potential; and 
finally, to consider the possible forms of reparation.
271
This chap ter exam ines the characteristics of responsibility for internationally 
wrongful acts, th a t is, for breach of the obligation to co-operate and  of its 
corollaries, w hether these are treaty obligations, or ru les of local, regional or 
general custom ary  law. For this purpose, the work of scholarly associations 
and  the  ILC, the  provisions on responsibility in different treaties and the 
existing case law are analysed. The chapter also looks a t the question of 
w hether responsibility  and liability are also engaged before or even w ithout the 
occurrence of dam age. It also provides a brief analysis of circum stances 
excluding responsibility , and  forms of reparation. In addition, it exam ines the 
liability arising  o u t of acts not prohibited by in ternational law, i.e., the objective 
regime as  applicable to the procedural law of co-operation.
6 .1  In troductory
In general, the  existence or lack of co-operation am ong States is easily
identified. G overnm ents em phasise their co-operation for political reasons,
usually  to m ain ta in  or reinforce good state relations. They also occasionally 
claim th a t o ther S ta tes  failed to co-operate, w hether privately, through 
unpublicised p ro tests, or publicly, particularly w hen support is sought on a 
politically sensitive m a tte r  -  as  m ost water resources issues are -, and  before a 
court or tribunal, w hen a  d ispu te  h as  already arisen.
When a  specific obligation h a s  been breached, S tates m ay be able to claim the 
breach no t only of th a t  obligation bu t also of the all-em bracing obligation of 
co-operation. One of the  reasons for this is the political and  legal connotations 
of the word. Co-operative conduct is associated w ith good faith, with the
willingness to p revent d ispu tes  and to m aintain peace and  good neighbourly
relations w ith o ther S tates. In other words, a S tate accused  of not co-operating 
is regarded as  infringing several other basic principles of international law, 
such  as  the  principle of good faith or the principle of good neighbourliness.1 
And even th o u g h  it is u p  to the claim ant State to prove th is  breach, the effects 
produced u su a lly  go well beyond the legal field.
1 See supra  s .2.3.
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Special regimes of state responsibility are regarded as limiting state 
sovereignty, and  S tates are usually  re luctan t to agree to them . This is why 
Principle 12(2) of the 1978 UNEP Principles on Shared N atural Resources 
s ta tes  th a t ‘S tates should co-operate to develop fu rther in ternational law 
regarding liability and  com pensation for the victim s of environm ental damage 
arising o u t of the  utilization of a  shared n a tu ra l resource and  caused to areas 
beyond th e ir ju risd ic tion ’,2 and later Article 7 of the 1992 Helsinki 
W atercourses Convention and  Article 13 of the 1992 Industria l Accidents 
Convention provide th a t S tates ‘shall support appropriate in ternational efforts 
to elaborate ru les, criteria  and  procedures in the field of responsibility and  
liability’. T hus, it is the  general regime of sta te  responsibility th a t usually  
applies to in te rn a tio n a l w ater resources, with certain  ad justm ents. This is 
confirmed, for in stan ce , by Article 68 of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules on Water 
Resources, w hich refers directly to the general law on sta te  responsibility, and 
thereby to th e  2001 ILC Articles on the Responsibility of S tates for 
Internationally W rongful Acts, insofar as they reflect the position in custom ary 
in ternational law.
6 .2  R e s p o n s ib i l i t y  for Wrongful A cts
There are still today across  the  globe several exam ples of lack of co-operation in 
relation to sh ared  w ater resources. The natu re  of the relations between the 
riparian  S tates involved range between friendly and  hostile.
An example of the  la tte r s ituation  is th a t of the  T igris-Euphrates basin. This 
basin  com prises bo th  th e  Tigris and  Euphrates rivers, shared  between Turkey, 
Syria, and  Iraq.3 There is no m ultilateral com prehensive agreem ent4 and each
2 Based on Principle 22 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration. Caflisch argues th a t Principle 22 of 
the 1972 Stockholm  D eclaration generated a system of responsibility erga om nes in case of 
violation of the obligation to co-operate it establishes. Caflisch (1989), 171.
See also Principle 13 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, Article 235(3) of the 1982 UNCLOS in 
relation to dam age caused  by pollution of the m arine environm ent, and  Article 14(2) of the 1992 
CBD in relation to dam age caused  to biological diversity.
3 The confluence of the Tigris and  E uphrates rivers form the Shatt-al Arab river, which flows to 
the Persian Gulf an d  is shared  between Iraq and Iran.
4 There are som e bilateral treaties, including Protocol 1 annexed to the 1946 Treaty of 
Friendship an d  Neighbourly Relations between Iraq and  Turkey, which provided for the 
estab lishm ent of a  jo in t technical committee between the two States, which has never been set 
up.
273
State p u ts  forward a  legal position according to its  geographic position in the 
basin . Turkey, the upstream  State, h as  decided to carry out the controversial 
South  E astern  Anatolia Project (GAP Project),5 which com prises the 
construction  of a  series of dam s, including the colossal A taturk dam, and 
hydro-electric power p lan ts designed to prevent flooding, to produce 
hydro-electricity, and  to increase irrigation. Turkey h a s  not given advance 
notice of the  project to Syria and  Iraq. This project will have a significant 
im pact on th e  lower riparians, mainly because it will drastically reduce the 
flow, and  bo th  Syria and  Iraq are absolutely dependent on the water. In fact, 
each S tate is carrying ou t separately a development p lan  for the river within its 
own boundaries. The th ree S tates entered into consu lta tions after claims from 
the two dow nstream  riparians th a t they had  acquired w ater rights through 
historical p receden t, b u t they broke down due to disagreem ent over w ater 
quotas and  th e  o u tb reak  of the Gulf war. At p resen t the situation is still 
unresolved.
Another exam ple elsew here, b u t th is time showing partia l success in achieving 
co-operation betw een som e riparian  States, is the case of the Mekong River. 
This river is sh a red  betw een China, M yanmar (formerly Burma), Laos, 
Thailand, Cam bodia an d  Vietnam, b u t only the last four S tates are parties to 
the 1995 Agreem ent on the  Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the 
Mekong River B asin . This Agreement provides for the estab lishm ent of the 
Mekong River C om m ission (MRC) and in Article 1 for ‘co-operation in all fields 
of susta inab le  developm ent, utilisation, m anagem ent and  conservation of the 
w ater and  related  resou rces of the Mekong River B asin ’. C hina and  M yanmar 
are the u p s tre a m  S ta tes  and , although the activities und ertak en  on the river 
basin  on the ir territo ry  are likely to produce significant effects downstream , 
they have decided no t to becom e Parties to the Agreement. Yet since 1996 they 
have observer s ta tu s  a t the  MRC. As with the GAP Project, China has decided 
to construc t eight dam s on the Mekong River w ithout informing or consulting 
with the  dow nstream  riparians. But here there are signs of increasing 
co-operation, a s  on 1 April 2002 China signed an  agreem ent on the provision of 
hydrological inform ation on the Mekong River.6
5 On the m ain  issu es  raised by the GAP Project, see, e.g. Scheum ann (1998). See also 
McCaffrey (2001), 279-284.
6 In particu lar, C hina provides water level data  in the flood season from two stations located on 
the Upper Mekong in China. Currently, riparian States are negotiating a more comprehensive 
d a ta  sharing  agreem ent to include dry season levels.
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One could nam e m any more examples. Each case of failure to co-operate raises 
several questions as  to responsibility. The conduct, be it an  action or omission, 
co n stitu tes  a  b reach  of an  international obligation of a  State, w hether 
conventional or custom ary, and  is attributable to th a t S tate u n d er international 
law.7 This conduct, w hether with intention to cause the wrongful act or through 
negligence, en ta ils  the in ternational responsibility of th a t State. The type of 
activity cau sin g  th e  dam age is not an  im portant factor for the purposes of 
determ ining liability.
6 .2 .1  T h e  O b lig a tio n  to  C o-operate: I s su e s  o f  N on -C om p lian ce
The wording of th e  obligation to co-operate u sed  in treaties often needs 
clarification or in te rp re ta tio n  in order to determ ine the specific course of action 
required to fulfil th e  obligation in good faith. This raises several problems. One 
is th a t of the  evidence of th e  breach of the obligation. Unless the violating State 
h as  positively acted  in an  unco-operative fashion or, conversely, h as  taken  no 
action a t all, providing evidence of a  breach of the obligation to co-operate may 
prove to be a  very difficult task . An im portant threshold  to be considered here 
is th a t of conduct th a t  could be deemed minim al co-operation. When the 
burden  of proof lies w ith the  S tate claiming lack of co-operation, the fact th a t 
the obligation is d rafted  in  general term s w ithout specifying the action required 
to im plem ent it m ay m ake it im possible to dem onstrate th a t there is a breach 
of the obligation, w hether th is  consists of lack of any action or of action falling 
short of or n o t in conform ity with the obligation, and  in  particu lar th a t this 
action or om ission h a s  n o t reached  the threshold.
In co n trast to o ther a reas of in ternational law, such  as rules on 
m ost-favoured-nation trea tm en t or ru les on protection of inviolable persons or 
prem ises, in th e  law of in terna tional w ater resources it is often very difficult to 
determ ine w hether an  obligation has been complied with or not. This reason 
alone suggests the  desirability of prescribing of a  m uch  more detailed and 
specific co n ten t for the  obligation. This problem  arises, for example, in 
determ ining w hether a  S tate h as  exceeded its equitable share of the water or
7 The elem ents of an  internationally wrongful act of a S tate are set ou t in Article 2 of the 2001 
ILC Articles on S tate Responsibility.
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h as  not called for co-operation between the riparian  S tates concerned in order 
to achieve and  m aintain  an  equitable share. As we have already seen, it is 
fundam ental th a t there is some degree of contact and  co-operation between the 
co-riparians, which should include, a t least, the regular exchange of da ta  and 
inform ation regarding the river basin within each S ta te ’s territory.8 B ut would 
th is  conduct be enough? How does a State know the lim its of its own right 
w ithout having previously consulted with the o ther co-riparians?9
In legislative drafting, it is u su a l to use m andatory term s such  as the verb shall 
in order to convey a  notion of command. And the com m and to co-operate 
Svould seem  necessarily  to entail the obligation to en ter into negotiations in 
good faith a t th e  req u est of any interested party with a  view to transform ing a 
provision w orded in  general term s into specific u n its  of obligation for the 
purpose of im plem entation  susceptible of being m onitored and, where 
necessary, sub jec ted  to dispute settlem ent procedures. Before such  a  
transform ation is effected and  the resulting arrangem ents have entered into 
effect, the  refusal to respond  to a  request to enter into negotiations or other 
uncooperative action a t any  subsequent stage of the im plem entation process, 
would itself am o u n t to a  breach  of the Convention’s provisions, and  justify  
appropriate rem edial action under . . . general in ternational law .’10 Although 
w ritten with regard to th e  1982 UNCLOS, this may be applied mutatis mutandis 
to treaties on w atercou rses and  to the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention once 
in force.
6 .2 .2  T h e R e la t io n s h ip  B etw een  S u b sta n tiv e  a n d  P roced u ra l 
R u les
The responsibility  of the S tate violating a  treaty  rule does no t vary depending 
on w hether th e  ru le  is substantive or procedural. However, the violation of 
procedural ru les  often affects the application of substan tive rules, th a t is, it 
may lead to th e  b reach  of these rules.
8 See su pra  s .4.2.
9 On the application of the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation, see supra  s.2.3.4.
10 Pinto (1986), 145.
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The b reach  of the obligation to co-operate usually  implies th a t one of the two 
essential substantive ru les h as  not been observed. The obligation of equitable 
and  reasonable utilisation as well as the obligation not to cause significant 
tran sb o u n d ary  harm  require different procedural ru les to be complied w ith .11 If 
one of th ese  procedural rules has not been observed, the potentially affected 
S tate m ay also -  as they often do -  claim th a t the  general obligation to 
co-operate h a s  been breached. Should harm  occur, the  issue of responsibility 
of the in ju ring  S tate  is raised, not least in order to determ ine w hether the harm  
reached the  ‘significant’ threshold. And in case of difficulties in determ ining the 
threshold  of ‘significant’ harm , in particular w hen S ta tes do no t have good 
neighbourly relations, a  dispute may arise. Yet S tates m ay agree th a t 
responsibility does no t arise if co-riparians do not object to the fact causing the 
harm  or if, w hen they  do object, the injuring State stops causing it .12
6 .2 .3  B rea ch  o f  P ro ced u ra l R u les in  R egu lar S itu a t io n s
The issue of s ta te  responsibility  arising from the breach of the obligation to 
co-operate or one of its  corollaries has never been analysed in a  dedicated 
study nor in an  in te rn a tio n a l instrum ent. There are only general references to 
the law of sta te  responsibility . Conversely, m any studies on in ternational water 
resources have dealt w ith the m atter of responsibility for substan tia l 
transboundary  h a rm .13
Failure to co-operate or to comply with one of the  requirem ents of the 
obligation to co-operate, w hether an  act or om ission, m ay constitu te an 
in ternational wrongful ac t entailing the responsibility of the  breaching State. 
Examples of violation, as  referred to in the Lake Lanoux a rb itra tion ,14 include 
the refusal to provide d a ta  and  inform ation on the w atercourse, refusal to 
notify p lanned  m easu res  or to en ter into consultations in good faith, system atic 
obstruction in  m eetings, unjustified  breaking off of d iscussions, abnorm al
11 See su pra  C h.4.
12 See, e.g. Article 63 of the 1960 Frontier Treaty.
13 See, e.g. Principle VII of the 1956 ILA Dubrovnik S tatem ent of Principles and Article XI(1) of 
the 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules on violation of the obligation of pollution prevention, Article V of 
1972 Articles on M arine Pollution of Continental Origin, and  Article V of the 1979 IDI Athens 
Resolution with respect to pollution of rivers and lakes. See supra  s .2.3.5.
14 See su pra  s.3 .2 .6 .4 . and  s.4.4.
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delays, d isregard of the agreed procedures, system atic refusals to take into 
consideration adverse proposals or in terests, and, m ore generally, the violation 
of the  ru les  of good faith. Furtherm ore, where a  trea ty  requires S tates to 
co-operate th ro u g h  concerted action, obstruction to such  action may be viewed, 
in certain  circum stances, as a  breach of the obligation to co-operate.
The 1997 UN W atercourses Convention provides in Article 16 on the absence of 
reply to notification th a t where a  planning State notifies a  potentially affected 
State of projected  works, provided th a t this work does not deprive the other 
State of its  equ itab le  and  reasonable use of the w atercourse (Article 5) and  
provided th a t  the  project will not cause significant harm  to the potentially 
affected S tate  (Article 7), and  the notified State does no t reply within six 
m onths, the  notifying S tate may proceed with the im plem entation of its 
p lanned m e a su re s .15 This Article aims a t protecting the notifying State against 
subsequen t claim s by th e  notified State. Article 16(2) lays down th a t
Any claim to com pensation by a notified State which has failed to reply within the 
period applicable pursuant to Article 13 may be offset by the costs incurred by the 
notifying State for action undertaken after the expiration of the time for a reply which 
would not have been undertaken if the notified State had objected within that period.
This clearly s ta te s  th a t  the costs incurred by the notifying State in 
im plem enting its  project in  reliance on the absence of a  reply to notification 
may be deducted  from  any  dam ages claimed later on by the notified S ta te .16 In 
the case of several notified S tates who failed to reply and  claim ed dam ages, the 
deduction w ould be m ade pro rata on the basis of their respective claims.
There is no provision in th e  1997 UN W atercourses Convention regarding legal 
consequences of non-com pliance with the obligation to notify17 or to respond to 
a request of notification. This m eans th a t the general regime of state 
responsibility applies, an d  in case of dam age caused  in the territory of the 
affected S tate, th is  b reach  m ay affect the level of com pensation to be paid if it
15 See su p ra  s .4 .3 .1 .4 . See also Article 59(1) of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules, which does not 
provide a  specific deadline for the reply, ra ther using the general expression ‘within a reasonable 
tim e’ for en tering  into consultations or negotiations.
16 See also Article 59(2) of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules.
17 Only the 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules provided for a sanction in th is case. See supra  s .4.3.1.2.
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can  be show n th a t  the  breach of th is obligation led to additional loss.18 This is 
the case, for instance, when the upstream  State closes the dam  gates. This 
d im inishes significantly the w ater flow relied on by the  dow nstream  State, even 
if only for a  specific period of time. The decision to close the gates may be 
caused  by different reasons. Electricity might not be needed tem porarily from 
th is  power p lan t or the p lan t equipm ent m ight require m aintenance. If the 
affected dow nstream  State is not promptly notified, it m ay suffer additional 
dam age a s  it could  n o t take appropriate m easu res to prevent, mitigate or 
elim inate th e  dam age dow nstream , such as obtaining the required am ount of 
w ater from o th er sources.
Kiss speaks of a  regim e of soft responsibility, based  in the concept of soft law .19 
As the prim ary  goal in  the  law of na tu ra l resources is to obtain compliance 
before the env ironm ent is harm ed, monitoring and reporting on the sta te  of the 
water resources are helpful compliance techniques. These compliance control 
m echanism s exert p re ssu re  on Governments not only sensitive to public 
opinion b u t also protective of their reputation. The possibility of civil 
proceedings ag a in st indiv iduals in domestic courts h a s  the sam e effect.
6 .2 .3 .1  O verview o f  Relevant International 
D ecisions
Some in tern a tio n al decisions, which have contributed  directly to the 
developm ent of th e  law of in ternational responsibility, are relevant to the 
application of th e  two substan tive  principles of in ternational w ater resources: 
first, the principle th a t  S ta tes  are subject to lim itations on their u se  of the fresh 
w ater of in te rn a tio n a l rivers;20 secondly, the principle th a t unilatera l action in 
certain  c ircu m stan ces  m ay be subject to an  in terna tional claim if the u se  of the 
w aters cau ses  in ju ry  to o ther riparian  States.
In the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the  Tribunal asserted  the rule that, as in the 
common law  of n u isan ce , liability derives from unreasonab le  interference with
18 This s itua tion  is sim ilar to the breach of binding interim  m easures of protection. The ICJ, 
however, h a s  no t yet dealt with the issue of rem edies in the case where a party claiming 
com pensation for dam age h as  offered proof of additional loss caused  by th a t breach. See 
M endelson (2004), 43.
19 Kiss (1989), 20 and  117.
20 See su pra  s .2 .2 .3 .
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the enjoym ent of land. It should be noted th a t the  arb itral agreem ent contained 
a  proper law clause which required the Tribunal to apply no t only in ternational 
law and  practice b u t also US law and practice. C anada supported  th is 
reference to US law as decisions of national courts  regarding industrial 
nu isance  were less favourable to industry. While finding C anada responsible in 
in terna tional law for the conduct of Trail Smelter, the Tribunal concluded th a t 
Tinder th e  principles of international law, as well as of the law of the United 
States, no S ta te  h a s  the right to use or perm it the  use  of its territory in such  a 
m anner as to cau se  injury by fumes in or to the  territory of another or the 
properties or p e rso n s  therein, when the case is of serious consequence and  the 
injury is es tab lish ed  by clear and convincing evidence’.21 The underlying 
principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas applies by analogy to the 
utilisation of th e  w aters  of river basins.22
In the Corfu Channel case, Albania was found to be responsible for failing to 
give w arning to th e  U nited Kingdom or others exercising lawful rights of 
innocent passage of th e  existence of mines, th a t is, of breaching the obligation 
to notify o ther S ta tes  of know n dangers. The Court noted th a t it is ‘every S ta te’s 
obligation no t to allow knowingly its territory to be u sed  for acts contrary to the 
rights of o ther S ta te s ’ .23 This dictum  of the Court also applies to problems 
related to in tern a tio n al w ater resources.
In the Gut Dam Arbitration, a  Tribunal was established in 1965 to adjudicate 
claims by US n a tio n a ls  against C anada for dam age caused  by the construction 
and  operation of th e  G ut Dam on the St. Lawrence River. The U.S.A. had  
consented to the  construc tion  of the dam, provided th a t C anada would pay 
com pensation if th e  dam  caused  damage or detrim ent to US property owners. 
Due to the  diversion of w ater by Canada into the  G reat Lakes to increase 
hydro-electric pow er generation and to storm s, w ater levels reached 
unprecedented  levels causing  flooding and erosion dam age to the north  and 
south  shores of all the  G reat Lakes. Before the estab lishm ent of the Tribunal, 
C anada h a d  recognised its obligation to pay com pensation for damage 
a ttribu tab le  to th e  G ut Dam. Thus, the Tribunal concluded th a t it only had  to 
determ ine w hether the dam  had  been the cause of the dam age claimed and the
21 3 RIAA, 1965.
22 See su pra  s .2.3.5.
23 ICJ Reports (1949), 4, a t 22.
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am ount of the  dam ages to be paid. Even though C anada agreed to settle the 
case w ithout prejudice to the legal and  factual positions m aintained by the 
parties, th is  case provides support for the obligation no t to cause significant 
harm  to o ther S tates.
In the San Juan River Case24 the Central American Court of Justice , in its 
decision of 30 Septem ber 1916, addressed the question of the stage a t which 
the obligation to consu lt m ust be discharged. It concluded th a t it was not 
necessary  to w ait u n til the site of the projected canal h ad  been located or until 
Costa R ica’s ‘n a tu ra l rig h ts’ had  suffered concrete and  m aterial injury to 
determ ine w h eth er C osta Rica had to be notified and  consulted. It further 
added th a t it w as a  principle of inter-state relations th a t a  potential affected 
State w as en titled  to dem and ‘redress, in the nam e of its fundam ental rights of 
existence and  preservation , for an  act th a t involves a  simple m enace or danger 
to the developm ent of those  righ ts .’25
6 .2 .3 .2  The Contribution o f R ecent Law o f the Sea
Case-Law 26
The breach of th e  obligation to co-operate h as  been claimed in three cases 
before the In ternational T ribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).
The Southern Bluefin Tuna C ases27 concerned the conservation and optim um  
utilisation of th e  S o u th ern  Bluefin Tuna (SBT). In these cases, and  in the 
absence of agreem ent betw een the S tates for the settlem ent of the  m erits of the 
dispute, ITLOS w as asked  to prescribe provisional m easu res pending the 
constitu tion of an  a rb itra l trib u n a l under Annex VII to the  1982 UNCLOS.
A ustralia, New Zealand, an d  J a p a n  are parties to the  1993 Convention for the 
Conservation of SBT28, u n d er which a  Commission w as established.29 This 
Com m ission decides, w ith the assistance of a  Scientific Committee, a total
24 For an  ana lysis of the case, see supra  s.3.2.6.1.
25 Robb (1999), 39.
26 For the contribu tion  of the 1982 UNCLOS, see supra  s.3.3.1.
27 (New Zealand v. Jap an ; Australia v. Japan), Provisional M easures.
28 Adopted on 10 May 1993, in Canberra, Australia, and entered into force on 20 May 1994.
29 See generally its website a t http: / Zwww.ccsbt.org.
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allowable catch  and  its distribution am ong the m em ber S tates. Although the 
stock h ad  been severely depleted and continued to decline, other non-m em ber 
S tates increased  fishing. From 1995 Ja p a n  proposed an  increase in the total 
allowable catch  (TAC), b u t no agreem ent was reached. In 1998 Jap an  initiated 
an experim ental fishing programme (EFP).
On 30 Ju ly  1999, New Zealand and A ustralia filed their requests  for provisional 
m easures w ith ITLOS. They claimed among o ther th ings th a t Jap a n  had  failed 
to comply w ith its  obligation to co-operate in good faith in the conservation of 
the SBT stock  p rescribed  in Articles 64 and  116 to 119 of the 1982 UNCLOS by 
undertak ing  u n ila te ra l experim ental fishing for SBT in 1998 and 1999. This 
unco-operative action  h ad  also resulted in a th rea t to the  stock as Ja p a n  was 
taking over th e  na tio n al allocation previously agreed upon. Thus, they 
requested the  T ribunal to issue  an interim  injunction against Ja p a n  requiring 
it, inter alia, im m ediately to cease the EFP for the SBT, to restric t its  catch to 
its national q uo ta  as  la s t agreed, reduced by the am ount taken  in the course of 
its EFP, and  to ac t consisten tly  with the precautionary principle in the fishing 
of the SBT pending  final settlem ent of the dispute. They also asked the 
Tribunal to order J a p a n  to ‘negotiate and  co-operate in good faith’ with them , 
including th rough  th e  Com m ission ‘with a  view to agreeing fu ture conservation 
m easures and  TAC for SBT necessary  for m aintaining and  restoring the SBT 
stock to levels w hich can  produce the m axim um  susta inab le  yield’.
In its Response an d  C ounter Request, Jap an  requested  the Tribunal to grant it 
provisional relief by p rescrib ing  th a t A ustralia and  New Zealand urgently and  in 
good faith resum e negotiations and  consultations w ith J a p a n  for a  period of six 
m onths w ith a  view to reaching  an  agreem ent on the  ou tstand ing  issues 
between them , nam ely, th e  TAC catch and national an n u a l allocations, and  the 
continuation  of th e  EFP (on a  jo in t basis). If no agreem ent w as reached within 
six m onths, any  rem ain ing  disagreem ent should  be referred for resolution to 
the panel of in d ep en d en t scien tists who h ad  been engaged by the parties. 
Ja p a n  argued  th a t
The ... Statem ent of Facts and the history of negotiations between Australia, New 
Zealand and Japan concerning conservation of SBT, chronicles the bad faith exhibited 
by Australia and New Zealand in terminating consultations and negotiations over the 
terms of a joint experimental fishing program and their rash resort to proceedings 
under UNCLOS despite the absence of any controversy thereunder and the failure to
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exhaust the amicable provisions for dispute resolution that Part XV mandates be fully 
utilized. Accordingly, this Tribunal should require Australia and New Zealand to fulfil 
their obligations to continue negotiations over this scientific dispute.
According to Article 64(1) and Article 118 of the 1982 UNCLOS, the coastal 
S tate an d  o th er S tates whose nationals fish in the  region for the highly 
m igratory species listed in Annex I, which includes so u th ern  bluefin tuna, have 
the du ty  to co-operate directly or through appropriate international 
organizations w ith  a  view to ensuring conservation and  prom oting the objective 
of optim um  u tilisa tion  of such species th roughou t the region. Article 118 
specifies th a t
States shall co-operate with each other in the conservation and management of living 
resources in the areas of the high seas. States whose nationals exploit identical living 
resources, or different living resources in the same area, shall enter into negotiations 
with a view to taking the measures necessary for the conservation of the living 
resources concerned. They shall, as appropriate, co-operate to establish subregional or 
regional fisheries organizations to this end.
The Tribunal, after finding th a t it had  jurisdiction over the d isputes, considered 
it appropriate to p rescribe provisional m easures. Although the Tribunal could 
not conclusively a sse ss  th e  scientific evidence presented  by the parties (para. 
80), it found th a t  th e  p artie s  should act with prudence and  caution and  th a t 
m easures should  be tak en  as a  m atter of urgency to preserve the rights of the 
parties and  to avert fu rth er deterioration of the SBT stock. Thus, the Tribunal 
decided th a t th e  p a rtie s  should  refrain from conducting an  EFP involving the 
taking of a  ca tch  of SBT, except with the agreem ent of the  other parties or 
un less the  ca tch  is coun ted  against its annual national allocation, and th a t 
their an n u a l ca tch es  should  no t exceed the an n u a l national allocations at the 
levels la st agreed by the parties. It also decided th a t the parties should  resum e 
negotiations w ithou t delay with a  view to reaching agreem ent on m easures for 
the conservation an d  m anagem ent of SBT, and  th a t they  should  m ake further 
efforts to reach  agreem ent with other States and  fishing entities engaged in 
fishing for SBT, w ith a  view to ensuring conservation and  promoting the 
objective of optim um  utilisation  of the stock.
This order to co-operate seemed to resu lt from the  fact th a t no t only had  the 
parties n o t agreed as  to w hether the conservation m easu res taken so far had
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led to the  im provem ent in the stock of SBT b u t also due to presen t scientific 
u n certa in ty  as  to the appropriate m easures to be taken  to conserve the stock of 
SBT. Therefore, in th is  situation the Court could no t p u rsu e  the avenue of 
prescrib ing  th e  ac tual m easures to be taken  by the parties to achieve the 
desired re su lt of conserving the stock. The T ribunal could only order the parties 
to negotiate in  order to reach an agreem ent and  fulfil their obligations under 
the 1982 UNCLOS.
Judge V ukas, in h is  d issenting opinion, considered th a t the provisional 
m easures req u ested  were not urgent. Among h is argum ents w as the fact that, 
although A ustra lia  an d  New Zealand had  argued th a t Ja p a n 's  unilateral 
experim ental fishing for SBT in 1998 and  1999 w as b u t one of the 
m anifestations of ‘J a p a n ’s failure to conserve, and  to cooperate in the 
conservation, of th e  SBT stock ...’, all the relevant d a ta  and  argum entation 
dealt alm ost exclusively w ith Ja p a n 's  experim ental fishing in 1998 and 1999 
and  ‘no o ther ac ts  of J a p a n  which could be characterized as relevant 
independent m an ifesta tions of the non-willingness of th a t State to cooperate in 
the conservation of th e  so u th ern  bluefin tu n a  stock’ were advanced.
A jo in t declaration  by six judges points out th a t co-operation between the 
Parties to the  Convention, a t both  the scientific and  governm ental levels, has  
not been effective in  recen t years and  rem inds the parties th a t Article 64 of the 
1982 UNCLOS lays down a  du ty  to co-operate to conserve the stocks. Thus, the 
judges criticise th e  a ttitu d e  of all parties to the dispute, leaving it clear -  
though sub tly  -  th a t  the  obligation to co-operate applies to all S tates involved.
The Annex VII A rbitral T ribunal later decided th a t it h ad  no jurisdiction and 
consequently did n o t consider the  m erits of the case.
The th ird  case w here th e  breach  of the obligation to co-operate has been 
claimed is the  Mox Plant case. The United Kingdom authorized operations of a 
mixed oxide fuel (MOX) p lan t located a t Sellafield B ritish nuclear facility near 
the coast of th e  Irish  Sea, resu lting  in discharges, and  related movements of 
radioactive m ate ria ls  into the Irish Sea. Ireland asked  ITLOS to suspend 
operation of th e  p lan t and  to take certain  o ther protective m easures pending 
constitu tion  of an  arb itra l tribunal un d er Annex VII to the 1982 UNCLOS to 
hear the case on the  m erits.
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Ireland claim ed, am ong other things, th a t the United Kingdom had  breached its 
obligations u n d e r Articles 123 and  197 of the 1982 UNCLOS by having failed to 
comply w ith the  obligation to co-operate with Ireland in the protection of the 
m arine environm ent of the Irish Sea. This was evidenced, inter alia, by refusing 
to share  inform ation, by refusing to carry ou t a  proper environm ental 
assessm en t of the  im pact on the m arine environm ent of the MOX Plant and 
associated activities, and  by proceeding to au thorise  the operation of the MOX 
plan t w hilst proceedings relating to the settlem ent of a  d ispute on access to 
inform ation were still pending.
Although the  T ribunal denied the provisional m easures requested  by Ireland in 
its Order of 3 D ecem ber 2001, it prescribed co-operation between the two 
States and, specifically, consulta tions on some m atters. This was based on the 
T ribunal’s recognition th a t  ‘the duty to co-operate is a  fundam ental principle in 
the prevention of pollution of the m arine environm ent un d er Part XII of 
UNCLOS and  general in terna tional law and th a t rights arise therefrom ...’ (para. 
82), such  as  th e  righ t to receive and exchange inform ation and  to enter into 
consultations.
As in the SBT cases, th e  Tribunal did not found its decision expressly on the 
precautionary principle, b u t referred to ‘prudence and  cau tion ’ which ‘require 
th a t Ireland an d  th e  U nited Kingdom co-operate in exchanging information 
concerning risk s  or effects of the operation of the MOX p lan t and  in devising 
ways to deal w ith them , as  app ropria te’ (para. 84).
The Tribunal u n an im o u sly  ordered the parties to co-operate and  specified how 
th is obligation w ould be im plem ented.30 The operative p a rt reads as follows:
Ireland and the United Kingdom shall co-operate and shall, for this purpose, enter into 
consultations forthwith in order to:
(a) exchange further information with regard to possible consequences for the Irish Sea 
arising out of the commissioning of the MOX plant;
(b) monitor risks or the effects of the operation of the MOX plant for the Irish Sea;
30 In 2003, in the Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of 
Johor, ITLOS once again unanim ously  ordered the S tates involved to co-operate and specified 
w hat th is obligation entailed for Malaysia and Singapore.
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(c) devise, as appropriate, measures to prevent pollution of the marine environment 
which might result from the operation of the MOX plant.
In a  jo in t declaration, Judges Caminos, Yamamoto, Park, Akl, Marsit, Eiriksson 
and  J e s u s  explain their decision:
More importantly, our position is a response to another characteristic of the dispute as 
presented to the Tribunal, that is, the almost complete lack of co-operation between the 
Governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom with respect to the environmental 
impact of the planned operations. It is clear that this state of affairs has its origin in a 
long-standing dispute with respect to other activities at the Sellafield site, but those 
activities are not before the Tribunal.
The Tribunal has identified the duty to co-operate as a fundamental principle in the 
regime of the prevention of pollution of the marine environment under Part XII of the 
Convention and general international law. Against the background of that duty, we 
regard the most effective measure that the Tribunal could have adopted was to require 
the parties to co-operate forthwith. It is not, we trust, an idle hope that the results of 
the consultations prescribed will include a common understanding of the scientific 
evidence and a common appreciation of the measures which must be taken with 
respect to the plant to prevent harm to the marine environment.
In a  separate  opinion, Ju d g e  M ensah went fu rther and  explained th a t in his 
view the p rocedural rig h ts  in question could in any event be enforced at a  later 
stage:
With regard to the ‘procedural rights’ (co-operation and consultation) which Ireland 
claims have been violated by the United Kingdom, I agree with the Tribunal that some 
at least of these are ‘rights’ that may ‘be appropriate for protection’ by provisional 
measures under Article 290 of the Convention (paragraph 82 of the Order). However, I 
do not find that any irreparable prejudice to Ireland has occurred or might occur before 
the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. In my view none of the violations of the 
procedural rights arising from the duty to co-operate or to consult or to undertake 
appropriate environmental assessm ents are ‘irreversible’ in the sense that they cannot 
effectively be enforced against the United Kingdom by decision of the Annex VII arbitral 
tribunal, if the arbitral tribunal were to conclude that any such violations have in fact 
occurred. For example, it would be within the competence of the Annex VII arbitral 
tribunal to order United Kingdom either to decommission the MOX plant altogether or 
to go back to the drawing board and take action to comply with any applicable 
procedural requirements that the arbitral tribunal finds should have been followed
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before giving final authorization for the MOX plant. Thus, in my view, the violations of 
the ‘procedural rights’ about which Ireland complains are capable of being made good 
by reparations that the arbitral tribunal may consider appropriate. I regret that the 
Tribunal did not consider it necessary to deal explicitly and directly with this aspect of 
the matter.
The case is still pending  before the Annex VII arb itration  tribunal. By Order 
No. 3 of 24 J u n e  2003 ,31 the Tribunal formally suspended  further proceedings 
due to a  challenge to its  ju risd iction .32 The arb itral tribunal also affirmed the 
provisional m easu res  ordered by ITLOS, and decided th a t no further order was 
required as to co-operation and  the provision of inform ation a t th a t stage.33 
Although the  T ribunal did no t address the issue of ‘adequacy and  tim eliness of 
the disclosure of certain  inform ation’ and ‘the character and extent of 
co-operation’, it b ased  its  decision on the increased m easure of co-operation 
developed betw een th e  parties  since the ITLOS order.34 Nevertheless, it 
expressed its concern  th a t  ‘su ch  co-operation and  consultation may not always 
have been as tim ely an d  effective as it could have been ’ (para. 66). Thus, the 
Tribunal recom m ended th e  parties  to seek to establish  fu rther arrangem ents at 
intergovernm ental level to address th is  concern, and  to undertake a general 
review of the system  of intergovernm ental co-operation as offered by the United 
Kingdom (paras. 48 an d  67).
As to the proceedings b rough t against Ireland by the Commission of the 
European C om m unities, th e  European  Court of Ju stice  gave judgm ent on 30 
May 2006.35 The C ourt found th a t it had  exclusive jurisd iction  under Article 
292 EC since th e  d isp u te  concerned the in terpretation  and  application of 
Com m unity law  issu es . The Court declared th a t, by institu ting  dispute 
settlem ent proceedings against the UK un d er the 1982 UNCLOS concerning the
31 Order No.3 - Suspension  of Proceedings on Jurisd iction  and  Merits, and Request for Further 
Provisional M easures.
32 By O rder No.4, of 14 November 2003, the Tribunal decided th a t the proceedings remain 
suspended un til the E uropean  C ourt of Justice  h as  given judgm ent on Community law issues.
33 As ITLOS, it based  the decision on the assu ran ces m ade by the United Kingdom 
Government. See p a ra .47.
34 Ireland con tinued  to argue th a t the UK had failed to consult and  co-operate fully and 
effectively. F u rth e r to detailing the procedural applications and  im plem entation of the general 
duty to co-operate, Ireland describes w hat it calls ‘the history of non-cooperation’ .
In the oral pleadings on 17 Ju n e  2003, the Attorney General of Ireland, Mr Rory Brady SC, 
explained th a t ‘In general, Ireland hopes that the T ribunal will establish  a framework for real and 
meaningful consu lta tion  between the parties, guided by the principles of UNCLOS.’
33 Case C -4 5 9 /0 3 , [2006] ECR 1-4635.
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MOX plan t, Ireland exercised a  competence which belongs to the Com m unity 
and  h a s  th u s  failed to fulfil its obligations u n d e r Articles 10 EC and  292 EC 
and  u n d e r  Articles 192 EA and  193 EA. The arb itra l tribunal proceedings can 
therefore be con tinued  if a t all only on a  greatly reduced  basis .36
This case proves th a t  even in the context of treaty  obligations, co-operation as 
such  requ ires  specific detail in order to be im plem ented. It also shows th a t the 
failure to com ply w ith it can be argued even if only one specific application has 
been disregarded . As the  obligation h as  a  strong political connotation, invoking 
its failure is u sed  as  an  effective political tool to obtain  support domestically 
and  as a  d iplom atic tool to exert pressure at the  in ternational level. In this 
context it is u se d  to em phasise  the breaching S ta te ’s conduct as it may imply 
the acting in  b ad  faith.
In ternational co u rts  an d  trib u n als  are faced with the difficult ta sk  of 
determ ining the  exact legal content of the obligation in cases brought before it. 
But as p rocedural obligations are often required to be im plem ented on a 
continuous basis , th e  jud ic ia l function seem s to imply a  rem inder to S tates 
th a t m ost issu e s  have to be resolved between the S tates them selves.37 
Moreover, detailed  prescrip tion  of procedures in some cases does not seem to 
be practicably possible.
6 .2 .4  B re a ch  o f  P roced u ra l R u les  for E m e r g e n c ie s
The risk  of w ater-re la ted  d isas te rs  h as  always existed, b u t in the p as t couple of 
decades in te rn a tio n a l efforts to dim inish it have been on the rise, mainly 
through d a ta  collection and  sharing , and  jo in t preventive action. In the period 
between 1990 an d  2001, over 2,200 w ater-related d isasters occurred 
worldwide: 35% in  Asia, 29% in  Africa, 20% in the  Americas, 13% in Europe, 
and  3% in  O ceania. More th a n  half of these were caused  by floods, 28% by 
w ater-borne an d  vector d isease outbreaks, and  11% by droughts.38
36 Since th is  judgm en t, the arb itra l tribunal h as  decided to suspend  until further notice the 
requirem ent th a t  the parties subm it periodic reports and  inform ation on the provisional m easure 
affirmed an d  the recom m endations m ade in its Order No.3.
37 See also su p ra  s .3 .2.6.7.
38 At http : / / w w w .unesco.org/w ater/ (last visited on 15.1.2007).
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Some of th e  cases a ttracting  wider public a tten tion  and  outrage are those 
resu lting  from the  breach  of the obligation to notify in  em ergencies,39 which is 
linked w ith th e  substan tive obligation to prevent, m itigate or eliminate harm . If 
notification is n o t given in a  timely fashion, the S tate will be held accountable 
for the  add itional dam age caused  by th is breach.
The 1997 UN W atercourses Convention provides both  for the obligation to 
notify Svithout delay and  by the m ost expeditious m eans possible’ and  to 
co-operate w ith  potentially  affected States and  com petent in ternational 
organizations to prevent, m itigate and eliminate h arm  by im mediately taking 
‘all p ractical m easu res  necessita ted  by the c ircum stances’ (Article 28(2) and 
(3)). A lthough in  th e  case of emergencies originated solely by n a tu ra l causes, 
the S tate w here th e  em ergency originated is likely no t to be liable for the 
harm ful effects in  o ther S ta tes,40 the breach of the obligation to notify and  to 
take the n ecessary  m easu res  to prevent, mitigate and  elim inate harm  will 
engage the responsib ility  of th a t S tate.41 This is the case, for example, of an 
emergency cau sed  by heavy ra ins where the w ater w ithhold in a  reservoir 
reaches a  very high  level w ith a  consequent increase of p ressu re  against the 
dam. In order to d im in ish  th is  pressure and to prevent the breaking of the 
dam, the u p s trea m  S tate  h a s  to release water in larger am ounts th an  u su a l by 
opening the safety  gates. If the  dam  State does not notify the dow nstream  State 
of the s ituation , app rop ria te  m easures are no t taken  and  dam age m ay be 
caused by the  su d d en  increase  of w ater discharge.
In Europe, two cases w hich have had  significant consequences illustrate 
different experiences. F irst, the  spill of pesticides by the  pharm aceutical 
com pany Sandoz in  th e  river Rhine in 1986, which led to closer co-operation. 
Secondly, th e  cyanide and  m ineral w aste spills from Rom anian m ines into 
different rivers in  2000.
39 See su pra  s .4 .3 .3 .
40 See infra s .6 .2 .7 .
41 See Article 28 of the 1994 ILC Draft Articles, com m .2 in fine.
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6 .2 .4 .1  The Sandoz A ccident
In ternational co-operation between the S tates of the International Commission 
for the  Protection of the Rhine against Pollution (ICPR)42 may be deemed a 
model, in p a rticu la r due to its overcoming difficult situations, such as the 
Sandoz acciden t in 1986. The 1976 Agreement for the  Protection of the Rhine 
against C hem ical Pollution, which was then  the m ain  legal instrum ent 
regulating pollution, w as inspired by Council Directive 7 6 /4 6 4 /E E C , of 4 May 
1976, on pollu tion  cau sed  by certain dangerous su b stan ces  discharged into the 
aquatic env ironm ent of the  European Com m unity.43 The w ater m anagem ent 
conceived in  th e  trea ty  w as based on the concept of the  hydrographic basin, 
which allowed a n  im provem ent of the w ater quality in the basin.
On 31 O ctober 1986, th e  pharm aceutical com pany Ciba-Geigy had  released 88 
gallons of A trazin, a  weed killer, into the Rhine River from a  treatm ent plant in 
Switzerland. According to Ciba-Geigy, its staff accidentally released pesticides 
into the river before they  h ad  been treated; b u t the  concentration of Atrazin, 
which is no t a  pow erful poison, w as low and did not kill the fish.
The next day, a  fire broke ou t a t a  riverside storage building at the Sandoz 
plan t in Schw eizerhalle, a  chem ical company in Basel, Switzerland, and  spilled 
an  enorm ous d ischarge of toxic chem icals, including 8 tons of m ercury, into 
the Rhine River. The w ater u sed  to p u t out the fire carried 10 to 30 tons of toxic 
substances in to  th e  river. At least 34 different chem icals were w ashed into the 
Rhine, some of w hich m ay have fused into new com pounds as a  resu lt of the 
high tem p era tu re s  c reated  by the fire. The chem icals included dyes, 
insecticides an d  m ercury.
On 11 November 1986 only, the  W ater Safety A dm inistration authorities in 
Basel, Sw itzerland, an n o u n ced  th a t the day before the  Sandoz well-publicised 
accident an o th e r acciden tal leak of toxic chem icals h ad  spilled into the Rhine 
River. Still in  November, France, West Germ any, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland, r ip a rian s  of the  Rhine, reacted very rapidly by taking defensive
42 For an  overview of the evolution of co-operation between the Rhine riparians, see, e.g. Irmer 
and Vogt (2001), 127-136.
43 This Directive h a s  been significantly am ended on several occasions, and was recently 
codified as  Directive 2 0 0 6 /1 1  /E C  of the European Parliam ent and  of the Council, of 15 February 
2006, OJ L 64, 52-59, 4.3.2006.
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action: all p lan ts  processing Rhine w ater for drinking were sh u t down, fishing 
in the river w as b an n ed  and sluices and  locks were closed to stop polluted 
w ater from contam inating  estuaries, stream s and  underground  w atercourses.
The issu e  of Swiss sta te  responsibility h as  never been raised  and  all claims for 
dam ages w ere resolved a t the private level.44 Not only did Sandoz settle the 
question of dam ages directly with the victims, b u t it also agreed to fund a 
m easuring  s ta tio n  on th e  river, a  station to alert the  populations and inform 
border tow ns, an d  to contribute to the restoration of the Rhine ecosystem.
After the  acc iden t a t  the Sandoz plant, the riparian  S ta tes decided to improve 
the em ergency w arn ing  and alert system  and  to elaborate a  strict liability 
regime to resolve th e  problem  of com pensating the victims, and  to set u p  a 
‘Program for A ction’ in th ree  stages aimed a t improving the  river w ater quality. 
In 1998, th e  p a rtie s  concluded the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine, 
the scope of w hich is m ore com prehensive th an  previous agreem ents. On the 
issue of em ergencies, it provides for the obligation to reduce the risk of 
pollution from  in c id en ts  or accidents and  to take the  requisite m easures in the 
event of an  em ergency (Article 4(e)). There is in particu lar an  obligation 
imm ediately to inform  th e  Com m ission and  the  other S tates liable to be 
affected, in accordance w ith the  w arning and  alert p lans coordinated by the 
Com mission, in  th e  event of incidents or accidents th a t m ight th reaten  the 
quality of th e  w ater of th e  Rhine or in the event of im m inent flooding (Article 
5(6)).
6 .2 .4 .2  The Baia Mare and Baia Borsa A ccidents
A more recen t exam ple of b reaches of the obligation to notify in emergencies in 
a  timely fash ion  is the  sequence of cyanide and  m ineral w aste spills from 
Rom anian m ines in to  the D anube catchm ent area .45
On 30 J a n u a ry  2000  a t ab o u t 10 p.m ., approxim ately 100,000 cubic m eters of 
liquid an d  su sp en d ed  w aste containing abou t 50 to 100 tons of cyanide, a 
leeching agen t u se d  to ex tract gold, as  well as  copper an d  other heavy metals,
44 On the liability aspects  of the  accident, see, e.g. Oliveira (1991).
http: / / w w w .m ineralresourcesforum .org/incidents/BaiaM are/#U N EP/O CH A  
http: / / w w w .zpok.hu/ cyanide/ baiam are/index.htm  (last visited on 15.5.2007).
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were spilled from a  Rom anian gold sm elter a t B aia Mare, Romania, into the 
rivers S asar, Som es and  the adjacent Lapus River. The toxic spillage then  
crossed  the  border into Hungary, and reached the Tisza River, a  tributary  of the 
D anube, an d  one of eastern  Europe’s largest and  formerly cleanest rivers. The 
cyanide w as carried  dow nstream  to the river D anube in Yugoslavia, and 
con tinued  th ro u g h  the Rom anian-Bulgarian frontier un til it reached the 
D anube d e lta  four w eeks later.
The cause  for th e  spill w as a  com bination of heavy ra in s and  rapidly melting 
snows, an d  a  new  poorly-designed tailings dam  a t the gold mine which 
ru p tu red  an d  for four days released contam inated w ater. 4&
The 1994 D anube Convention provides for an  early w arning system  and 
prescribes th a t  w hen a  sudden  increase of hazardous substances in the 
D anube river or in  w aters  w ithin its catchm ent area  is identified, the Principal 
In ternational Alert C enters (PIAC) in case of accidental pollution on the D anube 
River an d  th e  In te rn a tio n a l Commission should be informed immediately 
(Article 16(3)). Yet, approxim ately ten  hours were lost for unknow n reasons 
between the  tim e th e  local Environm ental Protection Agency Baia Mare (EPA) 
received notification of th e  spill from the m ining com pany and  the time the 
local R om anian W aters A uthority was informed. Once informed, however, the 
regional env ironm ent an d  w ater au thorities imm ediately acted and ordered the 
com pany to s top  activities and  close the breakage. They also informed Hungary 
about the  acc iden t 17 h o u rs  after it occurred, and  alerted local authorities 
dow nstream  ab o u t the  spill and  dangers in using  the river water. Local 
residen ts n ea r th e  source of the  spill were not inform ed as early as possible.
The UNEP m ission  w hich analysed the accident found th a t the early warning 
system  responded  adequately  to the spill. H ungarian au thorities confirmed tha t 
they were con tinuously  inform ed by Rom anian au thorities about the event and 
the degree of pollution. This allowed them  to alert all regional and local 
au thorities in  a  tim ely m an n er and  to take the necessary  m easures to minimise 
the im pact of th e  spill. The UNEP m ission concluded th a t timely information
46 For m ore details, see, e.g. Report on the C yanide Spill a t B aia Mare, Romania, March 2000, 
prepared by the  A ssessm ent Mission of UNEP/ Office for the Co-ordination of Hum anitarian 
Affairs (OCHA), at
h ttp :/ / www.m ineralresourcesfo rum .org /inc iden ts/B aiaM are /docs/final report.pdf. or its
sum m ary a t  http : / / w w w .rec.org/REC/Publications/CyanideSpill/EN G Cyanide.pdf (last visited 
on 15.5.2007).
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exchange an d  m easu res taken  by the Rom anian, H ungarian and  Yugoslavian 
au tho rities , including a  tem porary closure of the  Tisza lake dam , reduced the 
im pact of th e  spill. The estim ates of the degree of biological dam age and 
recovery given by the authorities and experts are, however, very variable.
There were several su bsequen t accidents. On 7 F ebruary  Rom anian authorities 
alerted th e  H ungarian  public by reporting a second spill of cyanide. On 10 
M arch, after a  dyke b u rs t in the Baia Borsa m ine of no rthern  Rom ania a spill of 
around  20 ,000  to n s  of m ineral waste polluted the  Vaser River, a  tribu tary  of 
the Tisza river, flowing in Ukraine and through H ungary. On 14 March 2000 
another dam  failure occurred a t the Baia Borsa heavy m etal mine. Hungary did 
not receive any  early  notification from Romania.
The EU ta sk  force w hich assessed  the damage concluded th a t existing accident 
p lans for em ergencies and  m easures taken  by the  com pany and local 
au thorities w ere insuffic ien t and  inadequate, considering the large am ount of 
hazardous m ate ria ls  u sed  close to populations and  the river system. Hence, the 
Rom anian S ta te  violated bo th  the  obligation to notify in em ergencies as well as 
the substan tive  obligation to prevent, mitigate or elim inate harm . These 
in ternational acc iden ts , w ith potential long-term effects for the population and 
environm ent, h ighlight th e  need for a  prom pt early w arning system  and an 
effective em ergency prevention and  response planning, which includes the 
timely notification of potentially  affected States.
H ungary claim ed liability against the A ustralian m ining com pany for the 
dam age cau sed  by th e  J a n u a ry  cyanide spill.47 It claim ed the spill killed 1,241 
tons of fish in  H ungary  alone and  th a t it was the w orst case of pollution in the 
region since th e  1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident in Ukraine. The claim for 
com pensation included  the  costs of averting im m ediate damage, damage 
assessm en t costs , long-term  losses in the area 's wildlife, expected rehabilitation 
costs and  fu rth e r econom ic disadvantage due to the  dam age. It seems possible 
th a t H ungary  h a s  also considered starting  proceedings against the Romanian 
p artn er in  th e  jo in t ven tu re  and  the Rom anian S tate for com pensation.
47 E.g., The Sydney M orning Herald, of 11 Ju ly  2000.
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S ubsequen t to the  Sandoz and  the Chernobyl accidents, European States 
recognised the  need  to regulate international liability in case of accidents and 
concluded som e regional treaties on the subject.48 In addition, in the afterm ath 
of the acciden ts in Rom ania, the Commission of the European Com m unities 
has p u sh ed  ah ead  w ith its p lans to introduce a  stric t liability regime for 
environm ental dam age caused  by hazardous activities based  on the polluter 
pays principle.49
6 .2 .5  D a m a g e , L ia b ility , a n d  F orm s o f  R ep a ra tio n
The ILC w orked on the  topic of Responsibility of S tates for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts for ab o u t 45 years and  in 2001 adopted a  set of Articles, at its 
fifty-third session, together w ith com m entaries.50 These Articles codify the law 
on the subject an d  it is th u s  the  m ost useful set of articles reflecting the 
cu rren t s ta te  of the  law.
The elem ents of liability th a t  need to be presen t for the purposes of reparation 
are the in ternationally  w rongful act, the  existence of injury, which includes any 
m aterial or m oral dam age, an d  causation .51 The obligation to make full 
reparation  arises to a  S tate  w hen all the conditions for responsibility are met 
and  there are no c ircu m stan ces  excluding it.
The ru les of s ta te  responsib ility  help in m easuring  the  degree of diligence of the 
S ta te’s conduct,52 an d  consequently  the  level of com pensation th a t m ight have 
to be paid. B u t th e  conduct of the affected S tate m ay also be relevant for 
determ ining liability.53 The contribution  to the in jury  by the injured State or
48 See infra s.6 .3 .1 . On the im pact of the Chernobyl accident on the S ta tes’ perception of 
international responsibility  for tran sb o u n d ary  damage, see Politi (1991).
49 In particu lar, Directive 2 0 0 4 /3 5 /CE, of 21 April 2004, on environm ental liability with regard 
to the prevention an d  rem edying of environm ental damage. See infra s.6.3.1.
See also the C om m ission staff working paper -  Liability and  Redress Regimes in Multilateral 
Environm ental Agreem ents (MEAs), S E C /2 0 0 6 /1131 final, available at 
http: / / eur-lex .europa.eu  /
50 Due to the im portance of the topic, the ILC recom m ended to the UNGA th a t it consider the 
possibility of convening an  in ternational conference of plenipotentiaries to examine the articles 
with a view to adopting  a  convention.
51 See Article 31 of the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility.
52 Okowa (1996), 332-3.
53 See Article 39 of the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility.
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other person  or entity, although it does not preclude w rongfulness, is relevant 
for determ ining  the  form and  extent of reparation. This m ay be illustrated  by 
the  case w here a  S tate is notified immediately of an  emergency, such  as the 
b reak  of a  dam  upstream , b u t takes inadequate m easu res to m inim ise the 
dam age, aggravating it instead.
Several rem edies are available to States for conduct in violation of an  
in terna tional obligation by another State. In the  case of a  breach of a  treaty 
rule, the  responsib ility  arises irrespective of th is being expressly provided for in 
the treaty. A p a rty  or parties to a  treaty m ay be entitled to term inate or 
w ithdraw  from  it or su sp en d  its operation in the event of a  m aterial breach .54 A 
‘m aterial b re a c h ’ co n sis ts  of a  repudiation of the  treaty  no t sanctioned by the 
1969 V ienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, or the  violation of a  provision 
essential to th e  accom plishm ent of the object and  purpose  of the treaty ,55 and it 
includes a fortiori a  fu n d am en ta l breach, i.e., ‘one w hich goes to the root of the 
trea ty ’.56
In addition, th e  w ronged S tate m ay ask  for the cessation  of the wrongful 
conduct and  a s su ra n c e s  an d  guaran tees th a t the conduct concerned will not 
be repeated. The in ju ring  S tate is then  obliged to adopt m easures to prevent 
the recurrence of th e  b reach . In practice, th is is u sually  a  question of insisting 
on the perform ance of th e  obligation or of resum ption  of appropriate conduct. It 
is not m erely a  m a tte r  of illegality b u t also of concrete h arm  caused  to the legal 
in terest of th e  c la im an t S tate  giving rise to a claim of reparation  or of the right 
to m ake a  claim . Even if th e  claim  is not actually  m ade, th is  right is usually  
asserted  in a  form al no te  of p ro test.57
The form s of rep ara tio n  or counter-m easures u sed  for cases involving 
in terna tional w atercou rses are those generally u sed  in o ther areas of 
in terna tional law. The cla im an t S tate m ay carry ou t retorsion, i.e., a  penalty 
which does n o t en ta il any  unlaw ful m easure, e.g., a  decision not to offer 
financial help. It m ay also seek satisfaction th rough  a  formal apology, nom inal
54 See Articles 60(1) an d  (2) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties concerning 
the m aterial b reach  of a  bilateral or m ultilateral treaty, respectively.
55 See Article 60(3) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The determ ination of 
the breach obviously depends on the circum stances of the case.
56 A ust (2000), 239.
57 Brownlie (1983), 22.
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com pensation  or an  expression of regret, usually  in addition to other remedy in 
the case of a  b reach  of a  treaty  rule.
The in ju red  S tate  is also entitled to ask, when possible, for restitu tion  (restitutio 
in integrum). The ICJ in the Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project case, quoting the 
PCIJ’s Ju d g m e n t of 13 Septem ber 1928 in the Chorzow Factory case, explained 
th a t ‘rep a ra tio n  m u st, as  far as possible, wipe ou t all the  consequences of the 
illegal ac t an d  re-estab lish  the situation which would, in all probability, have 
existed if th a t  ac t h ad  no t been com m itted’.58 In th is  case, the Court considered 
th a t consequences of the  wrongful acts of both  Parties would be wiped out ‘as 
far as po ssib le ’ if they  would resum e co-operation in the utilisation of the 
shared  w ater reso u rces  of the D anube, and  if the m ulti-purpose programme, in 
the form of a  co -ord inated  single un it, for the use, developm ent and protection 
of the w atercourse  w as im plem ented in an  equitable and  reasonable m anner 
(para. 150).
This leads u s  to th e  m o st com m on rem edy in cases of transboundary  damage. 
As a form of rep ara tio n , the  paym ent of com pensation, including interest, 
corresponds to a  financial a ssessm en t of the wrong done. It is th u s  associated 
with ac tual dam age to p roperty  and  persons.
In the Gabcikovo Nagym aros Project case, both  S ta tes claim ed to have suffered 
considerable financial losses and  both claim ed pecuniary  com pensation for 
them . The ICJ found  th a t  since both  Parties com m itted internationally  wrongful 
acts, w hich gave rise to the  dam age susta ined  by the  Parties,59 Hungary and 
Slovakia were b o th  u n d e r  an  obligation to pay com pensation and  were both 
entitled to ob ta in  com pensation . However, due to the  fact th a t there had  been 
intersecting w rongs by bo th  Parties, the C ourt observed th a t the issue of 
com pensation could  satisfactorily  be resolved in the  fram ework of an  overall 
settlem ent if each  of the  Parties were to renounce or cancel all financial claims 
and  counter-claim s (para. 153).
58 PCIJ, Series A, No. 17, 47. The concept of restitu tion is not uniform ly defined. Article 35 of 
the 2001 ILC Articles on S tate Responsibility defines restitu tion  as  the re-establishm ent of the 
situation w hich existed before the wrongful act was com m itted, th a t is, the s ta tu s  quo ante. For 
an  explanation for the u se  of th is norrower definition, see Crawford (2002), 213-7. Article 35 
specifies th a t th is  obligation exists when it is not m aterially impossible and does not involve a 
burden ou t of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitu tion  instead  of compensation.
59 Sohnle criticises the ICJ for basing its decision on the classic concept of damage rather than 
broadening its scope to include ‘ecological dam age’, which is related to risk. See Sohnle (2002), 
359.
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Finally, th e  w ronged State may respond to a  m aterial b reach  of a  treaty rule by 
no t com plying w ith one or more of its obligations u n d e r the treaty .60 In fact, ‘an 
otherw ise unlaw ful ac t loses its unlawful character w hen it is taken  in response 
to an  un law fu l a c t’.61 The diversion of the D anube by Slovakia m ay be deemed a 
co u n te rm easu re  to the  suspension  of works by Hungary. B ut the ICJ asserted  
th a t H ungary  h a d  a  right to an  equitable p a rt of the  w ater resources of the 
D anube, a n d  th a t  th e  diversion by Slovakia did no t respect the degree of 
proportionality  th a t  w as required  for it to be justifiable (para. 85).
6 .2 .6  P r e v e n t iv e  A c t io n  b efore D am age
As m entioned above, liability arises from the existence of an  internationally 
wrongful act, in ju ry  an d  causation . B ut w hat if dam age h as  not, or not yet, 
occurred? W hat can  or shou ld  a  State do? For example, in the situation where 
a  S tate h a s  n o t notified o ther S tates of p lanned works which m ay affect those 
dow nstream , sh o u ld  th e  potentially affected S tates, after finding out about 
these p lans, a sk  to be notified and  be given inform ation from the planning 
State regard ing  th e  pro ject an d  ask  to en ter into consultations?
Potentially affected S ta tes  often react by way of diplom atic action, for instance, 
a formal note of p ro test. In reality, the question here is not w hether a State 
which h a s  n o t yet suffered dam age m ay act upon  the  circum stances, bu t ra ther 
if these could generate  responsibility  on the p a rt of the planning State prior to, 
or irrespective of, th e  occurrence of ac tual dam age w hen th is  is likely to occur.
In the case w here th e  p lann ing  State does not react, the  potentially affected 
State does n o t have to w ait u n til dam age actually  occurs to bring proceedings 
before a  co u rt or a rb itra l trib u n a l because there is an  obligation to prevent 
significant tra n sb o u n d a ry  harm , such  as in cases of hazardous activities, 
which are now  increasingly  covered by an  objective regime.62 A recent example
60 In the G abcikovo-N agym aros Project case, the ICJ held th a t four conditions had to be met for 
coun term easu res to be justified, see ICJ Reports, 7, a t p a ra s .82-7.
61 A ust (2000), 303. See also Ch.II of the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, and in 
particu lar Article 52, w hich lays down the injured S ta te’s obligation to notify the responsible 
State of the decision to take counterm easures and to offer to negotiate.
62 See infra s .6.3.
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is the Mox Plant case brought by Ireland before ITLOS for provisional 
m easu res.63
Proceedings are m ore likely to be brought in the  context of non-com pliance 
with treaty  obligations, such  as  the case brought by Argentina against Uruguay 
regarding the  con stru c tio n  of two pulp mills.64 Moreover, as happened in these 
two cases, th e  potentially  affected State may also ask  for provisional m easures 
in the event of an  im m inent th reat.
In case of a  b reach  of an  in ternational obligation, su ch  as the violation of a 
procedural obligation, there  is often no direct proof of specific financial loss or 
th is  is very difficult to obtain. Although the violation is actionable, States 
usually  seek som e form of satisfaction. As with dom estic legal system s, 
reparation m ay be sough t or aw arded for ‘political’ or ‘m oral’ injury.
Under EC law, the  m ere violation of a  Com m unity law rule is often sufficient to 
allow stand ing  before th e  EC J, and  it is no t necessary  to dem onstrate th a t the 
claim ant suffered dam age. A Member S tate m ay bring an  action to the ECJ 
p u rsu an t to Article 227 of the  EC Treaty in the event of another Member State 
not fulfilling its  obligations.
In different s itu a tio n s  directly affected S tates have pro tested  for not having 
been notified no r consu lted  an d  have asserted  th is  right, which has been 
increasingly h o noured  by o ther S tates as they decide on how to proceed.66 This 
w as the case of th e  GAP Project on th e  E uphra tes  and  Tigris Rivers, where after 
pro test from Syria an d  th re a ts  from Iraq, Turkey agreed to provide information 
on the project, as  well a s  w ith the Itaipu dam  on the P arana  River, the m ost 
im portan t river in  th e  P ra ta  system , where Argentina pro tested  and  diplomatic 
relations w ith Brazil an d  Paraguay were stra ined  for some tim e.66
In both cases, the  defaulting S ta tes have not ignored p ro test b u t have rejected 
the claim  an d  have denied the  breach of any obligation. They affirmed their 
right to ac t un ila tera lly  and , according to them , their reason  for providing
63 See su pra  s .6 .2 .3 .2 .
64 See su pra  s .3 .2 .6 .6 .
66 Kirgis (1983), 375.
66 See su pra  s .4 .1 .1 . For the Itaipu case, see also s. 1.3.1.
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inform ation and  consulting was to conform to the principle of good 
neighbourliness and  to contribute to m ain tain ing  peace in the region. In 
addition, Brazil counter-argued  th a t the obligation of prior notification and to 
consu lt p rio r to final decisions were m ade and  the project im plem ented would 
call into question  the  S ta te ’s sovereignty over its n a tu ra l resources. Brazil 
nevertheless repeatedly  recognised the obligation not to cause significant harm .
S ubsequen t developm ents were different in the  two examples. In the GAP 
Project case, th e re  were no negotiations betw een the  S tates involved and 
dam age m ay con tinue  to occur today. But with the Itaipu case, after a long and 
com plicated diplom atic an d  negotiating history, the th ree S tates concluded the 
1979 T ripartite  A greem ent on P arana River Projects, which integrates the 
different dam  projects on the  P arana  River as well as  navigation. This is despite 
the fact th a t  the  1973 T reaty of Itaipu, concluded between Brazil and  Paraguay 
to regulate the  Ita ipu  project, h ad  been in force and  the construction of the 
dam  had  already b e g u n . 67
In practical term s, since the  Ita ipu project, once im plem ented, w as not likely to 
be removed, th is  m ean t th a t  Brazil was considering not complying with the 
obligation no t to cau se  significant h arm  b u t to provide com pensation for the 
dam age caused . This in  essence m eans th a t a lthough Brazil recognised the 
obligation, it w ould n o t respect the  prevention aspect b u t would accept liability 
for any in jury  caused .
The tripartite  agreem ent seem s to have been concluded because of official 
pro test from an o th e r rip a rian  and  its  legal argum ents. Since there are m any 
in terests a t s tak e  an d  th ere  is a  need for co-operation on other basins by 
entering into su b seq u en t agreem ents, S tates recognise the need to m aintain 
good neighbourly  relations. T hus, p ro test m ay lead directly to negotiations, 
ra th er th a n  co n su lta tio n s ,6s and  eventually perh ap s also to paym ent of an 
indem nity.
67 The 1973 Treaty of Itaipu  creates Itaipu Binacional, a  binational power facility in charge of 
the construction  an d  operation of the power plant. Itaipu B inacional commenced its work on 17 
May 1974, an d  the hydro-electric power p lan t was officially inaugura ted  on 25 October 1984.
68 For the difference between consultations and  negotiations, see supra  s.4.5.1.
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Some au th o rs  have draw n a  parallel between the H arm on Doctrine and  Brazil’s 
co n s tan t objection to the existence of these procedural ru les.69 B ut Brazil, 
a lthough  still n o t recognising these obligations, voted in favour of the 1997 UN 
W atercourses Convention, like Uruguay, while Argentina, Bolivia and  Paraguay 
absta ined .
It m ay also  be argued  th a t Brazil, by negotiating with Argentina after the 
protest, an d  concluding  a  treaty, recognised implicitly the obligation to notify. 
Here p ro test seem ed to have a  vital im portance, because it triggered the 
initiation of th e  p rocess of negotiation. B ut Brazil h as  arguably acted 
consistently  in its  position in relation to procedural obligations, and  th u s  in the 
context of em erging ru le s  of custom ary law m ay claim  to be a  persisten t 
objector. The fact th a t  it en tered  into agreem ents after protest does not 
necessarily m ean  th a t  it implicitly recognised those ru les as compulsory.
6 .2 .7  C ir c u m s ta n c e s  E x c lu d in g  R e sp o n s ib ility
There are c ircu m stan ces  w hich m ay exclude the responsibility of S tates for 
breach of an  in te rn a tio n a l obligation and  th u s  from the  need for reparation. 
They are exceptional by n a tu re  and  provide a  justification or excuse for 
non-com pliance so long as  the circum stance in question su b sis ts .70 As soon as 
the factors causing  th e  non-perform ance cease to exist, the  duty  to comply with 
the obligation re su m e s .71 These circum stances include force majeure or Act of 
God,72 for exam ple n a tu ra l ca tastrophes, such  as floods and  earthquakes, or 
those caused  by h u m a n  action, such  as arm ed conflict or strikes.
Necessity is an o th e r excuse recognised by custom ary  in ternational law and 
th u s  excluding responsib ility .73 It consists of c ircum stances where the only 
m eans for a  S ta te  to ‘safeguard  an  essential in te rest th reatened  by a grave and
69 E.g. McCaffrey (2001), 265.
70 Crawford (2002), 160.
71 Unless they have led to a  fundam ental change of c ircum stances th a t would excuse further 
perform ance indefinitely.
72 See Article 23 of the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility.
73 Article 25 of the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility defines the conditions th a t m ust 
be cum ulatively satisfied.
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im m inent peril is, for the  time being, not to perform  some other in ternational 
obligation of lesser weight or urgency’.74
In the  Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case,75 the ICJ did no t consider th a t the 
‘s ta te  of ecological necessity’ invoked by H ungary justified  the suspension and 
ab an d o n m en t of the  works agreed to under the  1977 Treaty (para. 40). The 
Court did consider th a t an  ‘essential in terest’ of the S tate h ad  been affected by 
the project, nam ely  its  n a tu ra l environment. B ut after analysing the particular 
situation , th e  C ourt found th a t the elem ents of ‘grave and  im m inent peril’ 
alleged by H ungary  were no t present (paras. 52-7). It fu rther added th a t 
H ungary b ased  its  a rgum ents on uncertainties as  to the  ecological im pact of the 
barrage system . The C ourt observed that, even if a  s ta te  of necessity  was found 
to exist, it w as n o t a  g round for the term ination of a  treaty. It could only be 
invoked to exonerate  from its responsibility a  S tate which had  failed to 
im plem ent a  tre a ty  (para. 101). The Court also held th a t H ungary could have 
acted differently in  o rder to protect its interest, since the initial project also 
gave it som e contro l over the  allocation of water. Thus, Hungary h ad  also 
contributed to th e  alleged s ta te  of necessity and  th u s  could not now rely on it 
(para. 56 in fine  a n d  57).
O ther c ircu m stan ces  arising  from the action of the affected S tate may exclude 
its responsibility. T hese include consent for the injury, as well as self-defence 
and lawful co u n te rm easu res .76 S tates may agree to exclude responsibility,77 for 
example by providing for the paym ent of an  am ount prior to the conclusion of 
works by way of com pensation .78
None of these  ju stifica tio n s  exem pt S tates from the obligation to co-operate, in 
particu lar to notify, an d  to m itigate or eliminate harm , in emergencies.
There are, however, two cases in which failure to co-operate between States is 
provided for in  the  1997 UN W atercourses Convention.
74 Crawford (2002), 178.
75 See su pra  s .3 .2 .6 .5 .
76 See Articles 20 to 22 of the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility.
77 See Article 20 of the 2001 ILC Articles on S tate Responsibility, and, e.g. Article 23 of the 
1956 Rhine Convention between France and Germany and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol.
78 See, e.g. Article 1 of the Additional Protocol between USSR and Finland to the 1959 Lake 
Inari Agreement.
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One case re la tes to the exceptional c ircum stances w here there is no direct 
con tact betw een the States. Article 30 of the  1997 UN W atercourses 
Convention, concerning indirect procedures, applies in cases where there are 
‘serious obstac les to direct contacts between w atercourse S ta tes’, e.g. where 
parties do n o t m ain ta in  diplomatic relations or are in arm ed conflict.79
The second case is foreseen in Article 31 of the Convention, which sets forth an 
exception to th e  obligation of provision of da ta  and  inform ation in the cases 
where th ese  are Vital to national defence or security ’. To avoid a situation 
where the  potentially  affected State would T)e left entirely w ithout inform ation’ 
concerning possib le adverse effects,80 Article 31 qualifies th is  exception by 
providing th a t  S ta tes  have an  obligation to co-operate in good faith Svith a  view 
to providing a s  m u ch  inform ation as possible u n d er the  c ircum stances’. This 
Article in tends, in  fact, to achieve a  balance between the need for 
confidentiality of sensitive inform ation, on the one hand , and  the need for 
inform ation concerning  potentia l adverse effects of p lanned m easures, on the 
other.81 It shou ld  be po in ted  ou t th a t, un less  there is a s ta te  of necessity, S tates 
may not invoke th is  exception in the event of a  b reach  of the principles of 
equitable and  reasonab le  utilisation  or of prevention of significant 
tran sb o u n d ary  harm .
Principle 6(2) of 1978 UNEP Principles on Shared N atural Resources h as  a 
more general scope. It s ta te s  th a t
In cases where the transm ission of certain information is prevented by national 
legislation or international conventions, the State or States withholding such 
information shall nevertheless, on the basis, in particular, of the principle of good faith 
and in the spirit of good neighbourliness, co-operate with the other interested State or 
States with the aim of finding a satisfactory solution.
The first p a rt in  p a rticu la r led to Article 8 of the 1992 Helsinki W atercourses 
Convention, w hich also provides an  exception for the protection of information. 
B ut it goes fu rth e r by specifying the  type of inform ation excepted, th a t is,
79 See infra s .4 .3 .1 .6 .
80 Article 31, com m ., of the 1994 ILC Draft Articles.
81 Idem.
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inform ation related  to intellectual property, including industria l and 
com m ercial secrecy, or national security. This exception was included and 
developed in su b seq u en t treaties.82
6 .3  S tr ic t  R e s p o n s ib i l i ty
Objective or s tr ic t responsibility is based on the doctrine of the voluntary act, 
i.e., ‘provided th a t  agency and  causal connection are established, there is a 
breach of d u ty  by re su lt alone’.83 It characterizes only some special regimes, 
such  as  those  of licit activities th a t carry serious risks by their own natu re  of 
causing som e dam age to the  territory of other S tates or to their environment.
The purpose of special regim es is to protect the potential affected persons or 
S tates from th e  h a za rd s  of industries  and to facilitate their right of reparation, 
since often it is very difficult for the claim ant to obtain evidence of fault. The 
basis for com pensation  lies no t on the fault or negligence of the State b u t on 
risk. N onetheless, if negligence or fault is proved as well as causation, then  the 
general regime of responsib ility  applies.
H azardous activ ities im ply an  obligation of due diligence. In con trast to 
responsibility for w rongful acts, it is the result, the dam age caused, and  not the 
S ta te’s conduct, th a t  engages its in ternational responsibility. As to the damage 
caused, it is th e  cau sa tio n  from a  hazardous activity th a t is relevant. Hence, 
the bu rden  of proving fau lt does no t lie with the claim ant. Moreover, there are 
very few ju stifica tions. Even if the  person solely responsible for the damage is a 
private person , th e  S tate  h a s  residual responsibility, th a t is, it has to ensure 
full paym ent of com pensation  in case the am ount paid by the private person’s 
in surance is insufficient.
82 See, e.g. Articles 12(5) and  (6), and 13 of the 1994 D anube Convention.
83 Brownlie (1983), 38.
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6 .3 .1  In te r n a t io n a l W ater-re la ted  T r e a tie s  P ro v id in g  for a S p ec ia l  
R eg im e
As to in te rn a tio n a l w ater resources, it is the  general regime th a t usually  
applies, desp ite  a ttem pts  to create a  special regime of strict responsibility for 
the p ro tection  of freshw ater against accidental pollution. When im portant 
econom ic in te re s ts  are a t stake, S tates are very re lu c tan t to accept a regime of 
prima facie  liability, where fault and  negligence do no t need to be proven.
In 1979 th e  IDI proposed  in Article VI(b) of its A thens Resolution on Pollution 
that,
With a view to ensuring an effective system of prevention and of compensation for 
victims of transboundary pollution, States should conclude international conventions 
concerning in particular:
(b) the procedure for special arrangements providing in particular for objective liability 
systems and com pensation funds with regard to pollution brought about by 
ultrahazardous activities.
If created, th e  regim e w ould be applicable in relation to dangerous activities 
and  dam age cau sed  to the  environm ent. These would include nuclear 
accidents; pollu tion from  hydrocarbons; highly toxic substances or radioactive 
waste; or th e  deposit of chem ical or bacteriological w eapons in the vicinity of 
w ater resources.
In Europe, som e regional in terna tional in stru m en ts  providing for a strict 
liability regim e have been  adopted. Once im plem ented, such  a  regime has the 
effect of im plem enting  in terna tional responsibility in dom estic law, and  sets up  
a direct legal re la tionsh ip  betw een the in jured  S tate and  the na tu ra l or legal 
person u n d e r  th e  in ju ring  S ta te ’s jurisdiction.
In line w ith th e  p u rp o se  of the  IDI, b u t w ith wider scope, the Convention on 
Civil Liability for D am age Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the 
Environm ent w as e laborated  in the am bit of the  Council of Europe and signed 
a t Lugano in  1993. This regional convention im poses a  stric t liability regime for 
dangerous activities or su b stan ces  on the operator of the activity concerned, or 
in the case of perm anen tly  deposited w aste, on the  operator of the site. The
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Convention does no t set a financial limit of liability. Recovery is assu red  by 
com pulsory in su ran ce  or other financial security.
A lthough th is  Convention only requires three ratifications to enter into force, 
only Portugal h a s  so far ratified. This is easily explained. Portugal is a 
dow nstream  S ta te  in relation to five river basins shared  with Spain,84 its sole 
neighbour, a n d  it does no t have any nuclear power plant.
In the am bit of UNECE, 22 of the State Parties to the 1992 Helsinki 
W atercourses Convention and  the 1992 Industria l Accidents Convention have 
adopted in  Kiev, on 21 May 2003, the Protocol on Civil Liability and 
C om pensation for D am age C aused by the T ransboundary  Effects of Industrial 
Accidents on T ran sb o u n d ary  States. As with o ther in stru m en ts  concluded 
within ECE, any  o ther UN Member State m ay accede to the Protocol. The 
agreem ent w as drafted  tak ing  into account the experience with other 
in ternational civil liability in stru m en ts  which have failed to en ter into force. 
The Protocol is n o t yet in  force.85
The objective of th e  Protocol is ‘to provide for a  com prehensive regime for civil 
liability and  for ad eq u a te  and  prom pt com pensation for dam age caused by the 
transboundary  effects of in d u stria l accidents on transboundary  w aters’ (Article
1). It provides a  regim e com bining stric t liability and  fau lt-based  liability.
The individuals affected by the  transboundary  im pact of industria l accidents on 
in ternational w atercou rses, su ch  as fisherm en or owners of downstream  
waterworks, are given a  legal right to adequate an d  prom pt com pensation. 
Com panies are liable for acciden ts a t industria l installations, including tailing 
dam s -  su ch  as  th e  R om anian spill accidents86 - ,  and  during  transport through 
pipelines. The Protocol covers physical dam age, dam age to property, loss of 
income, the  cost of re in sta tem en t and  response m easures. In contrast to the 
1993 CE Lugano Convention, it sets financial lim its of liability depending on 
the risk  of the  activity (Article 9 and  Annex II, P art 1), i.e. the quantities of the 
hazardous su b s tan ce s  th a t are or m ay be p resen t an d  their toxicity or the risk 
they pose to th e  environm ent. In addition, it se ts  m inim um  limits of financial
84 Except for a  sh o rt s tre tch  of the River G uadiana in the south .
85 It requires 16 ratifications, b u t so far only Hungary h as  ratified it.
86 See su pra  s .6 .2 .4 .
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securities w hich operators have to establish to cover th is  liability. These consist 
of in su rance , bonds or other guarantees, including financial m echanism s 
providing com pensation in the event of insolvency (Article 11 and  Annex II, Part
2). The financial lim its of liability and  the m inim um  am ount of financial 
securities have been agreed by all the in terested  parties, including the 
in su ran ce  sector, and  aim  at being ‘realistic and  app rop ria te’.
In context of th e  E uropean  Union, Member S tates have to im plem ent Directive 
2 0 0 4 /3 5 /E C  of th e  European  Parliam ent and  of the Council, of 21 April 2004, 
on environm ental liability with regard to the prevention and  remedying of 
environm ental dam age.87 This directive provides for a  s tric t liability regime for 
environm ental dam age caused  by certain activities based  on the polluter pays 
principle. It does not, however, give private parties a  right of com pensation as a 
consequence of environm ental damage or of an  im m inent th rea t of such 
damage. Its se ts  o u t preventive and remedial action in case of environm ental 
damage or any  im m inen t th re a t of such dam age caused  by any of the 
occupational activities listed  in Annex III, as well as dam age or any im m inent 
th rea t of su ch  dam age to protected species and  n a tu ra l hab ita ts  caused by 
other occupational activities whenever the operator h as  been at fault or 
negligent. M em ber S ta tes  m ay m aintain  or adopt m ore stringent provisions in 
relation to the  preven tion  an d  remedying of environm ental damage, including 
the identification of add itional activities and  of additional responsible parties 
(Article 16).
As with o ther in te rn a tio n a l in stru m en ts  providing for preventive or remedial 
action, Article 15 lays down the obligation to co-operate between Member 
S tates where environm ental dam age affects or is likely to affect several Member 
States, including th ro u g h  the  appropriate exchange of inform ation. In addition, 
where environm ental dam age h as  occurred, the M ember State in whose 
territory the  dam age originates m u st provide sufficient inform ation to the 
potentially affected M ember S tates.
The form s of rep ara tio n  u sed  in the general regim es are not always suitable in 
the case of s tric t liability regimes, and  some alternative system s have been 
used. The m ost com m on form of reparation, restitutio in integrum, is not
87 OJ L 143, 30 .4 .2004, p.56-75.
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applicable since it is usually  difficult to stop the  dangerous activity from 
proceeding. W hat is sought from this regime is to reduce the negative effects by 
com pensating  the injured. In contrast to the general regime, the cause of 
dam age rem ains. It m ay be considered a  rough form of reparation by 
equivalent.
6 .3 .2  T h e  W ork o f  th e  ILC: P r ev en tio n  a n d  In te r n a tio n a l L iab ility  
fro m  T ran sb ou n d ary  Harm  C au sed  b y  H azard ou s A c t iv it ie s
In 2001, th e  ILC concluded its work on the Prevention of T ransboundary  Harm 
from H azardous Activities w ith a  set of 19 draft articles. This work was done in 
the context of th e  in terna tional liability for in jurious consequences arising out 
of acts no t p roh ib ited  by in ternational law, which also includes the Draft 
Principles on th e  Allocation of Loss in the Case of T ransboundary  Harm Arising 
O ut of H azardous Activities, concluded in 2006. This is because the objective of 
liability regim es is generally two-fold: to prevent dam age from occurring, on the 
one hand , an d  if dam age h a s  nevertheless occurred, to ensure th a t the original 
situation is resto red  an d  victim s com pensated.
The ILC recom m ended th e  UNGA to elaborate a  convention based on the draft 
articles. These concern  th e  tak ing  of preventive m easu res in respect of activities 
not prohibited by in te rn a tio n a l law which involve a  risk  of causing significant 
transboundary  h a rm  th ro u g h  their physical consequences. The activities 
covered include w orks on a  river basin , such  as dam s, or power plants.
The draft artic les p rescribe the  obligation to co-operate (Article 4) and the 
procedural obligations included in the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention 
adapted to include o ther type of circum stances. These include the obligation to 
notify risk  an d  a sse ssm en t (Article 8), including in em ergencies (Article 17), the 
obligation to en te r  in to  consu lta tions on preventive m easu res (Article 9) and to 
exchange inform ation concerning the activity (Article 12). B ut it goes further 
and  specifically requ ires im pact assessm ents, including environm ental im pact 
assessm en ts  (Article 7). It also sets out the obligation from the operator of the 
activity to ob ta in  prior au thorization from the S tate in the  territory or under the 
ju risd iction  or control of which the activity is p lanned  or is carried out (Article 
6 ) .
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As a regime of prevention which would be -  as it w as -  eventually followed by 
work on the allocation of loss, it does not provide any article dealing specifically 
with the issue  of responsibility  for the breach of the obligations it lays down. 
W hat followed, however, w as a  set of principles. These are general and residual 
in character as well as  being non-binding. The work of the ILC in th is field is 
clearly in tended to develop in ternational law, and  to provide guidance to S tates 
in respect of h azard o u s activities not covered by specific agreem ents. It 
suggests m atters  th a t  shou ld  be dealt with in such  agreem ents. Once again, 
while no t addressing  the  issue of state responsibility for the breach of 
procedural obligations, th e  ILC implicitly endorses in th is  context the general 
state responsibility regime it h ad  previously codified.
The Principles aim  a t en su rin g  prom pt and  adequate com pensation to victims 
of transboundary  dam age, and  preserving and  protecting the environm ent in 
the event of tran sb o u n d ary  dam age, ‘especially with respect to mitigation of 
damage to the environm ent an d  its restoration and  re in sta tem en t’ (Principle 3).
S tates ‘should’ en su re  th a t  dom estic legal system s provide for a  strict liability 
regime regarding h azard o u s  activities located w ithin their territory or under 
their ju risdiction or control (Principle 4(2)), and  th a t their judicial and 
adm inistrative bodies have prom pt, adequate and  effective rem edies available 
in the event of tran sb o u n d a ry  dam age (Principle 6(1)). Although the residual 
responsibility of S ta tes  is no t directly spelt out, Principle 4(5) stipulates th a t 
S tates should en su re  th a t  sufficient financial resources are available for the 
paym ent of adequate  com pensation.
Once again, p rocedural obligations as  response m easu res are set out in 
Principle 5. They becom e applicable upon the occurrence of an  ‘incident’ 
involving a  h azard o u s activity which resu lts  or is likely to result in 
transboundary  dam age. These include the obligation to notify, to consult with 
and ‘seek the co-operation of all S tates affected or likely to be affected’ to 
mitigate an d  elim inate the damage. Modelled on Article 28 of the 1997 UN 
W atercourses Convention, Principle 5(e) provides for assis tance  from com petent 
in ternational organizations and  other States.
In C o n c l u s i o n
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  a n d  A p p l i c a t i o n  o f  
t h e  P r i n c i p l e  o f  C o - o p e r a t i o n :  
E v o l u t i o n  a n d  C o n s o l i d a t i o n
The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics
are always so certain o f themselves, 
but wiser people so full o f doubts.
Bertrand Russell
Sharing the w aters of in terna tional w atercourses is inevitable. Although S ta tes’ 
perm anent sovereignty over all their n a tu ra l resources is a  generally accepted 
and  constantly  repeated  principle, sovereignty is lim ited by the principle of 
equitable and  reasonable u tilisa tion  and  by the principle of diligent prevention 
of significant tran sb o u n d ary  harm . S tates are positioned differently in relation 
to the w atercourse, an d  th e ir  activities m ay in consequence cause different 
kinds of im pact elsew here in  the basin. Moreover, since the geographical 
characteristics of river b as in s , as  well as the social and  economic needs of 
S tates differ, so does th e  precise m eaning of any S ta te ’s entitlem ent to 
equitable and  reasonable  u se  of the w aters of the  in ternational w atercourse.
The complex determ ination  of the  equitable and  reasonable use  requires the 
weighing of several re levant factors, which should  include, am ong others, the 
geographical, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological, and  other factors 
of a  n a tu ra l character, as  well as the effects of the u se  or u ses on the other 
co-riparian S tates. T hus, the  practical application of these general principles 
dem ands a  soph istica ted  level of co-operation. It requires S tates to take into 
account the in te re s ts  of neighbouring riparian  S tates, th u s  calling for 
compromise of righ ts and  in terests  by all. Yet, S tates m ay develop the river 
basin  in their territory  independently.
The theory of lim ited territorial sovereignty or integrity h a s  acquired the largest 
support in s ta te  practice on sharing of w ater resources, bilateral treaties,
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m ultilateral conventions, and  decisions of both  dom estic and  international 
courts and  tribunals . However, the theory of ‘com m unity of in te rests’, also 
known as the doctrine of common m anagem ent, is steadily gaining support at 
the in ternational level. It aim s a t obtaining an  optim um  utilisation of the w ater 
resources of the river b asin  in its entirety by using  an  integrated and jo int 
m anagem ent approach. In practical term s, th is  is a  very am bitious project as it 
involves a  very intensive level of co-operation. For instance, further to the 
procedural obligations indispensable for the im plem entation of the substantive 
principles, such  as the  obligation to notify p lanned  works, it requires the 
establishm ent of an  in stitu tio n a l framework.
The law of in ternational w atercourses has evolved in order to settle water 
d isputes peacefully and  to se t the framework for co-operative alternative 
solutions. Indeed, the h isto ry  of projects, negotiations and  d isputes proves th a t 
water is more likely to lead to in terna tional co-operation th a n  to conflict.
In th is context, the  principle of co-operation h as  been of fundam ental 
im portance. It h as  been affirm ed in conventions, treaties and  declarations, in 
in ternational decisions, relied on by States, and  incorporated in national laws 
and  decision-m aking practices. It h a s  continuously been a  dynamic source of 
other ru les of in ternational law. Its repeated u se  in in ternational instrum ents 
dem onstrates th a t S ta tes recognize co-operation as a  basis for other 
obligations. This is evidenced by the  m ultiple form s and  levels of co-operation 
in the practice of S tates, given precision and  procedures in countless treaties.
In the n ineteen th  century , m ost of the  treaties on in ternational w atercourses 
were prim arily concerned with navigation and  fishing. Subsequently, treaties 
sought to control o ther specific u ses, such  as irrigation, hydro-electric power 
generation, flood control, or prevention of pollution. If o ther w ater uses were 
m entioned in the treaty , they  were regulated only by reference to the principal 
purpose of th a t treaty.
Recently, an  increasing  nu m b er of treaties have been shifting the focus from 
the m ere allocation of w aters or the regulation of one specific use to an 
integrated m anagem ent approach  and  the estab lishm ent of jo in t commissions 
with wider pow ers and  functions. S tates recognize th a t in th is way they may 
atta in  the  optim al u tilisation  of the shared  w ater resources and  maximize the
310
benefits derived from them , while a t the sam e tim e they m ay better protect and  
preserve the river environm ent. In fact, recent trea ties dem onstrate a  trend 
towards the conclusion of fu rther and  m ore com prehensive agreem ents 
between basin  S tates, and  the adoption of m ore detailed rules regarding 
procedures and  co-operative action within a jo in t institu tional m echanism  or 
commission. They reveal multiple forms of co-operative action steadily 
becoming more intensive. Therefore, the developm ent of in ternational water 
resources h as  now become less limited by the artificial frontiers im posed by 
territorial sovereignty.
There have been several attem pts a t codification of the  law of in ternational 
w atercourses over the past fifty years, and  som e regional and  universal 
conventions have been concluded. Yet specific geographic conditions and  w ater 
uses have continued to encourage and  indeed to require particu lar 
in ternational agreem ents to ad just the in terna tional fram ework of these 
m ultilateral conventions to each particu lar case. This h a s  led to significant 
treaty practice in the field.
Nevertheless, m any international w atercourses are still no t governed by specific 
treaties. In effect, the river basins m ost likely to generate tension between 
riparians are those where there is no agreem ent governing the allocation of 
w ater am ong all basin  States. Examples of su ch  s itua tions of potential conflict 
include the  b asins of the G anges-B rahm aputra-M eghna, the Jordan-Y arm ouk, 
and the Tigris-Euphrates, where boundary d ispu tes  still exist. W ithout treaties 
regulating their relations concerning the tran sb o u n d ary  resource, the  S tates 
affected m u st rely instead on existing custom ary  in terna tional law and 
m ultilateral conventions, and  on occasional ad hoc unofficial arrangem ents.
Under in ternational law, the practical application of custom ary  in ternational 
rules, and  adherence to general principles, is m ore significant th an  any 
expression of acceptance in in ternational docum ents. Co-operation, being an 
obligation of conduct, derives from the substan tive  obligations as clearly 
evidenced by relevant in ternational in stru m en ts  an d  decisions as well as by 
other forms of s ta te  practice. It m ay be concluded th a t  there  is a  body of 
authority  th a t provides support for the proposition th a t S tates have a general 
obligation to co-operate with co-riparians regard ing  shared  international 
w atercourses. B ut the  problem  with th is  obligation is th a t even if formally
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binding it is som ew hat soft in character because of the  lack of precision as to 
w hat exactly is implied. This principle, by its na tu re , is m anifested through 
procedural obligations. These include the obligation to exchange da ta  and 
inform ation regularly, the  obligation to notify p lanned  m easures with possible 
adverse effects and  to notify the existence or the th re a t of emergency 
situations, and  the du ties to en ter into consu lta tions and  to negotiate 
concerning p lanned m easures.
The ‘Procedural Law of C o-operation’1 h as  evolved significantly over the last few 
decades. Most procedural obligations developed from recom m endations and 
rules of scholarly associations, and  gained consistency th rough  treaty practice.
International law requires the  system atic exchange of d a ta  and  inform ation on 
the w atercourse as a  m inim al form of co-operation. This obligation is provided 
in detail in some treaties, b u t in m any other in stances it is provided for in a 
program m atic way. In th is  case, even though acceptance of these provisions 
indicates the S tates w illingness to comply with the obligation, they leave the 
door open for S tates to restric t the  access to w ater d a ta  for political reasons.
In addition, the obligation to provide d a ta  and  inform ation on planned 
m easures is implied in notification. This obligation of prior notice, qualified for 
the situations where the proposed m easures m ay cause significant 
transboundary  adverse effects, h a s  evolved in s ta te  practice, and  h as  been 
assisted  by the World B ank policies and  good practices. The strengthening of 
the requirem ent to notify reveals th a t in terna tional organisations may 
contribute significantly to the  developm ent of in terna tional law.
The obligations to en ter into consultations and  to negotiate in good faith 
concerning p lanned m easu res  w hich m ay cause significant adverse effect have 
also evolved, alm ost pari passu . These obligations have been repeatedly 
affirmed in treaties and  o ther in ternational legal in stru m en ts , th u s  indicating 
an  increasing willingness of S tates to have recourse to these procedural rules 
in order to avoid conflict.
1 Higgins (1994), 136.
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From the exam ination of sta te  practice, recom m endations of conferences and 
resolutions of scholarly associations, and  the stud ies of experts, it may be 
concluded th a t the obligation to co-operate in regard to international 
w atercourses and  its applications is better fulfilled th rough  jo in t institu tional 
m echanism s or com m issions, as these are the  m ost effective channels of 
ongoing com m unication between States. A lthough bilateral and  m ultilateral 
w ater treaties continue to create these jo in t m echanism s or institu tions, 
international law at p resent still falls short of requiring  their establishm ent. 
S tates cannot be obliged to establish  jo in t in s titu tio n s  for any purpose or in 
any form -  even if their establishm ent is the best way to fulfil the international 
duty of co-operation.
Co-operation has nevertheless evolved no t only in scope b u t also in the variety 
of partic ipants dealing with w ater-related m atters: public participation is 
increasing in decision-m aking a t local, national an d  regional level. In addition, 
international organisations, which in the p as t have successfully contributed to 
the development of co-operation in different forms, have been actively involved 
with w ater issues, notably in the assessm en t of w ater resources, determ ining 
areas a t risk, and  investing in capacity-building worldwide.
Framework conventions, such as the 1992 UNECE Helsinki W atercourses 
Convention, of regional character, and  the 1997 UN W atercourses Convention, 
of universal character, play an im portan t role in  providing model ru les 
im plem enting the obligation to co-operate. The form er h a s  been successfully 
im plem ented in Europe and may serve as an  exam ple for o ther regions.
Although no t yet in force, the im portance of the  1997 UN W atercourses 
Convention should not be underestim ated . It h a s  undoub ted ly  served as a 
model for subsequen t regional treaties, such  as  th e  2000 Revised Protocol on 
Shared W atercourse System s in the Southern  African Developm ent Community 
(SADC), as well as particu lar bilateral and  m ultila te ral trea ties from different 
regions, such  as the 2002 Incom aputo Tripartite In terim  Agreement, or the 
1995 Mekong River Agreement. These follow very closely the 1997 UN 
W atercourses Convention in their general term s an d  occasionally even through 
replicating detailed requirem ents.
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Even if some of the  provisions of the Convention are progressive development 
ra ther th an  codification of ru les of custom ary  in ternational law, they 
indubitably serve as  persuasive policy guidelines -  also due to the fact th a t all 
S tates partic ipated in the trea ty ’s elaboration and  a ss is t in the interpretation 
of existing particu lar w atercourse treaties in the context of specific 
controversies.
Similarly, the work of codification and  progressive developm ent of international 
w ater resources law carried out by in ternational bodies, such  as  the ILC, and 
scholarly associations, such  as the ILA, will rem ain  an  im portan t source of 
guidance and  reference for S tates, in terna tional organizations, local 
governments, and  water professionals.
The breach of any one application of co-operation allows a  S tate to claim the 
breach of the overall obligation of co-operation with legal and  political 
consequences. Although the general ru les of s ta te  responsibility  usually  apply, 
damage directly linked to the breach is often difficult to prove un less  the 
breach leads to another breach of the ru les on sharing  of w ater resources. B ut 
non-co-operation or the failure to actively co-operate m ay prove to be 
detrim ental to the national in terests of the b asin  State: defaulting on its duties, 
the cost of lengthy proceedings and the deterioration of political relations have 
to be considered, as well as possible forms of reparation . Moreover, w ith 
increasing in ternational support for the  in tegra ted  an d  jo in t m anagem ent 
approach, m ore basin  States from all regions recognise the advantages of 
co-operation and  enter into particu lar trea ties providing for m ore precise rules 
regarding co-operation. The role of general ru les  on responsibility is th u s  
gradually narrow ing as the field is occupied by specific and  more easily 
enforceable rules.
As dem onstrated in th is  thesis, the obligation to co-operate in the law of 
in ternational w atercourses h a s  progressively evolved in its different 
applications and  forms tow ards a  m ore intensive level. S ta tes have consistently 
m anifested in their in terna tional practice the will to improve co-operation with 
their co-riparian States. As in the past, m ost S ta tes today choose co-operation 
over conflict, and  can see th a t co-operation is in the ir own long-term  interest as 
well as th a t of the  in terna tional com m unity.
Select Bibliography: Law
A-Khavari, A., and Rothwell, D. R. (1998), The ICJ and the Danube Dam Case: A 
Missed Opportunity for International Environmental Law?’, 22 Melbourne University 
Law Review  507-536
Alheritiere, D. (1985), ‘Settlement of Public International Disputes on Shared 
Resources. Elements of a Comparative Study of International Instruments’, 25 
Natural Resources Journal 701 -711
Anderson, D. (1998), ‘Negotiation and Dispute Settlem ent’ in Evans, M. D. (ed.), 
Remedies in International Law: The Institutional Dilemma. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
1 1 1 - 1 2 1
Andrassy, J. (1951), ‘Les relations internationales de voisinage’, 79 RdC, ii, 77-181
Andrassy, J. (1959), ‘L'utilisation des eaux internationales non maritimes (en dehors 
de la navigation)’, 1 Annuaire de I'Institut de Droit International 131-358
Aust, A. (2000), Modem Treaty Law and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press
Babovic, B. (1972), The Duty of States to Cooperate with One another in Accordance 
with the Charter’ in Sahovic, M. (ed.) Principles o f International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation. Belgrade/Dobbs Ferry, New York: The Institute 
of International Politics and Economics/Oceana Publications
Barandat, J ., and Kaplan, A. (1998), ‘International Water Law: Regulations for 
Cooperation and the Discussion of the International Water Convention’ in 
Scheumann, W. and Schiffler, M. (eds.), Water in the Middle East: Potential for 
Conflicts and Prospects for Cooperation. Berlin: Springer Verlag, 11-30
Barberis, J. A. (1986), ‘International Regulation of the Use of Water’, 9 Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law. International Relations and Legal Cooperation in General. 
Diplomacy and Consular Relations. Amsterdam: North Holland Pub., 406-409
Barberis, J . A. (1986), ‘L’exploitation hydroelectrique du Parana et l’Accord tripartite 
de 1979’, 32 Annuaire frangais de droit international 779-793
Barberis, J. A. (1992), ‘International Rivers’, 2 Encyclopedia o f Public International 
Law. Amsterdam: North Holland Pub., 1364-1368
Barboza, M. G. (1992), Na diplomacia, o trago todo da vida [In Diplomacy, the Whole 
Mark of Life]. Rio de Janeiro: Distribuidora Record
Baxter, R. R. (1964), The Law o f International Waterways. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press
Beach, H. L., et al. (2000), Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Resolution: Theory, 
Practice, and Annotated References. Tokyo: United Nations University Press
Bekker, P. H. F. (2006), ‘Argentina-Uruguay Environmental Border Dispute Before the 
World Court’, 10 ASIL Insight, Issue 11, also online at 
http: / / w w w .asil.org/in sigh ts/2006/05/in sigh ts060516.html
Bennet, L. L., Ragland, S. E., and Yolles, P. (1998), ‘Facilitating International 
Agreements Through an Interconnected Game Approach: The Case of River Basins’ 
in Just, R. E. and Netanyahu, S. (eds.), Conflict and Cooperation on Trans-Boundary 
Water Resources. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 61-85
315
Benvenisti, E. (1996), ‘Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The 
Challenges of International Water Resources Law’, 90 AJIL 384-415
Benvenisti, E. (2002), Sharing Transboundary Resources: International Law and 
Optimal Resource Use. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Benvenisti, E. (2003), The Role of Third Parties in Promoting Collective Action Among 
Riparians’ in The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.), 
Resolution o f International Water Disputes. PCA/Peace Palace Papers, vol. 5. The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 201-233
Benvenisti, E. (2000), ‘Domestic Politics and International Resources: What Role for 
International Law?’ in Byers, M. (ed.), The Role o f Law in International Politics: 
Essays in International Relations and International Law. Oxford University Press, 
109-129
Berber, F. J . (1959), Rivers in International Law. Translated by R. K. Batstone. 
London/New York: Stevens/Oceana
Beyerlin, U. (1996), The Concept of Sustainable Development’ in Wolfrum, R. (ed.) 
Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic Mechanisms as Viable Means?. 
Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 95-121
Birnie, P., and Boyle, A. (2002), International Law and the Environment. 2nd ed., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press
Blake, G., et al. (eds.)(1995), The Peaceful Management o f Transboundary Resources. 
London: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff
Bodansky, D. (1995), ‘Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental 
Law’, 3 Indiana Journal o f Global Legal Studies 105-20
Bogdanovic, S. (2001), International Law o f Water Resources: Contribution o f the 
International Law Association. The Hague: Kluwer Law International
Boisson de Chazournes, L. (2000), ‘Unilateralism and Environmental Protection: 
Issues of Perception and Reality of Issues’ 11 European Journal o f International Law  
315-338
Boisson de Chazournes, L. (2003), The Role of Diplomatic Means of Solving Water 
Disputes: A Special Emphasis on Institutional M echanism s’ in The International 
Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.), Resolution o f International Water 
Disputes. PCA/Peace Palace Papers, vol. 5. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
91-110
Boisson de Chazournes, L., and Salman, S. M. A. (eds.)(2005), Water Resources and 
International Law. Centre for Studies and Research in International Law and 
International Relations of The Hague Academy of International Law, Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
Bos, A., and Siblesz, H. (eds.)(1986), Realism in Law-Making: E ssays on International 
Law in Honour o f Willem Riphagen. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff
Bosnjakovic, B. (1998), TJN/ECE Strategies for Protecting the Environment with 
Respect to International Watercourses: The Helsinki and Espoo Conventions’ in 
Salman, S. M. A., and Boisson de Chazournes, L. (eds.) International Watercourses: 
Enhancing Cooperation and Managing Conflict -  Proceedings o f a World Bank 
Seminar. Washington: World Bank, Ch. 4, 47-64
Bosnjakovic, B., (2001), The UNECE Environmental Conventions: Their Role and 
Potential to Promote Conflict Prevention and Settlement of Disputes in
316
Transboundary Environmental Issues’ in Petzold-Bradley, E., Carius, A., and 
Vincze, A. (eds.), Responding to Environmental Conflicts: Implications for Theory and 
Practice. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 263-282
Bosnjakovic, B. (2002), Negotiations in the Context o f International Water-Related 
Agreements. Report, World Water A ssessm ent Programme. At 
http: / /w ebw orld.unesco.org/water/wwap/pccp/cd/pdf/negotiation mediation facil 
itation/negotiations in the context of int context.pdf
Bourne, C. B. (1963), The Right to Utilize the Waters of International Rivers’, 3 
Canadian Yearbook o f International Law  187-264; reprinted in Wouters, P. 
(ed.)(1997), International Water Law: Selected Writings o f Professor Charles B. 
Bourne, London: Kluwer Law International, Ch. 2, 25-82
Bourne, C. B. (1969), The Development of International Water Resources: The 
Drainage Basin Approach”, 47 Canadian Bar Review 62-87; reprinted in Wouters, 
P. (ed.)(1997), International Water Law: Selected Writings o f Professor Charles B. 
Bourne, London: Kluwer Law International, Ch. 1, 3-22
Bourne, C. B. (1971), ‘Mediations, Conciliation and Adjudication in the Settlement of 
International Drainage Basin Disputes’, 9 Canadian Yearbook o f International Law 
114-158; reprinted in Wouters, P. (ed.)(1997), International Water Law: Selected 
Writings o f Professor Charles B. Bourne. London: Kluwer Law International, Ch. 8, 
197-230
Bourne, C. B. (1972), ‘Procedures in the Development of International Drainage 
Basins: Notice and Exchange of Information’, 22 University of Toronto Law Journal 
172-206; reprinted in Wouters, P. (ed.)(1997), International Water Law: Selected 
Writings o f Professor Charles B. Bourne. London: Kluwer Law International, Ch. 6, 
143-175
Bourne, C. B. (1972a), ‘Procedures in the Development of International Drainage 
Basins: the Duty to Consult and to Negotiate’, 10 Canadian Yearbook o f 
International Law  212-234; reprinted in Wouters, P. (ed.)(1997), International Water 
Law: Selected Writings o f Professor Charles B. Bourne. London: Kluwer Law 
International, Ch. 7, 177-193
Bourne, C.B. (1992), The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Law of 
International Watercourses: Principles and Planned M easures’, 3 Colorado Journal 
of International Environmental Law and Policy 65-92; reprinted in Wouters, P. 
(ed.)(1997), International Water Law: Selected Writings o f Professor Charles B. 
Bourne. London: Kluwer Law International, Ch. 3, 83-106
Bourne, C. B. (1996), The International Law Association's Contribution to 
International Water Resources Law’, 36 Natural Resources Journal 155-216; 
reprinted in Wouters, P. (ed.)(1997), International Water Law: Selected Writings o f 
Professor Charles B. Bourne. London: Kluwer Law International, Ch. 9, 233-284
Bowman, M., and Boyle, A. (eds.)(2002), Environmental Damage in International and 
Comparative Law: Problems o f Definition and Valuation. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press
Boyle, A. E. (1994), The Principle of Co-operation: the Environment’ in Lowe, V. and 
Warbrick, C. (eds.) The United Nations and the Principles o f International Law: 
Essays in Memory o f Michael Akehurst. London: Routledge, 120-136
Boyle, A. E. (1997), The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case: New Law in Old Bottles’ in 
Symposium: The Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 8 Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law  13-20
317
Boyle, A. E. (1999), ‘Codification of International Environmental Law and the 
International Law Commission: Injurious Consequences Revisited’ in Boyle, A. E., 
and Freestone, D. (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development: Past 
Achievements and Future Challenges. New York: Oxford University Press, Ch. 4, 
61-85
Boyle, A. E. (1999), ‘Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law’, 48 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 901-913
Boyle, A. E. (2006), ‘Soft Law in International Law-Making’ in Evans, M. D. (ed.) 
International Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch. 5, 141-158
Boyle, A. E., and Freestone, D. (eds.)(1999), International Law and Sustainable 
Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges. New York: Oxford
University Press
Boyle, A., and C hinkin, C. (2007), The Making o f International Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press
Brans, E. H., de Haan, E. J ., and Nollkaemper, A. (eds.)(1997), The Scarcity o f Water: 
Emerging Legal and Policy Responses. The Hague: Kluwer Law International
Browder, G. (2000), ‘An Analysis of the Negotiations for the 1995 Mekong Agreement’, 
5 International Negotiation 237-261
Browder, G., and Ortolano, L. (2000), The Evolution of an International Water 
Resources Management Regime in the Mekong River Basin’, 40 Natural Resources 
Journal 499-531
Brownlie, I. (1978), Loaves and Fishes: Access To Natural Resources and International 
Law. London: London School of Economics and Political Science
Brownlie, I. (1979), ‘Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law’, 162 RdC 
245-317
Brownlie, I. (1983), System  o f the Law o f Nations. State Responsibility. Part I. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press
Brownlie, I. (1995), The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes in Practice’, 7 
Pace International Law Review  257-279
Brownlie, I. (1998), The Rule o f Law in International Affairs: International Law at the 
Fiftieth Anniversary o f the United Nations. London: Martinus Nijhoff/Kluwer Law 
International
Brownlie, I. (1998), Principles o f Public International Law. 5th ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, and
Brownlie, I. (2003), Principles o f Public International Law. 6th ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press
Bruhacs, J . (1993), The Law o f Non-Navigational Uses o f International Watercourses. 
Translated by M. Zehery. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff
Brunnee, J. (1989), “Common Interest’ Echos from an Empty Shell? Some Thoughts 
on Common Interest and International Environmental Law’, 49 Zeitschrift fu r  
Auslandisches Offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 791-808
Brunnee, J ., and Toope, S. J. (1997), ‘Environmental Security and Freshwater 
Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building’, 91 AJIL 26-59
318
Buirette, P. (1991), ‘Genese d'un droit fluvial international general’, 95 Revue generate 
de droit international public 5-70
Burchi, S. (1985), ‘Shared Natural Resources in the European Community Legislation 
-  Transbounsdary Resources Law’, 25 Natural Resources Journal 639-649
Burchi, S. (1994), Preparing National Regulations for Water Resources Management. 
Principles and Practices. Legislative Study 52, Rome: FAO
Burchi, S ., and Spreij, M. (2003), Institutions for International Freshwater 
Management. Technical Documents in Hydrology: PC-CP Series No. 3, Paris: 
UNESCO/IHP, also available at
http: / /unesdoc.unesco.org/im ages/0013/001324/ 132478e.pdf
Burchi, S., and M echlem, K. (2005), Groundwater in International Law: Compilation o f 
Treaties and Other Legal Instruments, Legislative Study 86, Rome: FAO and 
UNESCO, also available at http://w w w .fao.org/docrep/008/v5739e/v5739e00.htm  
or ftp://ftp .fao.org/docrep/fao/008/v5739e/v5739e00.pdf
Byers, M. (1999), Custom, Power and the Power o f Rules: International Relations and 
Customary International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Cabral, B. (1998), Tratados Intemacionais de Recursos Hidricos [International Treaties 
on Water Resources]. Brasilia: Ed. Fundagao Biblioteca Nacional
Caflisch, L. (1989), ‘Regies generates du droit des cours d'eau internationaux’, 219 
RdC 9-225
Caflisch, L. (1994), The Law of International Waterways and its Sources’ in McDonald, 
R. St. J., Essays in Honour o f Wang Tieya. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 115-129
Caflisch, L. (1998), ‘Regulation of the Uses of International Watercourses’ in Salman, 
S. M. A., and Boisson de Chazournes, L. (eds.), International Watercourses: 
Enhancing Cooperation and Managing Conflict -  Proceedings o f a World Bank 
Seminar. Washington: World Bank, Ch. 1, 3-16
Caflisch, L. (2003), ‘Judicial Means for Settling Water Disputes’ in The International 
Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.), Resolution o f International Water 
Disputes. PCA/Peace Palace Papers, vol. 5. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
235-245
Canelas de Castro, P. (1996), ‘O Regime Juridico das Utilizagoes dos Cursos de Agua 
Intemacionais no Projecto da Comissao de Direito Internacional’ [The Legal Regime 
of International Watercourses in the ILC's Draft], 5-6 Revista Jundica do Urbanismo 
e Ambiente 141-199
Canelas de Castro, P. (1997), The Judgment in the Case Concerning the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project: Positive Signs for the Evolution of International Water 
Law’ in Symposium: The Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 8 
Yearbook o f International Environmental Law 21-31
Canelas de Castro, P. (2003), ‘Prospects for the Future of International Water Law: the 
View Projected by the Epistemic Community’ in The International Bureau of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.), Resolution o f International Water Disputes. 
PCA/Peace Palace Papers, vol. 5. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 371-416
Canelas de Castro, P. (2003), ‘New Era in Luso-Spanish Relations in the Management 
of Shared Basins? The Challenge of Sustainability’ in Fitzmaurice, M., and 
Szuniewicz, M. (eds.), Exploitation o f Natural Resources in the 21st Century. The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 191-233
319
Cano, G. J . (1978), ‘Argentina, Brazil, and the de la Plata River Basin: A Summary 
Review of their Legal Relationship’ in Utton, A. E. and Teclaff, L. (eds.) Water in a 
Developing World. The Management o f a Critical Resource. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 127-146; reprint of 16 Natural Resources Journal (1976) 863-882
Caponera, D. A. (1980), The Law of International Water Resources: Some General 
Conventions, Declarations, and Resolutions adopted by Governments, International 
Legal Institutions, and International Organizations, on the Management o f 
International Water Resources. Rome: FAO
Caponera, D. A. (1992), Principles o f Water Law and Administration: National and 
International. Rotterdam: A. A. Balkema
Caponera, D. A. (1995), ‘Shared Waters and International Law’ in Blake, G., et al. 
(eds.) The Peaceful Management o f Transboundary Resources. London: Graham & 
Trotman, Ch. 8, 121-6
Caponera, D. A. (1996), ‘Conflicts over International River Basins in Africa, the Middle 
East and Asia’, 5 Review o f European Community and International Environmental 
Law  97-106
Carrillo-Salcedo, J. A. (1996), ‘Droit international et souverainete des Etats’, 257 RdC 
35-222
Cassese, A. (2001), International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Castelein, S., and Bogardi, J. (eds.)(2004), From Conflict to Co-operation in 
International Water Resources Management: Challenges and Opportunities.
Proceedings, International Conference, 20-22 November 2002, Delft, The 
Netherlands. Technical Documents in Hydrology: PC-CP series No. 31, Paris: 
UNESCO/IHP/WWAP, also available at
http: / /unesdoc.unesco.org/im ages/0013/001354/ 135494e.pdf
Caubet, C. G. (1991), As grandes manobras de Itaipu: energia, diplomacia e direito na 
bacia do Prata [Itaipu Large Manoeuvres: Energy, Diplomacy and Law]. Sao Paulo: 
Editora Academica
CBD Secretariat (2001), Handbook o f the Convention on Biological Diversity. London: 
Earthscan
Charney, J. I. (1993), Universal International Law’, 87 AJIL 529-551
Chauhan, B. R. (1981), Settlement o f International Water Law Disputes in International 
Drainage Basins. Berlin: Schmidt
Chayes, A. H. e t a l (1995), ‘Active Compliance Management in Environmental 
Treaties’ in Lang, W. (ed.) Sustainable Development and International Law  75-89
Cheng, B. (1953), General Principles o f Law as Applied by International Courts and 
Tribunals. London: Stevens & Sons
Chenoweth, J . (2000), International River Basin Management: Data and Information 
Exchange under International Law and the Case of the Mekong River Basin.’, 18 
Journal o f Energy and Natural Resources Law  142-158
Chowdhury, S. R. (1984), ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’, in Hossain, 
K., and Chowdhury, S. R. (eds.), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in 
International Law, Principle and Practice. London: Frances Pinter, 1-41
320
Civic, M. A. (1998), ‘A New Conceptual Framework for Jordan River Basin 
Management: A Proposal for a Trusteeship Commission’, 9 Colorado Journal o f 
International Environmental Law and Policy 285-329
Civic, M. A. (1998a), ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Israel and Arab Water Law 
Traditions and Insights for Modern Water Sharing Agreements’, 26 Denver Journal 
o f International Law and Policy 437-452
Cohen, M. (1975), The Regime of Boundary Waters: the Canadian-United States 
Experience’, 146 RdC 219-339
Colliard, C.-A. (1968), ‘Evolution et aspects actuels du regime juridique des fleuves 
internationaux’, 125 RdC 343-442
Collier, J ., and Lowe, V. (2000), The Settlement o f Disputes in International Law: 
Institutions and Procedures. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Cook, P. J ., and Carleton, C. M. (eds.)(2000), Continental Shelf Limits: The Scientific 
and Legal Interface. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Crawford, J . (2002), The International Law Commission's Articles on State 
Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
Crawford, J . (2002a), International Law as an Open System: Selected Essays. London: 
Cameron May
Crucho de Almeida, L. (2000), The Water-Flow Regime established by the 
Luso-Spanish Agreements Governing the Shared Rivers and Other Matters’ in 
Luso-American Foundation (ed.), Shared Water System s and Transboundary Issues 
with Special Emphasis on the Iberian Peninsula. Lisbon: Luso-American
Development Foundation, 279-99
Damrosch, L. F. (2002), ‘Obligations of cooperation in the international protection of 
human rights’, in Delbriick, J. and Heinz, U. E. (eds.), International Law of 
Cooperation and State Sovereignty: Proceedings of an International Symposium of 
the Kiel Walther-Schiicking-Institute of International Law, May 23-26, 2001’, 139 
Veroffentlichungen des Walther-Schucking-Instituts fu r  Internationales Recht an der 
Universitat Kiel. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 15-43
D’Aspremont, J. (2007), The Recommendations Made by the International Court of 
Justice’, 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 185-198
Delbriick, J. and Heinz, U. E. (eds.)(2002), ‘International Law of Cooperation and 
State Sovereignty: Proceedings of an International Symposium of the Kiel 
Walther-Schiicking-Institute of International Law, May 23-26, 2001’, 139
Veroffentlichungen des Walther-Schucking-Instituts fu r  Internationales Recht an der 
Universitat Kiel. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot
Dellapenna, J. W. (1994), Treaties as Instruments for Managing 
Internationally-Shared Water Resources: Restricted Sovereignty vs. Community of 
Property’, 26 Case Western Reserve Journal o f International Law  27-56
Dellapenna, J . W. (2003), The Customary International Law of Transboundary Fresh 
Waters’ in Fitzmaurice, M., and Szuniewicz, M. (eds.), Exploitation of Natural 
Resources in the 21st Century. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 143-190
Denza, E. (2002), The Intergovernmental Pillars o f the European Union. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press
321
Denza, E. (2006), “The Relationship Between International and National Law’ in Evans, 
M. D. (ed.), International Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch. 14, 
423-448
Dinh, N. Q., Daillier, P., and Pellet, A. (1999), Droit international public. 6th ed., Paris: 
Libr. Generale de droit et de jurisprudence
Dipla, H. (1985), ‘Les regies de droit international en matiere de delimitation fluviale: 
remise en questions?’, 89 Revue generale de droit international public 589-624
Dubreuil, C. (2006), The Right to Water: From Concept to Implementation. Report. 
Marseilles: World Water Council
Dupuy, P.-M. (1978), ‘La gestion concertee des ressources naturelles: a propos du 
differend entre le Bresil et L'Argentine relatif au barrage d'ltaipu’, 24 Annuaire 
frangais de droit international 866-889
Dupuy, P.-M. (1991), ‘Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment’, 12 
Michigan Journal o f International Law 420-435
Dupuy, P.-M. (2000), The Place and Role of Unilateralism in Contemporary 
International Law’, 11 European Journal o f International Law  19-29
Dupuy, R. J . (ed.)(1983), The Settlement o f Disputes on the New Natural Resources. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
Dworkin, R. (1977), Taking Rights Seriously. 10th impression, 2002, London: 
Duckworth
Eckstein, G. E. (1998), ‘Hydrologic Reality: International Water Law and
Transboundary Ground-Water Resources’ in American University Center for the 
Global South, Water: Dispute Prevention and Development conference, Washington,
D.C., October 12-13, 1998, at
http: /  / www.internationalwaterlaw.org/A rticles/GlobalSouth.htm
Eckstein, G. E. (2002), ‘Development of International Water Law and the UN 
Watercourse Convention’ in Turton, A. R., and Henwood, R. (eds.)(Hydropolitics in 
the Developing World: A Southern African Perspective. Pretoria: African Water Issues 
Research Unit (AWIRU), 81-96. Also at
http: / / www. up. ac. za / academic / libarts / polsci / awiru /
Eckstein, G. E. (2007), ‘Commentary on the UN International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles on Transboundary Aquifers’, 18 Colorado Journal o f International 
Environmental Law and Policy 537-610. Also at
http: / / internationalwaterlaw.org/articles / Eckstein-UNILC-Commentary.pdf
Elver, H. (2002), Peaceful Uses o f International Rivers: the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers 
Dispute. Imprint Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers
Evans, M. D. (ed.)(1998), Remedies in International Law: The Institutional Dilemma. 
Oxford: Hart Publishing
Evans, M. D. (ed.)(2006), International Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Fabri, H. R. (1990), ‘Regies coutumieres generates et droit international fluvial’, 36 
Annuaire frangais de droit international 818-842
Fahmi, A. M. (1977), The Degree of Effectiveness of International Law as Regards 
International Rivers’, 28 Austrian Journal o f Public and International Law  291-302
322
FAO, Legal Office (1993), Treaties Concerning the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses: Europe. Legislative Study 50, Rome: FAO
FAO, Legal Office (1995), Treaties Concerning the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses: Asia. Legislative Study 55, Rome: FAO
FAO, Legal Office (1997), Treaties Concerning the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses: Africa. Legislative Study 61, Rome: FAO
FAO, Legal Office (1998), Sources o f International Water Law. Legislative Study 65, 
Rome: FAO
FAO, Legal Office (1999), Issues in Water Law Reform. Legislative Study 67, Rome: 
FAO
Farmer, A. M. (2001), The EC Water Framework Directive: An Introduction’, 12 Water 
Law  40-46
Ferret, J.-L. (1981), ‘Le regime juridique du Mekong’ in Zacklin, R., and Caflisch, L.
(eds.), The Legal Regime o f International Rivers and Lakes. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 75-96
Fitzm aurice, M. (1997), ‘Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses’, 10 Leiden Journal o f International Law  501-508
Fitzm aurice, M. (1998), The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case: the Law of Treaties’, 11 
Leiden Journal o f International Law  321-344
Fitzm aurice, M. (2001), ‘International Protection of the Environment’, 293 RdC 9-488
Fitzm aurice, M. (2003), ‘Central Principles Governing the Co-operation between States 
in Relation to Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses’ 14 Yearbook o f 
International Environmental Law  3
Fitzm aurice, M. (2006), The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties’, in Evans, M. D. 
(ed.), International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 7, 187-213
Fitzm aurice, M. and Lowe, V. (eds.)(1996), 50 Years o f the International Court o f 
Justice: Essays in Honour o f Sir Robert Jennings. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press
Fitzm aurice, M., and Redgwell, C. (2000), ‘Environmental Non-Compliance 
Procedures and International Law’, 31 Netherlands Yearbook o f International Law 
35-65
Fitzm aurice, M., and Szuniew icz, M. (eds.)(2003), Exploitation o f Natural Resources 
in the 21st Century. The Hague: Kluwer Law International
Fitzm aurice, M., and Sarooshi, D. (eds.)(2004), Issues o f State Responsibility before 
international Judicial Institutions. The Clifford Chance Lectures, vol. 7, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing
Fitzm aurice, M., and Elias, O. (2004), Watercourse Co-operation in Northern Europe: a 
Model for the Future. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press/Hart Publishing
Fitzm aurice, M., and Elias, O. (2005), Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties. 
Utrecht: Eleven International Pub.
Fombad, C. M. (1989), ‘Consultation and Negotiation in the Pacific Settlement of 
International D isputes’, 1 African Journal o f International and Comparative Law 
707-724
323
Francioni, F. (1991), ‘International Co-operation for the Protection of the 
Environment: The Procedural Dimension’ in Lang, W., Neuhold, H., and Zemanek, 
K. (eds.) Environmental Protection and International Law. Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff/ Graham & Trotman, 203-225
Francioni, F., and Scovazzi, T. (eds.)(1991), International Responsibility for 
Environmental Harm. London: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff
Franz, K. (2003), ‘Redefining Progress at the Third World Water Forum in Kyoto’, 5 
International Law FORUM 221-224
Freeman, M. D. A. (2001), Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 7th ed., London: 
Sweet & Maxwell
Freestone, D. (1994), The Road from Rio: International Environmental Law after the 
Earth Summit’, 6 Journal o f Environmental Law 193-218
Freestone, D., and Hey, E. (1996), The Precautionary Principle and International Law: 
The Challenge o f Implementation. The Hague: Kluwer Law International
Friedmann, W. (1964), The Changing Structure o f International Law. New York: 
Columbia University Press
Friedmann, W. (1969), ‘General Course in Public International Law’, 127 RdC 39-246
Fuentes, X. (1996), The Criteria for the Equitable Utilization of International Rivers’, 
67 BYIL 339-412
Fuentes, X. (1998), ‘Sustainable Development and the Equitable Utilization of 
International Watercourses’, 69 BYIL 119-200
Garretson, A. H., Hayton, R. D., and Olm stead, C. J . (eds.)(1967), The Law of
International Drainage Basins. Dobbs Feriy: Oceana Publications
Ginther, K., Denters, E., and Waart P. de (eds.)(1995), Sustainable Development and 
Good Governance. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff
Glos, G. E. (1961), International Rivers: a Policy-Oriented Perspective. Singapore: 
University of Malaya in Singapore
Godana, B. A. (1985), Africa's Shared Water Resources: Legal and Institutional Aspects 
of the Nile, Niger and Senegal River Systems. London: Frances Pinter Publishers
Gotz, R. (2005), The European Community’s Water Framework Directive: a Regional 
Approach to the Protection and Management of Transboundary Freshwater 
Resources?’ in Boisson de Chazournes, L., and Salman, S. M. A. (eds.), Water 
Resources and International Law. Centre for Studies and Research in International 
Law and International Relations of The Hague Academy of International Law, 
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Ch. 11, 429-472
Goldberg, D. (1995), World Bank Policy on Projects on International Waterways in the 
Context of Emerging International Law and the Work of the International Law 
Commission’ in Blake, G., et al. (eds.), The Peaceful Management o f Transboundary 
Resources. London: Graham & Trotman, 153-166
Goodwin-Gill, G. (2004), ‘State Responsibility and the “Good Faith” Obligation in 
International Law’ in Fitzmaurice, M., and Sarooshi, D. (eds.), Issues o f State 
Responsibility before international Judicial Institutions. The Clifford Chance 
Lectures, vol. 7, Oxford: Hart Publishing, Ch. 6, 75-1049
324
Green Cross International (1999), National Sovereignty and International 
Watercourses. Geneva: Green Cross International. Also at
http: /  /  www. gci. ch /  GreenCrossPrograms /  waterres /  sovereignty /  watersovereignty. ht 
ml
Griffin, W. L. (1959), The Uses of Waters of International Drainage Basins under 
Customary International Law’, 53 AJIL 50-80
Hafner, G. (1993), The Optimum Utilization Principle and the Non-Navigational Uses 
of Drainage Basins’, 45 Austrian Journal o f Public and International Law  113-146
Hafner, G. (2003), ‘General Principles of Sustainable Development: From Soft Law to 
Hard Law’, in Fitzmaurice, M., and Szuniewicz, M. (eds.), Exploitation o f Natural 
Resources in the 21st Century. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 53-66
Handl, G. (1978), The Principle of 'Equitable Use' as Applied to International Shared 
Resources’, 14 Revue Beige de droit international 40-62
Happold, M. (2005), ‘Dams and International Law’ in Boisson de Chazournes, L., and 
Salman, S. M. A. (eds.), Water Resources and International Law. Centre for Studies 
and Research in International Law and International Relations of The Hague 
Academy of International Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Ch. 14, 
577-604
Hayton, R. D. (1967), The Formation of the Customary Rules of the Drainage Basin 
Law’ in Garretson, A. H., Hayton, R. D., and Olmstead, C. J., (eds.) The Law o f 
International Drainage Basins. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 834-895
Hayton, R. D. (1967a), The Plata Basin’ in Garretson, A. H., Hayton, R. D., and 
Olmstead, C. J., (eds.) The Law o f International Drainage Basins. Dobbs Ferry: 
Oceana Publications, 298-442
Hayton, R. D. (1990), The Freshwater -  Maritime Interface: Legal and Institutional 
Aspects. Legislative Study 46, Rome: FAO
Hey, E. (1995), ‘Sustainable Use of Shared Water Resources: The Need for a 
Paradigmatic Shift in International Watercourses Law’ in Blake, G., et al. (eds.) The 
Peaceful Management o f Transboundary Resources. London: Graham & Trotman, 
127-152
Hey, E. (2003), ‘Non-State Actors and International Water Disputes: A Search for the 
Nexus Between the Local and the Global’ in The International Bureau of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.), Resolution o f International Water Disputes. 
PCA/Peace Palace Papers, vol. 5. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 299-318
Higgins, R., (1991), ‘International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and 
Resolution of Disputes: General Course on Public International Law’, 230 RdC 
9-339, also published as
Higgins, R., (1994), Problems and Process: International Law and How we Use it. 
Oxford: Clarendon, Oxford University Press
Higgins, R. (1999), ‘Natural Resources in the Case Law of the International Court’ in 
Boyle, A. E., and Freestone, D. (eds.), International Law and Sustainable 
Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 87-111
Higgins, R. (2004), Issu es of State Responsibility before the International Court of 
Justice’ in Fitzmaurice, M., and Sarooshi, D. (eds.), Issues o f State Responsibility 
before international Judicial Institutions. The Clifford Chance Lectures, vol. 7, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, Ch. 1 ,1-9
325
Hohmann, H. (1992), Basic Documents o f International Environmental Law. 3 vols. 
London: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff
Hohmann, H. (1994), Precautionary Legal Duties and Principles o f Modem International 
Environmental Law. The Precautionary Principle: International Environmental Law 
Between Exploitation and Protection. London: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff
H utchinson, D. N. (1993), The Material Scope of the Obligation Under the United 
Nations Charter to take Action to Settle International D isputes’, 14 The Australian 
Year Book o f International Law 1-128
Itaipu B inacional (1996), Atos Oficiais da Itaipu Binacional [Legal Documents on 
Itaipu Binational]. Curitiba: Itaipu Binacional
Jennings, R., and Watts, A. (1992), Oppenheim's International Law. 9th ed., Harlow: 
Longmans
Kallis, G. and Butler, D. (2001), The EU Water Framework Directive: Measures and 
Implications’, 3 Water Policy 125-142
Kamto, M. (1990), £Le droit international des ressources en eau continentales 
africaines’, 36 Annuaire frangais de droit international 843-911
Kirgis, J . F. (1983), Prior Consultation in International Law: a Study o f State Practice. 
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia
Kiss, A. (1996), The Protection of the Environmental Interests of the World 
Community Through International Environmental Law’ in Wolfrum, R. (ed.) 
Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic Mechanisms as Viable Means?. 
Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1-12
Kiss, A. (1997), ‘Legal Procedures Applicable to Interstate Conflicts on Water Scarcity: 
The Gabcikovo Case’ in Brans, E. H. P., de Haan, E. J., and Nollkaemper, A. (eds.), 
The Scarcity o f Water: Emerging Legal and Policy Responses. London: Kluwer Law 
International, 59-79
Kiss, A. C., and Shelton, D. (1997), Manual o f European Environmental Law. 2nd ed., 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Kiss, A. C., and Shelton, D. (2000), International Environmental Law. 2nd ed., 
Ardseley, N.Y.: Transactional Publishers
Knox, J. H. (2002), The Myth and Reality of Transboundary Environmental Impact 
Assessment’, 96 AJIL 291-319
Kolb, R. (2006), ‘Principles as Sources of International Law (With Special Reference to 
Good Faith)’, 53 Netherlands International Law Review  1, 1-36
Koutikov, V. (1969), ‘Les Problemes du Droit International Prive Fluvial’, 127 RdC 
247-354
Krishna, R. (1998), The Evolution and Context of the Bank Policy for Projects on 
International Waterways’ in Salman, S. M. A., and Boisson de Chazournes, L. (eds.), 
International Watercourses: Enhancing Cooperation and Managing Conflict -  
Proceedings o f a World Bank Seminar. Washington: World Bank, Ch. 3, 31-43
Kristjansdottir, E. (2003), ‘Resolution of Water Disputes: Lessons from the Middle 
East’ in The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.), 
Resolution o f International Water Disputes. PCA/Peace Palace Papers, vol. 5. The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 351-370
326
LaBorde, L. C. (1998), The Plata Basin Institutional Framework’, in Biswas, A. K., et 
al. (ed.) Management o f Latin American River Basins: Amazon, Plata, and Sao 
Francisco. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 175-204
Lammers, J . G. (1984), Pollution o f International Watercourses: A Search for 
Substantive Rules and Principles o f Law. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
Lammers, J . G. (1991), ‘International and European Community Law Aspects of 
Pollution of International Watercourses’ in Lang, W., Neuhold, H., and Zemanek, K. 
(eds.), Environmental Protection and International Law. Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff/Graham & Trotman, 115-146
Lammers, J . G. (1998), The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case Seen in Particular from the 
Perspective of the Law of International Watercourses and the Protection of the 
Environment’, 11 Leiden Journal o f International Law  287-320
Lang, W., Neuhold, H., and Zemanek, K. (eds.)(1991), Environmental Protection and 
International Law. Dordrecht: Martinus Nij hoff/Graham & Trotman
Lang, W. (ed.)(1995), Sustainable Development and International Law. London: 
Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff
Lauterpacht, E. (1997), ‘Sovereignty -  Myth or Reality?’, 73 International Affairs 
137-150
Lawrence, P. (1990), ‘Mekong River’ in 12 Encyclopedia o f Public International Law, 
Geographic Issues. Amsterdam: North Holland Pub., 225-7
Laylin, J. G., and Bianchi, R. L. (1959), The Role of Adjudication in International 
River Disputes: The Lake Lanoux Case’, 53 AJIL 30-49
Leestem aker, J. H. (2001), Gaps Between the UN Convention, the SADC Protocol and 
National Legal Systems in South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique. Report, in file 
with the author
Lefeber, R. (1998), The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project and the Law of State 
Responsibility’, 11 Leiden Journal o f International Law  609-623
Lester, Anthony (1963), ‘River Pollution in International Law’, 57 AJIL 828-853
Lipper, J . (1967), ‘Equitable Utilisation’, in Garretson, A. H., Hayton, R. D., and 
Olmstead, C. J. (eds.), The Law o f International Drainage Basins. Dobbs Ferry: 
Oceana Publications, 18-88
Loewenstein, K. (1954), ‘Sovereignty and International Co-operation’, 48 AJIL 222-244
Loibl, G. (2004), ‘Environmental Law and Non-Compliance Procedures: Issues of State 
Responsibility’ in Fitzmaurice, M., and Sarooshi, D. (eds.), Issues o f State 
Responsibility before international Judicial Institutions. The Clifford Chance 
Lectures, vol. 7, Oxford: Hart Publishing, Ch. 11, 201-218
Lowe, V. (1999), ‘Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments’ in Boyle, A.
E., and Freestone, D. (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development: Past 
Achievements and Future Challenges. New York: Oxford University Press, 19-37
Lowe, V. (2000), The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of 
Norm-Creation Changing?’ in Byers, M. (ed.), The Role o f Law in International 
Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law. Oxford University 
Press, 207-26
327
Lowe, V., and Warbrick, C. (eds.)(1994), The United Nations and the Principles of 
International Law: Essays in Memory o f Michael Akehurst. London: Routledge
Luso-American Foundation (ed.)(2000), Shared Water System s and Transboundary 
Issues with Special Emphasis on the Iberian Peninsula. Lisbon: Luso-American 
Development Foundation
M acChesney, B. (1959), ‘Judicial Decisions: Lake Lanoux Case (France-Spain)’, 53 
AJIL 156-171.
Manner, E. J . (1973), The Present State of International Water Resources Law’, in 
Bos, M. (ed.), The Present State o f International Law and Other Essays, Written in 
Honour o f the International Law Association 1873-1973. Deventer: Kluwer, 131-141
Marston, G. (1987), ‘Boundary Waters’, 10 Encyclopedia o f Public International Law. 
Amsterdam: North Holland Pub., 26-30
Martinez-Ajullo y Sanchis, L. (1962), ‘Los tratados y la costumbre en el derecho 
fluvial internacional’, 15 Revista Espahola de Derecho Intemacional 35-95
McCaffrey, S. (1989), The Law of International Watercourses: Some Recent 
Developments and Unanswered Questions’, 17 Denver Journal o f International Law 
505-526
McCaffrey, S. (1990), The Law of International Watercourses: Ecocide or 
Ecomanagement?’, 59 Revista Juridica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 1003-1012
McCaffrey, S. (1993), The Evolution of the Law of International Watercourses’, 45 
Austrian Journal o f Public and International Law  87-111
McCaffrey, S. C. (1996), The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried, Not 
Praised’, 36 Natural Resources Journal 725-767
McCaffrey, S. C. (1997), ‘Middle East Water Problems: Jordan River’ in Brans, E. H., 
de Haan, E. J., and Nollkaemper, A. (eds.), The Scarcity o f Water: Emerging Legal 
and Policy Responses. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, Ch. 9, 158-165
McCaffrey, S. (1998), The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses: Prospects and Pitfalls’ in Salman, S. M. A., and 
Boisson de Chazournes, L. (eds.), International Watercourses: Enhancing
Cooperation and Managing Conflict -  Proceedings o f a World Bank Seminar. 
Washington: World Bank, Ch. 2, 17-28
McCaffrey, S. C. (2001), The Law o f International Watercourses, Non-Navigational Uses. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press
McCaffrey, S. C. (2003), Water Disputes Defined: Characteristics and Trends for 
Resolving Them’ in The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(ed.), Resolution o f International Water Disputes. PCA/Peace Palace Papers, vol. 5. 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 49-90
McCaffrey, S. C. (2003b), The need for flexibility in freshwater treaty regimes’, 27 
Natural Resources Forum 156-162
McCaffrey, S. and R osenstock , R. (1996), The International Law Commission's Draft 
Articles on International Watercourses: an Overview and Commentary’, 5 Review o f 
European Community and International Environmental Law  89-96
McCaffrey, S. and Sinjela, M. (1998), The 1997 United Nations Convention on 
International Watercourses’, 92 AJIL 97-107
328
McIntyre, O. (1998), ‘Case Analysis: Environmental Protection of International Rivers’, 
10 Journal of Environmental Law 79-91
M cIntyre, O. (2004), The Emergence of an ‘Ecosystem Approach’ to the Protection of 
International Watercourses under International Law’, 13 Review o f European 
Community and International Environmental Law (RECIEL), 1-14
McIntyre, O. and Mosedale, T. (1997), The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of 
Customary International Law’, 9 Journal o f Environmental Law, 221-241
McNair, A. D. (1961), Law o f Treaties. Oxford: Oxford University Press
McWhinney, E. (1991), The Concept of Co-operation’ in Bedjaoui, M. (ed.) 
International Law: Achievements and Prospects. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
425-436
M echlem, K. (2003), Water as a Vehicle for Inter-State Co-Operation: A Legal 
Perspective. FAO Legal Papers online No. 32, available at 
http: / / www.fao.org/Legal/prs-ol/lpo32.pdf
M endelson, M. H. (1995), The Subjective Element in Customary International Law’, 
66  BYIL 177-208
Mendelson, M. H. (1996), The International Court of Justice and the Sources of 
International Law’ in Fitzmaurice, M. and Lowe, V. (eds.), 50 Years o f the 
International Court o f Justice: Essays in Honour o f Sir Robert Jennings. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 63-89
M endelson, M. H. (1998), The Formation of Customary International Law’, 272 RdC 
155-410
M endelson, M. H. (2002), ‘On the Quasi-Normative Effect of Maritime Boundary 
Agreements’ in Ando, N., McWhinney, E., and Wolfrum, R. (eds.) Liber Amicorum 
Judge Shigeru Oda. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1069-86
M endelson, M. H. (2004), ‘State Responsibility for Breach of Interim Protection Orders 
of the International Court of Justice’ in Fitzmaurice, M., and Sarooshi, D. (eds.), 
Issues o f State Responsibility before International Judicial Institutions. The Clifford 
Chance Lectures, vol. 7, Oxford: Hart Publishing, Ch. 4, 35-53
Merla, A. (2002), Contributions to Global and Regional Agreements: Review o f GEF 
International Waters Program. Washington: World Bank
Merrils, J. G. (1998), International Dispute Settlement. 3rd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press
Merrils, J. G. (2006), The Means of Dispute Settlement’ in Evans, M. D. (ed.), 
International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 18, 533-559
Moore (1898), History and Digest o f International Arbitrations to which the United States 
has been a Party. 6 vols., Washington, DC: GPO.
Munro, R. D., and Lammers, J . G. (1987), Environmental Protection and Sustainable 
Development: Legal Principles and Recommendations. London: Graham 8s
Trotman /  Martinu s Nij hoff
Nakayama, M. (1999), ‘Aspects Behind Differences in Two Agreements Adopted by 
Riparian Countries of Lower Mekong River Basin’, 1 Journal o f Comparative Policy 
Analysis 293-308
329
Neves, M. A. (1995), Le detoumement des cours d'eau intemationaux et la protection de 
Venvironnement -  Etude d'un cas pratique. Master’s Dissertation. Strasbourg: 
Universite Robert Schuman
Nollkaemper, A. (1993), The Legal Regime for Transboundary Water Pollution: Between 
Discretion and Constraint. Dordrecht: Martinus Nij hoff/Graham & Trotman
Nollkaemper, A. (1996), The Contribution of the International Law Commission to 
International Water Law: Does it Reverse the Flight from Substance?’, 27 
Netherlands Yearbook o f International Law 39-73
Ochoa-Ruiz, N. (2005), ‘Dispute Settlement over Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses: Theory and Practice’ in Boisson de Chazournes, L., and 
Salman, S. M. A. (eds.), Water Resources and International Law. Centre for Studies 
and Research in International Law and International Relations of The Hague 
Academy of International Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Ch. 9, 343-387
O’Connor, J. F. (1991), Good Faith in International Law. Dartmouth: Aldershot
Okaru-Bisant, V. (1998), ‘Institutional and Legal Frameworks for Preventing and 
Resolving Disputes Concerning the Development and Management of Africa’s 
Shared River Basins’, 9 Colorado Journal o f International Environmental Law and 
Policy 331-369
Okidi, C. O. (1997), ‘International Law and Water Scarcity in Africa’ in Brans, E. H., de 
Haan, E. J., and Nollkaemper, A. (eds.), The Scarcity o f Water: Emerging Legal and 
Policy Responses. London: Kluwer Law International, 166-180
Okidi, C. O. (1998), The State and the Management of International Drainage Basins 
in Africa’, 28 Natural Resources Journal 645-669
Okowa, P. (1996), ‘Procedural Obligations in International Environmental Agreements’, 
67 BYIL 275-336
Oliveira, H. U. (1991), The Sandoz Blaze: The Damage and the Public and Private
Liabilities’, in Francioni, F., and Scovazzi, T. (eds.), International Responsibility for
Environmental Harm. London: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 429-445
Ong, D. M. (1995), ‘South-east Asian State Practice on the Joint Development of 
Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits’, Blake, G., et al. (eds.) The Peaceful Management o f 
Transboundary Resources. London: Graham & Trotman, Ch. 5, 77-96
Ong, D. M. (1999), ‘Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: 
‘Mere’ State Practice or Customary International Law?’, 93 AJIL 771-804
Oppenheim, L. F. (1948), International Law: a Treatise. 7th ed., vol.l. Peace,
Lauterpacht, H. (ed.), London: Longmans
Oppenheim, L. F. (1955), International Law: a Treatise. 8 th ed., vol.l. Peace,
Lauterpacht, H. (ed.), London: Longmans
Palmieri, A., Bradlow, D. D., and Salman, S. M. A. (2002), Regulatory Frameworks for 
Dam Safety: A Comparative Study. Washington: World Bank
Pereira, O. D. (1974), Itaipu -  pros e contras. Breve analise da Historia das Relagoes 
entre Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguai e Brasil e ensaio politico-juridico sobre o 
aproveitamento hidreletrico do Rio Parana. [Itaipu -  Pros and Cons. Brief Analysis of 
the History of the Relationship between Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil, 
and Political and Legal Essay on the Hydro-electric Use of the River Parana]. Rio de 
Janeiro: Paz e Terra
330
Perrez, F. X. (1998), 'The Efficiency of Cooperation: A Functional Analysis of 
Sovereignty' 15 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law  515-582
Perrez, F. X. (2000), Cooperative Sovereignty. From Independence To Interdependence 
In The Structure o f International Environmental Law. The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International
Peters, A. (2002), ‘Cooperation in International Dispute Settlement’ in Delbriick, J. 
and Heinz, U. E. (eds.), ‘International Law of Cooperation and State Sovereignty: 
Proceedings of an International Symposium of the Kiel Walther-Schucking-Institute 
of International Law, May 23-26, 2001’, 139 Veroffentlichungen des
Walther-Schucking-Instituts fu r  Internationales Recht an der Universitat Kiel. Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 107-162
Peters, A. (2003), ‘International Dispute Settlement: a Network of Cooperational 
Duties’, 14 European Journal o f International Law  1-34
Phommachanh, K. (2002), Information Exchange, Notification and Consultation: the 
Case o f the Mekong Framework Agreement. Report, at www. 
Iucn.org/themes/law/pdfdocuments/CDGFinalPaperKetsanaPhommachanh.pdf, 
last visited on 12 December 2002
Pinto, M. C. (1986), The Duty of Co-operation and the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea’ in Bos, A. and Siblesz, H. (eds.), Realism in Law-Making: Essays  
on International Law in Honour o f Willem Riphagen. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
131-154
Pitman, G. T. K eith (1998), The Role of the World Bank in Enhancing Cooperation 
and Resolving Conflict on International Watercourses: The Case of the Indus Basin’ 
in Salman, S. M.A., and Boisson de Chazournes, L. (eds.) International 
Watercourses: Enhancing Cooperation and Managing Conflict -  Proceedings o f a 
World Bank Seminar. Washington: World Bank, Ch. 9, 155-165
Politi, M. (1991), The Impact of the Chernobyl Accident on the States’ Perception of 
International Responsibility for Nuclear Damage’ in Francioni, F., and Scovazzi, T. 
(eds.) International Responsibility for Environmental Harm. London: Graham & 
Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 473-490
Politis, N. (1925), ‘Le probleme des limitations de la souverainete et la theorie de 
l’abus des droits dans les rapports internationaux’, 6  RdC  (1925-1), 1-121
Querol, M. (2003), Estudio Sobre Los Convenios Y Acuerdos De Cooperacion Entre Los 
Paises De America Latina Y El Caribe, En Relacion Con Sistemas Hidricos Y Cuerpos 
De Agua Transfronterizos. [Study on the Co-operation Conventions and Agreements 
between Latin America and the Caribbean Countries] UN/ECLAC Doc. 
LC/L.2002-P/E. Also at
http: / / www.eclac.org/ publicaciones / RecursosNaturales 72/ LCL2002PE / lcl2002e. p 
df
Robb, A. R. (ed.)(1999), International Environmental Law Reports: Early Decisions. Vol. 
1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Roben, B. B. (2000), ‘International Freshwaters’ in Morrison, F. L. and Wolfrum, R. 
(eds.) International, Regional and National Environmental Law. The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 285-328
Rogoff, M. A. (1994), The Obligation To Negotiate In International Law: Rules And 
Realities’, 16 Michigan Journal o f International Law  141-185
Romano, C. P. (2000), The Peaceful Settlement o f International Environmental Disputes: 
A Pragmatic Approach. The Hague: Kluwer Law International
331
Sahovic, M. (ed.)(1972), Principles o f International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation. Belgrade/Dobbs Ferry, N.Y: Institute of International Politics and 
Economics/Oceana Publications
Salman, S. M. A. (ed.)(1999), Groundwater: Legal and Policy Perspectives: Proceedings 
o f a World Bank Seminar. World Bank Technical Paper 456, Washington: World 
Bank
Salman, S. M. A. (2001), ‘Legal Regime for Use and Protection of International 
Watercourses in the Southern African Region: Evolution and Context’, 41 Natural 
Resources Journal 981 -1022
Salman, S. M. A. (2001a), ‘Dams, International Rivers, and Riparian States: an 
Analysis of the Recommendations of the World Commission on Dams’, 16 American 
University International Law Review 1477-1505
Salman, S. M. A. (2001b), ‘Sharing Rivers for Peace, Development, and Security: 
Analysis of the Recommendations of the World Commission on Dams’, 26 Water 
International 283-288
Salman, S. M. A. (2003), ‘Good Offices and Mediation and International Water 
Disputes’ in The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.), 
Resolution o f International Water Disputes. PCA/Peace Palace Papers, vol. 5. The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 155-199
Salman, S. M. A. (2003a), ‘From Marrakech Through The Hague to Kyoto: Has the 
Global Debate on Water Reached a Dead End? Part One’, 28 Water International 
491-500
Salman, S. M. A. (2004), ‘From Marrakech Through The Hague to Kyoto: Has the 
Global Debate on Water Reached a Dead End? Part Two’, 29 Water International
11-19
Salman, S. M. A., and Boisson de Chazournes, L. (eds.)(1998), International 
Watercourses: Enhancing Cooperation and Managing Conflict -  Proceedings o f a 
World Bank Seminar. World Bank Technical Paper 414, Washington: World Bank
Salman, S. M. A., and Uprety, K. (1999), ‘Hydro-Politics in South Asia: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Mahakali and the Ganges Treaties’, 39 Natural Resources Journal 
295-343
Salman, S. M. A., and Uprety, K. (2002), Conflict and Cooperation on South Asia's 
International Rivers: A Legal Perspective. The Hague: Kluwer Law International; and 
Washington: World Bank
Salman, S. M. A., and Mclnerney-Lankford (2004), The Human Right to Water: Legal 
and Policy Dimensions. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank
Salman, S. M. A., and Bradlow, D. D. (2006), Regulatory Frameworks for Water 
Resources Management: A Comparative Study. Washington: World Bank
Salmon, J. J. (1991), Introduction to the Law of Friendly Relations between States’, in 
Bedjaoui, M. (ed.) International Law: Achievements and Prospects. Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 415-423
Sand, P. (ed.)(1992), The Effectiveness o f International Environmental Agreements: a 
Survey o f Existing Legal Instruments. Cambridge: Grotius
Sand, P. (1996), The Potential Impact of the Global Environment Facility of the World 
Bank, UNDP and UNEP’ in Wolfrum, R. (ed.) Enforcing Environmental Standards: 
Economic Mechanisms as Viable Means?. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 479-499
332
Sand, P. H. (1999), Transnational Environmental Law: Lessons on Global Change. The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International
Sands, P. (ed.)(1993), Greening International Law. London: Earthscan
Sands, P. (1994), Principles o f International Environmental Law I, Frameworks, 
Standards and Implementation. Manchester: Manchester University Press
Sands, P. (1994a), International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development’, 65 
BYIL 303-381
Sands, P. (1994b), The ‘Greening’ of International Law: Emerging Principles and 
Rules’, 1 Indiana Journal o f Global Legal Studies 293-323
Sands, P. (1995), ‘International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: 
Emerging Legal Principles’ in Lang, W. (ed.) Sustainable Development and 
International Law. Boston: Graham 85 Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 53-66
Sands, P. (1998), Treaty, Custom and the Cross-Fertilization of International Law’, 1 
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 85-105, also published as
Sands, P. (1999), ‘Sustainable Development: Treaty, Custom and the
Cross-Fertilization of International Law’ in Boyle, A. E., and Freestone, D. (eds.), 
International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future 
Challenges. New York: Oxford University Press, 39-60
Sands, P. (2003), Principles o f International Environmental Law. 2nd ed., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press
Sauser-Hall, G. (1953), ‘L'utilisation industrielle des fleuves internationaux’, 83 RdC 
471-586
Savenije, H. H. G., and van der Zaag, P. (2000), ‘Conceptual Framework for the 
Management of Shared River Basins; with Special Reference to the SADC and EU’, 
2 Water Policy 9-45
Schreuer, C. (2002), ‘State Sovereignty and the Duty of States to Cooperate -  Two 
Incompatible Notions? (Summary and Comments)’ in Delbruck, J. and Heinz, U. E. 
(eds.), ‘International Law of Cooperation and State Sovereignty: Proceedings of an 
International Symposium of the Kiel Walther-Schucking-Institute of International 
Law, May 23-26, 2001’, 139 Veroffentlichungen des Walther-Schucking-Instituts fur  
Internationales Recht an der Universitat Kiel. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 163-180
Schrijver, N. (1997), Sovereignty over Natural Resources -  Balancing Rights and Duties. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Also at
http: /  /  www. ub. rug. n l/ eldoc /  dis/jur / n .j. schrijver /
Schrijver, N. (1999), The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty’, 70 BYIL 65-98
Schwabach, A. (1998), The United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses, Customary International Law, and the Interests 
of Developing Upper Riparians’, 33 Texas International Law Journal 257-279
Schwarzenberger, G. (1957), International Law as Applied by International Courts and 
Tribunals. [Vol.Jl, [General Principles]. London: Stevens
Schwebel, S. M. (2003), The Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the 
Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)’ in The 
International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.), Resolution of 
International Water Disputes. PCA/Peace Palace Papers, vol. 5. The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 247-258
333
Shigeta, Y. (1998), ‘Some Reflections on the Relationship between the Principle of 
Equitable Utilization of International Watercourses and the Obligation Not to Cause 
Transfrontier Pollution Harm’ 9 Asian Yearbook of International Law, 9
Sinclair, I. (1986), The Impact of the Unratified Codification Convention’ in Bos, A. 
and Siblesz, H. (eds.), Realism in Law-Making: E ssays on International Law in 
Honour o f Willem Riphagen. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 211-229
Sinclair, I. (1994), The Significance of the Friendly Relations Declaration’, in Lowe, V. 
and Warbrick, C. (eds.) The United Nations and the Principles o f International Law: 
Essays in Memory o f Michael Akehurst. London: Routledge, 1-32
Sm ith, H. A. (1930), ‘Diversion of International Waters’, 11 BYIL 195-196
Sm ith, H. A. (1931), The Economic Uses of International Rivers. London: P.S. King & 
Son
Sohn, L. B. (1986), ‘Unratified Treaties as a Source of Customary International Law’ in 
Bos, A. and Siblesz, H. (eds.), Realism in Law-Making: E ssays on International Law 
in Honour o f Willem Riphagen. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 231-246
Sohnle, J. (1998), ‘Irruption du droit de l'environnement dans la jurisprudence de la 
C.I.J.: l'affaire Gabcikovo-Nagymaros’, 102 Revue General de Droit International 
Public 85-121
Sohnle, J. (2000), Le droit international des ressources en eau douce: solidarite contre 
souverainete. Ph.D. thesis, Universite Strasbourg III -  Robert Schuman, also 
published as
Sohnle, J . (2002), Le droit international des ressources en eau douce: solidarite contre 
souverainete. Paris: La documentation frangaise
Sohnle, J. (2005), ‘Nouvelles tendances en matiere de reglement pacifique des 
differends relatifs aux ressources en eau douce internationales’ in Boisson de 
Chazournes, L., and Salman, S. M. A. (eds.), Water Resources and International 
Law. Centre for Studies and Research in International Law and International 
Relations of The Hague Academy of International Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Ch. 10, 389-426
Stec, S., and Eckstein, G. E. (1997), ‘Of Solemn Oaths and Obligations: The 
Environmental Impact of the ICJ's Decision in the Case Concerning the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project’ in Symposium: The Case Concerning the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 8 Yearbook o f International Environmental Law 41-50
Stein, R. (2000), ‘South Africa’s New Democratic Water Legislation: National 
Government’s Role as Public Trustee in Dam Building and Management Activities’, 
18 Journal o f Energy & Natural Resources 284-295
Stein, R. (2001), ‘South Africa's Water and Dam Safety Legislation: A Commentary and 
Analysis on the Impact of the World Commission on Dams' Report, Dams and 
Development’, 16 American University International Law Review  1573-1590
Stoll, P.-T. (1996), The International Environmental Law of Cooperation’ in Wolfrum, 
R. (ed.) Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic Mechanisms as Viable 
Means?. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 39-93
Subedi, S. P. (2003), ‘Resolution of International Water Disputes: Challenges for the 
21st Century’ in The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(ed.), Resolution o f International Water Disputes. PCA/Peace Palace Papers, vol. 5. 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 33-47
334
Subedi, S. P. (ed.)(2005), International Watercourses Law for the 21st Century: The 
Case o f the River Ganges Basin. Aldershot: Ashgate
Tanzi, A. (1998), The UN Convention on International Watercourses as a Framework 
for the Avoidance and Settlement of Water Law D isputes’, 11 Leiden Journal o f 
International Law  441-472
Tanzi, A. (2000), The Relationship Between the 1992 UN/ECE Convention on the 
Protection and Use o f Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and the 
1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses o f International 
Watercourses. Report of the UN/ECE Task Force on Legal and Administrative 
Aspects, Geneva. At
http: / / www. unece. org / env / water / publications / documents / conventiontotal. pdf
Tanzi, A. (2001), ‘Recent Trends in International Water Law Dispute Settlement’ in The 
International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.) International
Investments and Protection o f the Environment: The Role o f Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms. PCA/Peace Palace Papers, vol. 2. The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 133-174
Tanzi, A., and Arcari, M. (2001), The United Nations Convention on the Law of 
International Watercourses. The Hague: Kluwer Law International
Tanzi, A., and Pitea, C. (2003), ‘Emerging Trends in the Role of Non-State Actors in 
International Water Disputes’ in The International Bureau of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (ed.), Resolution o f International Water Disputes. PCA/Peace Palace 
Papers, vol. 5. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 259-297
Teclaff, L. A. (1967), The River Basin in History and Law. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
Teclaff, L. A. (1985), Water Law in Historical Perspective. Buffalo, New York: W.S. Hein
Teclaff, L. A. (1996), ‘Evolution of the River Basin Concept in National and 
International Water Law’, 36 Natural Resources Journal 359-391
Tietje, C. (2002), The duty to cooperate in international economic law and related 
areas’ in Delbruck, J. and Heinz, U. E. (eds.), ‘International Law of Cooperation and 
State Sovereignty: Proceedings of an International Symposium of the Kiel
Walther-Schucking-Institute of International Law, May 23-26, 2001’, 139
Verdffentlichungen des Walther-Schucking-Instituts fu r  Internationales Recht an der 
Universitat Kiel. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 45-65
Tignino, M. (2003), Water in Times of Armed Conflict’ in The International Bureau of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.), Resolution o f International Water Disputes. 
PCA/Peace Palace Papers, vol. 5. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 319-349
Torres Cazorla, M. I. (2000), ‘Otra vuelta de tuerca del derecho internacional para 
regular los cursos de agua internacionales: el Convenio de Helsinki de 17 de Marzo 
de 1992’, 16 Anuario de Derecho Internacional 225-261
Townsend-Gault, I., and Storm ont, W. G. (1995), ‘Offshore Petroleum Joint 
Development Arrangements: Functional Instrument? Compromise? Obligation?’ in 
Blake, G., et al. (eds.) The Peaceful Management o f Transboundary Resources. 
London: Graham 8s Trotman, Ch. 4, 51-76
Trouwborst, A. (2002), Evolution and Status o f the Precautionary Principle in 
International Law. The Hague: Kluwer Law International
Trouwborst, A. (2006), Precautionary Rights and Duties o f States. Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff
335
UN (1963), Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions concerning the Utilisation o f 
International Rivers for other Purposes than Navigation. ST/LEG /SER.B/12. New 
York: United Nations
UN, D epartm ent o f Econom ic and Social Affairs (1975), Management o f International 
Water Resources: Institutional and Legal Aspects: Report o f the Panel o f Experts on 
the Legal and Institutional Aspects o f International Water Resources Development. 
Natural Re sources/W ater Series No.l., UN Doc ST /E SA /5. New York: United 
Nations
UN (1984), Treaties concerning the Utilization o f International Water Courses for other 
Purposes than Navigation, Africa. New York: United Nations
UN (1992), Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement o f Disputes between States. New York: 
United Nations
Upadhye, S. (2000), The International Watercourse: An Exploitable Resource for the 
Developing Nation Under International Law?’, 8 Cardozo Journal o f International 
and Comparative Law  61-101
Utton, A. E. (1973), ‘International Environmental Law and Consultation Mechanisms’, 
12 Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law  56-72
Utton, A. E. (1996), ‘Regional Cooperation: The Example of International Water 
Systems in the Twentieth Century’, 36 Natural Resources Journal 151-154
Utton, A. E., and Teclaff, L. (1978), Water in a Developing World: The Management o f 
a Critical Resource. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press
Utton, A. E., and Teclaff, L. (eds.)(1987), Transboundary Resources Law. Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press
Utton, A. E., and Utton, J. (1999), The International Law of Minimum Stream Flows’, 
10 Colorado Journal o f International Environmental Law and Policy 7-37
Vails, M. F. (1983), Water Legislation in South American Countries. Legislative Study 
19, Rome: FAO
Verzijl, J . W. (1970), International Law in Historical Perspective. Leyden: Sijhoff
Villeneuve, C. H. (1998), The Contribution of Regional River Treaties to the Protection 
of the North Sea’, 13 The International Journal o f Marine and Coastal Law  373-378
Vinogradov, S., Wouters, P., and Jones, P. (2003) Transforming Potential Conflict into 
Cooperation Potential: The Role o f International Law. Technical Documents in 
Hydrology: PC-CP Series No. 2, Paris: UNESCO/IHP, also available at
http: / /unesdoc.unesco.org/im ages/0013 / 001332 / 133258e.pdf
Virally, M. (1983), ‘Review Essay: Good Faith in Public International Law’, 77 AJIL 
130-134
Vitanyi, B. (1979), The International Reqime o f River Navigation. Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Sijhoff & Noordhoff
Warbrick, C. (1994), The Principle of Sovereign Equality’ in Lowe, V. and Warbrick, C. 
(eds.) The United Nations and the Principles o f International Law: Essays in Memory 
of Michael Akehurst. London: Routledge, 204-229
Weiss, E. B. (2000), ‘International Water Conflicts: Managing Competing Uses’, in 
Barea, C. A., et al. (eds.) Liber amicorum 'In memoriam' o f judge Jose Maria Ruda, 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 89-98
336
W escoat, J . L. (1995), ‘Main Currents In Early Multilateral Water Treaties: A 
Historical-Geographic Perspective, 1648-1948’, 7 Colorado Journal o f International 
Environmental Law and Policy 39-74
White, G. (1994), The Principle of Good Faith’ in Lowe, V., and Warbrick, C. (eds.), The 
United Nations and the Principles o f International Law: E ssays in Memory of Michael 
Akehurst. London: Routledge, 230-255
W hiteman, M. M. (1963), Digest o f International Law. Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office
William, H. (1992), Wisdom's Law of Watercourses. London: Shaw & Sons
W iniarski, B. (1933), ‘Principes generaux du droit fluvial international’, 45 RdC 79-217
Wisdom, A. S. (1979), The Law of Rivers and Watercourses. London: Shaw
Wolfrom, M. (1964), L 'Utilisation, a des fins autre que la navigation, des eaux des 
fleuves, lacs et canaux intemationaux. Paris: A. Pedone
Wolfrum, R. (1986), ‘International Law of Cooperation’, in 9 Encyclopedia o f Public 
International Law, International Relations and Legal Cooperation in General. 
Diplomacy and Consular Relations. Amsterdam: North Holland Pub., 193-8
Wolfrum, R. (1996), The Convention on Biological Diversity: Using State Jurisdiction 
as a Means of Ensuring Compliance’ in Wolfrum, R. (ed.), Enforcing Environmental 
Standards: Economic Mechanisms as Viable Means?. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 
373-393
Wolfrum, R. (ed.)( 1996a), Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic Mechanisms 
as Viable Means?. Berlin: Springer-Verlag
World C om m ission on Environment and D evelopm ent (WCED)(1987), Our Common 
Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Wouters, P. (1996), ‘An Assessment of Recent Developments in International 
Watercourses Law: Law Through the Prism of the Substantive Rules Governing Use 
Allocation’, 36 Natural Resources Journal 417-439
Wouters, P. (ed.)(1997), International Water Law, Selected Writings o f Professor Charles 
B. Bourne. The Hague: Kluwer Law International
Wouters, P. (1997a), ‘Present Status of International Water Law’ in Wouters, P. (ed.), 
International Water Law, Selected Writings o f Professor Charles B. Bourne. The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, editor’s foreword
Wouters, P. (2003), ‘Universal and Regional Approaches to Resolving International 
Water Disputes: What Lessons Learned from State Practice?’ in The International 
Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.), Resolution o f International Water 
Disputes. PCA/Peace Palace Papers, vol. 5. The Hague: Kluwer Law International,
111-154
Wouters, P. K., et al. (2005), Sharing Transboundary Waters, An Integrated 
Assessm ent o f Equitable Entitlement: The Legal Assessm ent Model. Technical 
Documents in Hydrology: PC-CP Series No. 74, Paris: UNESCO/IHP, also available 
at http:/ /unesdoc.unesco .org/im ages/0013/001397/ 139794e.pdf
Xue, Hanqin (2003), Transboundary Damage in International Law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press
337
Zacklin, R., and Caflisch, L. (eds.)(1981), The Legal Regime o f International Rivers and 
Lakes. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
Zemanek, K. (1991), ‘State Responsibility and Liability’ in Lang, W., Neuhold, H., and 
Zemanek, K. (eds.), Environmental Protection and International Law. Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nij hoff/Graham 8s Trotman, 187-201
Select Bibliography: Geography and 
O ther Subjects
Allan, J . A. (1996), The Political Economy of Water: Reasons for Optimism but Long 
Term Caution’ in Allan, J. A., and Court, J. H. (eds.), Water, Peace and the Middle 
East: Negotiating Resources in the Jordan Basin. London: Tauris, 75-117
Allan, J . A. (1996a), Water Use and Development in Arid Regions: Environment, 
Economic Development and Water Resource Politics and Policy’, 5 Review o f 
European Community and International Environmental Law  107-115
Allan, J. A. (2001), The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global 
Economy. London: I.B. Tauris
Allan, J. A., and Court, J. H. (eds.)(1996), Water, Peace and the Middle East: 
Negotiating Resources in the Jordan Basin. London: Tauris Academic Studies
Agencia Nacional de Aguas (ANA)[National Water A gency o f Brazil](2002), The
Evolution o f Water Resources Management in Brazil. Brasilia: ANA
Agencia Nacional de Aguas (ANA)[National Water A gency o f Brazil](2002b), The
Evolution and Organization o f River Basin Management in Brazil. At 
http://www.ana.gov.br/ingles/docs/24%20PG%20MADRID.pdf
Axelrod, R. (1986), ‘An Evolutionary Approach to Norms’, 80 The American Political 
Science Review 1095-1111
Axelrod, R. M. (1990), The Evolution o f Cooperation. London: Penguin Books
Axelrod, R., and Hamilton, W. D. (1981), The Evolution of Cooperation’, 211 Science 
No. 4489, 1390-1396
Axelrod, R., and Dion, D. (1988), The Further Evolution of Cooperation’ 242 Science 
No. 4884, 1385-1390
Beaumont, P. (1997), ‘Dividing the Waters of the River Jordan: An Analysis of the 
1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty’, 13 International Journal o f Water Resources 
Development 415-424
Biswas, A. K. (1982), The Shared Natural Resources: Future Conflicts or Peaceful 
Development?’ in Dupuy, R. J. (ed.) The Settlement o f Disputes on the New Natural 
Resources. Workshop 1982. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 197-215
Biswas, A. K. (ed.)(1978), Water Development and Management: Proceedings o f the 
United Nations Water Conference, Mar del Plata, Argentina, March 1977. Oxford: 
United Nations/Pergamon
Biswas, A. K. (ed.)(1978), United Nations Water Conference: Summary and Main 
Documents. Oxford: United Nations/Pergamon
Biswas, A. K. (2001), Water Policies in the Developing World’, 17 International Journal 
of Water Resources Development 489-499
Biswas, A. K. (editor-in-chief)(1997), Water Resources: Environmental Planning, 
Management, and Development. New York: McGraw-Hill
Biswas, A. K., and Geping, Q. (eds.)(1987), Environmental Impact Assessment for 
Developing Countries. London: Tycooly International/United Nations University
339
Biswas, A. K., and Agarwala, S. B. (eds.)(1994), Environmental Impact Assessment For 
Developing Countries. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann
Biswas, A. K., and H ashim oto, T. (eds.)(1996), Asian International Waters: From 
Ganges-Brahmaputra to Mekong. Bombay: Oxford University Press
Biswas, A. K., and Tortajada, C. (2001), ‘Development and Large Dams: A Global 
Perspective’, 17 International Journal o f Water Resources Development 9-21
Biswas, A. K., et al. (1983), Long-Distance Water Transfer: a Chinese Case Study and 
International Experiences. Dublin: Tycooly International/United Nations University
Biswas, A. K., et al. (eds.)(1997), National Water Master Plans for Developing 
Countries. Delhi: Oxford University Press
Biswas, A. K., Jelhali, and Stout, G. (eds.)(1993), Water for Sustainable Development 
in the 21st Century. Delhi: Oxford University Press
Biswas, A. K., et al. (ed.)(1999), Management o f Latin American River Basins: Amazon, 
Plata, and Sao Francisco. Tokyo: United Nations University Press
Blake, G., et al. (eds.)(1997), International Boundaries and Environmental Security: 
Frameworks for Regional Cooperation. The Hague: Kluwer Law International
Blake, G., et al. (eds.)(1999), Boundaries and Energy: Problems and Prospects. The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International
Boon, P. J ., Calow, P., and Petts, G. E. (eds.)(1992), River Conservation and 
Management. Chichester: Wiley
Briggs, D., et al. (1997), Fundamentals o f the Physical Environment. 2nd ed. London: 
Routledge
Brooks, D. B. (1997), ‘Between the Great Rivers: Water in the Heart of the Middle 
East’, 13 International Journal o f Water Resources Development 291-310
Campos, J. N., and Studart, T. M. (2000), ‘An Historical Perspective on the 
Administration of Water in Brazil’, 25 Water International 148-156
Carmo Vaz, A., and Pereira, A. L. (2000), The Incomati and Limpopo International 
River Basins: a View from Downstream’, 2 Water Policy 99-112
Carmo Vaz, A., and van der Zaag, P. (2003), Sharing the Incomati Waters: Cooperation 
and Competition in the Balance. Technical Documents in Hydrology: PC-CP Series 
No. 14, Paris: UNESCO/IHP, also available at
http: / / unesdoc.unesco.org/ images / 0013 / 001332 / 133297e.pdf
CBD Secretariat (2003), Report on the Status and Trends o f Biodiversity o f Inland 
Water Ecosystems. CBD Technical Series No. 11, also at
http: / / www. biodiv. org / doc / publications / cbd-ts-11. pdf
Chenje, M., and Johnson , P. (eds.)(1996), Water in Southern Africa. Maseru/Harare: 
SAD C /  IUCN /  SARD C
Chenoweth, J. L., Malano, H. M., and Bird, J. F. (2001), ‘Integrated River Basin 
Management in the Multi-jurisdictional River Basins: The Case of the Mekong River 
Basin’, 17 International Journal o f Water Resources Development 365-377
Chomchai, P. (1995), ‘Management of Transboundary Water Resources: a Case Study 
of the Mekong’ in Blake, G., et al. (eds.) The Peaceful Management o f Transboundary 
Resources. London: Graham & Trotman
340
Clarke, R. (1991), Water: The International Crisis. London: Earthscan Publications
Com issao Mista Tecnica Brasileiro-Paraguaia, Eletrobras-Ande (1975),
Relatorio-Resumo do Projeto Itaipu [Report-Summary of the Itaipu Project]
Cordeiro, N. V. (1999), ‘Environmental Management Issues in the Plata Basin’, in 
Biswas, A. K., et al. (ed.) Management o f Latin American River Basins: Amazon, 
Plata, and Sao Francisco. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 148-173
Cosgrove, W. J. (2003), Water Security and Peace: a Synthesis o f Studies Prepared 
Under the PCCP-Water for Peace Process. Technical Documents in Hydrology: PC-CP 
Series No. 29, Paris: UNESCO/IHP, also available at
http: / / unesdoc.unesco.org/images / 0013 / 001333 / 133318e.pdf
Cosgrove, W. J ., and Rijsberman, F. R. (2000), World Water Vision: Making Water 
Everybody's Business. London: Earthscan
Cummings, B. J. (1990), Dam the Rivers, Damn the People, Development and 
Resistance in Amazonian Brazil. London: Earthscan Publications
Cunha, L. Veiga, et al. (1980), A gestao da agua: Principos fundamentals e sua  
aplicagao em Portugal. [Water Management: Fundamental Principles and their 
Application in Portugal]. Lisboa: Fundagao Calouste Gulbenkian
Cunha, L. Veiga, e t al. (1977), Management and Law for Water Resourcs. Fort Collins: 
Water Resources Publications
Dorcey, T., et al. (eds.)(1997), Large Dams: Learning from  the Past, Looking at the 
future. Washington: IUCN The World Conservation Union, The World Bank
Dourojeanni, A. (2001), Water Management At The River Basin Level: Challenges In 
Latin America. UN/ECLAC Doc. LC/L. 1583-P/I Also at
http: / / www.eclac.org / publicaciones / RecursosNaturales / 3 / LCL1583PI / Lcl. 1583-P- 
I.pdf
Dourojeanni, A., Jouravlev, A., and Chavez, G. (2002), Gestidn Del Agua A Nivel De 
Cuencas: Teoria Y Practica [Management of Water at Basin Level: Theory and 
Practice] UN/ECLAC Doc. LC/L. 1777-P/E. Also at
http: / / www. eclac. org / drni / publicaciones / xml / 5 /11195 /lc ll777 -P -E . pdf
Dourojeanni, A., and Jouravlev, A. (2002), Evolucion De Poltticas Hidricas En America 
Latina Y El Caribe. [Evolution of Water Policies in Latin America and the Caribean] 
UN/ECLAC Doc. LC/L. 1826-P/E. Also at
http: / / www. eclac. org / publicacione s / Recur so sNaturale s / 6 / LCL 1826PE /lc!1826e.p  
df
Duda, A. M., and Roche, D. La (1997), ‘Sustainable Development of International 
Waters and their Basins: Implementing the GEF Operational Strategy’, 13 
International Journal o f Water Resources Development 383-402
Econom ic and Social C om m ission for Asia and the Pacific, United Nations (1997),
Guidelines on Water and Sustainable Development: Principles and Policy Options. 
New York: United Nations
Fahim, H. M. (1980), Dams, People, and Development: The Aswan High Dam Case. New 
York: Pergamon Press
Falkenmark, M. (2001), The Greatest Water Problem: The Inability to Link 
Environmental Security, Water Security and Food Security’, 17 International 
Journal o f Water Resources Development 539-554
341
Frederiksen, H. D. (1992), Water Resources Institutions: Some Principles and Practices. 
World Bank Technical Paper 191. Washington: World Bank
Frederiksen, H. D. (1998), International Community Response to Critical World Water 
Problems: a Perspective for Policy Makers’, 1 Water Policy 139-158
Fujikura, R., and Nakayama, M. (2003), ‘Perception Gaps on the WCD Guidelines 
among Groups with Different Interests’, 3 International Environmental Agreements: 
Politics, Law and Economics 43-57
Fujikura, R., and Nakayama, M. (2002), ‘Study on Feasibility of the WCD Guidelines 
as an Operational Instrument’, 18 International Journal o f Water Resources 
Development 301-314
Ganoulis, J ., et. al. (1996), Transboundary Water Resources Management: Institutional 
and Engineering Approaches. Berlin: Springer-Verlag
Gardiner, J. L. (ed.)(1991), River Projects and Conservation: a Manual for Holistic 
Appraisal. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons
Giordano, M. A. and Wolf, A. T. (2003), ‘Sharing Waters: Post-Rio International Water 
Management.’ 27 Natural Resources Forum 163-171. Also at 
http: / / www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/narf 051 Giordano.pdf
Gleick, P. H. (1993), Water in Crisis: A Guide to the World’s Fresh Water Resources. 
Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment and Security, and 
Stockholm Environment Institute, New York: Oxford University Press
Gleick, P. H. (1999), The World's Water 1998-1999, The Biennial Report on Freshwater 
Resources. Washington: Island Press
Gleick, P. H. (2000), The World's Water 2000-2001, The Biennial Report on Freshwater 
Resources. Washington: Island Press
Goldsmith, E., and Hildyard, N. (eds.)(1992), The Social and Environmental Effects of 
Large Dams. Camelford: Wadebridge Ecological Centre, 3 Vol.
Green Cross International (2000), Water For Peace in the Middle East and Southern 
Africa. Lausanne: Green Cross International
Grover, B. (1998), Twenty-Five Years of International Cooperation in Water-Related 
Development Assistance, 1972-1997’, 1 Water Policy 29-43
Hamner, J. H., and Wolf, A. T. (1997), ‘Patterns in International Water Resource 
Treaties: the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database’, 1997 Yearbook, 
Colorado Journal o f International Environmental Law and Policy 157-177
Hassan, F. A. (2002), Water Management and Early Civilizations: From Cooperation to 
Conflict’, in History and Future o f Shared Water Resources. Technical Documents in 
Hydrology: PC-CP Series No. 6, Paris: UNESCO/IHP, also available at
http: / /unesdoc.unesco.org/im ages/0013 /0 0 1 3 3 2 / 133286e.pdf
Hillel, D. (1994), Rivers o f Eden, The Struggle for Water and the Quest for Peace in the 
Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press
International C om m ission on Large Dams (ICOLD)(1998) and (2003), World Register 
of Dams. Paris: ICOLD
Inter-American D evelopm ent Bank (1998), Integrated Water Resources Management 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Technical study No. ENV-123, December 1998,
342
Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, also available at
http: / /www2.iadb.org/sds/doc/ENV123E.pdf,
Inter-American D evelopm ent Bank (1998), Strategy for Integrated Water Resources 
Management. Technical study No. ENV-125, December 1998, Washington, D.C.: 
Inter-American Development Bank, also available at
http://w w w .iadb.org/sds/doc/ 1289eng.pdf
Inner, H. and Vogt, K. (2001), The Rhine 2000 -  A Program for Europe’ in Rudolph, 
K.-U., and Block, T. (eds.), The German Water Sector: Policies and Experiences. [Der 
Wassersektor in Deutschland -  Methoden und Erfahrungen] Report prepared by the 
Institut fur Umwelttechnik und Management
an der Universitat Witten/Herdecke, Berlin: Federal Environmental Agency. Also 
at http: / / www.umweltbundesamt.de/ wasser/ veroeffentlich/ kostenlos.htm
IUCN/IWMI/Ramsar/WRI (eds.)(2003), Watersheds o f the World CD. Water Resources 
eAtlas. CD-ROM: IUCN-The World Conservation Union, the International Water 
Management Institute, the Ramsar Convention Bureau, and the World Resources 
Institute, also available at http: / / www.iucn.org/ themes / wani / eatlas / , 
http: / / multimedia.wri.org/watersheds 2003/index.htm l or at
http: / /pubs.wri.org/pubs pdf.cfm?PubID=3818
Jaspers, F. G. (2003), Institutional Arrangements for Integrated River Basin 
Management’, 5 Water Policy 77-90
Jobin, W. (1999), Dams and Disease: Ecological Design and Health Impacts o f Large 
Dams, Canals and Irrigation Systems. London: E & FN Spon (Routledge)
Jonch-Clausen, T., and Fugl, J . (2001), ‘Firming up the Conceptual Basis of 
Integrated Water Resources Management’, 17 International Journal of Water 
Resources Development 501-510
Jourlavlev, A. (2003), Latin America and the Caribbean Preparatory Process for the 
Twelfth Session o f the Commission on Sustainable Development Effective Water 
Governance in the Americas: a Key Issue. UN/ECLAC Doc. LC/IN.138. Also at 
http: / / www. eclac.org/publicaciones/ RecursosNaturales / 8 / LCIN1381 / IciO 138e. pdf
Just, R. E., and Netanyahu, S. (1998), ‘International Water Resource Conflicts: 
Experience and Potential’ in Just, R. E. and Netanyahu, S. (eds.) Conflict and 
Cooperation on Trans-boundary Water Resources. Boston: Kluwer Academic
Publishers
Just, R. E., and Netanyahu, S. (1998), Conflict and Cooperation on Trans-boundary 
Water Resources. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Kajander, T. (2001), Water Resources, Large Dams and Hydropower in Asia. Master of 
Science Thesis, Helsinki University of Technology, Laboratory of Water Resources. 
Global changes and water resources Online publications. At 
http: / / www.water. hut, fi / wr / research / glob / pubications / kai ander / toe. html
Kaufman, E. et al. (1997), Transboundary Fresh Water Disputes and Conflict 
Resolution: Planning an Integrated Approach’, 22 Water International 37-48
Kay, B. H. (ed.)(1999), Water Resources: Health, Environment and Development. 
London: E & FN SPON (Routledge)
Kirmani, S., and R angeley, R. (1994), International Inland Waters: Concepts for a 
More Active World Bank Role. World Bank Technical Paper 239. Washington: World 
Bank
Kliot, N. (1994), Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East. London: Routledge
343
Kliot, N., Shm ueli, D., and Shamir, U. (2001), Institutions for Management of 
Transboundary Water Resources: their Nature, Characteristics and Shortcomings’, 
3 Water Policy 229-255
Kukk, C. L., and D eese, D. A. (1996), ‘At the Water's Edge: Regional Conflict and 
Cooperation over Fresh Water’, 1 UCLA Journal o f International Law and Foreign 
Affairs 21-64
Le-Huu, T., and Nguyen-Duc, L. (2003), Mekong Case Study. Technical Documents in 
Hydrology: PC-CP Series No. 10, Paris: UNESCO/IHP, also available at
http: / /unesdoc.unesco.org/im ages/0013/001332/ 133290e.pdf or
http: / /webworld.unesco.org/water/wwap/pccp/cd/mekong.html
Le Moigne, G. (2000), ‘Model for Process of Formulating Water Resources Strategy’ in 
Biswas, A. K., et. al. (eds.) National Water Master Plans for Developing Countries. 
Delhi: Oxford University Press
Le Moigne, G., et. al. (eds.)(1992), Country Experiences with Water Resources 
Management: Economic, Institutional, Technological and Environmental issues. World 
Bank Technical Paper 175. Washington: World Bank
Le Moigne, G., et al. (eds.)(1994), A Guide to the Formulation o f Water Resources 
Strategy. World Bank Technical Paper 263. Washington: World Bank
Lee, T. R. (1995), The Management of Shared Water Resources in Latin America’, 35 
Natural Resources Journal 541-553
Instituto Portugues de Rela^des Internationais e Seguran$a (2003), O desafio da 
Agua no seculo XXI: entre o conflito e a cooperaqao [The Challenge of Water in the 
XXI Century: Between Conflict and Co-operation]. Lisbon: Editorial Noticias
McCully, P. (2001), Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics o f Large Dams. 2nd ed., 
London: Zed Books
Mekong River Com m ission (2001), MRC Hydropower Development Strategy. Phnom 
Penh, at http://www.mrcmekong.org/programmes/programme.htm
Merrett, S. (1997), Introduction to the Economics o f Water Resources, An International 
Perspective. London: UCL Press
Mohamed, A. E. (2003), ‘Joint Development and Cooperation in International Water 
Resources’ in Nakayama, M. (ed.) International Waters in Southern Africa. Tokyo: 
UNU Press, Ch. 9, 209-248
Monteiro, N. (1999), Itaipu, a luz [Itaipu, the Light]. Curitiba: Itaipu Binacional
Mostert, E. (2003), Conflict and Cooperation in the Management o f International 
Freshwater Resources: a Global Review. Technical Documents in Hydrology: PC-CP 
Series No. 19, Paris: UNESCO/IHP, also available at
http: / / unesdoc.unesco.org/images 70013 /0 0 1 3 3 3 / 133305e.pdf
Murakami, M., and M usiake, K. (1997), ‘Eco-political Decision-making and 
Confidence-building Measures in the Development of International Rivers’, 13 
International Journal o f Water Resources Development 403-414
Nakayama, M. (1997), ‘Successes and Failures of International Organizations in 
Dealing with International Waters’, 13 International Journal o f Water Resources 
Development 367-382
344
Nakayama, M. (2000), The World Bank's Environmental Agenda’ in Chasek, P. (ed.), 
The Global Environment in the Twenty-First Century: Prospects for International 
Cooperation. Tokyo: United Nations University Press
Nakayama, M. (ed.)(2003), International Waters in Southern Africa. Tokyo: UNU Press
Nakayama, M., and Glantz, M. H. (1998), link ing ENSO and the Mekong Hydrologic 
Regime’, 197 Water Resources Journal 93-99
Nakayama, M., and Fujikura, R. (2001), ‘Political Bias and Methodological Failure in 
Assessing Environmental Impacts of Development Projects: Comparative Analysis of 
the High Aswan Dam and Calaca Thermal Power Plant Development Projects’, 3 
Journal o f Comparative Policy Analysis 291-310
Nakayama, M., Fujikura, R., and Yoshida, T. (2002), ‘Japanese Experiences to 
Enhance the WCD Guidelines ‘, 16 Hydrological Processes 2091-2098
National Research Council (U. S.), and Com m ittee on Sustainable Water Supplies 
for the Middle Bast (1999), Water for the Future: The West Bank and Gaza Strip -  
Israel and Jordan. Washington: National Academy Press
Newson, M. (1994), Hydrology and the River Environment. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
Oxford University Press
Newson, M. (1997), Land, Water and Development: Sustainable Management o f River 
Basin Systems. 2nd ed., London: Routledge
Ohlsson, L. (ed.)(1995), Hydropolitics, Conflicts over Water as a Development 
Constraint. Dhaka: University Press Ltd/Zed Books
Ohlsson, L. (1995a), ‘Introduction: The Role of Water and the Origins of Conflict’ in 
Ohlsson, L. (ed.) Hydropolitics: Conflicts over Water as a Development Constraint, 
Dhaka: University Press Ltd/Zed Books, 1-28
Ojendal, J. (1995), ‘Mainland Southeast Asia: Co-operation or Conflict Over Water?’ in 
Ohlsson, L. (ed.) Hydropolitics: Conflicts over Water as a Development Constraint, 
Dhaka: University Press Ltd/Zed Books, 149-177
Ojendal, J. (2000), Sharing the Good: Modes o f Managing Water Resources in the Lower 
Mekong River Basin. Gothenburg: Padrigu Papers
Ojendal, J ., Mathur, V., and Sith irith , M. (2002), Environmental Governance in the 
Mekong: Hydropower Site Selection Processes in the Se San and Sre Pok Basins. 
SEI/REPSI Report Series No. 4, Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute
Olcay Unver, I.H. (2001), ‘Institutionalizing the Sustainable Development Approach: 
Co-ordination across Traditional Boundaries’, 17 International Journal o f Water 
Resources Development 511-520
O'Riordan, T. (ed.)(2000), Environmental Science for Environmental Management. 2nd 
ed., London: Prentice Hall
Osborne, M. E. (2000), The Mekong: Turbulent Past, Uncertain Future. St. Leonards, 
N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin
Pearce, F. (1992), The Dammed: Rivers, Dams and The Coming World Water Crisis. 
London: Bodley Head
Pigram, J . J . (2001), ‘Opportunities and Constraints in the Transfer of Water 
Technology and Experience between Countries and Regions’, 17 International 
Journal o f Water Resources Development 563-579
345
Pinheiro, I. G onsalves, Gabaake, G., and H eyins, P. (2002), ‘Co-operation in the 
Okavango River Basin: the OKAKOM perspective’, paper presented at Okavango 
Pilot Project Workshop, 9 and 11 September 2002, in Turton, A., Ashton, P., and 
Cloete, E. (eds.)(2003), Transboundary Rivers, Sovereignty and Development: 
Hydropolitical Drivers in the Okavango River Basin. Pretoria & Geneva: Africa Water 
Issues Research Unit & Green Cross International, 105-118, also at 
http: / / www.okavangochallenge.com/okaweb/wp6/hydropolitical
Pochat, V. (1998), Water Resources Management of the Plata Basin’, in Biswas, A. K., 
et al. (ed.) Management o f Latin American River Basins: Amazon, Plata, and Sao 
Francisco. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 123-147
Postel, S., and Wolf, A. (2001), ‘Dehydrating Conflict’, Foreign Policy. 
September/October 2001, 60-67
Poulsen, U. (2001), River Basin Management -  The Incomati as a Case Study. Master of 
Science Thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
Revenga, C., et al. (eds.)(2000), Pilot Analysis o f Global Ecosystems: Freshwater 
Ecosystems. Research Report. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, also 
available at http://water.wri.org/pubs pdf.cfm?PubID=3056
Rosegrant, M. W. (1996), Water Resources in the 21st Century: Increasing Scarcity, 
Declining Quality, and Implications for Action. United Nations University/Institute of 
Advanced Studies Working Paper No. 3
Sadoff, C. W., and Grey, D. (2002), ‘Beyond the River: the Benefits of Cooperation on 
International Rivers’, 4 Water Policy 389-403
Saleth, R. M., and Dinar, A. (2000), Institutional Changes in the Global Water Sector: 
Trends, Patterns, and Implications’, 2 Water Policy 175-199
Scheum ann, W. (1998), ‘Conflicts on the Euphrates: an Analysis of Water and 
Non-Water Issues’ in Scheumann, W. and Schiffler, M. (eds.), Water in the Middle 
East: Potential for Conflicts and Prospects for Cooperation. Berlin: Springer Verlag, 
113-135
Scheum ann, W., and Schiffler, M. (eds.)(1998), Water in the Middle East: Potential for 
Conflicts and Prospects for Cooperation. Berlin: Springer Verlag
Schnitter, N. J. (1994), A History o f Dams: The Useful Pyramids. Rotterdam: A.A. 
Balkema
Shady, M., Abdel, H., and Biswas, A. K. (eds.)(2000), Management and Development 
of Major Rivers. Delhi: Oxford University Press
Solom on, H., and Turton, A. (eds.)(2000), Water Wars: Enduring Myth or Impending 
Reality. Africa Dialogue Monograph Series No. 2, KwaZulu-Natal: ACCORD
Takahashi, K. (2001), ‘Globalization and Management of Water Resources: 
Development Opportunities and Constraints of Diversified Developing Countries’, 
17 International Journal o f Water Resources Development 481 -487
Takahasi, Y. (2001), Towards a Solution to the North-South Problem’, 17 International 
Journal o f Water Resources Development 555-561
Tarlock, D. (2001), Globalization and Water Resources Management: The Changing 
Value o f Water. AWRA/IWLRI-University of Dundee International Specialty 
Conference, August 2001. At
www.awra.org/proceedings/dundee01/Documents/tarlock.pdf
346
Thomas, D. S., and Goudie, A. (eds.)(2000), The Dictionary o f Physical Geography. 3rd 
ed., Oxford: Blackwell Publishers
Thukral, E. G. (ed.)(1992), Big Dams, Displaced People: Rivers o f Sorrow Rivers of 
Change. New Delhi: Sage Publications
Tucci, Carlos E. M.; Hespanhol, Ivanildo; Netto, Oscar de M. Cordeiro (2002),
Gestao da agua no Brasil. 192 pp.
http: / / www.unesco.org.br/download/Livro%20Gest%E3o%20da%20%C1gua.pdf 
(last visited on 24 March 2004)
Turton, A. R. (2005), Water as a Source o f Conflict or Cooperation: The Case o f South 
Africa and its Transboundary Rivers. Report, African Water Issues Research Unit 
(AWIRU), University of Pretoria Water Institute. At
http: / / www.awiru.co.za/OccasionalP.asp
Turton, A. R., and Quinn, N. (2001), The Shared River Initiative on the Incomati. 
‘Partnership for Sustainability II’ Conference, 21-22 September, Cape Town. At 
http: / / www.awiru.co.za/p d f/trutonanthony3.pdf (last visited on 31 October 2007)
Turton, A. R., and Henwood, R. (eds.)(2002), Hydropolitics in the Developing World: A 
Southern African Perspective. Pretoria: African Water Issues Research Unit (AWIRU). 
Also at http://w ww .up.ac.za/academ ic/libarts/polsci/aw iru/
UN, Centre for Natural Resources, Energy and Transport (1978), Register of 
International Rivers. New York: Pergamon Press
UN, Departm ent o f Technical Cooperation for D evelopm ent (1983), Experiences in 
the Development and Management o f International River and Lake Basins: 
Proceedings o f the United Nations Interregional Meeting o f International River 
Organizations, Dakar, Senegal, 5-14 May 1981. Natural Resources/Water Series No. 
10, UN Doc. ST /E SA /120. New York: United Nations
UN, Department o f Technical Co-operation for D evelopm ent (1986), Ground Water 
in Continental Asia (Central, Eastern, Southern, South-Eastern Asia). Natural 
Resources/Water Series No. 15. New York: United Nations
UN, Department o f Technical Co-operation for D evelopm ent (1989), Ground Water 
In Eastern, Central And Southern Africa. Natural Resources/W ater Series No. 19. 
New York: United Nations
UN/World Water A ssessm ent Programme (WWAP)(2003), The UN World Water 
Development Report: Water For People -  Water For Life. Paris: UNESCO Publishing/ 
Berghahn Books, and Executive Summary at
http: / /unesdoc.unesco.org/im ages 70012 /001295 / 129556e.pdf
UN/World Water A ssessm ent Programme (WWAP)(2006), The UN World Water 
Development Report: Water a Shared Responsibility. Paris: UNESCO Publishing/ 
Berghahn Books, also available online at
http: / / unesdoc. unesco. org / images / 0014 / 001454 / 145405e. pdf
UNECE, e t al. (2003), Transboundary Water Cooperation in the Newly Independent 
States’, UNECE, UNEP/Regional Office for Europe, the Ministry for Natural 
Resources of the Russian Federation, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency 
and the Agency for Environmental Assessm ent "Ecoterra" at 
http://www.unece.org/env/w ater/docum ents/transbwatcoopnis fin e.pdf. last 
visited on 15.1.2007
UNESCO/WMO (1992), International Glossary o f Hydrology. 2nd ed. UNESCO and 
WMO. Experimental web version of the glossary database at
347
http:/ /w ebw orld.unesco.org/w ater/ihp/db/glossarv/glu/aglu.htm , last visited on 
28.7.2007
van Hofwegen, P. (2000), ‘Framework for Assessment of Institutional Frameworks for 
Integrated Water Resources Management’, in Intersectoral Management o f River 
Basins, Proceedings of an International Workshop Integrated Water Management in 
Water-Stresses River Basins in Developing Countries: Strategies for Poverty 
Alleviation and Agricultural Growth’, Loskop Dam, South Africa, 16-21 October 
2000. Section C, 137-58, at
www. iwmi. cgiar. org / pubs / Proceedings / Loskop / sectionC. pdf.
van Hofwegen, P. J. M., and Jaspers, F. G. W. (2006), Analytical framework for 
integrated water resources management. Guidelines for assessm ent o f institutional 
frameworks. Delft: IHE Monograph 2.
Vieira, R. S. (1991), ‘Problemas Ambientais na Construgao de Barragens’ 
[Environmental Problems in Dam Construction], Conferencia Internacional de 
Direito Ambiental, Anais, Rio de Janeiro, 28 a 31 de Outubro de 1991. [Proceedings 
of an International Conference on Environmental Law], 357-376
Villiers, M. de (1999), Water Wars: is the World's Water Running Out? London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson
Vyas, J. N. (2001), ‘Large Dams and Sustainable Development: A Case-study of the 
Sardar Sarovar Project, India’, 17 International Journal o f Water Resources 
Development 601-609
Water R esources Institu te, UNEP, UNDP, and World Bank (1998), 1998-99 World 
Resources: a Guide to the Global Environment. New York: Oxford University Press
Waterbury, J . (1997), ‘Between Unilateralism and Comprehensive Accords: Modest 
Steps toward Cooperation in International River Basins’, 13 International Journal o f 
Water Resources Development 279-290
Widstrand, C. (ed.)(1980), Water and Society: Conflicts in Development. Part 2: Water 
Conflicts and Research Priorities. Oxford: Pergamon Press
Wolf, A. T. (1993), Water For Peace in the Jordan River Watershed’, 33 Natural 
Resources Journal 797-839
Wolf, A. T. (1997), ‘International Water Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Comparative 
Analysis’, 13 International Journal o f Water Resources Development 333-366
Wolf, A. T. (1998), ‘Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways’, 1 Water 
Policy 251-265
Wolf, A. T. (2002), ‘Conflict and Cooperation: Survey of the Past and Reflection for the 
Future’ in History and Future o f Shared Water Resources. Technical Documents in 
Hydrology: PC-CP Series No. 6, Paris: UNESCO/IHP, also available at
h ttp://unesdoc.unesco.org/im ages/0013/001332/133286e.pdf. An earlier version 
was presented as:
Wolf, A. T. (2002a), The Importance o f Regional Co-operation on Water Management for 
Confidence-Building: Lessons Learned. Keynote address, Third Preparatory Seminar 
for the 10th OSCE Forum, Baku, Azerbaijan, 15-16 April 2002; and Tenth OSCE 
Economic Forum, Prague, Czech Republic, 28-30 May 2002. At 
http: / / www. osce. org / events / ef /2002 / documents / files / background-paper-wolf. pdf
Wolf, A. T., e t al. (1999), ‘International River Basins of the World’, 15 International 
Journal o f Water Resources Development no.4, 387-427
348
Wolf, A. T., and Hamner, J. H. (2000), Trends in Transboundary Water Disputes and 
Dispute Resolution’, in Green Cross International, Water For Peace in the Middle 
East and Southern Africa. Lausanne: Green Cross International, 55-66
Wolf, A. T., UNEP, and FAO (2002), Atlas o f International Freshwater Agreements. 
Nairobi: UNEP. Also at
http: / / www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/atlas/
Wolf, A. T., Stahl, K., and Macomber, M. F. (2003), ‘Conflict and Cooperation Within 
International River Basins: the Importance of Institutional Capacity.’ in Water 
Resources Update, Vol. 125, Universities Council on Water Resouces. Also at 
http: / / www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/Wolf 2Q03.pdf
Wolf, A. T., Yoffe, S. B., and Giordano, M. (2003a), International Waters: Identifying 
Basins at Risk’, 5 Water Policy 29-60
World C om m ission on Dams (2000), Dams and Development: a New Framework for 
Decision-Making. The Report o f the World Commission on Dams. London: Earthscan. 
Also at http: / / www.dams.org/report/
^ONDO* 
\0nntJ
U N I V E R S I T Y  OF  L O N D O N
SENATE HOUSE. MALET STREET, LONDON, WCIE 7HU
REPRODUCTION OF THESES
A thesis which is accepted by the University for the award of a  Research Degree is placed in the Library of the College 
and in the University of London Library. The copyright of the thesis is retained by the author.
As you are about to submit a  thesis for a  Research Degree, you are required to sign the declaration below. This 
declaration is separate from any which may be m ade under arrangem ents with the College at which you have pursued 
your course (for internal candidates only). The declaration will De destroyed if your tnesis is not approved by the 
examiners, being either rejected or referred for revision.
Academic Registrar
To be completed by the candidate
NAME IN FULL (please type surnam e in BLOCK CAPITALS)
p* faUjuJIa d i  SOiHA \ o  tA MJCa A ^O
THESIS TITLE C O - O \ a )  V U C
d e g r e e  f o r  w h ic h  t h e s i s  is p r e s e n t e d  Please select either...
DATE OF AWARD OF DEGREE (To be  completed bv the University):_______
DECLARATION
1. I authorise that the thesis presented by me in *[ ] for examination for the WBPW/PhD Degree of the
University of London shall, if a  degree is awarded, be deposited in the library of the appropriate College and in 
the University of London Library and that, subject to the conditions set out below, my tnesis be m ade available 
for public reference, inter-library loan and copying.
2. I authorise the College or University authorities as  appropriate to supply a  copy of the abstract of my thesis for 
inclusion in any published list of theses offered for nigher degrees in British universities or in any supplement 
thereto, or for consultation in any central file of abstracts of such theses.
3. I authorise the College and the University of London Libraries, or their designated agents, to make a  microform 
or digital copy of my Thesis for the purposes of inter-library loan and the supply of copies.
4. I understand that before my thesis is m ade available for public reference, inter-library loan and copying, the 
following statem ent will have been included at the beginning of my thesis: The copyright of this thesis rests with 
the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the prior written 
consent of the author.
5. I authorise the College and/or the University of London to make a microform or digital copy of my thesis in due 
course as  the archival copy for permanent retention in substitution for the original copy.
6. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.
7. I understand that in the event of my thesis being not approved by the examiners, this declaration would becom e 
void.
’"Please state year bv hand, using a pen.
h ^
B » £ S UaHiATHRE-  g  ^ ^  ' ________________
Note: The University’s Ordinances make provision for restriction of access to an MPhil/PhD thesis and/or the abstract
but only in certain specified circumstances and for a  maxiumum period of two years. If you wish to apply for 
such restriction, please enquire at your College about the conditions and procedures. External Students should 
enquire at the Research Degree Examinations Office, Room 261, Senate House.
